Invasive Threats to the American Homeland
"Defending our nation against its enemies
is the first and fundamental commitment of the federal government.
Today, that task has changed dramatically. Enemies in the past needed
great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America.
Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering
to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank."
- President George W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United
States, September 2002
Before 11 September 2001, when American leaders
prepared for war they envisioned enemies using bombs, tanks, guns,
military force, and other traditional armaments. The attacks on
that fateful day forever changed the way the United States and the
world would view the nature of war. Using four hijacked commercial
jetliners, terrorists attacked the United States, killing some 3,000
men and women. This surprise attack was not a symmetric attack,
but an asymmetric one. Furthermore, a non-state entity conducted
this attack at a relatively low cost of under $500,000.1
However, that may have been just the beginning. The success of the
attack, and the devastation inflicted on the nation at a relatively
low cost, will doubtless inspire our adversaries to continue to
employ asymmetric methods to threaten and weaken the United States.
Among those methods may be the introduction of an invasive species,
a disease pathogen, or some other biological threat.
Introducing Invasive Species
Presidential Executive Order 13112 defines
invasive species as "a species that is (1) non-native (or alien)
to the ecosystem under consideration and (2) whose introduction
causes or is likely to cause economic or environmental harm or harm
to human health."2 An invasive
species can be a microbe, plant, animal, or other organism. These
invaders may be moved from their natural habitat and introduced
to a new environment either purposefully or by accident. The simple
act of moving a nonindigenous species to a new habitat does not
make it invasive. For centuries people have moved species around
the world for agricultural and other purposes. Examples of noninvasive
species are numerous-from livestock to grain crops to ornamental
plants. Most of these species are nonthreatening and benign, but
some species can be threatening because of their adverse impact
on their new environment. Their introduction may threaten the natural
balance in the ecosystem because of their competitive nature, may
threaten human and agricultural plant and animal health, and may
cause economic damage through the cost of controlling or managing
the species. These threatening species are "invasive species."
Historically, the introduction of an invasive species has not been
intentional, nor has it been the purposeful act of an adversary
to weaken or attack the United States. Typically, invasive species
have been accidentally introduced when they were imported for ornamental
purposes, escaped from captivity, or were carelessly released into
the environment. Often invasive species arrived by means of ocean
vessels' ballasts, or in pallets, produce, or plant nursery stock.
Additionally, animals and other agricultural products have transported
them to the United States.3
The new species may flourish and rapidly expand, as they typically
have few or no natural enemies in their new environment. Parasites,
pathogens, or predators that would inhibit or limit their spread
may be few or nonexistent. In addition, the new environment often
provides a better medium for growth and reproduction than the species'
original surroundings.4 With these advantages,
native species may find it difficult to compete and survive against
a new, more energetic and prolific neighbor.
A 1999 study by Cornell University estimated that approximately
50,000 foreign species have invaded the United States since the
1700s, and the number in the last 30 years has increased at an alarming
rate.5 Ten to 15 percent of these foreign
species are considered threatening or invasive. Their effects range
from being a nuisance to causing economic damage, health problems,
and endangerment of native species; 42 percent of "endangered"
or "threatened" species are at risk because of invasive
species.6 One hundred million acres
of the United States are covered by invasive plants, and the rate
of spread is 14 percent per year-an area twice the size of Delaware.7
Since 1985, the US Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has intercepted 7,400 species
of plant pests at our country's borders.8
The US Department of Transportation estimates that every day 4,600
acres of land are colonized by invasive species in the United States.9
Every 60 seconds, oceangoing vessels release 40,000 gallons of foreign
ballast water in American waters, often releasing invasive species.10
Historical Examples
History offers many examples of invasive species
damaging their new parent environment. Four revealing examples include
the invasion of multiple species in San Francisco Bay, the glassy-winged
sharpshooter, "foot-and-mouth" disease (aphthovirus),
and the brown tree snake.
The San Francisco Bay plays an important role in American commerce.
Many ocean-going vessels bring in foreign goods through the Bay's
ports to trade with the United States. In addition to bringing in
foreign goods, these transports also inadvertently bring in foreign
invasive species; the Bay is invaded by a new species an average
of once every 12 weeks.11 From 1940
to 1969 the Bay saw a doubling of the number of entering invasive
species. From 1970 to 1995 the rate jumped to almost a fivefold
increase.12 The San Francisco Bay is
now home to over 240 nonindigenous species.13
In some areas of the Bay it is difficult to find a native organism.14
In October 1986, three small clams were collected from the Bay by
a college biology class and later identified as a foreign species
from Asia, the Asian species Potamocorbula amurinsis. In 1996, this
species reached densities of 50,000 clams per square meter, a density
that filters the entire water in the Bay at least once and up to
two times a day. These prolific clams virtually eliminated phytoplankton,
the base of the food chain in the Bay. Although the final effects
have yet to be determined, this disruption in the food chain can
only be detrimental.15
The second example is the glassy-winged sharpshooter, an invasive
insect that hosts the bacterium Xylella Fastidiosa. The insect was
first detected in California in 1990. Although it is uncertain how
it arrived in California, it is believed to have arrived on imported
plants. The bacterium Xylella Fastidiosa causes Pierce's Disease
in grapes, which infects and kills the grapevine. The glassy-winged
sharpshooter transmits and spreads the disease when it feeds on
the plant. Severe outbreaks of the disease necessitated destruction
of diseased plants and a major replanting of grapevines, resulting
in a reduction in grape production.16
Tourism and grape-related industries are collectively worth $35
billion in California. The bacteria-carrying insect has cost a $40
million overall loss in California's grape, wine, and raisin industry
and an undisclosed amount in the tourism industry.17
A third example is foot-and-mouth disease (aphthovirus), a highly
infectious disease that infects cloven-hoofed animals. The disease
struck Britain in 2001 with a vengeance, killing over a thousand
livestock,18 with millions more voluntarily
killed or destroyed to prevent the spread of the disease.19
Furthermore, to prevent the disease from spreading from Great Britain,
the European Union placed an embargo on British meat. In turn, the
United States placed a temporary ban on meat imports from the entire
European Union and Chile. To control the spread of the disease in
Britain, limits were placed on movement of people and equipment
throughout the area. Overall, foot-and-mouth disease cost British
companies the equivalent of $30 billion, with a $300,000 average
loss to large businesses and a $75,000 average loss to small businesses.20
A fourth and powerful example of the effect of invasive species
is the accidental introduction of the brown tree snake into Guam.
The brown tree snake was probably brought into Guam during World
War II by military ships arriving from the South Pacific. Its introduction
eventually resulted in 1,200 incidents of power outages and the
extinction of several native species, including 10 of the 13 native
bird species, two of the three native bat species, and six of the
12 native lizard species.21 The snake
is indeed a public nuisance; it has spread across the island at
a rapid rate and achieved densities of 12,000 snakes per square
mile.22 The snakes are very aggressive
and have been reported to attack small children while they sleep.
One in every thousand visits to the emergency room is the result
of snakebite from the slightly venomous snake. As a result, Guam,
which was once a popular tourist site, has lost most of its tourism
business. Before the brown tree snake's invasion, tourism ranked
third as a revenue source, surpassed only by federal government
and military expenditures. Transportation and shipping have slowed
to ensure no further spread of the snake. Healthcare costs on the
island have risen due to snakebites. The snake has gravely affected
agriculture, where production and revenues have steadily declined
since the snake was introduced in 1945. The snake's predation pressure
on both live animals and eggs makes it almost impossible to raise
poultry. Insect species that were formerly controlled by species
eliminated by the brown tree snake are now damaging fruits and vegetables.
Increased insect populations demand more pesticides, which increases
the cost of agricultural production. Direct damages in losses of
overall productivity in the country are estimated at between $1
million and $4 million per year, with estimated research and control
costs of the brown tree snake at an additional $4 million.23
In all, the introduction of the brown tree snake has had a more
negative ecological impact on the island of Guam than all of the
heavy fighting and naval bombardment that leveled the island's forests
in World War II. The island's ecology recovered from World War II
with time, but time offers no chance for recovery of the extinct
species lost to the brown tree snake.24
Prospects for an Attack
Terrorist adversaries will not overlook the
overwhelming impact that invasive species could have on the United
States. An adversary could use invasive species as an asymmetric
method of attack to weaken the country by inflicting tremendous
economic and psychological damage. Such an attack could ultimately
weaken the will of the people and affect national policy by straining
the economy, tainting America's food supply, or endangering the
health of the populace. In addition, adversaries could strike a
strong blow while avoiding any symmetric retaliation.
Adversaries may seek to weaken the United States as a way to achieve
a more equitable political, economic, and military balance of power.
Today, the United States is the world's only true superpower, so
dominating that it is sometimes referred to as a "hyper-power."25
To attack the United States directly in a symmetric manner would
defy logic and result in the rapid destruction of a weaker adversary.
Additionally, the United States is increasing its dominance through
constant incorporation of state-of-the-art technology and advanced
information systems. Few adversaries will be able and willing to
commit the resources necessary to build a force that is a symmetric
peer competitor of the United States. An asymmetric attack, however,
could delay the United States' transformation of military forces
and continued buildup of military and national power. This could
allow an adversary the opportunity for a buildup of its own, to
permit a direct, symmetric confrontation at a later time when the
correlation of forces and the balance of military strength might
be more favorable. A successful asymmetric attack also would provide
a more favorable position for an adversary to use in negotiating
for desired goals.
Terrorists have other reasons for using invasive species. Traditionally,
terrorists have used violence and fear as a means of political coercion
to "undermine the legitimacy of the targeted government and
garner support among a disaffected populace." Other nonpolitical
objectives include using "indiscriminate violence to create
a general environment of fear and chaos prior to a general overthrow
of Western political order or . . . even simply [to] seek anarchy
as a goal." An example of this is the subway sarin attack in
Tokyo by the Aum Shinrikyo group, which took no credit for the attack.26
Yet another reason for terrorists' use of an invasive species is
the new "war paradigm."27
Paradigmatic theorists assert that since terrorist groups typically
lack the ability to confront their adversary directly, they will
take a more indirect, less confrontational approach to conducting
terrorist acts. This long-term approach does not advance specific
demands but intends to inflict damage to wear down an adversary
over time. Consider the strategy of Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda
organization. The bombings in the 1990s of the World Trade Center,
of the embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Saalam, and of US military
forces at the Khobar Towers exemplify this protracted war paradigm.28
They are not isolated events. Rather, they are a loosely coordinated
series of attacks designed to confuse, disrupt, and demoralize the
US government and its citizens over time.
Invasive species could be used to support all three of these terrorist
motives. The introduction of fast-spreading invasive species and
pathogens such as smallpox and other microbes that threaten human
health or food safety would directly support the terrorist tactics
of causing violence and instilling fear to undermine the legitimacy
of government or to support anarchical objectives. However, the
use of most other invasive species would support the latter, "protracted
war" paradigm. Most of these are slower in their effects and
would require some time to cause damage. Such a slower, covert attack
might go undetected for years until the species are well implanted
and impossible to counter. The long-term economic, health, and psychological
effects of using invasive species could strike a tremendous blow
at the United States by exhausting resources and national will over
time.
Potential Effects
One of the primary effects of a terrorist introduction
of an invasive species would be economic damage. The 1999 Cornell
University study estimated the cost of invasive species to be $138
billion annually in their effects and control measures in the United
States.29 This equates to more than
one-third of the funding allocated to the total military budget
in the 2003 National Defense Authorization Act. According to the
Congressional Budget Office, discretionary spending for defense
as a percentage of the total GDP has been decreasing from 1962 to
2001. Domestic needs compete heavily for tax dollars. Given the
drastic increases forecast in spending for Social Security, Medicare,
and Medicaid in the years ahead, expenditures for national defense
will undoubtedly be constrained.
If an adversary chooses the right invasive species, the additional
cost to counter its effects could be dramatic. Coupled with a strained
economy and a tight budget, it could become difficult to sustain
the funds to fully man and equip US military forces at current levels.
It might become extremely difficult to fund costly transformation
forces. Therefore, the second- or third-order effects of an invasive
species attack could mean less money for discretionary spending
and ultimately a weakened military.
Second, military resources could also be diverted to meet an emerging
crisis. Military forces could be needed to cordon off infested areas
or to assist in caring for the sick from an invasive bacteria or
virus. Consider an outbreak of Ebola or smallpox. National Guard
forces would be diverted for homeland security missions and thus
not be available for contingencies elsewhere or to support major
regional wars. Military forces also would suffer direct casualties
from such an attack, as the same invasive microbes or pathogens
that attack the civilian population would attack military personnel.
Whole Army divisions and specialized units could be rendered physically
ineffective from an invasive disease. The ensuing psychological
impact would be immense.
Third, invasive species could diminish the industrial capability
and productivity of the United States to support a war. Resources
used to mobilize the nation's industrial base conceivably would
be diverted to control the effects of the invasive species. Personnel
needed to support industry and augment military forces could be
incapacitated or be unwilling to work in areas where they would
be exposed to infectious bacteria. Invasive species might directly
attack timber or other natural resources used as raw material for
industry, thereby forcing the United States to rely on imports or
other expensive alternatives for raw materials.
Fourth, illness could be spread rampantly by an invasive disease.
A biological attack could begin with one infected person or the
release of toxins in a highly populated area, such as a subway or
a sports stadium. Victims probably would not initially know they
were infected. The first victims might report to their doctors with
common flu-like complaints, and their symptoms could easily be misdiagnosed.
Even after suspicion of a deliberate attack, it would take time
for the Centers for Disease Control to identify the agent. Meanwhile,
the contagious disease would spread, leading to widespread illness
and public panic. Critical community services, where available,
would be strained. Officials might consider quarantining affected
communities. But quarantines are very difficult if not impossible
to enforce on a large scale. In the end the disease could spread
in epidemic proportions.30 Health care
costs for an invasive contagious disease in this scenario would
be phenomenal. The health care system would be greatly stressed
in terms of its capacity to handle patients and the money, facilities,
and professionals available to support the population's health care
needs. The cost of providing such massive care would eventually
be placed on the consumer, further straining the economy.
Fifth, the agricultural sector and a reliable food supply could
be deeply affected. A recent US government report asserted that
the "US agricultural sector is especially vulnerable to agro
terrorism . . . and a successful attack could result in local or
regional economic destabilization," ultimately affecting international
commerce.31 Citizens have come to expect
a safe and cheap food supply. Although American agriculture is diverse
and spread over many states, large portions of it are concentrated
in local areas. The top five agricultural states account for 34
percent of the nation's total agricultural production. Some crops
are far more concentrated in specific regions than others. For example,
California produces 100 percent of the nation's almonds, 92 percent
of its grapes, 78 percent of its lettuce, 75 percent of its strawberries,
47 percent of its tomatoes, and 34 percent of its oranges. Such
concentrations can be further localized. Forty-one percent of California's
strawberry production is concentrated in two contiguous counties.
Seventy percent of its cattle production is concentrated in a 200-mile
radius. Such concentration makes our agricultural assets especially
vulnerable to a terrorist attack using an invasive species.32
The cost to agriculture from the introduction of one or several
invasive species is difficult to predict, but it could be extraordinary.
The attack would not only affect the producer, but the entire producer-consumer
chain, from the grower and those employed in agriculture-related
fields, through packagers and distributors, and ultimately the consumer.
In 1999, farming and its related industries accounted for 16 percent
of the US gross national product. In the same year agriculture employed
17 percent of the US work force, some 24 million people.33
In 1997, US farmers sold $208 billion in agricultural products.34
The amount of economic damage from an invasive species attack would
vary considerably depending on the extent of infestation, the crops
or livestock affected, the response, and the ability to counter,
contain, or destroy the species. Effects also would be dependent
on the availability of substitute products and the elasticity of
supply, and on the ability to ramp up production elsewhere.35
Last but certainly not least, as Joint Vision 2020 notes, there
would be psychological or political costs to the introduction of
an invasive species: "The psychological impact of an attack
might far outweigh the actual physical damage inflicted."36
The apparent inability of the government of the United States to
protect its people and resources would have severe detrimental effects
on the social contract between the government and the people. The
government would lose credibility, with a resulting loss of confidence
and productivity from its citizens.37
Historically, consumer confidence has been the objective of attacks
on agriculture.38 For example, in 1989,
a previously unknown group called the Breeders threatened to spread
the Medfly to damage crops in California if the state did not stop
aerial spraying of pesticides. Although no one was caught or prosecuted,
that season's dense Medfly population confirmed that a deliberate
infestation was being conducted. Although their attack may not have
been successful, the Breeders attracted much publicity by destroying
crops and reducing consumer confidence.39
Another example is the West Nile Virus. First detected in 1999 in
the state of New York, in 2000 it spread up and down the East Coast.
In 2001, it spread north and further into the central part of the
United States. In 2002, it was reported in 32 states, in Canada,
and was suspected to be in Mexico. As of September 2002 there had
been 1,965 West Nile cases resulting in 94 deaths.40
West Nile Virus is non-native, and it is not known how it was introduced
into the United States. As the number of cases and deaths continue
to increase and further affect public health and possibly our blood
supply, it is uncertain what psychological effects will result and
what effects it will have on everyday life. If it continues to spread,
will the elderly or people who are not in good health avoid outdoor
activity? If it is determined that the introduction of West Nile
virus was intentional, would it be wise to inform the public? Such
an announcement of an intentional infestation could spread panic,
fear, lack of trust in the government and its services, and in turn
support the goals of the perpetrator.41
An invasive species coupled with other forms of asymmetric warfare
also would have a synergistic effect. If an enemy focused on creating
maximum economic impact and attacked along multiple, low-profile
paths, he would be more likely to generate overwhelming effects.
Such an attack could include an invasive species coupled with a
cyber attack, the use of weapons of mass destruction such as a "dirty
bomb," or the use of more standard terrorist bombing techniques.
Likewise, invasive species could be coupled with more symmetric
methods of conventional force-on-force warfare. Such multifaceted
attacks would have a greater chance of destroying or severely damaging
American national power. If two or more methods proved successful,
the combined synergistic effect could be much greater, producing
more physical and psychological damage.
Production and Introduction
Invasive species are relatively cheap and easy
to produce or acquire and introduce into the environment. Large
numbers need not be introduced, only enough to start a population
base. Introduction at multiple locations in numbers large enough
to begin colonization would reduce the risk of both detection and
the failure of one or two clusters to colonize and establish a population
base for the species' spread. Introduction in multiple locations
also would decrease the amount of time needed to establish and spread
the invasive species to dangerous levels.
Most microbes can be easily produced. Kathleen Bailey, who interviewed
pharmaceutical manufacturers, professors, and graduate students,
concluded, "Several biologists with only $10,000 worth of equipment
could produce a significant quantity of biological agents. The required
site equipment would fit in a small room, and the glassware, centrifuges,
growth media, etc., can all be manufactured by virtually any country."42
Detection at American borders would be extremely difficult. The
mere fact that billions of dollars of illegal drugs are smuggled
into our country annually speaks for itself. Border inspectors have
difficulty finding unintentional smuggling violations, let alone
detecting the purposefully concealed smuggling of invasive species.
Insects, plant seeds, or a vial of microbes could be easily hidden.
Most likely, inspectors would not even know what to look for.
Once an invasive species is established it would be extremely difficult
to discern who had implanted it unless the perpetrator or group
claimed credit for the attack. In turn, it would be virtually impossible
to track it to its source. If the United States could not identify
who introduced the species, it would be difficult to counter or
apply national power in retribution for such an attack. With all
the accidental introduction of so many invasive species, how could
we legitimately and credibly blame a suspected adversary? A current
example is the West Nile Virus. As previously noted, no one knows
how it was introduced to this country. Some, including at least
one analyst at the Center for Defense Information, suspect it was
brought to the United States as a terrorist act.43
Once an invasive species becomes established, it is difficult if
not impossible to exterminate it without a huge expenditure. Our
history is replete with failures to control invasive species once
they are established. The gypsy moth, zebra mussel, purple loosestrife,
and Kudzu are just a few examples. The foot-and-mouth disease outbreak
in England is an example of an invasive disease being controlled,
but at a high cost ($30 billion).44
The Asian long-horned beetle is another example. Thought to have
been carried into this country in wooden pallets from China, it
was detected in New York City and Chicago in 1996. The United States
has been battling the beetle ever since. In 1996, the cost to control
it was $4 million in New York alone. Total annual revenue from all
New York related industries affected is $11 billion, and the total
for the affected US industries is $138 billion. In response, Secretary
of Agriculture Dan Glickman declared a state of emergency, authorizing
$5.5 million to aid in the prevention, detection, control, and eradication
of the pest in 2001. Even with all this expenditure of effort and
resources, however, the Asian long-horned beetle has yet to be exterminated.45
Genetic Engineering
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines
genetic engineering as "the directed alteration of genetic
material by intervention in genetic processes." Adversaries
of the United States may modify the genetics of an invasive species
to increase its competitiveness, virulence, lethality, or resistance
to control measures. Subtle changes in gene and DNA sequencings
can have drastic effects on the characteristics of an organism.
Genetic engineering is a common practice in agriculture. Plants
are engineered to be hardier, more chemical-tolerant, and more resistant
to insects. For example, Bacillus thuringiensis, a bacterium commonly
known as "Bt," is used as a natural insecticide. The toxin
gene which makes it an effective insecticide was identified by scientists
and inserted into agricultural crops such as field corn to make
them resistant to corn borers. When the corn borer ingests plant
material, it dies from the toxic gene.46
Another example is glyphosate, the active ingredient in Roundup
herbicide. Glyphosate is a broad-spectrum herbicide used to kill
most herbaceous plants. Microbiologists inserted a glyphosate-resistant
gene into corn, soybeans, and other agricultural crops, enabling
farmers to liberally spray glyphosate and kill all other plants
except the resistant variety. Inserting these same genes into an
aggressive invasive plant would nullify many of the chemicals used
to control unwanted plants and even make them resistant to some
natural biological insect controls, thereby making the invasive
species a more lethal, faster-spreading asymmetric weapon. Another
example is the laboratory mouse on display in the Smithsonian Institution
which scientists genetically modified to be susceptible to cancer.
Scientists identified and inserted the gene to aid in cancer research.
If scientists can modify the mouse's genetic makeup, they can modify
an invasive species to make it more competitive, resilient, or tailored
for a particular need.
Adversaries with technological and scientific support could genetically
modify all types of organisms. If the technology or the scientific
support is not available, they could purchase or acquire it through
the black market.
Alastair Hay, an expert on biological warfare from the University
of Leeds in the United Kingdom, debriefed defecting scientists from
Biopreparat (a clandestine group of facilities spread across Russia
and Kazakhstan). From these interviews, he believes genetically
modified organisms currently exist. One of them is a form of the
plague that is resistant to 16 different antibiotics.47
Stephen Block, a biophysicist at Stanford University and the leader
of JASON (a study of a group of scientists hired by the US government
for technical advice), commenting on the possibilities of genetic
engineering, observed, "If you put a bunch of biologists in
a room and asked them to brainstorm, you'd come up with countless
possibilities."48
In the wrong hands, genetic engineering technology applied to an
already competitive or virulent invasive species would make control
methods difficult, if not impossible. New methods of control would
have to be developed, tested, and fielded to defeat the genetically
modified organism. Serums would be less effective, and diagnosis
of human pathogens could change and become harder to recognize.
It would take a considerable amount of time to isolate, test, and
determine what control or treatment methods would be necessary to
battle the organism.49 Additionally,
production and distribution of counter-mechanisms in large numbers
would take significant time and resources.
Hypothetical Attack
What would an attack with an invasive species
or a group of invasive species look like? What effects might it
have? There are many possibilities, but let's consider one hypothetical
nightmare:
The year is 2025. America remains a strong military power, but her
national power is waning. Adversaries of the United States have
subversively smuggled invasive species and pathogens into the country
and attacked her in the first decades of the 21st century. The attacks
were designed to weaken the US economy and diminish America's influence
around the world. Asian long-horned beetles have decimated the American
forests and severely weakened the related $138 billion timber industry.50
The brown tree snake was introduced in Hawaii and the population
is rapidly growing, nearing densities of 12,000 per square mile,
as was seen in Guam in 2002.51 Hawaii's
tourist industry and economy are faltering. American agriculture
and its food supply are also in jeopardy. Foot-and-mouth disease
has killed many livestock, and hundreds of thousands of livestock
were destroyed before the disease could be contained. Most countries
have banned American exports of meat due to concerns about the spread
of disease. Similar problems have occurred in the grain industry
after a contagious rust was identified on summer and winter wheat.
West Nile Virus deaths continue to rise. A "small" outbreak
of smallpox left five million Americans dead, requiring vaccination
for the remainder of the population and further stressing the health
care system. No country or organization takes credit for the attacks,
nor has the United States been able to determine who or what organization
is responsible. The American economy is in a full depression. America
has shifted what little discretionary funds remain in the federal
budget away from defense spending. The military has abandoned its
technological transformation to maintain current military strength
and programs. Adversaries are rapidly approaching parity in military
strength and should surpass America's military prowess in the near
future. America's national security is threatened.
Executive Order 13112
That distressing scenario indicates that the
detrimental effects of invasive species and pathogens are potentially
insurmountable. Local governments, state governments, environmental
groups, farmers, ranchers, and scientists collectively have urged
the federal government to coordinate the defensive effort and to
make invasive species control a higher-priority issue. In 1999,
in response to this pressure, President Clinton issued Executive
Order 13112 on invasive species.52
It was designed to coordinate and enhance federal activities "to
prevent the introduction of invasive species and provide for their
control and to minimize the economic, ecological, and human health
impacts that invasive species cause."53
Executive Order 13112 established the National Invasive Species
Council, whose members include the Secretary of State, the Secretary
of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the
Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce,
the Secretary of Transportation, and the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency.54 The purpose of
the Invasive Species Council is to prepare and oversee a "National
Invasive Species Management Plan," which would detail the requirements,
goals, objectives, and efforts of involved federal agencies.55
Additionally, the council was established to "provide national
leadership on invasive species; see that their federal efforts are
coordinated and effective; promote action at local, state, tribal,
and ecosystem levels; identify recommendations for international
cooperation; [and] facilitate a coordinated network to document
and monitor invasive species for federal agencies to use in implementing
the National Environmental Policy Act."56
The Invasive Species Council developed a national management plan
within the 18-month period set by the executive order. The plan
identified nine interrelated and equally important areas of concern
for addressing invasive species issues and countering their potentially
devastating spread (leadership, coordination, prevention, research,
early detection and rapid response, international cooperation, information
management, education, and public awareness); the coordinated activities
emanating from these areas thus comprise the defense of the United
States against invasive species.
Evaluation and Recommendations
Executive Order 13112 makes an excellent start
toward development of a much-needed national plan for invasive species
control. The establishment of the Invasive Species Council's National
Management Plan continues the movement in the right direction. Despite
this good start, however, there remains much to do. Al Qaeda terrorists
continue to threaten the United States and could be introducing
invasive species to weaken the United States even at this moment.
First, we must prepare for the purposeful introduction of invasive
species. The National Invasive Species Management Plan and the General
Accounting Office's report to Congress on the matter do not currently
consider the intentional introduction of an invasive species as
a security threat. Identification of all asymmetric threats and
pathways should be anticipated in order to defend the US homeland,
to include an adversary's use of invasive species. Potential pathways
should be identified and analyzed in the council's prioritizing
of invasive species problems. Adversaries may choose methods of
introduction that are considerably different from those that happen
by accident.
Second, the plan conveys no sense of urgency. The management plan
is not being implemented fast enough, particularly to counter a
known hostile threat. The plan's timeline should be accelerated
to quickly mobilize the resources and efforts of all agencies involved.
As with any new plan, deficiencies surface and problems arise during
implementation. The plan was issued in 2001, and many of the proposed
programs have yet to be implemented. The sooner the plan is fully
implemented, the sooner its deficiencies and problems can be identified
and fixed. Rapid identification and response is critical to success
in controlling invasive species. If the plan is not fully implemented,
invasive species may become established and spread before proposals
to control them are fully implemented.
A third deficiency of the plan is the development and implementation
of a comprehensive national system for detecting all types of invasive
species infestations and responding to them. All levels of government,
national through local, will need to work together under one national
system to adequately detect and combat invasive species and protect
the homeland. Both the GAO report and the National Invasive Species
Management Plan identify this weakness. According to the GAO report
this "system could provide (1) integrated planning to encourage
partnerships, coordinate funding, and develop response priorities;
(2) technical assistance and other resources; and (3) guidance on
effective response measures."57
The Invasive Species Council's Management Plan adequately identified
this need, recommending by July 2003 the development of a program
of coordinated rapid response and support. Again, this is a slow
process, with nothing yet produced. The Centers for Disease Control's
reaction plan to an invasive disease dangerous to human health offers
a good model for responding to invasive species. The council's plan
indicates that insufficient resources, lack of funding, jurisdictional
issues, limited technology, and other factors are the prominent
reasons for lack of a national system.58
The fourth deficiency is rapid response. Officials from the Departments
of Agriculture, Interior, Commerce, and Defense have reported that
"rapid response needs have not been and are not being adequately
met."59 Reasons for this include
lack of resources, lack of attention to the problem, not detecting
infestations in their early stages of spread, insufficient understanding
about the potential risk, and lack of technology to thwart the colonization
of the invasive species. In addition, the nation needs a systematic
national approach with criteria to determine when a rapid, crisis
response is needed. Many agencies stated they did not know when
or what criteria to use when requesting a rapid response. Rapid
response criteria should be based on a fair risk analysis. Currently,
responses to invasive species on agricultural land receive a higher
priority than on non-agricultural land or native areas. This may
not be the right priority for a terrorist attack. Rapid response
decisions should be based on common risk criteria, and these risks
should include intentional introductions of invasive species.60
Adequate funding is currently unavailable for an aggressive invasive
species program. Implementing the strategies identified in the Invasive
Species National Management Plan will be costly. In fiscal year
2000 the total expenditure of the federal government on invasive
species-related activities was over $611 million. The Department
of Agriculture spent over $556 million -90 percent of the total
federal outlay to fight invasive species. The Department of Interior
spent over $30 million, and the Department of Defense spent over
$12 million.61 Of the $611 million
budgeted, rapid response costs were less than one-quarter, resourced
at $148.7 million. This is not adequate.62
More funding is necessary to support the plan. If the federal government
cannot handle the monetary burden, then the tasks should be shifted
to the state and local levels. An official from the Bureau of Land
Management aptly observed, "You can pay now or later, but you
will eventually pay sometime."63
The Invasive Species Management Plan does not address invasive pathogens
that affect human health. However, such pathogens fall under the
Presidential Executive Order 13112 definition of an invasive species
and should be included in the Management Plan. If not, then the
definition should be changed to exclude human disease pathogens.
This must be made clear to determine who responds and who manages
an outbreak of such pathogens. The Centers for Disease Control currently
responds to the introduction of invasive human pathogens, but its
efforts are not integrated into the Invasive Species Management
Plan. Nor is the Department of Health and Human Services or the
Centers for Disease Control represented on the council. The plan
simply does not include all of the needed agencies.
Last, the Department of Homeland Security ought to be integrated
into the council and, indeed, assume the lead agency role. Although
the Department of Homeland Security is new, the Executive Order
should be amended to add the department as a full, leading member.
Invasive species management is a homeland security issue. The new
department should lead the council's efforts to integrate inspection,
detection, prevention, and crisis response capabilities across government
agencies. Invasive species management should be embedded into the
homeland security strategy.
Conclusion
An adversary's purposeful introduction of
invasive species or disease pathogens into the United States presents
a potentially devastating threat. Currently, the United States is
not adequately prepared for such an attack. The Invasive Species
Management Plan is designed more to protect US agriculture from
accidental introductions of invasive species than to counter intentional,
hostile introductions. To better protect the United States from
an attack, we need to prepare now.
Recommendations to improve protection from an adversary's use of
invasive species should include timely national identification of
the employment of an invasive species as a potential weapon and
appropriate planning and preparation to counter its use as a weapon.
Additionally, the federal government must speed up the process for
full implementation of the Invasive Species Council's plan to fully
implement a comprehensive national system for management and control
of this potential threat. The council should develop and implement
criteria for rapid response based on risk correlation. The plan
should be fully resourced and actively supported at an accelerated
pace. Mitigation measures should include invasive human disease
pathogens as part of the Management Plan or else the definition
should be changed to exclude such pathogens. The Department of Health
and Human Services and the Department of Homeland Defense should
participate on the National Invasive Species Council. Finally, invasive
species protection and management should be made a key part of the
homeland security strategy.
Despite America's status and strength as a superpower, the United
States was tragically vulnerable to attack on 11 September 2001.
That attack came not from cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, bombing,
or other conventional weapons, but by unconventional asymmetric
means. Today, the homeland is vulnerable to a different type of
asymmetric attack, a biological attack from invasive species. We
should act now to strengthen our defenses to protect ourselves from
such attacks. Our future and our children's future might depend
on it.
NOTES
1. Daniel Rubin and
Michael Dorgan, "Terrorists' Sept. 11 Plot a Many-Tentacled
Creature," Knight Rider Newspapers, 9 September 2002, http://www.tallahassee.com/mld/tallahassee/news/special_packages/attack_
on_america/4020169.
2. National Invasive Species Council (NISC),
"National Management Plan: Executive Summary," http://www.invasivespecies.gov/council/execsumm.shtml,
p. 1.
3. Ibid.
4. Tim Abbey, "University of Connecticut;
Integrated Peat Management - Check Those Plants for Unwanted Pests,"
Connecticut Agricultural Experiment Station, Windsor, Conn., 2001,
http://www.hort.uconn.edu/ipm/nursery/htms/invasives.htm.
5. Lori Lach et al., "Environmental
and Economic Costs Associated with Non-Indigenous Species in the
United States," College of Agriculture and Life Sciences, Cornell
University, Ithaca, N.Y., 12 June 1999, http://www.news.cornell.edu/releases/Jan99/species_costs.html.
6. Ibid.
7. US Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service, "Invasive Species,"
April 2003, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/pubs/fsheet_faq_notice/fs_aphisinvasive.html.
8. Abbey.
9. US Department of Transportation, Federal
Highway Administration, "Guidance: Implementing Executive Order
on Invasive Species," 20 June 2001, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/em_inv.htm.
10. National Oceanic & Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA),"America's Ocean Future," http://www.publicaffairs.noaa.gov/pdf/ocean_rpt.pdf.
11. USDA, "Invasive Species."
12. NISC, "National Management Plan:
Meeting the Invasive Species Challenge," 18 January 2001, http://www.invasivespecies.gov/council/nmptoc.shtml,
p. 17.
13. NOAA, "America's Ocean Future."
14. NISC, "National Management Plan:
Introduction," http://www.invasivespecies.gov/council/intro.shtml.
15. NISC, "National Management Plan:
Meeting the Invasive Species Challenge," p. 17.
16. Mark Souder, "Small Carriers Deliver
Big Worries to Local Agriculture," Farm Bureau Bulletin, April
2000, http://www.slofarmbureau.org/OldNews/april00.html.
17. NISC, "Invasive Species: Impacts
of Invasive Species," http://www.invasivespecies.gov/impacts.shtml.
18. Gavon Cameron and Jason Pate, "Covert
Biological Weapons Attacks Against Agriculture Targets, Assessing
the Impact Against U.S. Agriculture," in Terrorism and Counterterrorism,
Understanding the New Security Environment, ed. Russel D. Howard,
Reid L. Sawyer, and Barry R. McCaffrey (Guilfford, Conn.: McGraw
Hill, 2003), p. 254.
19. John Leatherbury, "Living Through
the FMD Outbreak," Country Spirit, Summer 2002, p. 13.
20. NISC, "Invasive Species: Impacts
of Invasive Species."
21. Ibid.
22. US Geologic Service, "Safety and
Health of Pacific Island Residents and Tourists," http://www.mesc.usgs.gov/resources/education/bts/impacts/safety.asp.
23. US Geologic Service, "Economic
Damages from the Brown Tree Snake," http://www.mesc.usgs.gov/resources/education/bts/invasion/intro_pred.asp.
24. US Geologic Service, "Introduced
Predators on Formerly Snake Free Oceanic Islands," http://www.mesc.usgs.gov/resources/education/bts/impacts/economic.asp.
25. G. John Ikenberry, "Getting Hegemony
Right," National Interest, No. 63 (Spring 2001), p. 17.
26. Gregory J. Rattray, "The Cyberterrorism
Threat," in Howard, Sawyer, and McCaffrey, p. 224.
27. Caleb Carr, "Terrorism as Warfare,"
World Policy Journal, 13 (Winter 1996-1997), 1-12.
28. Rattray, pp. 224-25.
29. Lach et al.
30. Frank Cilluffo, Sharon Cardash, and
Gordon N. Lederman, Combating Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
and Nuclear Terrorism: A Comprehensive Strategy: A Report of the
CSIS Homeland Defense Project (Washington: CSIS Press, 2001), p.
5.
31. Gilmore Commission, "First Annual
Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to
Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons
of Mass Destruction, I: Assessing the Threat," 15 December
1999, http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/terror.pdf, p. 12.
32. Cameron and Pate, pp. 258-59.
33. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations,
Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, and Related Agencies,
"Statement of Keith Collins, Chief Economist, U.S. Department
of Agriculture," 17 May 2001, http://www.usda.gov/oce/speeches/051701co.html.
34. Cameron and Pate, p. 258.
35. Ibid., p. 250.
36. Director for Strategic Plans and Policy,
J5, Strategy Division, Joint Vision 2020 (Washington: GPO, June
2000), p. 5.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., p. 260.
39. Ibid., p. 253.
40. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Restructuring
and the District of Columbia Subcommittee, Senate Government Affairs
Committee, and Subcommittee Oversight of Government Management,
"US Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL) Holds Joint Hearing With
Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee on West Nile
Virus," 24 September 2002, http://environmentalrisk.cornell.edu/WNV/WNVEducDocs/SenateHearing9-24-02.html.
41. Cameron and Pate, p. 257.
42. Jessica Stern, "Getting and Using
the Weapons," in Howard, Sawyer, and McCaffrey, p. 159.
43. Seva Gunitskiy, "Iraq and the
West Nile Virus: A Possible Connection?" Center for Defense
Information, Terrorism Project, 28 October 2002, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/west-nile.cfm.
44. NISC, "Invasive Species: Impacts
of Invasive Species."
45. USDA, Agricultural Research Service,
"From East to West: The Asian Longhorned Beetle Has Landed,"
http://www.ars.usda.gov/is/np/mba/apr00/asian.htm.
46. Jim Deacon, "The Microbial World:
Bacillus thuringiensis," University of Edinburgh, Institute
of Cell and Molecular Biology, http://helios.bto.ed.ac.uk/bto/microbes/bt.htm.
47. Carina Dennis, "The Bugs of War,"
Nature, 17 May 2001, p. 232, http://www.nature.com/cgi-taf/DynaPage.taf?file=/nature/journal/v411/n6835/full/411232a0_fs.html.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., pp. 232-35.
50. USDA, "From East to West: The
Asian Longhorned Beetle Has Landed."
51. NISC, "Invasive Species: Impacts
of Invasive Species."
52. NISC, "National Management Plan:
Executive Summary."
53. The White House, Executive Order 13112,
"Invasive Species," 3 February 1999, http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/nepa/regs/eos/eo13112.html.
54. Ibid.
55. USDA, "Invasive Species."
56. NISC, "National Management Plan:
Executive Summary."
57. General Accounting Office, Invasive
Species: Obstacles Hinder Federal Rapid Response to Growing Threat
(Washington: GPO, 2001), p. 20.
58. NISC, "National Management Plan:
Meeting the Invasive Species Challenge," p. 5.
59. General Accounting Office, Invasive
Species, p. 17.
60. Ibid., pp. 27-34.
61. Ibid., p. 4.
62. Ibid., p. 12.
63. Ibid., p. 20.
Also available online at:
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