The Afghan barber cutting my hair at an American installation in Kabul had a good life by Afghan standards. So when I asked what he thought of the post-Taliban era, I had every reason to expect a favorable review. But as he pondered his response, I could tell that he was choosing his words carefully. Finally, he answered, "I don't approve of what the Taliban did to the people, but it is now very difficult to move around the country ... and there is a lot of corruption in the government." The first part of his response was ironic, as it was the Taliban's insurgent activities that had created the need for the heightened transportation security that made travel slow. But the second part of his response was telling. For him, it would be the success or failure of our nontraditional, nonmilitary stability and reconstruction operations that would ultimately shape his decision whether to support the popularly elected government of Afghanistan.

When 3rd Squadron, 1st U.S. Cavalry Regiment, deployed to Iraq in March 2007 as part of 3d Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), the third of five "surge" brigades, the unit inherited a complex battlespace that had not been routinely occupied by large numbers of coalition forces (CF) since late 2004. Only two under-strength cavalry troops conducting economy-of-force operations for Multi-National Division-Baghdad patrolled the entire Mada'in Qada, an area east of the Diyala and Tigris Rivers approximately the size of Rhode Island. As a result, the security situation deteriorated to the extent that forces operating out of central Baghdad labeled it the "wild, wild East." Large and well-organized extremist forces-both Shi'a and Sunni-operated with impunity and virtually held citizens and local government representatives hostage. Although the surge of American forces brought CF units there for the first time in several years, the complex environment and poor security situation made counterinsurgency progress slow and difficult. After creating forward deployed bases to better project troops into the population, 3-1 CAV had to overcome some initial challenges to make progress.

In May 2003, the United States began the daunting task of nation building in Iraq by rebuilding the Iraqi infrastructure and reformulating its political institutions. The military's role in modern stability operations, though seemingly new, fits into a preexisting American foreign policy formula. However, the military sees stability operations through contemporary ethical lenses. Since each case depends upon current ethical understanding about what the military should or should not do, past examples of stability operations do not necessarily provide fitting frameworks for modern efforts. This article focuses on ethical abstractions as well as the ways national and social views of how "right" and "wrong" translate into political and military application, and it examines examples of stability operations and the ethical challenges and implications such efforts raise.