The future of the joint civil affairs (CA) force looks bleak. If drastic measures are not taken, this unique capability will soon be a shadow of its former self. To make it relevant for the nation building operations of the future, the active force needs to be greatly expanded while the reserve component must be right-sized and realigned to reflect recruiting and membership realities that are part of reserve life. Establishing a habitual relationship with a combatant command is the way ahead for this expanded CA force, without all the bureaucratic layers of headquarters that get in the way. The best proposal to fix the civil affairs force is an active component expansion to five larger battalions assigned to the combatant commands, and the creation of a smaller, more capable reserve CA force aligned with these battalions. Without steps to alleviate the stress on the reserve component civil affairs force, it will cease to be relevant or effective.

With the current operations tempo for federal forces, the availability of manpower for homeland security is a major concern. Today’s missions are full spectrum: traditional operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, peacekeeping in the Balkans and the Sinai, and defense support to civil authorities in hurricanes Katrina and Rita. President George W. Bush’s National Security Strategy makes it clear that “defending our nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the federal government.” With the gradual reduction in force and increased deployments, however, commanders are asked to do more with less. As troops engage in overseas operations, for example, they are tasked with additional short-notice contingencies that further exacerbate the problem. Given the needs of the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Northern Command, the increased use of National Guard and Reserve units, and the many and varied asymmetrical threats confronting the nation since 9/11, it is questionable whether sufficient forces will be available. Therefore, a serious study of expanding the use of legitimate volunteer military organizations is long overdue.

The U.S. military is currently focused on deliberate transformation to meet the challenges of the contemporary operating environment and the requirements of future wars, but something might be lacking in the military’s rush toward transformation: true transformation is more than reorganization and reequipping; it is a process of creation in which things are made anew. The most important transformation the U.S. national security apparatus must make as it prepares for future conflict is not limited to organizational or technological change; it requires transforming the military culture to manage the complex tasks of counterinsurgency and to avoid endangering the most cherished American values. Furthermore, the fourth-generation threats we will face during the next decade will effectively negate our technological superiority in weapons systems, sensors, and even communications. Paradoxically, our current opponents are at once immune to many of our technological advantages while they themselves leverage the nature of the information age in their attempts to defeat us.