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The U.S. Army Professional Writing Collection draws from a variety of professional journals that focus on relevant issues affecting The Army. The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent the official position of the Army. This micro-site seeks to stimulate innovative thinking about the challenges that may face tomorrow's Army. It is further intended that the articles featured on this site cause reflection, increased dialogue within the Army Community, and in the best case, action by Soldiers. Updated monthly, these articles are written by Soldiers, civilians, academics, and other subject matter experts. Links to various Army publications, Department of Defense journals and selected non-governmental defense-related publications are also provided on this site.

Storming the Ivory Tower: The Military's Return to American Campuses

Storming the Ivory Tower: The Military's Return to American CampusesAfter more than 50 years of cooperation between the U.S. military and universities, antiwar protests culminated in the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps’ exile from many campuses in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Two decades later, not content with the mere absence of ROTC, some prominent institutions, such as Harvard and Yale, went so far as to erect barriers to military recruiting on campus, claiming that Defense Department regulations were incompatible with the schools’ own non-discrimination policies. In the mid-1990s, Congress attempted to bring the military back to these campuses through federal legislation, but several of the schools and their faculties petitioned the courts to overturn these laws. A recent Supreme Court decision, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., has once again opened university campuses to military recruiters. No longer can the nation’s most selective schools accept federal Education or Health and Human Services Department dollars while restricting military recruitment on their grounds. As we go forward, it is important to craft a reasoned recruiting response targeting students from schools that have previously shut their doors to the military.

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The Limits of Training in Iraqi Force Development

The Limits of Training in Iraqi Force DevelopmentTraining the Iraqi forces is one of our most important and pressing objectives, a key to victory. To that end, some of the world’s best instructors have trained over 277,000 Iraqi security forces. Courses have ranged from basic police officer training to special commando training. More than 40 countries have participated in this effort, with billions of dollars spent. Other coalition forces have “mentored” the Iraqis. Yet despite significant progress, there is nearly universal agreement that Iraqi forces will not be able to take over our security responsibilities any time soon. Why hasn’t all of this training solved the problem? At least part of the answer is that training is the wrong intervention for many of the ills in the Iraqi security forces and society. Training can help solve many human performance issues. It can help make great armies. It is rarely, however, the entire solution, and it is a poor match for many of the problems identified in the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. As the painful events of the last three years have shown, more training courses are not going to stabilize Iraq.


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US-Pakistan Relations: The Way Forward

US-Pakistan Relations: The Way ForwardThe 58-year history of relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has been marked by periods of courtship and phases of distrust. Since 9/11, these relations have again entered an era of close ties with shared interests. However, there is a perception that the renewed friendship is being driven solely by America’s need for Pakistani cooperation in the war on terrorism and is dependent upon the continued presence and leadership of President Pervez Musharraf. The perception, if true, portends severe consequences for both the United States and Pakistan. On a positive note, although both nations have their respective national interests and security concerns, most long-term U.S. objectives are shared by Pakistan. Importantly, there are no areas of significant divergence regarding the national interests of both nations.


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Russian Nonproliferation Policy and the Korean Peninsula

Russian Nonproliferation Policy and the Korean PeninsulaRussia is one of the members of the six-party talks on North Korean nuclearization, but its views on how to deal with this problem do not agree with those of the United States. We may attribute the major differences between Moscow and Washington to several factors, but two stand out here. One is that Moscow prefers a different model of resolving proliferation issues than Washington apparently does. Moscow’s preferred option is the so-called Ukrainian model, whereby the proliferating state is induced to relinquish its pursuit of nuclear weapons through a multilateral negotiation in which it receives both economic compensation and security guarantees from its partners. This is what happened with regard to Ukraine’s inheritance of thousands of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles after 1991. The second model, apparently preferred by the United States, is the so-called Libyan model, which is based on the experience of unrelenting coercive diplomacy, including sanctions and possible threats of actual coercion, until the proliferating state gives in and renounces nuclear weapons in return for better relations with its interlocutors.


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