The Limits of Training in Iraqi Force Development
The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq has
three avenues: the political track, the economic track, and the
security track.1 While the three are
mutually reinforcing, the national strategy is largely dependent
on significantly improving security. Moreover, security has been
"our most important and pressing objective" since the
summer of 2003.2 As noted then by Douglas
Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, "Without security,
we can't rebuild the Iraqi infrastructure and protect it from sabotage,
nor can we expect Iraqi political life to revive if Iraqis don't
feel secure enough to travel, go to meetings, express their views
In July 2003, former Deputy Secretary of Defense
Paul Wolfowitz articulated the basic US exit strategy: properly
train the Iraqi police, army, and civil defense forces and they
will take over the security work being done by Americans.4
This carried forward into the national strategy, which contains
the core assumption that while the United States "can help,
assist, and train, Iraqis will ultimately be the ones to eliminate
their security threats over the long term."5
Prominent critics have repeatedly called on the administration to
accelerate the training of Iraqi forces, or quickly finish it.6
None, however, has challenged the core assumption that US forces
are mostly going to train their way out of Iraq.
It would appear, therefore, that training the
Iraqi forces is one of our most important and pressing objectives,
a key to victory. To that end, some of the world's best instructors
have trained over 277,000 Iraqi security forces.7
Courses have ranged from basic police officer training to special
commando training. More than 40 countries have participated in this
effort, with billions of dollars spent.8
Other coalition forces have "mentored" the Iraqis through
field exercises and supervision. Yet despite significant progress,
there is nearly universal agreement that Iraqi forces will not be
able to take over our security responsibilities any time soon. Why
hasn't all of this training solved the problem?
At least part of the answer is that training
is the wrong intervention for many of the ills in the Iraqi security
forces and society. Training can help solve many human performance
issues. It can help make great armies. It is rarely, however, the
entire solution, and it is a poor match for many of the problems
identified in the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. As the
painful events of the last three years have shown, more training
courses are not going to stabilize Iraq. This article explains why
and provides a clearer lens through which to view this key part
of the overall mission.
The Power of Training
Training is a form of performance intervention
designed to improve the skills, knowledge, and, to some extent,
the attitudes of students. This often leads to improved work performance.
In the US armed forces, training is used to solve or prevent problems
ranging from bad mess hall food to unstable nuclear weapons. It
also supports new performances. Training is normally thought of
as a specific course of instruction, usually in a classroom or at
a training facility. On-line and computer-based courses are also
becoming more widespread. Other learning activities such as unit
exercises, drills, and individual performance counseling are also
sometimes called training; however, the national strategy appears
to use the label "mentoring" for these types of programs.
Thus, US forces are said to be training and mentoring the Iraqi
forces, or helping, assisting, and training them.9
A good training program begins with some sort
of analysis of the gap between current and desired knowledge and
skills. Many programs, however, assume that the incoming students
know little about the material and focus on identifying the desired
end-state. For more complex matters, the analysis may be called
a competency map; that is, a formal effort to identify, list, track,
label, and measure the knowledge, skills, attributes, attitudes,
and traits necessary for a student to succeed at various levels
of an organization.10 This can lead
to a blueprint, map, or matrix to drive training, and other key
decisions such as personnel selection.
As every military leader knows, the right training
can help produce highly effective forces with the skills, knowledge,
and attitudes necessary to win conflicts. Training and mentoring
can build fighting spirit, aggressiveness, and strong morale, allowing
quantitatively inferior forces to prevail.11
Training and mentoring reinforce unit cohesion, bonding the group
together in a way to sustain their will and commitment to each other,
their unit, and mission.12 In short,
training and mentoring can be a powerful "force multiplier"-just
what the Iraqi security forces need, at least if the root problem
is a lack of skills and knowledge.
The Limits of Training
Training, however, cannot solve all human performance
problems. Some disciplines view training as a last resort, to be
employed only when no other means of improving performance will
work.13 Or, as trainers sometimes put
it, "If I hold a gun to your head and you can do it, then a
lack of training wasn't the problem." In fact, training is
rarely the entire solution to a problem or the sole way to realize
Two disparate examples illustrate the universal
and timeless nature of this principle. In 1861, Colonel Robert E.
Lee, considered by many contemporaries to be the finest officer
in the United States Army, declined its command and resigned his
commission to serve his home state of Virginia.14
Lee was a graduate of West Point and a combat veteran who had been
mentored by General in Chief Winfield Scott. Lee's training and
development was complete with the moment of national crisis at hand.
He was devoted to the Union and the Army. He felt strong loyalty
and duty as an American citizen and opposed secession, thinking
it contrary to the Constitution.15
Commanding the rapidly expanding US Army offered the ultimate professional
accomplishment and challenge. It would have fully satisfied his
personal ambitions. General Scott, his long-standing mentor and
dear friend, tried to keep Lee in Union service. Yet Lee refused,
at great personal cost, giving what has been called "the answer
he was born to make."16
From the federal perspective, Robert E. Lee
failed to perform the duties he had been perfectly trained and mentored
to assume. Lee, however, was a Virginian first and foremost. No
amount of training, development, or logic could change that.
The limits of training and mentoring are also
apparent in far more mundane situations. For example, the Women's
Health Initiative Study is a large, long-term study on the effect
of diet upon health.17 One goal is
to study the impact of reducing dietary fat intake on the rates
of various cancers. The study selected highly motivated and dedicated
participants for assignment to the low-fat diet group. They were
to reduce their daily fat consumption to no more than 20 percent
of total daily calories.
The study's designers and government sponsors
assumed that the eating behavior of these highly motivated volunteers
could be changed through training and support. Consistent with this
assumption, each member of the low-fat group received 18 intensive
dietary counseling sessions in the first year with quarterly maintenance
sessions thereafter. Despite this intervention, the group reduced
fat intake only modestly, to 29 percent. Training and support had
helped somewhat, but the study ultimately failed. In this instance,
modern scientists and government officials greatly overestimated
their ability to change a fairly straightforward behavior through
Root Causes of Human Performance Problems
Both Robert E. Lee's resignation from the federal
army and the Women's Health Initiative Study can be described as
human performance problems. In each case, the person, or persons,
could have done as expected but did not. While one case implicated
significant issues of duty and identity and the other involved a
series of routine dietary decisions, both involved capable human
beings not performing as desired-and as trained.
The relatively new discipline of Human Performance
Technology (HPT) takes a systemic approach to human performance
issues. It draws upon several other disciplines, including learning
psychology and organizational development and change.18
HPT practitioners have identified four root causes for performance
problems at the level of the individual performer: (1) a lack of
skills or knowledge, (2) a flawed work environment, (3) flawed incentives,
and (4) a lack of motivation.19 Related
factors include the organization's culture and design, along with
its personnel selection criteria.
A lack of skills and knowledge is the most
straightforward root cause and the only one where training is likely
to be a significant part of the solution. For example, if Cadet
Lee didn't know how to clean a musket to US Army standards or read
a map, training could be an effective intervention. The same is
true if a volunteer subject in the Women's Health Study didn't know
how to calculate the fat content of her meals. Refresher training,
or some type of job aid, may also be appropriate when someone who
has been able to perform a task in the past has forgotten how to
A flawed work environment often concerns problems
with the tools necessary to get the job done; for example, a lack
of horses for an 1860s cavalry company or lack of vehicles for modern
soldiers. As every leader knows, these types of equipment problems
can be fatal to mission accomplishment. Training, however, cannot
help solve the problem unless a lack of skills and knowledge is
causing the vehicle shortage.
A flawed work environment may also concern
a lack of feedback or poor leadership. Leaders may say one thing,
through training, yet act very differently. Or the environment may
send powerful messages that undermine the desired performance. For
example, the subjects in the Women's Health Study conducted their
"work" while going about their daily lives. Most were
undoubtedly bombarded by media images and advertising that encouraged
them to eat tasty, convenient, and fast foods that also happen to
be high in fat. Some women probably were surrounded by high-fat
foods as family members and peers maintained their normal eating
habits. Others had very busy schedules. Like many Americans, they
probably ate on the go, grabbing the most convenient, and frequently
higher fat, offering-notwithstanding the intensive training and
counseling. In hindsight this all appears obvious; however, assumptions
about training and mentoring blinded the scientists to the importance
of fully understanding the root causes of a performance challenge.
It is a common mistake.
The flawed incentives category takes a broader
look at how the workplace system rewards the desired performance
or responds to substandard performance. A stereotypical example
of this problem is an organization that "rewards" its
best performers with more work, perhaps unpleasant or even dangerous,
while promotions and salary increases are based solely on longevity.
A system may have few daily incentives for the desired performance.
It may even reward negative performance. For example, a woman in
the low-fat group of the Women's Health Study who ordered take-out
pizza to silence her whining children instead of cooking a low-fat
meal was immediately rewarded with silent children, less work, and
more time. These types of powerful incentives may be why one of
the study's principal investigators now believes that the general
population could never reduce fat intake to the desired levels,
even with intensive dietary counseling.20
The right incentives, on the other hand, can
powerfully reinforce desired behaviors. For example, in 1825 the
US Military Academy had an elaborate system of both positive and
negative incentives for Cadet Robert E. Lee. He earned regular membership
in the corps of cadets only by passing first-term examinations.21
A summer furlough depended upon his grades and conduct. Superior
students such as Lee earned extra money and privileges by serving
as acting assistant professors of mathematics, and only the top
graduates chose their arm of the service. This incentive system,
with its capitalistic elements, rewarded those who obeyed the rules
and produced the best academic results.
Motivation looks to the internal forces that
energize, direct, and sustain an individual's behavior. It helps
explain why Cadet Lee worked so hard to excel at West Point while
others facing the exact same workplace incentives were far less
Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs Theory is one of
the most widely used models and is frequently used to diagnose performance
problems caused by motivational gaps.22
It holds that all people have certain needs that they strive to
meet. Basic or lower-level needs such as food, safety, and acceptance
must be met before the higher growth needs are pursued.23
As with all generalizations, the model has its limits and even Maslow
recognized that not everyone followed his hierarchy.24
There are also other theories with different needs classifications;
however, internal motivation can be viewed as part of a comprehensive
systems approach to improving and sustaining desired performance.25
For example, all the armed forces of the United
States offer a large menu of personal and family support services
to active-duty service members and their families. These mostly
free services range from financial counseling to basic legal services.
The theory behind these programs is that helping service members
with their unmet lower-level, or "security," needs will
keep them focused on work and motivate them to higher levels of
Beyond the individual worker or small team,
the organization in which the performance occurs exerts a powerful,
if not controlling, influence on workplace performance. Two of the
most relevant contributors to the ultimate success of the Iraqi
national security forces are organizational culture and personnel
An organization's culture is commonly described
as the shared system of values, beliefs, and behaviors that characterize
the group of people.27 It is the group's
norms, practices, and philosophy; in short, the real rules of the
game for getting along or "how we really do things around here."28
An organization's culture can be changed over time, if fully supported
by all levels of leadership. Instant or revolutionary culture change,
however, is impossible. It is the shared experience and common history
of a group, over time, that changes a culture.29
Anyone who wants to change the organizational culture must commit
to a long-term evolutionary process, especially if the organization's
culture flows directly from societal values and practices.
It seems obvious that selecting the right people
is critically important to workplace performance. However, this
remains a challenge for many organizations-even those making routine
hiring and promotion decisions in stable western societies.30
Evaluating one's potential is not easy, especially when the new
job differs from a candidate's experience. Moreover, evaluating
how well a candidate's values align with those of the organization
is extremely difficult, if not impossible, absent extensive pre-hiring
evaluation. This is true even when both the selection official and
candidate speak the same language and there is little risk that
the applicant is seeking to infiltrate the organization in order
to destroy it from within.
Iraq in 2006: "The Year of the Police"
As a result of persistent problems in the 162,600-member
Iraqi police forces, the focus has shifted to improving their performance.31
Senior leaders in Iraq designated 2006 as "The Year of the
Police,"32 and President Bush
has repeated this theme in major speeches on the war.33
The Iraqi police are under the control of the
Ministry of Interior (MOI). The MOI forces, or police, consist of
the Iraq Police Service (IPS), National Police, Department of Border
Enforcement, and Center for Dignitary Protection.34
MOI forces comprise over half of all Iraqi security forces and are
slated to grow to a final end strength of 188,000 by December 2006.35
One goal of "The Year of the Police"
is to train the police to provide security in urban settings throughout
Iraq.36 According to the Inspectors
General of the State and Defense Departments, the National Security
Council, and many others, a number of significant obstacles remain.
For starters, police work in Iraq is increasingly
hazardous, with nearly 1,500 killed and over 3,200 wounded during
2005.37 It's a very dangerous job,
both for the police officer and his family. This has led to a perception
that past training programs, emphasizing quantity over quality,
have mostly produced "cannon fodder."38
Under Saddam Hussein, all police forces were
perceived as the corrupt and brutal implementers of oppression.39
The regular police, however, were conditioned to be passive, waiting
for the secret police to call them out of the station when needed.40
Moreover, many of the current police chiefs and deputies are accustomed
to the culture of the Saddam era, where forced confessions were
the primary investigative tool and responsibilities were rigidly
Today, the Iraqi police are highly decentralized,
which has led to some local "fiefdoms" subject to local
political maneuvering and divided loyalties.42
MOI command and control is rudimentary, with the ministry lacking
even a basic readiness reporting system for its units.43
Corruption is widespread and deeply rooted, with local police chiefs
said to frequently take a cut of their officers' salaries.44
The Ministry of Interior was found to have many "ghost"
employees on its payroll.45 Some payments
were for family or tribal members, while others served as an informal
retirement program, and this was at a time when some active-duty
officers went unpaid for weeks. Due in part to funding problems,
a significant number of police academy graduates were not hired
as police officers. They were trained by the Coalition and then
The MOI has not accepted ownership of all the
various police units.46 It has provided
only grudging support to police forces such as the Emergency Response
Unit, the Bureau of Dignitary Protection, and provincial SWAT (special
weapons and tactics) teams. As such, these units experienced frequent
pay problems and high attrition.47
The selection and screening of new recruits
and leaders has been problematic and often based on cronyism and
personal loyalties.48 Others have been
required to pay bribes to obtain an appointment. As late as April
2005, new entrants received only a cursory physical exam.49
Illiterates made it into basic training, as did some criminals and
drug users. There are also widespread reports of insurgent infiltration.
Merit-based selection for leadership training, or assignment to
special units, is still a foreign concept.
There also have been structural problems with
earlier training programs. Iraqi officials had only limited input
into standards and curricula, which had not been standardized across
the various training sources. Additionally, like most students,
Iraqis learn much better through hands-on exercises. Unfortunately,
much of the early training emphasized classroom lectures using interpreters.
There also was only limited testing to measure student retention,
with none in advanced and specialty courses.50
On top of all this, Iraq is a tribal society
where an individual's identity, and primary loyalty, runs to family,
tribe, ethnic group, and religious sect. Political identity is also
based on one's tribal or sectarian group.51
Some elements of the MOI forces, therefore, appear to serve Shi'ite,
Kurdish, or Iranian interests, acting as sectarian and ethnic forces
that abuse and murder Sunnis. Powerful militias and armed groups,
often affiliated with political parties, have infiltrated the police
forces. The primary loyalties of Iraqi police are thus so doubtful
that members of the Bureau of Dignitary Protection are normally
selected from the guarded dignitary's family or tribe.52
These trusted agents and relatives are then trained to serve in
the bureau for the duration of their sponsor's term of service.
Reportedly, the former prime minister ordered his own security force
to fire on any police that approached his headquarters without advance
Moreover, Iraq is just emerging from three
decades of a vicious tyranny where government authority stemmed
solely from fear, terror, and brutality.54
This corrosive misrule stifled initiative and confidence. People
naturally distrust their government, suspect American motives, and
look to regional or sectarian powers to protect their interests.
Despite these many challenges, some training
efforts have been a qualified success.55
The Multi-national Security Transition Command has delivered many
high-quality courses that have had a real impact on some Iraqi units.
But how many of the remaining problems with the Iraqi forces involve
a lack of skills and knowledge? Is the needed mission still training,
or is it something far more complex?
Applying Human Performance Technology Principles
While the situation has been frequently described
as a training challenge, the real goal since 2003 has been to create
capable Iraqi security forces to replace our own. As President Bush
says, "As they stand up, we'll stand down."56
While some Iraqi units are highly effective, the overall force still
has a long way to go. Yet only a few of the remaining significant
problems can be successfully addressed by training.
For example, insurgents frequently use the
cover of darkness to plant explosives and conduct operations. Experts
agree that nighttime patrolling and intelligence-gathering activities
employ very different tactics from daylight operations.57
However, many graduates of the basic police course received no training
in night tactics. Additional training courses to prepare them for
nighttime operations against the insurgency should improve performance-assuming
that this lack of skills and knowledge is the primary impediment.
Training also can help educate Ministry of
Interior officials on the importance of standardized operating and
supply procedures. Coalition teams can demonstrate the usefulness
of a readiness reporting system to MOI leadership. Training courses
also can provide the knowledge and skills to create and run a system
to measure unit readiness.
Finally, the methods and techniques used in
the courses can be refined to improve the training, or retraining,
of future students. Testing, including evaluating performance in
hands-on exercises, can be added to ensure that students retain
the lessons and have the ability to perform the desired skills.
Curricula can be adjusted based on Iraqi needs and standardized
across all training sources. Instruction can be done in Arabic and
made more culturally relevant and authentic for the average Iraqi.
Addressing these issues will undoubtedly improve the skills and
knowledge of the Iraqi police forces.
Yet training will not improve police effectiveness
in activities such as nighttime operations if the root problem is
a flawed work environment such as a lack of night vision gear or
timid leadership. The same is true if individual police officers
fear for the lives of their families. Training also won't improve
effectiveness if the professional culture is to be passive, avoid
risks, and demand bribes. Additional training won't improve nighttime
effectiveness in units infiltrated by insurgents, loyal to the local
militia, or staffed by physically disabled police officers who joined
the force out of financial desperation.
More training will have only a small effect
on performance if Iraqi police officers are not paid regularly in
order to support ghost employees at the Ministry of Interior. It
also won't improve performance in units where the only "reward"
for following the trained procedures is to always get the most dangerous
assignments while poor performers from certain tribes or families
face no negative consequences.
In fact, most of the security challenges identified
in the 2005 joint Defense and State Department police training assessment,
the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, and a host of other reports
are not training problems. Instead they go to improper selection
of police candidates and leaders, a poor organizational culture,
flawed work environments, divided loyalties, and officers focused
on basic survival. These are the root problems in many units, and
Human Performance Technology principles tell us that more training
courses will not solve them.
Viewed in this light, the Coalition training
courses have been merely the foundation for the hard work the Iraqis
must do to address root issues such as sectarian identity and strife.
We have taught thousands to shoot straight and true, but many Iraqis
still must decide whom they will shoot at and why. Future courses
might even be considered part of the background, or supporting cast,
for this broader Iraqi effort. Assuming some level of success, the
skills and knowledge gained through training can then be put to
Moving forward, the US plan appears to be a
more comprehensive engagement with the Iraqis to help them change
behaviors while building Iraqi institutions to address the root
problems. The Center for Military Values, Principles, and Leadership,
which opened in Rustamiyah, Iraq, in July 2006, is an example of
these new institutions.58 Its ambitious
goal is to identify, build, and enforce Iraqi military values and
ethics. While the program is currently run by Coalition trainers,
Iraqi staff members are scheduled to take full control of it by
Over time, these new institutions and behaviors
might eventually change values. These values eventually might become
part of the professional culture, helping members of the security
forces to see themselves as guardians of the state and all the Iraqi
people. It is a very ambitious goal. Yet even long-standing critics
think the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq can still work,
notwithstanding skepticism over any nation-building effort.59
It remains unclear, however, if the Iraqis are willing or able to
reinvent their security forces and society. Moreover, advisors on
the ground know that this process "can take decades" and
"is a generational goal."60
Another American commander put it this way:
We've had a tremendous impact shaping behavior,
and I think that we're making strides toward changing values. But
the fact is most of the people in this country [Iraq] have learned
and operate the way they do based on 35 years of experience. . .
. Right now we're shaping behavior, we're starting to affect values,
but changing values is going to take a long time.61
The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq and
much of the public debate surrounding it leaves the impression that
additional training will go a long way toward solving the security
problem and bringing our troops home. This focus on training, which
most people think of as a relatively short-term effort involving
courses, presents an unrealistic picture of the mission. It also
may have undermined domestic support for the holistic, longer-term
effort required to address all aspects of Iraqi force development
and implement the new counterinsurgency doctrine.62
Training cannot improve the long-term performance
of Iraqi national security forces unless the lack of skills and
knowledge are the root causes of their problems. Intensive training,
including regular refresher training and support, was unsuccessful
in getting a group of highly motivated western women to eat a low-fat
diet. We cannot expect it to change the culture of the Ministry
of Interior police forces in a few years. Decades of training, mentoring,
and development did not turn Robert E. Lee's ultimate loyalty away
from Virginia and toward the United States. Similarly, it will not
end regional ethnic divides in Iraq or change tribal values and
The security portion of the National Strategy
for Victory in Iraq is a multidimensional and nuanced document.
However, training, or something akin to training, is the dominant
label used for the means by which US forces are to accomplish the
mission. This may be the result of institutional resistance to the
more comprehensive term "nation-building" or the difficulty
of succinctly explaining the counterinsurgency strategy.63
Whatever the cause, national leaders emphasized training, leaving
the impression that we were going to train our way out of Iraq.
These words have continuing power, with President
Bush discussing a revised Iraq training strategy in late October
2006.64 It's time to more accurately
describe what US forces are attempting to accomplish in Iraq. Clearly,
it's much more than just training and mentoring. Call the task nation-building,
culture change, or societal reform. Any realistic label will do,
provided it reflects a far more complex task and recognizes the
limits of our ability to control the outcome. Just don't call it
a training program-unless failure is an option.
1. US National Security Council,
National Strategy For Victory In Iraq, November 2005, p. 1-2 (hereinafter
NSVI). While not stated in the document, the purpose of the NSVI
is to give the public a broad overview of the US strategy in Iraq.
The actual strategy is contained in the NSVI and several other documents.
See US Government Accountability Office, Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive
National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals, GAO-06-788
(Washington: GAO, July 2006), pp. 4, 6-8. This article addresses
the unclassified NSVI.
2. Remarks of Douglas
Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, 8 July 2003, quoted
in Jim Garamone, "Economic, Political Progress Tied to Iraqi
Security," American Forces Press Service, http://defenselink.mil/news/
4. Doug Sample, "Wolfowitz:
Security 'Real Problem,' but Situation Will Improve," American
Forces Press Service, 28 July 2003, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
5. NSVI, p. 18.
6. John F. Kerry, "The
Speech the President Should Give," The New York Times, 28 June
2005; letter from the Honorable Ike Skelton, ranking member of the
House Armed Services Committee to Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, 13
June 2005; John F. Kerry, remarks introducing S. J. Res. 33, 152
Congressional Record S3248, 6 April 2006.
7. US Department of
Defense, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," report
to Congress in accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations
Act 2006, August 2006, p. 41.
8. Congressional Research
Service (CRS), "Iraq: Recent Developments in Reconstruction
Assistance," Report for Congress, 4 January 2006, p. 16; CRS,
"Post-War Iraq: Foreign Contributions to Training, Peacekeeping,
and Reconstruction," Report for Congress, 13 January 2006,
9. NSVI, pp. 18-19 (core
assumptions 2, 4, and 6).
10. George Reed et
al., "Mapping the Route of Leadership Education: Caution Ahead,"
Parameters, 34 (Autumn 2004), 48.
11. Sergio Catignani,
"Motivating Soldiers: The Example of the Israeli Defense Forces,"
Parameters, 34 (Autumn 2004), 108.
12. Ibid., p. 110
(citing William D. Henderson, Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat
[Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1985], p. 4).
13. Harold D. Stolovitch
and Erica J. Keeps, Handbook of Human Performance Technology (San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992), p. 209.
14. Douglas Southall
Freeman, R. E. Lee, A Biography, Volume I (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1934), pp. 431-47.
15. Ibid., pp. 421,
16. Ibid., p. 431.
17. The Women's Health
Initiative, "Low-Fat Dietary Pattern and Risk of Breast Cancer,
Colorectal Cancer, and Cardiovascular Disease: The Women's Health
Initiative (WHI) Randomized Controlled Dietary Modification Trial,"
February 2006, http://www.whi.org/findings/dm/dm.php; Center For
Science in the Public Interest, Nutrition Health Newsletter, April
2006, pp. 3-7; Harvard School of Public Health, "Low-Fat Diet
Not a Cure-All," http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/nutritionsource/low_fat.html.
18. Marc J. Rosenberg,
William C. Coscarelli, and Cathleen Smith Hutchison, "The Origins
and Evolution of the Field," in Stolovitch and Keeps, pp. 14-29.
19. Allison Rossett,
"Analysis of Human Performance Problems," in Stolovitch
and Keeps, pp. 101-02.
20. Center for Science
in the Public Interest, Nutrition Health Newsletter, April 2006,
21. Freeman, p. 60.
22. John M. Keller,
"Motivational Systems," in Stolovitch and Keeps, p. 282.
23. A. H. Maslow,
Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper & Row, 1954).
24. W. Huitt, "Maslow's
Hierarchy of Needs," Educational Psychology Interactive (2004),
25. Keller, p. 292.
26. For example, US
Army, The Army Legal Assistance Program, Army Regulation 27-3 (Washington:
GPO, 21 February 1996), pp. 2-3.
27. Claude Lineberry
and J. Robert Carleton, "Culture Change," in Stolovitch
and Keeps, pp. 233-34.
29. Ibid., pp. 235,
30. Seth N. Leibler
and Ann W. Parkman, "Personnel Selection," in Stolovitch
and Keeps, pp. 259-60.
31. The White House,
"Fact Sheet: Progress and the Work Ahead in Iraq," 10
January 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060110.html;
US Department of Defense, "Measuring Stability and Security
in Iraq," p. 41.
32. For example, Lieutenant
General Martin Dempsey, "Update Briefing on Development of
Iraqi Security Forces," 2 December 2005; Major General Rick
Lynch, "Operational Update Briefing," 30 March 2006; Operation
Iraqi Freedom website, "MNDCS Launches New Training for Iraqi
Police," 30 January 2006, http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=
33. The White House,
"President Addresses Veterans of Foreign Wars on the War on
Terror," Omni Shoreham Hotel, Washington, 10 January 2006,
White House, "President Bush Discusses Global War on Terror,"
Central Piedmont Community College, Charlotte, N.C., 6 April 2006,
34. US Department
of Defense, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,"
p. 44. This grouping reflects a March 2006 reorganization of the
35. Ibid, pp. 41,
36. US Department
of State and US Department of Defense, Inspectors General, "Interagency
Assessment of Iraq Police Training," 15 July 2005, DoS Report
No. ISP-IQO-05-72, DoD Report No. IE-2005-002, p. 2 (hereinafter
37. Anthony Cordesman,
"Iraqi Force Development: A Current Status Report July 2005-February
2006," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 February
2006, p. 71.
38. IG Report, p.
- Iraq Police Primer, Iraq's New Police Chief: 'Nobody Said This
Was Going to Be Easy,'" National Journal, 25 October 2003;
IG Report, p. 16.
41. IG Report, p.
42. Ibid., pp. 12,
43. Ibid., p. 36.
44. Ibid., pp. 36,
50; NSVI, pp. 17-18.
45. IG Report, p.
46. Ibid., p. 46.
47. Ibid., p. 13.
48. Ibid., pp. 17,
49. Ibid., p. 20.
50. Ibid., p. 51.
51. NSVI, pp. 17-18.
52. IG Report, p.
53. Peter Beaumont,
"Abuse Worse than Under Saddam, says Iraqi Leader," The
Guardian, 27 November 2005.
54. NSVI, p. 10.
55. IG Report, p.
56. The White House,
"President Discusses War on Terror, Progress in Iraq in West
Virginia," Wheeling, W. Va., 22 March 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2006/03/20060322-3.html; The White House, "President
Bush Discusses Global War on Terror."
57. IG Report, p.
58. The Advisor, Official
Weekly Command Information Report for the Multi-National Security
Transition Command - Iraq, 8 July 2006, pp. 3, 5, and 3 June 2006,
59. Council on Foreign
Relations, interview, "Cordesman: After Three Years of War,
Results are Disastrous," 22 March 2006, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10208/cordesman.html;
James L. Payne, "Deconstructing Nation Building: The Results
Are In and the Record Isn't Good," The American Conservative,
24 October 2005; Council on Foreign Relations, interview, "Cordesman:
Civil War Can Break Out Anytime in Iraq," 5 September 2006,
60. Lieutenant Colonel
Ken McCreary, The Advisor, 3 June 2006, p. 7.
61. US Department
of Defense, "News Briefing with Colonel Jeffrey S. Buchanan,"
3 February 2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/
62. US Army, Counterinsurgency,
Field Manual 3-24 (Final Draft) (Washington: GPO, June 2006).
63. Ibid.; also see
James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, et al., America's Role In Nation-Building
from Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2003), p. 221.
64. The White House,
"Press Conference by the President," 25 October 2006,
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