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Strategic Imperative: The Necessity for Values Operations as Opposed to Information Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan

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Army Col. William M. Darley

Air & Space Power Journal
Spring 2007

>Colonel Darley is editor in chief, Military Review, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

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Strategic Imperative: The Necessity for Values Operations as Opposed to Information Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan

Thus it is that all armed prophets are victorious, and disarmed ones are crushed.

-Machiavelli, The Prince

Among the many epiphanies the military has experienced pursuant to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is the dramatic, albeit late, realization that it needs an intimate understanding of indigenous culture as well as well-developed cultural skills (such as linguistic capabilities) to operate successfully in such environments. As a result, culture has become a hot topic of discussion in military circles, resulting in a rapidly expanding body of literature that provides various prescriptions for obtaining and developing cultural capabilities.1 However, the major problem with the current thesis of most such literature-indeed, the entire thrust of interest by the military in culture as a dimension of the battlefield-is the unfortunate but prevailing assertion that culture is merely a kind of human-terrain obstacle that one must negotiate like any other factor impeding successful operations, similar to dealing with adverse weather or topography. If that is as far as we get in our appreciation of culture within the overall context of the kinds of conflicts we face in Iraq and Afghanistan, we will never develop the proper sets of skills, much less the appropriate policies, required to help attain the nation's political objectives. Instead we will get a set of truncated, although politically correct, capabilities that will prove ineffective and perhaps even counterproductive for prosecuting conflicts best understood as irreconcilable collisions between culturally dissimilar and incompatible values systems.2

To clarify the essence of the kinds of conflicts in which we currently find ourselves engaged, we must observe that the cultural dimension of these battlefields is best understood not as means but as ends. Culture is not merely one dimension of these conflicts; it is the battlefield. Therefore, we must logically and frankly understand the end objective as the transformation of those cultures and the values that underpin them in a manner that makes them compatible with the values underpinning our own culture and political objectives for being at war.3

Consequently, the most basic reason for the military's study of culture should not be learning merely how to negotiate or exploit the human cultural terrain as if it were a battlefield obstacle. Rather, the military's cultural study and training should focus on helping synchronize all elements of national and international power to change the character of the human terrain itself (i.e., defeat the adversary by changing the culture that sustains him). Without such a change to the basic culture and values system that abets the continued existence and activities of the enemy, successes on the battlefield-no matter how many and spectacular-will be ephemeral. Seen in this way, we can declare victory only after the emergence of clear and consistent evidence of compliance with a new set of normative values. In the end, the conquered must become Romans to stay conquered. How best can we effect such a transformation in culture within an enemy population?

History provides some compelling potential answers to the question. Recognizing the inducing of cultural change as an essential ingredient of conquest is an old and repeating feature in the history of major conflicts. As a result, since antiquity a key strategic reality for successfully building empires entailed imposing the conqueror's values system to make the culture of the conquered compatible with that of the conqueror and to reify acceptance of the conqueror's legitimacy and authority in the minds of the vanquished.4 Roberta L. Coles obliquely identifies the key cultural component for bringing about such an essential change by describing national cultural identity as "more than the land it encompasses, the number or kind of people residing in it, or the economy it generates. . . . Rather it is an 'imagined community' constructed through selectively remembered and embellished events, myths of origin, heroic stories, and proclaimed values. These transcendent symbols constitute the nation's civil religion, a set of myths that seeks consensus, attempts to provide a sacred canopy to a diverse community, and gives meaning to the community's existence."5

In other words, Coles identifies "civil religion" as the key centrifugal cultural force that unifies people in ethnic and national identity and shapes their values. Imperial powers of earlier times clearly recognized the key significance of civil religion to the integrity and cogency of society and therefore actively sought to transform the culture and values system of a vanquished people by imposing their own civil religion, doing so through a combination of proselytizing and coercion. For example, a major component of Roman conquest involved incorporation of local religious practices into Roman religion as a means of acculturating conquered people. At a minimum, Rome permitted continuation of local, independent religious traditions as long as the populace gave due deference to Roman religious authority and rendered appropriate honors to Roman deities. Rome answered defiance of that principle with breathtaking ruthlessness-the annihilation of British Druids is one prominent example.6

The many striking later parallels to Rome's emphasis on the use of civil religion as a cultural instrument of conquest include Russia's imperial conquest of Central Asia, the Northern European conquest of what is now the United States, and the Spanish conquest of Latin America, including Mexico. This principle is also reflected in the policies of conquest employed by states erected on secular ideologies that possessed the attributes of organized religion, such as National Socialism in Nazi Germany or the civil religion of individual human rights which emerged in the United States.

The dogma of the Eastern Orthodox Church lay at the heart of Imperial Russia's justification for conquest in Central Asia. The conviction that Russians had an obligation to spread civilization through the divine instrument of Orthodox Christian faith served as the common thread of Russian expansionism that transcended centuries.7 As described by Michael Khodarkovsky, "Russia's expansion to the south and east was anything but haphazard. . . . Cultivating the new lands and pacifying, settling, and converting its new subjects to orthodox Christianity became an imperial raison d'etat in the eighteenth century and Russia's own mission civilisatrice."8

Aware of the calculated purpose of their own policies, Russian leaders were acutely sensitive to threats posed by the emergence of other civil religions as challengers. As military historian Robert Baumann notes,

Aroused by the example of Poland and the rise of Germany, Russian nationalists viewed with alarm what they viewed as the centrifugal influence of Germanism and Lutheranism in the Baltic region. Among the most outspoken was the Slavophile publicist Iurii Samarin who attacked Baltic provincialism in his well-known Okrainy Rossii (Russia's Borderlands) and called for an aggressive effort to convert the Latvians and Estonians to Orthodox Christianity.9

In like manner, imposing civil religion on the conquered became a dominant feature of Northern European conquest of the Americas. Franz Altheim observes that the English perspective inherited by American Puritans derived from Protestant theology:

The English system of political thought was born of Puritanism, of the belief that one was a peculiar people and had therefore a special position before God and in the world as well. . . . England, like Rome, has her task to fulfill, assigned to her by the divine plan of history. This "manifest destiny" which includes a responsibility both to God and to the world, demands that, when occasion arises, she has to serve the welfare of the world and the welfare of her neighbour by establishing her own rule, where the other party cannot see, for the time at least, the necessity.10

Protestant American Manifest Destiny became both a powerful unifying psychological force for the early American colonists as well as a stimulant for aggressive westward conquest. Comments by Maj Gen Nelson Miles outlining the steps required to "civilize" Indian populations reflect how profoundly linked these concepts became in the general American consciousness. He saw the Indians as "a race of savages [that] cannot by any human ingenuity be civilized and Christianized within a few years of time."11

Ironically, leaders of Mexico-largely a product of Catholic civil religion imposed on vanquished peoples-viewed Protestant-inspired Manifest Destiny from the north as a direct threat to the values system underpinning the prevailing civil religion of the Mexican state. Maria Rodríguez Diaz comments that Mexican conservatives saw in the values espoused by Manifest Destiny "the [potential] destruction of the Mexican language and the erosion of religious custom in the face of increasing contact with the United States."12 She goes on to observe that conservatives were the most vocal in denouncing Manifest Destiny, in defending Catholicism as the taproot of Mexico's culture, and in denouncing the Liberal model for making Mexico a modern state. . . . They viewed the Catholic religion as essential for achieving national unity. The Anglo-Saxon advance threatened this essential foundation of Mexico's identity. The presumption of Manifest Destiny that Protestantism was superior to Catholicism inspired bellicose denouncements of the invader and calls to defend Mexico's Catholic faith. From the conservative point of view, Protestantism symbolized barbarism and Catholicism denoted civilization.13

"As a consequence, Mexican politicians frequently portrayed the intercultural conflict as 'a crusade against infidels-Protestants.' "14 Some conservatives even called for an aggressive campaign to bring Catholicism to the United States. Agitating for this cause, the Mexican newspaper La Voz del Pueblo declared on 19 July 1845 that "Mexico should arm itself and organize a significant territorial and maritime expedition to force the United States, by fire and the sword, to adopt solely the Roman Catholic Religion."15

In more recent times, ideologies espousing different systems of values emerged that have the structure and de facto force of religion on political, social, and economic organization as well as normative social behavior. Among these, National Socialism in Germany stands out as a prominent contemporary example. As Adolf Hitler noted, "We are not a movement. Rather we are a religion."16 Consciously aiming to supplant Judeo-Christian religions in Europe with the civil religion of National Socialism, he stated that when National Socialism has ruled long enough, it will no longer be possible to conceive of a form of life different from ours. In the long run, National Socialism and religion will no longer be able to exist together. . . . The heaviest blow that ever struck humanity was the coming [of] Christianity. Bolshevism is Christianity's illegitimate child. Both are inventions of the Jew. The deliberate lie in the matter of religion was introduced into the world by Christianity. Bolshevism practices a lie of the same nature, when it claims to bring liberty to men whereas in reality it seeks only to enslave them.17

Comparing the religious traditions of National Socialism to those of early Christianity, he went on to say that the greatness of every mighty organization embodying an idea in this world lies in the religious fanaticism and intolerance with which, fanatically convinced of its own right, it intolerantly imposes its will against all others. If an idea in itself is sound and thus armed, takes up a struggle on this earth, it is unconquerable and every persecution will only add to its inner strength. The greatness of Christianity did not lie in attempted negotiations for compromise with any similar philosophical opinions in the ancient world, but in its inexorable fanaticism in preaching and fighting for its own doctrine.18

Similarly, the fundamentally religious character underlying the values system and culture engendered by Communist "theology" had historically significant geopolitical consequences on a global scale for most of the twentieth century. This is reflected in the remarks of Marxist scholar Eugene Kamenka, who writes that "Karl Marx's position as the greatest of the socialist ideologists and as the posthumously proclaimed founder of one of the world's greatest religions, of course, has not prevented his greatness from being questioned, as it no doubt will continue to be, at least by some."19

In like manner, the emergence of the United States as a single national identity with aggressive designs on continental expansion and beyond correlates with the rise of secular civil religion having as its central icon the concept of "individual liberty" as a fundamental, natural endowment. The cultural values system that emerged on the foundation of this concept cultivated in the British colonies a distinct national identity together with the presumption of a sacred obligation to propagate the new religion. As observed by Coles, America's sense of Manifest Destiny originated in "centuries old themes of American civil religion; it proffered America's superior and chosen nature and its duty to redeem the continent and perhaps the globe as justification to expand America's geographical and political boundaries."20

Currently, the American civil religion of individual liberty and the cultural values system to which it has given rise are among the world's most powerful and feared iconic cultural movements. To cultures that eschew personal liberty as a legitimate principle of social and political organization of society, the concept of individual rights has now become so identified with the American civil religion that nations attempting to adopt similar systems are often viewed as literal extensions of American culture and civilization.

These observations are relevant to the contemporary situation we face in Iraq and Afghanistan. Fundamentally, seen from the perspective presented above, we can best understand those struggles at their most basic cultural level as disputes between different civil religions and the values system that stems from each. Therefore, we should view the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan in essence as those between incompatible values systems having different cosmological assumptions about the proper relationship of individual human beings to those governing them: a secular ideology asserting the existence of natural individual rights apart from government in conflict with a values system that denies the existence of such rights and demands submission to the dictates of God as interpreted by a de facto Islamic priesthood in charge of government.

We can illustrate the difference by comparing the most basic aspects and role of the central documents anchoring the civil religion of the United States of America-the US Constitution and Declaration of Independence-to those of the central document of Islamic culture and government: the Koran. The documents of the American civil religion make respectful, but only general, mention of Deity as the source of human dignity and rights, while asserting that the people have final authority over themselves and their civil government. Moreover, the documents outline specific methods for altering them to satisfy the changing desires of the people. In comparison, the Koran places the God of Islam at the center of government and asserts that His words as written in the Koran are unchangeable, especially by people, and certainly not through popular selection by majority vote. (Nevertheless, among fundamentalist Muslims of all stripes exists the practice of ceding interpretation of what the Koran means in practice to clerics and Islamic scholars.) As a result, we must realize that we can successfully establish democratic pluralism in countries that have never known it only if we broadly supplant cultural values at a grassroots level that currently makes cultural acceptance of democracy virtually impossible due to Islamic literalism.

The current conflict understood in this way clearly suggests that it can never be won through military measures-certainly none that Western society is morally prepared to undertake. Therefore, the current conflict can end only when the basic values of one religion or the other are sufficiently modified to make them compatible with the other. To do that, the United States must either abandon its policy of exporting the secular religion of personal liberty, which carries the presumption that it offers a universal panacea to the human condition, or the fundamentalist Islamic opponents must moderate their absolute literalism toward the Koran and the civil authority of Islamic Sharia law that stems from it. Certainly Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda view the struggle in this way: "I am one of the servants of Allah. We do our duty of fighting for the sake of the religion of Allah. It is also our duty to send a call to all the people of the world to enjoy this great light and to embrace Islam and experience the happiness in Islam. Our primary mission is nothing but the furthering of this religion."21

This is not the first time Western powers have faced the challenge of imposing civil religion on former enemies. American political and military leaders once saw operations aimed at broadly changing the cultural values of entire populations by modifying their civil religion not as utopian, insurmountable, and politically incorrect measures but as essential components of successful conflict termination. For example, American leaders recognized that the United States could not finally defeat the Japanese Empire until it curtailed ground-roots emperor worship and until the Japanese embraced secular democratic pluralism as the alternative to the state civil religion. This became a major tenet of US postwar reconstruction policy in occupied Japan. A momentously significant one-word change to the rewritten Japanese constitution following the war symbolized the profound cultural change that we sought: "The Matsumoto Committee (Draft A) retained the Privy Council and made only one slight change in the first four articles of the constitution, which concerned the crucial elements of the emperor system. Article III had stated: 'The person of the Emperor is Sacred.' The Matsumoto draft changed this to: 'The person of the Emperor is Supreme' " (emphasis in original).22

Similarly, the Allies assumed that Nazism would remain capable of resurgence until they uprooted the cult of fuehrer worship as well as the religion of Aryan supremacy and replaced them with egalitarianism. According to James F. Tent, "To institute a democracy in Germany required establishing more than the outward forms of popular governance. Free elections, democratic constitutions, independent political parties, and local government were simply institutional features; they required inner spirit to give them meaning. 'Reeducation' became the conquerors' catchword to describe the efforts to democratize Germany."23 Moreover, in opposing Communism during the Cold War, the US Information Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency, in concert with synchronized diplomacy by the State Department, executed a well-funded and comprehensive values campaign to directly attack Marxist/Leninist values globally using cultural weapons-the principal warheads of which consisted of carefully packaged liberal democratic values derived from the US civil religion.24

Similarly, whatever cultural understanding and respect we develop among our forces for the Arab-Islamic culture in Iraq and Afghanistan will be irrelevant unless we understand that success depends ultimately on the coalition's ability to transform the civil religion of Iraq and Afghanistan in a manner that sustains broad cultural acceptance of individual liberty as a legitimate organizing principle of society. The metrics of this success will serve as clear evidence of popular acceptance of a _single national identity as manifested through a continuing pattern of peaceful transfer of power through democratic elections and tolerance of minority opinion. Solid evidence of such cultural change will require more than public flirtation with a few elections.

Consequently, with regard to Iraq and Afghanistan, the most important question military planners and policy makers should ask themselves is, What essential elements and tools in the spectrum of cultural knowledge does the military need to master in order to change the basic values underpinning that culture? More than taxonomies of cultural facts or even acquisition of linguistic skills, the military needs a sophisticated understanding of applied techniques that specifically effect cultural transformation of values within societies.

We will not find the answer in developing broad and relatively superficial awareness of the cultures in which coalition forces operate. On the contrary, we can settle the high purpose for which we ostensibly wage these conflicts only by developing the functional equivalent of a fully synchronized cultural-values "missionary" program by those who have acquired the skills both to entice and compel the acceptance of the basic values of a democratic civil religion that ultimately shapes and modifies sociopolitical behavior. Therefore, for the coalition campaign ultimately to succeed, specific values must be resolutely introduced and steadfastly cultivated in Iraq by cultural "missionaries" properly armed and resourced to proselytize respect and tolerance for the unfettered right of individual freedom of conscience and choice as prerequisites for establishing democratic political institutions in Iraq.

To obtain this kind of understanding moves beyond T. E. Lawrence's observations regarding insights into the nature of Arab culture or the counterinsurgency theories of David Galula.25 Instead, it points up the necessity for intimate study of such effective practitioners of values modification as the Jesuits, the Communist International, or the proselytizing tactics, techniques, and procedures of Muhammad himself. Our adversaries understand the nature of this conflict more clearly than we do: "Democracy is a Greek word meaning the rule of the people, which means that the people do what they see fit. . . . This concept is considered apostasy and defies the belief in one God-Muslims' doctrine."26

Since a change in values systems at a cultural level would prove extraordinarily difficult under any circumstances, what practical steps might we take to support such a program? To highlight the most essential, we should consider the following statement used by Puritan leader Capt John Underhill to justify the ruthless annihilation of a Pequot Native American village formerly located near what is today West Mystic, Connecticut. On 26 May 1637, Underhill led an attack by Puritan militias against a sleeping village without warning, resulting in the massacre of more than 400 Native Americans, the majority of them old men, women, and children. Recounting his rationalization for this attack, he wrote, I would refer you to "Davids warre, when a people is growne to such a height of bloud, and sinne against God and man, and all confederates in the action, there he hath no respect to persons, but harrowes them, and sawes them, and puts them to the sword, and the most terrible death that may bee: sometimes the Scripture declareth women and children must perish with their parents; some-time the case alters: but we will not dispute it now. We had sufficient light from the word of God for our proceedings."27

In describing why he and his fellow Puritans came to the conclusion that they were justified in their actions, Underhill asserted that Judeo-Christian scripture had given him the authority to kill unbelievers. Such claims of divinely sanctioned violence based on scripture led to almost unspeakable barbarism not only among medieval European Christian sects in numerous merciless sectarian wars but also among many Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist sects as well. Taking note of this too-common inclination for clergy to claim divine authority on the matter of "revealed scripture" as justification for violent acts and coercion, the founders of American democracy intentionally defanged pugnacious European religious orders by establishing a secular government that specifically excluded clergy from exercising political authority and replaced the use of the Judeo-Christian Bible as civil authority with reliance upon a system of secular law.

This formal delinking of sectarian religion from state power has promoted a cultural environment that helps create conditions not only for development of unparalleled exercise of personal freedom of conscience and expression but also a flowering of intellectual inquiry free from intrusion by state-sponsored religious authority. Some observers have asserted that this disengagement of the state from sectarian religion also fostered unprecedented individual initiative leading to the flourishing of economic enterprise.28

Therefore, as we debate the content and direction of future values operations, the American experiment in secular civil religion may offer useful lessons for effecting the tectonic change of values required to give Iraqi and Afghan democracy their best opportunity for taking root-specifically, the essential need to delink Islamic religion and religious clergy from official administration of the state. In other words, to attain conditions conducive to democracy, the Iraqi people should shift the Koran to the same respected cultural niche within their society that the Judeo-Christian Bible now occupies in developed Western democratic societies-a resource for examining the traditions and wisdom associated with the history of Islamic moral judgments but entirely excluded from official legal standing as representing the authority for enforcement of civil law.

In conjunction, just as we sanction Judeo-Christian clergy from exercising civil legal authority except in closely circumscribed ways, Iraqis should sanction Islamic clergy from exercising any civil authority apart from such purely ceremonial activities as solemnizing marriages. To allow otherwise is to ensure that at the departure of the coalition, Iraq will rapidly become mired in a values struggle driven by age-old Islamic traditions including clerical fragmentation within Islamic groups. As a result, the outcome cannot avoid domination by the prejudices of powerful Islamic religious ideologues who have no interest in allowing the legal exercise of personal conscience outside the interpretation of religious values dictated by Imams. An article in the Washington Post expresses the aggressive point of view that would resist the establishment of a government not dominated by clergy: "Abu Ibrahim said he regarded Afghanistan during the Taliban rule as one of the few true Islamic governments since the time of Muhammad. 'The Koran is a constitution, a law to govern the world,' he said."29

The dilemma that the military, as well as the coalition, faces in prosecuting the current conflicts can be resolved only by clearly recognizing them as strife between civil religions and understanding them as primarily a test of strength of conviction by each side in the rightness of that civil religion. The real question then becomes whether we as a coalition have the same depth of conviction with regard to the superiority of our own civil religion and the values that stem from it that we previously held as a premise for shaping occupation policy toward Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany as well as Cold War policy in cultural conflict with the Marxist-Leninist Soviet Union. Western democracies will require strong resolve combined with a supporting values campaign to transform Middle Eastern populations to a civil-values system that establishes individual liberty as the core cultural value in democratic societies. Success therefore ultimately depends on the effectiveness of determined values-based campaigns that clearly persuade the ground-roots populace to accept an alternative cosmology that supplants both the fascist secular values of Sunnis loyal to the former regime as well as the fascist values of Wahhabi-fundamentalist Islam. Anything short of such concerted values operations to bring about this essential change is useless self-deception and wasteful dabbling at the edges of the essential issue.

With the above in mind, whatever fleeting political relief the coalition has enjoyed due to the public-relations value of a string of successful one-time elections, the short-term impact of such transitory events pales in comparison to the devastating long-term effect of officially conceding to the control of Islamic religious authority over the state apparatus. A public statement posted by members of the Iraqi insurgency on the World Wide Web following a suicide attack in Mosul, Iraq, foreshadows the consequences of ceding the values battlefield by permitting the clergy to assume secular authority in either Iraq or Afghanistan:

The "call to jihad is rising in the streets of Europe, and is being answered," reported The New York Times in April 2004. The Times story quoted a Muslim cleric in Britain touting the "culture of martyrdom," an imam in Switzerland urging his followers to "impose the will of Islam on the godless society of the West," and another radical Islamist leader in Britain predicting that "our Muslim brothers from abroad will come one day and conquer here, and then we will live under Islam in dignity."30

Notes

1. Among others, see Maxie McFarland, "Military Cultural Education," Military Review, March-April 2005, 62-69; Montgomery McFate, "The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture," Joint Force Quarterly, 3d quarter, issue 38 (2005): 42-48, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1038.pdf; Christopher Varhola, "The U.S. Military in Iraq: Are We Our Own Worst Enemy?" Practicing Anthropology 26, no. 4 (2004): 40; and House, Statement of Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director of Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities, Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives, 108th Cong., 2d sess., 26 February 2004.

2. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, 72-73.

3. See God's Rule: The Politics of World Religions, ed. Jacob Neusner (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003). See also R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism: A Historical Study (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000); Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947); and Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976).

4. Franz Altheim, A History of Roman Religion, trans. Harold Mattingly (London: Methuen, 1938), 422-23. "To take one point before others, so much is plain, that cult, the kernel of Roman religion, has a far wider importance for state and politics than has generally been supposed. The careful and unremitting worship of the gods will in that case have been the necessary conditions for the rise and rule of Rome" (423).

5. Roberta L. Coles, "Manifest Destiny Adapted for 1990's War Discourse: Mission and Destiny Intertwined," Sociology of Religion 63, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 403.

6. Alan Wardman, Religion and Statecraft among the Romans (London: Granada, 1982), 58-59. Religious groups that refused to respect Roman claims of divine authority for conquest and political rule were dealt with in a brutal manner and eliminated. For example, the Druids (who constituted the most prominent British religious cult) were singled out for annihilation, based on Roman claims that they used religious grounds to stir resistance to Roman rule. Noting this as official Roman policy, Pliny wrote, "The principiate of Tiberius did away with the Druids and this horde of seers and medicine men. . . . It is beyond calculating how great is the debt owed to the Romans who swept away the monstrous rites in which to kill a man was the highest religious duty and for him to be eaten was a passport to good health." Quoted in Wardman, Religion and Statecraft, 58-59. Also, "as is well known, the Druids and the religion they represented were, by the early first century AD, made the object of successive measures of repression by the Roman authorities. Augustus, according to Suetonius, took action to prohibit religio druidarum to those who had become Roman citizens; Pliny relates how under Tiberius a decree of the senate was issued against Gaulish Druids 'and all that kind of diviners and healers.' . . . And then Suetonius again states that Claudius in AD 54 'completely abolished the barbarous and inhuman religion of the Druids in Gaul.' " Quoted in Stuart Piggott, The Druids (1975; repr., New York: Thames & Hudson, 1999), 119. See also Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, s.v. "Druid," http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Druids.

7. Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia's Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500-1800 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 47. See also Firouzeh Mostashari, "Russian Colonization of Caucasian Azerbaijan, 1830-1905," in Extending the Borders of Russian History, ed. Alfred J. Rieber and Marsha Siefert (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2003), 175.

8. Khodarkovsky, Russia's Steppe Frontier, 37.

9. Robert F. Baumann, "Universal Service Reform and Russia's Imperial Dilemma," War and Society 4, no. 2 (September 1986): 35.

10. Altheim, History of Roman Religion, 429.

11. Nelson Miles, "Our Indian Question," Journal for the Military Service Institution of the United States 2 (1878): 291.

12. Maria del Rosario Rodríguez Diaz, "Mexico's Vision of Manifest Destiny during the 1847 War," Journal of Popular Culture 35, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 43.

13. Ibid., 45.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Robert G. L. Waite, The Psychopathic God: Adolf Hitler (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 29.

17. George H. Stein, Hitler (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968), 67.

18. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), 351.

19. Karl Marx, The Portable Karl Marx, ed. Eugene Kamenka (New York: Viking Penguin, 1983), xxxviii.

20. Coles, "Manifest Destiny," 404.

21. Osama bin Laden, interview by John Miller, American Broadcasting Company, May 1998, http://www.pbs .org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/binladen/who/ interview.html.

22. Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation, ed. Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 111. See also Richard B. Finn, Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 47-65; and Meirion Harries and Susie Harries, Sheathing the Sword: The Demilitarisation of Japan (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 33-84.

23. James F. Tent, Mission on the Rhine: "Reeducation" and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 1, 13-39. See also Arthur Lee Smith, The War for the German Mind: Re-Educating Hitler's Soldiers (Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1996); and Timothy R. Vogt, Denazification in Soviet-Occupied Germany: Brandenburg, 1945-1948 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).

24. See Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997). See also David Caute, The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); and Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters (New York: New Press, 1999).

25. See T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York: Anchor Books, 1991); and David Galula, Counter_insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger Press, 1964).

26. "Democracy Called Un-Islamic," Kansas City Star, 31 December 2004, A-13.

27. Ronald Dale Karr, "'Why Should You Be So Furious?' The Violence of the Pequot War," Journal of American History 85, no. 3 (December 1998): 877.

28. See Weber, Theory of Social and Economic Organization; and Weber, Protestant Ethic.

29. Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, "Outside Iraq but Deep in the Fight: A Smuggler of Insurgents Reveals Syria's Influential, Changing Role," Washington Post, 8 June 2005, 1.

30. Philip Seib, "The News Media and the 'Clash of Civilizations,' " Parameters 34, no. 4 (Winter 2004-5): 71, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/
parameters/04winter/seib.pdf
.

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