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The U.S. Army Professional Writing
Collection draws from a variety of professional
journals that focus on relevant issues affecting The Army. The views
expressed are those of the author and do not represent the official
position of the Army. This micro-site seeks to stimulate innovative
thinking about the challenges that may face tomorrow's Army. It
is further intended that the articles featured on this site cause
reflection, increased dialogue within the Army Community, and in
the best case, action by Soldiers. Updated monthly, these articles
are written by Soldiers, civilians, academics, and other subject
matter experts. Links to various Army publications, Department of
Defense journals and selected non-governmental defense-related publications
are also provided on this site. |
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Individually
accessible, ordinary networked communications such as personal
computers, DVDs, videotapes and cell phones are altering the
nature of human social interaction, thus also affecting the
shape and outcome of domestic and international conflict. The
evolving character of communications today is enabling the recruiting,
training, convincing, and motivating of individuals who are
driven to engage not primarily in the high-tech cyber-attacks
that many U.S. policymakers are focused upon, but in old-fashioned
violence in the physical world. The Internet is utterly intertwined
with the insurgency in Iraq, for example. Insurgent attacks
are regularly followed with postings of operational details,
claims of responsibility, and tips for tactical success. Those
who use insurgent chat rooms are often monitored by the hosts
and, if they seem amenable to recruitment, contacted via email. |
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| The
U.S. military does not need a culture that encourages daring
risk-taking, especially at senior levels. We may already be
paying a price in Iraq for this new emphasis on boldness.
In a post-invasion meeting discussing the planning and force
structure for reconstruction and stability operations, Gen.
Tommy Franks’ first slide for his field commanders read:
“Take as much risk coming out as you took going in.”
Such talk about accepting postwar risks alarmed retired Lt.
Gen. Jay Garner of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Affairs, but it was too late for him to affect the course
of events. The daring planning that helped bring swift success
in major combat operations did not effectively deal with the
aftermath, and contributed to the ongoing problems that continue
to bedevil us in Iraq. Patton remains a fine role model for
future leaders. Instead of promoting boldness, we should be
advocating the aggressive exploitation of opportunities, with
due concern to mitigate risks. The U.S. military still does
not do well with systematic risk assessment, as was revealed
in Iraq, and this is a fertile field for future research and
doctrine development.
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| U.S.
Northern Command supports civil authorities in protecting
the homeland within the continental United States, Alaska,
and U.S. territorial waters. To the north, east, and west,
the framework for a coordinated defense of land, sea, and
air domains with Canada is highly developed. To the south,
however, the United States faces formidable hurdles to organizing
a layered defense. Mexico is the key nation in the southern
sector. Its full cooperation is vital but doubtful. While
collaborating successfully on many law enforcement and security
issues, the country is reluctant to integrate into a defense
arrangement. The weight of history with Washington and an
inward-looking concept of national security preclude close
cooperation. The United States cannot protect its southern
approach alone, however, and Mexico must somehow play a role.
A Mexico that has a leading role in its own layered defense,
in collaboration with Latin American and Caribbean states
facing similar challenges, can be a strong force in executing
a defense-in-depth. The right collaboration can be a powerful
tool in achieving optimal solutions. To the extent that the
concept of a Mexico–Caribbean Basin Surveillance System
can be created over time, the United States will be increasingly
safe.
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| In
October 2005, forces from U.S. Southern Command traveled to
Guatemala City, Guatemala, to support local authorities inspecting
damage from Hurricane Stan. The command deployed a 58-person
disaster response team and eight helicopters to the Central
American nation as part of relief efforts. Among this team,
and among those back in the United States facilitating the
recovery assistance programs, were troops whose professional
skills and long affiliation with Guatemala’s military,
civilian and business leadership proved invaluable in helping
the disaster-stricken region. They were members of the Arkansas
National Guard helping their colleagues under the auspices
of an international security cooperation effort known as the
State Partnership Program (SPP). SPP activities focus the
attention and resources of a very small part of the Department
of Defense— a state National Guard—with a single
country in support of shared U.S. and partner nation objectives.
This concentrated focus allows for the development of long-term
institutional relationships, lasting personal relationships,
and a mechanism to catalyze a broad and expanding base of
support from outside the Defense Department—in particular,
state/local governments and private industry.
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