NTC: The Changing National Training Center
Since the first Army battalions rolled through
Fort Irwin in California's high Mojave Desert in October 1981, the
National Training Center (NTC) has helped lead a revolution in training
that fundamentally transformed our Army's culture toward greater
emphasis on warfighting proficiency in tactical units. Many credit
the competencies fostered at the NTC for having played a key role
in our Army's success in Operation Desert Shield/Storm as well as
in the initial phases of Operation Iraqi freedom (OIF).
While the NTC was a driving force in the Army's
first revolution in training, the demands of the Global War on terrorism
(GWOT) have required a fundamental reassessment of the character
and nature of training at the NTC. Candid assessments by leaders
involved in subsequent phases of OIF have suggested the combat training
centers (CTCs) could gain a greater operational payoff by focusing
training on the changing skill sets needed for ongoing operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Change at the NTC
During the last 30 months, the NTC has experienced
a period of profound and almost continuous change. While the specifics
of change vary from rotation to rotation, the larger trend is toward
refining the training experience based on feedback from the operational
force. Changes at the NTC have focused on a number of key features
associated with the GWOT and its campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Replication of the current operational environment has created an
intellectual framework that allows leaders to exercise potential
solutions to current problem sets, to build teams, and to gain experience
in an environment with human terrain similar to what they will experience
in theater. This entire process has created an environment in which
leader development is energized.
The change in NTC training is manifested in
the following important ways:
_ Training at the NTC now places more emphasis
on full-spectrum combat operations, especially counterinsurgency
(COIN) training involving both kinetic and nonkinetic means. Cultural
awareness training is a central feature of all phases of the rotation.
_ While the NTC is ideally suited to prepare
units for combat in a desert environment, increased emphasis on
operations in urban and complex terrain has been essential in preparing
units for combat in the GWOT.
_ The NTC is doing more than ever before to
help units integrate new technologies into their operations before
they deploy to combat. The NTC is now playing a leading role in
using technological innovations to train units to defeat insurgent
use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
_ With the growing significance of small-unit
actions, the NTC has redoubled efforts to increase the rigor and
fidelity of training at the small-unit level.
_ Finally, the NTC is placing significantly
greater emphasis on the use of joint enablers made available to
tactical echelons involved in combat missions with operational and
Pillars of NTC Training
The key elements of the NTC experience have
not changed. But, the challenge for NTC leaders has been to increase
focus on the key aspects of the new operational environment while
transitioning and maintaining the best of the traditional NTC culture,
_ Customer-focused training. Unit self-assessment
remains a vital element of training doctrine. As senior trainers,
division commanders continue to establish unit training objectives
and approve scenario design. No two NTC rotations are alike because
no two units have identical training needs.
_ Stressing units to their organizational limits.
Units learn best when pushed to the threshold of failure. The NTC
continues to push units to their limits, continuously raising the
threat, modifying conditions, and maintaining standards of performance
to expose weaknesses in key systems and functions. While the systems
we stress today are different from those of the past, the pressure
a unit feels must be both real and challenging. The NTC should be
hard-in many ways more difficult than actual combat.
_ Unblinking feedback. The NTC prides itself
on providing brutally honest and irrefutable feedback on unit performance
while providing a forum that encourages candid discussion and self-analysis
by the unit. While the metrics of performance might have changed,
the need for commanders to understand the strengths and weaknesses
of their formations has not.
_ Mastery of fundamentals. The NTC experience
has always focused on developing proficiency in a core set of mission-essential
tasks. While the tasks associated with the GWOT have changed to
include proficiency in both kinetic and nonkinetic realms, the philosophy
of focused training to achieve mastery remains the same.
_ Collective task integration. The NTC focuses
significant energy and resources on fully integrating all collective
training tasks within a brigade combat team (BCT). The desired end-state
is a holistic and synergistic approach to full-spectrum combat operations.
_ Importance of home-station training. The
level of training proficiency a unit achieves by the end of an NTC
rotation directly relates to its entry training level. Experience
shows that units that benefit most from the NTC arrive with solid
small-unit and staff proficiency derived from home-station training.
Units can then put their energies into taking full advantage of
the higher level complexity and scale of problem sets the NTC environment
_ Unique training capabilities. Units do not
come to the NTC to do what they are capable of doing at home station.
The NTC's advantages in training high-intensity warfare over vast
desert maneuver space and in challenging live-fire corridors can
now be translated to Iraq-like distances with multiple towns, villages,
caves, and urban live-fire venues. the NTC is one of only a few
established training venues in the world that allow a BCT to operate
at doctrinal distances in an instrumented live-fire and force-on-force
Integrating Lessons Learned
Another major feature of change at the NTC
is our current focus on integrating lessons learned and best practices
from theater into training scenarios. Leaders of the typical unit
preparing for deployment and about to train at the NTC are aware
of emerging problem sets from the theater that will pose challenges
for their units. They do not seek our interpretation of doctrinal
solutions to their problems. Rather, they ask us to teach them the
best practices being used in theater to address particular problem
sets. In most cases, existing doctrine provides a good point of
departure for unit training. However, in a war in which the adversary
is noted for being fiendishly reactive, units must seek to perform
specific practices more precisely to advance quickly to the latest
established iteration of successful performance.
To remain relevant, the NTC has established
a dynamic process to capture lessons learned and best practices
from the theater. The NTC uses three major processes to stay current
on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. These processes allow us
to triangulate observations about emerging trends in theater and
thus develop greater confidence in the solutions we advocate to
the problem sets we train units on.
First, the NTC monitors a number of classified
and unclassified websites to identify emerging trends. The center
for Army Lessons Learned, U.S. Central Command, Multinational Force-Iraq,
Multinational corps-Iraq, and Multinational security transition
command-Iraq, as well as unit websites, provide valuable information
about emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPS) and evolving
enemy trends. We also encourage units that have trained at the NTC
to provide continuous feedback via the internet on their experiences.
We ask them to offer suggestions to modify training.
Second, the NTC sends observer/controllers
(O/Cs) into theater to capture emerging trends and to conduct detailed
studies of best practices and new problem sets. While passive collection
from internet sites provides good background information, it is
necessary to actively examine unit performance in a combat environment
before advocating use of a particular practice to a training unit.
Active observation allows O/Cs to understand the context surrounding
the successful application of new TTPS. Trained units sponsor visits
by O/Cs, and that established relationship often leads to greater
rapport and continuity in the training process.
Third, while some of our best teachers and
coaches do not have recent combat experience, we actively seek combat
veterans with OIF or Operation enduring freedom (OEF) experience
to serve as O/Cs. Units appear to prefer O/Cs who can speak firsthand
of their experiences in similar situations in combat. Over 80 percent
of current field O/Cs have recent OIF/OEF experience, and that number
will only increase with future assignment cycles.
Physical Changes to the NTC Environment
Adapting the NTC to conduct training predicated
on Iraq and Afghanistan has resulted in a substantial investment
in physical infrastructure. These and future changes are absolutely
essential to providing the necessary context and realism for the
kinetic and nonkinetic COIN fight. New features at NTC include-
_ Towns and villages. The NTC has constructed
13 towns and villages spread across 1,100 square miles in both live-fire
and force-on-force environments. Buildings currently consist mainly
of modified shipping containers, railroad cars, and storage sheds,
but we are in the process of acquiring more permanent structures.
_ Caves and tunnels. Using highway construction
materials, the NTC has constructed 7 cave complexes in the mountainous
regions of fort Irwin. The NTC's largest town has an extensive underground
tunnel complex that replicates a sewer system.
_ Mountain strongholds. In hilly, constricted
terrain, we have created a defensive complex known as Milawa Valley
to provide a simulated terrorist training camp that serves as an
objective for deliberate dismounted attack.
_ Forward operating bases. Five semipermanent
forward operating bases exist with adequate fest tents, life support,
and force-protection facilities for a BCT.
_ Instrumentation. The NTC has augmented its
instrumentation system with fixed video facilities in its largest
town. This system consists of 79 infrared and low-light cameras,
a dual-editing and control suite, and a 40-seat theater facility.
In addition, the NTC has experimented with instrumentation in cave
complexes, using infrared video and mobile theaters. We are also
currently experimenting with handheld broadband video capabilities.
_ Digital command and control facilities. The
NTC's division tactical operations center is fully equipped with
a suite of Army battle command systems, including command Post of
the future. this minimizes the division headquarters' requirement
to provide a command and control (c2) node to support rotational
Training in a Full-Spectrum Environment
The NTC offers rotating units an extensive
menu of training options from the full spectrum of war. Units are
usually within 1 to 6 months of deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan
and seek mission-rehearsal exercises that meet predeployment training
requirements. We meet that need. We also maintain the capability
to provide a menu of predeployment lane training and limited new-equipment
training on IED-defeat systems. At unit request, we have also conducted
several rotations that included high-intensity combat operations
against an armored threat in conjunction with a transition to mission-rehearsal
exercise. NTC will maintain both the capability and institutional
memory needed to offer this option to training units. Overall, the
variety of training options that rotating units need has driven
the NTC to develop new flexibility in training format, facilities,
and rotation duration.
One of the greatest challenges we have faced
in the last 2 years is developing adequate realism and robustness
in training environments to support the problem sets we are encountering
in Iraq and Afghanistan. These problem sets range from kinetic to
nonkinetic; they call for human interaction and force units to consider
all the elements of national power. Of course, the specific objective
of our focused, replicative training is to facilitate a unit's rapid
and successful transition into theater operations. Because many
training units have done multiple combat deployments, there is an
increasing requirement for realistic, sophisticated training to
adequately challenge veteran units. Based on feedback from the operational
force, what follows are examples of the kinds of tough problem sets
emphasized during current mission-rehearsal exercises.
Nonkinetic operations. Training units in non-kinetic
operations requires establishing an environment in which human terrain
predominates. In such an environment, units can employ nonkinetic
resources such as civil affairs (CA) and psychological operations
(PSYOP) teams and public affairs officers; and they can conduct
leader engagements, disburse money, and participate in reconstruction.
to provide the human terrain necessary to train nonkinetic operations,
the NTC populates its towns and villages with up to 1,600 role players,
of which 250 are Iraqi-Americans who remain in their roles and live
in the field for the entire 14-day training event. Each role player
is influenced by respective tribal and religious leaders and maintains
familial, social, and business relationships throughout the rotation.
Some role players have businesses and jobs; others are unemployed
and disenfranchised, ripe for insurgent recruitment. Each urban
area has its own government structure, police force, businesses,
criminal element, and ethnic tension. Provincial government and
police forces also exert influence on towns and villages.
The human terrain element makes leaders and
soldiers engage with real Iraqis, a function that requires them
to adapt to Iraqi culture and seek cooperation. Leaders conduct
engagements and negotiate with provincial, town, and tribal leaders
to gather information on insurgent activity and to find out who
can create jobs, provide medical aid, or develop reconstruction
projects. The human element also allows the training unit to employ
CA and PSYOP teams throughout its area of operations to influence
the role players. Iraqi role players' attitudes change based on
The recently constructed Joint coordination
center, modeled after facilities in theater, is the focal point
of nonkinetic operations. It serves as a coordination center for
those acting as coalition forces; Iraqi security forces; local government,
tribal and religious leaders; local security and medical personnel;
and nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers.
Media operations. The NTC also replicates
television and print media continuously during the rotation. Television
media are portrayed by mock versions of an Al Jazeera affiliate
and an English-language network (the international news network
[inn]). While inn uses a Western reporting style, NTC's Al Jazeera
is staffed by Iraqi-Americans who constantly report on a unit's
actions and how those actions are perceived in the Arab world. Both
networks are seemingly ubiquitous in the training unit's area of
operations. They provide training for the unit's public affairs
team and give unit leaders experience in interacting with reporters.
Units learn how to recognize and even anticipate insurgent propaganda,
and they work with available media sources to counter misinformation
and rumor. Print media also comes into play: An Arabic newsletter
is distributed throughout the entire town, detailing actions occurring
during unit mission-rehearsal exercises.
Fiscal operations. Units practice using money
from the full variety of in-theater sources, including the commander's
emergency response Program, to fund reconstruction operations, condolence
payments, rewards, and claims. O/Cs track the amount and purpose
of money spent and ensure that the unit is properly accounting for
NTC towns and villages provide a venue to prepare
for real-world reconstruction projects. Units use their internal
engineers, CA teams, or attached forward engineer support teams
to assess town infrastructure and determine where the unit needs
to conduct reconstruction. After these assessments, units can contract
for reconstruction using funds or internal assets to improve the
town infrastructure. They can also employ Iraqi role players to
work on reconstruction projects (the idea being to help reduce the
insurgent recruiting base).
Intelligence-driven operations. Like nonkinetic
operations, intelligence-driven operations at the NTC require a
richly textured training environment. Quality role playing is key.
NTC has developed some 1,600 complex roles detailing the lives and
motivations of role players; their familial, tribal, and religious
influences; and their social and business relationships. Cultural
role playing has become more authentic. To fully exercise a training
unit's human intelligence and interrogation systems, Iraqi linguists
now play leading roles.
Working with the Defense Advanced research
Projects Agency, the NTC has developed a software program called
reactive information Propagation Planning for Lifelike Exercises
(RIPPLE) to improve scenario realism and increase the quantity and
fidelity of intelligence on the battlefield. RIPPLE is network-modeling
and artificial-intelligence software that tracks all role players,
roles, and relationships among the 1,600 Iraqi role players. It
maps all social, familial, and business relationships in the scenario
as well as each role player's personal history and motivation. Based
on this mapping, the NTC can dynamically assess and model the effects
of unit interaction with Iraqi role players. For example, if the
unit positively or negatively affects a local Iraqi leader, RIPPLE
can quickly determine second- and third-order effects of the actions
and issue instructions to role players accordingly. The software
allows exercise designers to pick the right role player to take
the right action to create credible cause-and-effect relationships.
The NTC has also worked closely with the University
of Southern California's Institute for Creative Technology (ICT),
a team of Hollywood producers, directors, actors, and special-effects
technicians, to improve the quality of role play and the realism
of scenarios. ICT has advised the NTC on script and scenario development,
role player acting, the physical realism of towns and villages,
and special effects to simulate IEDs.
For every terrorist action that occurs on the
NTC battlefield, we must construct a credible and possibly detectable
causal chain of events. This "kill chain," which replicates
the events necessary for carrying out an insurgent act, derives
from the latest available intelligence from theater. The NTC insurgency
will generate over 120 terrorist acts in a 14-day period, each with
its own kill chain and associated trail of intelligence clues.
Each rotation features over 300 threads of
information with more than a thousand discrete pieces of intelligence
woven throughout the training scenario. A role player holding potential
clues could be the operator of an air conditioning repair shop,
a member of the town council, or an actual insurgent. Good units
will use the full range of assets to collect available information
on the battlefield.
Detailed replication of insurgent activity
and the use of intelligence threads drastically change the nature
of the opposing force's (OPFOR's) mission requirements. OPFOR commanders
responsible for realistic execution of all of these intelligence
threads must maintain a balance between free play and scripted events,
must establish proper atmospherics among the townspeople, and must
maintain cultural realism continuously for 14 days.
Once the unit has collected intelligence, it
must connect the dots. This challenging analytical process translates
hundreds of pieces of raw data into knowledge that can aid the decisionmaker.
Creating a high-fidelity environment to exercise intelligence analysis
has been a major focus of the NTC. O/Cs are trained and site-licensed
to help units use the latest software available from theater.
Kinetic operations. Once the primary focus
of NTC training, kinetic operations are now trained in a theater-appropriate
context. Some units request high-intensity conflict scenarios for
their rotations, chiefly to train and maintain higher order combat
skills within their units. Most kinetic operations are designed
to exercise the skills that are most likely to be needed in theater:
cordon and search, raids on high value targets, operations with
special Operations forces (SOF), combat patrolling, and convoy security.
The NTC uses a combination of out-of-sector operations in force-on-force
and live-fire environments to stress a unit's ability to fire and
Detainee operations. The NTC training environment
provides a superb opportunity to establish a high moral standard
in the treatment of detainees. training units normally detain over
100 suspected insurgent role players during their mission-rehearsal
exercise. NTC trains detainee operations using the latest published
standards from theater. Units are required to fill out all the proper
paperwork on detainees and to operate their own detainee collection
point, which is inspected many times during the rotation by international
committee of the red cross role players.
Evidence collection and exploitation. The forcing
function for realistic evidence collection and exploitation training
is NTC's mock central criminal court of Iraq. Just as they do in
Iraq, units must bring detainees before an Iraqi judge. During court
proceedings, soldiers testify and the training unit's staff judge
advocate presents evidence for holding the detainee. Not every soldier
in the unit gets an opportunity to testify in the mock Iraqi court,
but the unit can fully exercise its legal system during the rotation.
Training units are provided instruction on best practices in evidence
collection and exploitation from the most successful units in theater.
IED defeat. In partnership with the Joint IED
Defeat Organization, the NTC has recently become the home of the
Joint IED Defeat center of excellence. This resource gives NTC's
training audience access to the latest IED-defeat technologies and
mission-specific training on IED-defeat tasks. Because the NTC operating
environment replicates the entire IED kill chain, NTC can train
a comprehensive approach to IED defeat that targets actions against
every node in the IED system.
The NTC conducts individual and small-unit
IED-defeat training using IED indicators and reconnaissance lanes
and by incorporating IED battle drills into mounted and dismounted
combat patrols. While this training is important, the NTC, as a
collective-task integrator, focuses training on battalion- and brigade-level
responsibilities in integrating all IED-defeat capabilities available
in the brigade's battlespace. Of particular note, we have found
that when units take an offensive approach to COIN, intelligence-driven
operations are especially important.
The NTC now maintains access to a fleet of
the latest IED-defeat capabilities for units to draw from and train
on during the rotation. The center's vehicle set includes capabilities
currently available in theater. Units also have access to some emerging
Personnel recovery (PR). Given recent emphasis
on the important area of personnel recovery, the NTC provides a
highly realistic venue for units to exercise PR operations both
with and without the assistance of SOF. We currently offer three
training scenarios in this area: downed coalition pilots, captured
U.S. Soldiers (including mission transition teams), and captured
civilian contractors and aid workers. NTC trains in accordance with
FM 3-50.1, Army Personnel Recovery, and provides O/Cs and scenario
writers whom the Joint Personnel recovery Agency has certified to
train and help units in all phases of PR preparation and mission
Joint integration. The GWOT compresses the
strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. A low-level
tactical patrol somewhere in Al Anbar province could quickly achieve
operational and strategic significance if it were to uncover intelligence
that key Al-Qaeda operatives were nearby. Based on time available,
this same tactical unit might almost immediately be given access
to joint capabilities that were once the province of operational
commanders. today's young leaders are fully up to the challenge
of applying these joint resources, and the NTC is working to create
a training environment where all of the joint problem sets and enablers
found in theater are routinely available for training.
The NTC has completed the U.S. Joint Forces
command accreditation process and has been recommended for conditional
accreditation in the following eight tasks related to the GWOT:
_ Counter-IED operations.
_ Joint urban operations.
_ Development and sharing of intelligence.
_ Joint personnel recovery.
_ Tactical information operations.
_ Close air support.
_ Joint fires.
NTC has twice served as a venue for Joint national
training capability events, most recently in September 2005, when
the center hosted a rotation that focused on applying joint capabilities
to key problem sets in COIN warfare such as-
_ Precision fires in urban areas and against
_ Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2).
_ Integration of joint nonkinetic enablers.
_ Integration of joint assets for IED defeat.
_ Integration of joint assets to conduct PR
Typical live joint enablers available at NTC
during recent rotations included F-16s, C-17s, Ac-130s, and a P-3
Orion with the Airborne integrated Mapping system and associated
rover downlink; e-8 Joint surveillance target Attack radar system;
compass call; EA-6B Prowler; and a variety of unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs). NTC is capable of replicating all of these enablers in a
virtual or constructive environment, but it tries to obtain live
assets when possible.
Integrating SOF into NTC rotations is a major
objective of training units. Last year, the NTC sponsored training
rotations by one Army special forces battalion and two navy SEAL
teams. Both Army and navy SOF have training events planned at the
NTC in the coming year.
Air-ground integration. The NTC has implemented
the latest air-ground integration TTPS from theater and has also
developed state-of-the-art A2C2 facilities to replicate airspace-management
problem sets from theater.
The NTC's airspace C2 play is modeled after
procedures used in Baghdad and other parts of Iraq. the center has
developed zones for airspace below the coordinating altitude, so
that units can integrate assets such as UAVs, rotary-wing aircraft,
and fires. Above the coordinating altitude, NTC uses the killbox
keypad system and replicates elements of a combined air operations
center with help from the Air Warrior Program from nearby Nellis
Air Force Base in Nevada. During one recent rotation, a unit successfully
integrated 13 different air platforms simultaneously in support
of ground operations. training units routinely integrate air assets
in a variety of key missions: IED defeat, UAV teaming, counter-mortar/rocket
operations, route reconnaissance, convoy security, cordon and search,
raids, and PR operations.
Based on unit feedback, the NTC constructed
improved aviation facilities in a new aviation forward operating
base designed to replicate facilities used in Iraq and Afghanistan.
To reduce wear and tear on helicopters, the facility has a paved
runway with 29 concrete landing pads. The aviation forward operating
base also includes two maintenance hangars and other buildings in
which to conduct aviation operations and maintenance.
Escalation-of-force training. Recent feedback
from the theater indicates a need for increased training on the
proper application of firepower, in particular the application of
minimal firepower to defeat a threat and protect the force. The
NTC has developed a two-phased approach, emphasizing in both the
uniquely designed lane training and embedded dilemmas within the
mission-rehearsal exercise. Units are trained on the latest theater-generated
escalation-of-force procedures, and throughout the rotation leaders
receive constant feedback on unit performance. The NTC environment
also allows us to show the consequences of excessive use of force
through realistic play featuring Arab media, local Iraqi reaction,
and human rights organizations.
The Way Ahead
Our experience in training units for the GWOT
confirms one thing: The only constant in this business is the constant
need for change. Given this reality, the NTC team is working on
the following new initiatives:
_ Improved urban operations facilities. The
NTC requires larger, more complex urban operations facilities in
order to challenge units with realistic training in an urban environment.
For fiscal Year 2006, the Army has committed over $12 million to
begin construction of a 300-building urban operations facility.
Follow-on funding of $45 million to complete the project and provide
state-of-the-art instrumentation is included in future defense plans.
_ Interagency and NGO training. Feedback indicates
we could do a better job training units to face the complexity of
the NGO and interagency environment. The NTC currently employs over
20 role players who simulate these functions. Training units receive
some benefits from NGO-agency interplay, but we aren't fully maximizing
a great training opportunity. The Army's investment in the realism
of the NTC environment could easily be leveraged by other governmental
and nongovernmental organizations, which could receive training
even as they help train soldiers. In a war in which all the elements
of national power are at play, we would welcome the opportunity
to make the NTC truly the "national" training center.
Training with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).
One of the NTC's top priorities is to find ways to better prepare
training units to work with and train ISF. the NTC currently uses
Iraqi-Americans to play Iraqi police and members of an Iraqi army
battalion (with U.S. augmentee units filling out the Iraqi battalion),
but the training is not completely realistic and does not portray
many of the complexities of dealing with Iraqi units in theater.
We are exploring options to bring greater realism to this training
and to build relationships with real Iraqi units earlier in the
Exportable training capability. Restationing
overseas units in the United States and the requirements of the
Army force Generation model will create a need for more CTC-like
experiences. While increased rotations at the Joint readiness training
center and the NTC are planned, the full number of new requirements
cannot be accommodated at existing training centers. This shortfall,
coupled with the divisions' diminishing ability to support home-station
training (a result of modularity), will create a greater requirement
for CTCs to assist with home-station training. The NTC has already
conducted prototype exportable training capability packages at Fort
Carson, Colorado, and Fort Bragg, North Carolina, during the last
18 months. Whether using mobile training teams for specific training
requirements or doing full-up mission-rehearsal exercises, our experience
indicates this is a viable option for improving the quality of home-station
training (given the availability of adequate resources for O/Cs,
instrumentation, OPFOR, and role players).
Leading the Army Forward
Today, the NTC as well as its sister CTCs are
at the forefront of leading the Army through a second revolution
in training-a process of continual change. Instead of training units
to improve their readiness for possible deployment for worldwide
contingencies, we are focused on creating a full-spectrum operational
environment and learning experience that will prepare them for the
harsh realities of imminent combat in Iraq or Afghanistan. In many
ways, this might be the most important work the NTC has ever done.
The leading advocates of this change are unit commanders faced with
the realities of preparing their units for war. The leading agents
of change are a new generation of O/Cs and OPFOR who, with recent
combat experience and an irresistible will to ensure victory and
save lives, are helping train their brothers-in-arms for the changing
requirements of war.
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