Victory Starts Here! Changing TRADOC to Meet
the Needs of the Army
Change: To make different in some particular
way, but short of conversion into something else; to give a different
position, status, course, or direction. -Webster's third new International
In order to adapt to meet new and evolving
challenges, change is an essential and necessary aspect of our personal
lives, our nation, our Army, and our operating environment. On 11
September 2001, a new kind of enemy declared
war on our nation, our Army, and on each one of us as individual
Americans. Today, we find ourselves having been at war with that
enemy longer than the span between the attack against the United
States at Pearl Harbor and Victory over Japan Day. In response,
the modification to our nation's culture as a whole has been relatively
modest: domestically, most changes have amounted to little more
than inconveniences. In contrast, however, our Army has found it
necessary to undergo change of a magnitude not seen since World
War II. Comparisons of the Army of today with that of even just
a decade ago reflect great differences.
Many factors have necessitated this change,
including the changing nature of the threat, a retooled national
military strategy, and the collective experiences of our deployed
formations engaged against an elusive enemy in a protracted war
of global scale. Each catalyst shapes the lens through which we
view the Army's mission, but one overriding thought remains: We
must increasingly and consistently adapt to how we handle the challenges
of full- spectrum operations in a protracted conflict.
The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC), as part of the generating force, is in the midst of transformation
in today's state of continuous operations. A symbiotic relationship
is forming between generating and operating forces, and the traditional
line between responsibilities is beginning to blur. TRADOC must
establish better linkages to the operating forces it supports while
simultaneously receiving constant feedback on adaptive solutions
for current and future Army modular forces (figure 1). TRADOC's
center of gravity is our ability to continue to learn and, as the
"architect of the Army," to adjust how we support the
Army's operating force.1 the strength
of our formation remains our people-both Soldiers and civilians-whose
intellectual energy drives change necessary for the nation's security.
This article highlights ongoing changes in TRADOC and seeks to generate
the intellectual discourse necessary to lead those changes.
Many describe today's threat as asymmetrical.
I would submit that this has become an overused term that creates
an intellectual box concerning how we wish we could fight versus
how we must apply ourselves in a full-spectrum environment where
offense, defense, stability, and civil support operations occur
simultaneously. Our young leaders and Soldiers understand both the
political and military implications of their tactical missions on
today's battlefields. They understand that cultural awareness is
a combat multiplier for this fight. They also understand that our
current enemy and future adversaries recognize our dependence on
coalitions and realize the excellence of our tactical formations.
The enemy of today and tomorrow will continue
to look for seams where he can achieve limited tactical success
reinforced by a highly effective strategic communications effort
to magnify his effect. We must train and educate our young leaders
and Soldiers to fight and win in this environment, write the concepts
and doctrine that guide our decisions, and thoughtfully develop
the Future Combat Force for a world more dangerous and complex than
that of today.
Army efforts to change from a division to a
brigade combat team-(BCT) based force continue. Lessons learned
from redeployed and engaged forces continue to inform TRADOC on
the modular force design. We know it is not perfect, and we will
continue to refine the doctrine, organizations, training, materiel,
leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) requirements with
the Department of the Army (DA).
Although many see the modular force as a revolutionary
change, the Army force generation (ARFORGEN) model will create the
truly dramatic and challenging changes. ARFORGEN has the potential
to touch and change every aspect of the Army. Gone are the days
of authorized Levels of organization units when TRADOC viewed Soldiers
as an input that surged following high school and college graduations.
ARFORGEN demands a continuous output of Soldiers to BCTs based on
reset dates and requires a prioritization of which units receive
mobile training teams (MTTS), which BCTs deploy to dirt Combat training
Centers (CTCS), which units conduct collective training at home
station, and when units participate in Battle Command training program
exercises. TRADOC no longer focuses on a DA-prescribed annual training
load to define mission success. Now we must clearly understand the
needs and priorities of operating force commanders and become an
output-oriented organization, adapted to the needs of the operating
Before I became TRADOC commander, a transition
team sought to answer a few basic questions: What does TRADOC do
well? What does TRADOC need to improve? How must we change? the
strength of the transition team was its organizational diversity:
It included leaders from TRADOC as well as representatives from
across the Army and the joint force; officers, noncommissioned officers
(NCOs), and civilians; and members of active component (AC) and
reserve component (RC) units. Their view of TRADOC was not through
a lens but a prism that projected many facets to view and assess.
The team interviewed hundreds of leaders, both active and retired,
from across the department of defense (DoD) to gather many thoughts,
ideas, and concerns.
This iterative process helped us better understand
TRADOC and how it needed to grow. The synthesis of ideas crystallized
a vision for TRADOC (figure 2), and five TRADOC areas of interests
emerged-areas requiring change from an internal process viewpoint
and from an enterprise perspective.
Each of these five TRADOC areas of interests
was assigned to a two- or three-star commander from within TRADOC,
who formed matrix teams to further analyze and develop solution
strategies to create the required changes. A series of issue papers,
initially staffed internally and then externally to a DoD audience,
were one critical output of this effort. the papers focused on the
truly challenging issues we as an Army must address. The feedback
we received was extremely informative, both from those who supported
our work and from colleagues with different viewpoints. The passionate
concerns of many great leaders truly shaped our thoughts. this collaborative
work guided our efforts and now forms the basis of TRADOC's Campaign
_ Recruit, assess, and train Soldiers and develop
_ Posture TRADOC to support ARFORGEN implementation.
_ Reshape the fundamental Army learning process
for a dynamic operating environment.
_ Redesign TRADOC for excellence.
_ Adapt requirements processes.
_ Support continued development of the Generating
_ Integrate current and future Army modular
TRADOC is an Army Command, but more important,
it has an enterprise role to drive change across the Army. Our Campaign
plan end-state envisions a TRADOC that has adapted its processes,
relationships, and organizations to support the Army campaign objectives
and a nation at war.
Recruit, assess, and train Soldiers and develop
adaptive leaders. For the first time in our Nation's history, we
are using an all-volunteer force to fight a protracted conflict.
The challenge of convincing young men and women to serve during
war while influencers such as parents, teachers, and coaches preach
otherwise, is considerable. However, the U.S. Army recruiting Command
has quietly met the Army's recruiting goals every month since april
2005-no easy task-and we have committed considerable resources.
Recruiting the youth of our nation is hard
work, and we are only as good as our last month's results. every
Soldier and leader in the Army today is a recruiter, and the operating
force's interaction with local communities tremendously affects
how the nation views the Army. We should all seek opportunities
to promote the values and discipline gained by becoming a Soldier
and serving our nation.
Over the past three years, TRADOC has dramatically
changed initial military training (IMT), and the feedback from the
operating force has been positive. Our young Soldiers do more tactical
training and weapons firing than ever before. The Warrior tasks
and Battle drills that form the core curriculum of basic and advanced
individual training prepare Soldiers to fight and win on the battlefield.
However, the Soldier receives less technical training, and operating
force commanders must understand this constraint and build home-station
training programs accordingly.
We continue to refine officer and senior NCO
professional development programs to produce adaptive leaders capable
of rapid decisionmaking in complex scenarios. Courses such as Basic
Officer Leader Course II provide all officers, regardless of branch,
the opportunity to train to a common warfighting skill level before
they receive basic-branch schooling. (the pilot program at Fort
Benning, Georgia, has expanded to include Fort Sill, Oklahoma.)
Feedback from the field and from combat veteran instructors and
students has allowed us to make evolutionary changes in the program
of instruction (POL). Leader courses have also increased the quality
and quantity of counterinsurgency doctrine and cultural instruction
needed to develop flexible, adaptive leaders of character and competence.
Posture TRADOC to support ARFORGEN implementation.
ARFORGEN is the structured progression of increased unit readiness
over time that results in recurring periods of availability of trained,
ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in
support of civil authorities and combatant commanders.3
ARFORGEN allows commanders to prioritize resources based on well-documented
gates, and it permits supporting commands, such as TRADOC, to build
nested plans. TRADOC must develop this training-support strategy
in close cooperation with Forces Command (FORSCOM), other Army commands,
and DA. This training strategy must account for all phases of the
model and provide prioritized training for each phase.
TRADOC's support to the ARFORGEN model begins
with the recruiters and young men and women who sign enlistment
contracts. Currently, those contracts are for a specified number
of years and are not tied to when Soldiers begin service or to their
first assignments. This process creates friction in the steady output
of trained Soldiers the Army requires. It also creates problems
in life- cycle units when a Soldier's termination of service date
does not match the unit's redeployment date. We can do better; we
are working with the Army G1 to emplace a system better nested within
the ARFORGEN process.
As we change from a division to a BCT-based
Army, a number of brigades will be going through the reset process
each year (figure 3). When ARFORGEN reaches its objective phase,
an estimated 13 BCTs will reset throughout the course of a year.
This aggressive reset process implies a near-continuous output from
the training base as well as leaders graduating from TRADOC's education
system; it is not based on when we plan for them to graduate, but
on the operational Army's manpower needs.
We predict that to meet ARFORGEN's output demands
we will need smaller classes that occur more frequently. For example,
some low-density military occupation specialty courses will need
additional start dates each year to provide a steady flow of IMT
graduates to units entering ARFORGEN's reset/train pool. Also, to
meet the operating force's needs, we began a second Intermediate-
Level education (ILE) class in February 2005 at the U.S. Army Command
and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to produce
graduates twice a year (in December and June).
Our institutional training support plan (ITSP)
must link course start and end dates to ARFORGEN's phases and encompass
all professional military education, additional skill identifiers,
functional training, and MTTS that support individual and unit training
throughout the ARFORGEN cycle. the ITSP is an annex to the ARFORGEN
Implementation Plan and defines how TRADOC provides institutional
training and training support to operational forces. The ITSP leverages
FORSCOM's semiannual ARFORGEN synchronization conferences to identify
all training requirements. This iterative process surveys the operating
force and balances its needs against TRADOC's capacity to provide
the requisite training.
We must also change the way TRADOC has traditionally
conducted MTTS. In the past, it was generally a first-come, first-served
process where units would contact and coordinate directly with the
branch schools. Over a several-month period in 2005, TRADOC completed
258 MTTS, but neither TRADOC nor other Army commands prioritized
support to those units with the shortest dwell time or deployment
dates. This legacy approach is not sustainable in ARFORGEN. The
delivery method, whether resident or Mtt, must consider training
aids, devices, simulations, and simulators (TADSS) requirements,
course size, and course duration. For example, if FORSCOM requests
a Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course MTT at a divisional post
to reduce Soldier time away from home, that division might provide
the equipment and facilities to execute the training. Finally, future
MTTS should focus on training the trainer instead of training the
Soldier, which would increase
TRADOC's ability to provide an enduring quality
of expertise in units. TRADOC cannot fixate on the immediate months
just before and after a unit reset date; it must provide first-class
training support throughout the ARFORGEN model. As we look at modular
force organizations and the number of BCTs entering the ready-force
and available-force pools, we must ensure that CTCS are postured
and resourced to meet their needs.
The CTCS provide a competitive training environment
difficult to replicate at home stations. the Army modular force
and ARFORGEN have changed the physics of what TRADOC must provide
the operating force to maintain the CTCS as a premiere training
event. Army modular forces-
_ Increased the basic rotational design from
two maneuver battalions to two combined arms battalions and one
reconnaissance squadron. _ Increased the number of companies in
a heavy BCT.
_ Pulled assets from the division structure
and consolidated them under a brigade troops battalion.
_ Significantly increased the size and capability
of the brigade staff.
the Army is reshaping the dirt CTC's operations
group to meet the requirements of the new rotational troop list.
Also, organic unmanned aerial vehicles, an array of complex digital
systems, and the ability of headquarters to influence the full-spectrum
battlefield must be stressed through battlefield events, enemy contact,
and higher-control-induced stimuli to hone the entire BCT's warfighting
Our opposing forces, long considered the epitome
of a thinking and adaptive enemy, must understand and apply the
most recent tactics the enemy is using in Iraq and Afghanistan and
replicate the human terrain on which we operate.
ARFORGEN also places additional stress on the
CTC system by creating more BCTs requiring more frequent training.
We can no longer afford to have battalion and brigade commanders
receive one CTC rotation per command tour. To solve this challenge,
DA, TRADOC, and U.S. Army Europe are building exportable training
capability (ETC) packages to provide enhanced collective training
at unit home stations or forward-deployed sites. the ETC provides
the essential CTC support (observer/controllers, opposing force,
instrumentation, TADSS) to conduct a BCT-level exercise. USAREUR's
Joint Multinational readiness Center established the first ETC with
an initial capacity of conducting four ETC rotations annually. Beginning
Fiscal Year (FY) 2009, we will stand up an ETC in the continental
United States. Although we have not yet determined the ETC's permanent
location, we know it will be sharply focused on advanced home-station
Reshape the fundamental Army learning process
for a dynamic operating environment. the Army's training and leader-development
model succinctly captures the notion of lifelong learning and how
the learning domains (operational, institutional, and self-development)
require mutual support between operating and generating forces.5
to continue our move toward this objective, we must assess what
we teach Soldiers, how we teach Soldiers, and how we exchange information
between operating and generating forces.
One of TRADOC's objectives is to reduce the
time Soldiers spend in school while still providing the operating
force with highly trained Soldiers. The key to this is assessing
and changing how we present information to the student. Many suggest
that distributed learning, distance learning, and assisted learning
are possible solutions to reducing the time Soldiers spend away
from their units and families. as an institution, we must be cautious
about how we integrate distance learning. We should not make Soldiers
choose between professional development and spending time with their
In my judgment, we should be able to reduce
course length by blending distance learning and traditional classroom
instruction. Distance learning should not be an entry requirement,
but a graduation requirement. For example, the Infantry Captain's
Career Course is 19 weeks long. By carefully analyzing the poI,
we might be able to shorten that to 16 weeks by moving three weeks
of instruction to distance learning, to be completed before graduation.
To accomplish this, we need to take advantage of the best available
learning technologies and seek advice from industry and academia
regarding their best-known methods of delivery.
We must also develop a process to seamlessly
link the operating force with the generating force in terms of doctrine,
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPS), and best practices through
a structured but adaptable knowledge-management network. The lessons
learned process has become vastly important to our Army. During
peacetime, the institutional Army drives change through DOTMLPF
and observations of trends at the CTCS. during war, the operating
force drives change based on experiences, events, and lessons learned
in theaters of operation.
Historically, we have considered TTPS as part
of our doctrine-development process, but with the enemy's evolving
tactics and the pace of change, this idea might no longer be valid.
We believe the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), at Fort Leavenworth,
will assume increased responsibility for the horizontal distribution
of best practices across the Army, while TRADOC focuses on high-level
doctrinal principles and immutable fundamentals.
TRADOC's Lessons Learned Initiative (L2I) envisions
branch schools having virtual cells in command posts deployed to
theaters and at home stations across the Army. These virtual cells
would provide a greater understanding of the current fight, serve
as a resource for deployed forces to reach back and query, and help
with the horizontal passing of best practices throughout TRADOC
as we develop DOTMLPF solutions for the current force and Future
Combat Force. L2I is more than CALL with additional resources; it
offers an opportunity to better understand and support the operating
force with ARFORGEN training, experimentation, and how we monitor
and police the communities of practice on the Internet. L2I must
be embedded as an integral component of future TRADOC centers of
Redesign TRADOC for excellence. The Army's
new global footprint of forces and the DoD Base Realignment and
Closure (BRAC) directive provide TRADOC an opportunity to change
its internal structures to better support Army needs. Over the decades,
our schools and centers have evolved to meet the needs of their
respective branches, which has resulted in duplicated efforts and
misplaced resources across TRADOC. A COE is an organization that
creates the highest standards of achievement by generating synergy
through effective, efficient integration of functions while reinforcing
the unique requirements and capabilities of the branches.6
the essential requirement is integration, not just colocation. Creating
COEs could break some rice bowls, but it would also build leaner,
more agile, more adaptive organizations.
The COE model (for single and multi-branch
installations) leverages BRAC's momentum by improving combined arms
solutions and DOT- MLPF integration, effectiveness, and efficiency
through synergy and reduction of redundancy, and by optimizing battle
labs to accelerate the development process.
Our COES are organized with four principles
in mind. First, and most important, our efforts must support the
needs of the operational Army, specifically improving how we interface
and provide DOTMLPF solutions. Second, we must develop a common
organizational framework to strengthen synergy and integration among
proponents, which would include horizontal information-sharing,
best practices, and vertical information-passing from within TRADOC
to our enterprise-level partners. third, our structure must support
the TRADOC core functions of recruiting, IMT, leader development
and education, lessons learned, the CTC program, doctrine, training
support, concepts, experimentation, and requirements determination.
Each of these functions requires far greater
integration with the operating force than ever before. Finally,
multi-branch COES will consolidate functions at the center level
to the maximum extent possible while maintaining branch identity
with branch commandants focusing on leader development, education,
and branch functional training.7
The two most well known COES are the Maneuver
Center and Fires Center. Moving the armor Center to Fort Benning
and the Air Defense Center to Fort Sill requires careful planning
to ensure we take care of our Soldiers, their families, and our
great DA civilians. It also requires resources and military construction
to ensure we can train and educate Soldiers to meet the Army's requirements.
However, these are relatively straightforward challenges when compared
to changing TRADOC and Army cultures.
We are all products of our branch schooling,
but that parochialism is in tension with the mindset required for
an expeditionary Army. Developing combined-arms solutions from the
beginning of the DOTMLPF process better serves the needs of the
Army modular force. To ensure that our new structures have capability,
we are developing a dynamic, collaborative network in support of
the Army Knowledge Management System embedded in the COES. Key parameters
include reaching back from deployed units, monitoring ongoing exercises
and experiments, linking to power-generation and power-generation
support platforms, and assisting in home-station training.
Other areas we are exploring include maintenance
and supply functions, neither of which are TRADOC core functions.
Yet, we must have equipment present and operational for training.
We are working closely with the Army Materiel Command (AMC) and
Installation Management agency (IMA) to develop training base equipment
improvement plans to optimize resources and place the experts (AMC
and IMA) in charge. We are also relooking how we think about battle
labs. As TRADOC commander during the early 1990s, General Frederick
Franks instituted the concept of battle labs to experiment with
and test emerging concepts needed for future battlefield functions.8
recently, battle labs have focused largely on branch-specific issues,
and we believe a broader, more functional approach to requirements-determination
might be more useful.
Adapt requirements process. The Army and joint
requirements process is a complex, sequential, prescriptive method
for developing and acquiring materiel solutions for the military.
Its thoroughness is both a virtue and a challenge. It ensures the
product is optimized for its intended purpose and nested across
DOTMLPF, but it is time-consuming, overly bureaucratic, and could
potentially lead to missed opportunities. TRADOC does not own the
process, but as an active participant it must understand it to meet
the needs of the operating force. The Joint Capabilities Integration
and development System (JCIDS) directs the Army's requirement process,
so unilateral changes are not a feasible course of action. However,
TRADOC's enterprise-level perspective obligates us to review the
process and recommend changes as necessary.
The first step is to examine and then reduce
the process itself by applying Lean Six Sigma methods to the development,
staffing, and approval process of requirements determination. Reducing
the staffing process to only two, at the colonel and general officer
levels, and developing automated databases of requirement documents
and supporting analysis, could help to shift the focus from routine
tasks to critical analysis. Additionally, creating a small number
of broadly focused, capability-based assessment categories under
which we can nest smaller requirements will accelerate the process
without being disruptive. TRADOC will conduct rehearsals of concept
drills to codify how we will accomplish each of the JCIDS processes.
Three critical outputs of these rehearsals are to develop a common
vision of the process, capture and publish the rules in a single
document allowing participants to clearly understand roles and responsibilities,
and provide our recommended changes to DA.
Given the reality of today's operating environment,
it is possible to use two separate and distinct requirements processes.
One process is very deliberate and futures- and technology-oriented;
the other is rapid, to meet the needs of the operating force. Unfortunately,
this creates an inevitable tension between doing things quickly
and doing things precisely. Operational needs statements have proven
incredibly helpful in getting equipment into the hands of the formations
in contact. However, we are experiencing the fallout of materiel
solutions that do not come with training packages, sustainment plans,
or the ability to interface with other equipment. TRADOC has an
obligation to evaluate new requirements through a DOTMLPF lens because
materiel not properly integrated from the beginning tends to cause
problems later in its life cycle.
Senior leaders must constantly look for targets
of opportunity to advance technological capabilities to meet the
needs of the operational force. To achieve this objective, we must
operationalize the requirements process and bring commanders in
at appropriate decision points. To support their decisionmaking,
we must develop commander's critical information requirements to
separate ordinary data from key information and to focus the staff's
analysis and recommendations in forums similar to battle update
briefs. The speed of technological advances combined with the adversary's
changing tactics creates windows of opportunities that open and
close quickly. Only with commanders' informed involvement can we
seize these opportunities.
Support continued development of the generating
force. The evolution of the institutional Army to the generating
force is ongoing. The incredibly diverse functions that various
Army commands execute make transformation challenging but necessary
to provide responsive title 10 functions to sustain a joint and
expeditionary Army with campaign qualities. As an emerging concept,
generating forces wrestles with fundamental questions: What is the
generating force? How is it different from the institutional Army?
What are its core competencies? A proposed definition for the generating
force is: The generating force provides Title 10 organizing, training,
and equipping functions that direct and resource, develop, generate,
project, and sustain forces' operational capability for use by the
Developing doctrine. TRADOC has identified
three areas critical to the Army's conversion to a generating force:
developing generating-force doctrine, achieving military-to-civilian
conversion, and developing a foundation for civilian education and
leader development. TRADOC will be working closely with other generating-force
Army commands in the staffing of Field Manual 1-01, The Generating
Force for the Army in Joint Operations: 2015-2024, which discusses
implementation strategies and articulates the role of the generating
force in support of the operating force.10
this doctrine must focus on overarching principles and not TTPS
to give the maximum flexibility to commanders and to fully support
the changes occurring in the operating force. Although separating
the Army into a generating and an operating force might be useful
for analyzing functions and organizations, the distinction blurs
As we develop doctrinal foundations, three
main points emerge. First, the generating force must be hyper-responsive
in generating the necessary capabilities. Second, the generating
force reach must be seamless or, in some cases, colocated in the
area of operations. Examples of this include the sustainment functions
conducted at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, and the knowledge reach-back
available through the communities of interest. Finally, generating-force
functions must be capable of replication in an area of operation.
Conducting concurrent combat, stability, and reconstruction operations
calls on many skill sets required to build an Army. The best example
of this might be the training of police and Army units in Iraq and
Converting positions. DA has announced it intends
to grow the operating force to 355,000 Soldiers within an Army end
strength of 482,400 active component Soldiers over the next several
years.12 TRADOC acknowledges this requirement
and is actively working with the Army for an optimal solution. However,
we must be cognizant of what this means to TRADOC's ability to meet
mission requirements. One partial solution is converting military
positions to civilian positions. In FY 2005, TRADOC converted more
than 3,000 Soldier positions to civilian positions. Conversion does
not equate to a decrease in capability, but it does give TRADOC
a different dynamic.
As we lead our organization through change,
the first critical step is for commanders to identify those positions
Soldiers must fill and those civilians can fill. Right now, Soldier-only
positions include those required to maintain combat readiness; those
required by law, such as joint positions; and those that require
the enforcement of good order and discipline.13
For example, we must fill drill sergeant positions with Soldiers,
but civilians can fill positions that teach a technical skill.
Educating and developing civilians. We are
taking on the challenge of civilian education within TRADOC. Organizations
becoming increasingly civilianized require an investment in civilian
education and civilian leader development. If we are to take advantage
of the talents of our civilian work- force, we must educate them
for the future. Analysis reveals that the Army sees civilian education
as a cost, not an investment, and consequently the Army does not
have an integrated, centrally managed, or adequately resourced program.
Several measurable objectives could fix this
challenge. First, we must develop a civilian education model and
policies that are sequential, progressive, tied to increased responsibility,
and codified in a DA pamphlet (pam) 600-type publication.14
Second, if we are serious about investing resources in our civilians,
we probably need to take a hard look at establishing a transient
account for civilian education so that supervisors who send civilians
to school are not hindered by having an empty seat in the office.
Third, we must tie civilian progression to mobility and professional
development. If the Army commits resources for training and incentives
for promotion, civilians must be prepared to fill nominative assignments
regardless of location. Changing the civilian education process
is a huge undertaking, but it has incredible potential. TRADOC is
prepared to test a pilot program with the objective of achieving
small victories over time versus changing a huge system immediately.
Integrate current and future Army modular forces.
Our future operating environment will be highly complex, distributed,
and extremely lethal. our enemies are currently training cadres
of people who are studying how we operate, what strengths to avoid,
and where we are vulnerable. Any future force we develop must be
unambiguously tied to the campaign needs that TRADOC pam 525-3-0,
The Army in Joint Operations: The Army's Future Force Capstone Concept
2015-2024, outlines.15 this is where
the intellectual must drive the physical, and our concepts must
drive DOTMLPF solutions.
Figure 4 lists the seven key ideas of the Army's
Joint operational Concept for future military operations.16
Currently, we do not have the capability to realize these seven
ideas, but through wargaming, experimentation and further concept
development, we will be able to form a comprehensive DOT- MLPF perspective
and integrate all force-capability requirements. This is hard but
important work, and we are working closely with Joint Forces Command
and the other services to identify and integrate joint required
capabilities to ensure we get this right.
We must also maintain a running dialog with
the operating force to understand its needs, determine what works,
and identify current capability gaps. We cannot allow the Future
Combat Force to become isolated from current operations and useful
only to scientists and theoreticians. As we identify capability
gaps and direct analytical support for DOTMLPF development, including
validation of research and development priorities for key Army science
and technology needs, we must seek opportunities to make those capabilities
available now to the current force. These developments help those
formations currently in contact, but also show tangible progress
and will sustain the valuable support the Army has received to date.
The evaluation Brigade Combat team slated to
be activated at Fort Bliss will truly accelerate the process. As
we place new doctrine and technologies in the hands of young Soldiers
and leaders, we have no doubt they will surprise us with their innovation
and understanding of how to get more out of the organization than
originally designed. TRADOC will focus on overarching principles
and allow Soldiers to develop the TTPs needed to fight with this
emergent formation. No matter how complex the future force becomes,
there remains a fundamental truth that training superiority trumps
technical wizardry every time. This might imply the need to develop
new training methods as we develop and mature the Future Combat
Our vision for TRADOC is simple: Victory Starts
Here! I believe this is absolutely true, and it starts in our classrooms,
on our ranges, and all across TRADOC where we develop young Soldiers
and adaptive leaders. It is where the foundation of our great Army
begins. As we fight this long war, there will be a tremendous amount
of focus on current operations, which is appropriate. TRADOC is
charged with preparing Soldiers for current needs while thinking
about the Army's future needs and how we will achieve our objectives.
Some of these objectives are simple changes to internal processes,
and we will be able to achieve them quickly. Other objectives require
coordination at the enterprise level, and we will not realize them
for years. As the generating force draws closer to the operating
force, we look forward to exchanging thoughts and concerns as we
adapt and learn now and in the future. Victory Starts Here!
1. U.S. Army training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC), TRADOC Campaign Plan, Fort Monroe, Virginia, coordinating
draft, 22 March 2006.
3. U.S. Department of
the Army, Army Campaign Plan (Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff G3, 30 September 2005), change 2, annex F, Army Force
4. U.S. Army Combined
Arms Center-Training (CAC-T) briefing, "CTC Way Ahead: Update
to the Army training and leader Development Conference," Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, 29 September 2005.
5. U.S. Army Field Manual
(FM) 7-0, Training the Force (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 22 October 2002), 1-6.
6. CAC in-Process review
(IPR) to Commanding General (CG) TRADOC, "TRADOC Area of Interest
(TAI) 3-Redesign for Excellence Solution Strategies," Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, 15 December 2005.
7. CAC briefing, "TRADOC
Area of Interest (TAI) 3-Redesign for Excellence Solution Strategies,"
TRADOC Senior leaders Conference, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 26 January
8. In 1992 Gen Frederick
Franks, CG TRADOC, established six battle labs: Early Entry, Lethality
and Survivability Battle Lab, Fort Monroe, Virginia; Depth and Simultaneous
Attack, Fort Sill, Oklahoma; Mounted Battle Space, Fort Knox, Kentucky;
Dismounted Battle Space, Fort Benning, Georgia; Battle Command,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and Combat Service Support, Fort Lee,
Virginia (unpublished point paper, "History of the TRADOC Battle
Labs," Office of the TRADOC Historian, Fort Monroe, Virginia,
9. E-mail exchange between
the TRADOC Commander's Planning Group and U.S. Army Combined arms
Support Command (CASCOM) initiatives Group, 30 January 2006.
10. FM 1-01, The Generating
Force for the Army in Joint Operations: 2015- 2024 (Washington,
DC: TRADOC, Futures Center (Forward), 26 September 2005), 11-31.
12. Office of the
Chief of Staff, United States Army, 2006 Army Posture Statement
(washington, DC: 10 February 2006), 20.
13. U.S Army Combined
Arms Support Center (CASCOM) briefing, "TRADOC area of interest
5," 27 January 2006.
14. All Da PaM 600-XX
publications deal with personnel issues.
15. TraDOC Pamphlet
525-3-0, The Army in Joint Operations: The Army Future Force Capstone
Concept 2015-2024 (Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters, TRADOC, 7 april
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