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Assessing Iraq's Sunni Arab Insurgency

Victory Starts Here! Changing TRADOC to Meet the Needs of the Army

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General William S. Wallace, U.S. Army

Military Review
May-June 2006

General Wallace has commanded from platoon to Army level and on two occasions led Soldiers in combat. He has served in the 82d Airborne Division and 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, and has commanded the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the National Training Center's (NTC) Operations Group, and later the NTC. In 1997, General Wallace took command of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Hood. Following division command, he served as Commander, Joint Warfighting Center, and as Director, Joint Training J-7, in the U.S. Joint Forces Command, Suffolk, Virginia. Returning to Germany in 2001, General Wallace assumed command of V Corps and led the Army's attack to Baghdad in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Following corps command, he served as Commanding General, United States Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth. General Wallace assumed the duties of Commander, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, on 13 October 2005. He has a B.S. From the United States Military Academy, an M.S. In operations analysis, and an M.A. In international relations and national security affairs.

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Victory Starts Here! Changing TRADOC to Meet the Needs of the Army

Change: To make different in some particular way, but short of conversion into something else; to give a different position, status, course, or direction. -Webster's third new International dictionary

In order to adapt to meet new and evolving challenges, change is an essential and necessary aspect of our personal lives, our nation, our Army, and our operating environment. On 11 September 2001, a new kind of enemy declared war on our nation, our Army, and on each one of us as individual Americans. Today, we find ourselves having been at war with that enemy longer than the span between the attack against the United States at Pearl Harbor and Victory over Japan Day. In response, the modification to our nation's culture as a whole has been relatively modest: domestically, most changes have amounted to little more than inconveniences. In contrast, however, our Army has found it necessary to undergo change of a magnitude not seen since World War II. Comparisons of the Army of today with that of even just a decade ago reflect great differences.

Many factors have necessitated this change, including the changing nature of the threat, a retooled national military strategy, and the collective experiences of our deployed formations engaged against an elusive enemy in a protracted war of global scale. Each catalyst shapes the lens through which we view the Army's mission, but one overriding thought remains: We must increasingly and consistently adapt to how we handle the challenges of full- spectrum operations in a protracted conflict.

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), as part of the generating force, is in the midst of transformation in today's state of continuous operations. A symbiotic relationship is forming between generating and operating forces, and the traditional line between responsibilities is beginning to blur. TRADOC must establish better linkages to the operating forces it supports while simultaneously receiving constant feedback on adaptive solutions for current and future Army modular forces (figure 1). TRADOC's center of gravity is our ability to continue to learn and, as the "architect of the Army," to adjust how we support the Army's operating force.1 the strength of our formation remains our people-both Soldiers and civilians-whose intellectual energy drives change necessary for the nation's security. This article highlights ongoing changes in TRADOC and seeks to generate the intellectual discourse necessary to lead those changes.

The Threat

Many describe today's threat as asymmetrical. I would submit that this has become an overused term that creates an intellectual box concerning how we wish we could fight versus how we must apply ourselves in a full-spectrum environment where offense, defense, stability, and civil support operations occur simultaneously. Our young leaders and Soldiers understand both the political and military implications of their tactical missions on today's battlefields. They understand that cultural awareness is a combat multiplier for this fight. They also understand that our current enemy and future adversaries recognize our dependence on coalitions and realize the excellence of our tactical formations.

The enemy of today and tomorrow will continue to look for seams where he can achieve limited tactical success reinforced by a highly effective strategic communications effort to magnify his effect. We must train and educate our young leaders and Soldiers to fight and win in this environment, write the concepts and doctrine that guide our decisions, and thoughtfully develop the Future Combat Force for a world more dangerous and complex than that of today.

The Army

Army efforts to change from a division to a brigade combat team-(BCT) based force continue. Lessons learned from redeployed and engaged forces continue to inform TRADOC on the modular force design. We know it is not perfect, and we will continue to refine the doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) requirements with the Department of the Army (DA).

Although many see the modular force as a revolutionary change, the Army force generation (ARFORGEN) model will create the truly dramatic and challenging changes. ARFORGEN has the potential to touch and change every aspect of the Army. Gone are the days of authorized Levels of organization units when TRADOC viewed Soldiers as an input that surged following high school and college graduations. ARFORGEN demands a continuous output of Soldiers to BCTs based on reset dates and requires a prioritization of which units receive mobile training teams (MTTS), which BCTs deploy to dirt Combat training Centers (CTCS), which units conduct collective training at home station, and when units participate in Battle Command training program exercises. TRADOC no longer focuses on a DA-prescribed annual training load to define mission success. Now we must clearly understand the needs and priorities of operating force commanders and become an output-oriented organization, adapted to the needs of the operating force.

Leading Change

Before I became TRADOC commander, a transition team sought to answer a few basic questions: What does TRADOC do well? What does TRADOC need to improve? How must we change? the strength of the transition team was its organizational diversity: It included leaders from TRADOC as well as representatives from across the Army and the joint force; officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and civilians; and members of active component (AC) and reserve component (RC) units. Their view of TRADOC was not through a lens but a prism that projected many facets to view and assess. The team interviewed hundreds of leaders, both active and retired, from across the department of defense (DoD) to gather many thoughts, ideas, and concerns.

This iterative process helped us better understand TRADOC and how it needed to grow. The synthesis of ideas crystallized a vision for TRADOC (figure 2), and five TRADOC areas of interests emerged-areas requiring change from an internal process viewpoint and from an enterprise perspective.

Each of these five TRADOC areas of interests was assigned to a two- or three-star commander from within TRADOC, who formed matrix teams to further analyze and develop solution strategies to create the required changes. A series of issue papers, initially staffed internally and then externally to a DoD audience, were one critical output of this effort. the papers focused on the truly challenging issues we as an Army must address. The feedback we received was extremely informative, both from those who supported our work and from colleagues with different viewpoints. The passionate concerns of many great leaders truly shaped our thoughts. this collaborative work guided our efforts and now forms the basis of TRADOC's Campaign plan objectives:2

_ Recruit, assess, and train Soldiers and develop adaptive leaders.

_ Posture TRADOC to support ARFORGEN implementation.

_ Reshape the fundamental Army learning process for a dynamic operating environment.

_ Redesign TRADOC for excellence.

_ Adapt requirements processes.

_ Support continued development of the Generating Force.

_ Integrate current and future Army modular forces.

TRADOC is an Army Command, but more important, it has an enterprise role to drive change across the Army. Our Campaign plan end-state envisions a TRADOC that has adapted its processes, relationships, and organizations to support the Army campaign objectives and a nation at war.

Recruit, assess, and train Soldiers and develop adaptive leaders. For the first time in our Nation's history, we are using an all-volunteer force to fight a protracted conflict. The challenge of convincing young men and women to serve during war while influencers such as parents, teachers, and coaches preach otherwise, is considerable. However, the U.S. Army recruiting Command has quietly met the Army's recruiting goals every month since april 2005-no easy task-and we have committed considerable resources.

Recruiting the youth of our nation is hard work, and we are only as good as our last month's results. every Soldier and leader in the Army today is a recruiter, and the operating force's interaction with local communities tremendously affects how the nation views the Army. We should all seek opportunities to promote the values and discipline gained by becoming a Soldier and serving our nation.

Over the past three years, TRADOC has dramatically changed initial military training (IMT), and the feedback from the operating force has been positive. Our young Soldiers do more tactical training and weapons firing than ever before. The Warrior tasks and Battle drills that form the core curriculum of basic and advanced individual training prepare Soldiers to fight and win on the battlefield. However, the Soldier receives less technical training, and operating force commanders must understand this constraint and build home-station training programs accordingly.

We continue to refine officer and senior NCO professional development programs to produce adaptive leaders capable of rapid decisionmaking in complex scenarios. Courses such as Basic Officer Leader Course II provide all officers, regardless of branch, the opportunity to train to a common warfighting skill level before they receive basic-branch schooling. (the pilot program at Fort Benning, Georgia, has expanded to include Fort Sill, Oklahoma.) Feedback from the field and from combat veteran instructors and students has allowed us to make evolutionary changes in the program of instruction (POL). Leader courses have also increased the quality and quantity of counterinsurgency doctrine and cultural instruction needed to develop flexible, adaptive leaders of character and competence.

Posture TRADOC to support ARFORGEN implementation. ARFORGEN is the structured progression of increased unit readiness over time that results in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready, and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment in support of civil authorities and combatant commanders.3 ARFORGEN allows commanders to prioritize resources based on well-documented gates, and it permits supporting commands, such as TRADOC, to build nested plans. TRADOC must develop this training-support strategy in close cooperation with Forces Command (FORSCOM), other Army commands, and DA. This training strategy must account for all phases of the model and provide prioritized training for each phase.

TRADOC's support to the ARFORGEN model begins with the recruiters and young men and women who sign enlistment contracts. Currently, those contracts are for a specified number of years and are not tied to when Soldiers begin service or to their first assignments. This process creates friction in the steady output of trained Soldiers the Army requires. It also creates problems in life- cycle units when a Soldier's termination of service date does not match the unit's redeployment date. We can do better; we are working with the Army G1 to emplace a system better nested within the ARFORGEN process.

As we change from a division to a BCT-based Army, a number of brigades will be going through the reset process each year (figure 3). When ARFORGEN reaches its objective phase, an estimated 13 BCTs will reset throughout the course of a year. This aggressive reset process implies a near-continuous output from the training base as well as leaders graduating from TRADOC's education system; it is not based on when we plan for them to graduate, but on the operational Army's manpower needs.

We predict that to meet ARFORGEN's output demands we will need smaller classes that occur more frequently. For example, some low-density military occupation specialty courses will need additional start dates each year to provide a steady flow of IMT graduates to units entering ARFORGEN's reset/train pool. Also, to meet the operating force's needs, we began a second Intermediate- Level education (ILE) class in February 2005 at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to produce graduates twice a year (in December and June).

Our institutional training support plan (ITSP) must link course start and end dates to ARFORGEN's phases and encompass all professional military education, additional skill identifiers, functional training, and MTTS that support individual and unit training throughout the ARFORGEN cycle. the ITSP is an annex to the ARFORGEN Implementation Plan and defines how TRADOC provides institutional training and training support to operational forces. The ITSP leverages FORSCOM's semiannual ARFORGEN synchronization conferences to identify all training requirements. This iterative process surveys the operating force and balances its needs against TRADOC's capacity to provide the requisite training.

We must also change the way TRADOC has traditionally conducted MTTS. In the past, it was generally a first-come, first-served process where units would contact and coordinate directly with the branch schools. Over a several-month period in 2005, TRADOC completed 258 MTTS, but neither TRADOC nor other Army commands prioritized support to those units with the shortest dwell time or deployment dates. This legacy approach is not sustainable in ARFORGEN. The delivery method, whether resident or Mtt, must consider training aids, devices, simulations, and simulators (TADSS) requirements, course size, and course duration. For example, if FORSCOM requests a Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course MTT at a divisional post to reduce Soldier time away from home, that division might provide the equipment and facilities to execute the training. Finally, future MTTS should focus on training the trainer instead of training the Soldier, which would increase

TRADOC's ability to provide an enduring quality of expertise in units. TRADOC cannot fixate on the immediate months just before and after a unit reset date; it must provide first-class training support throughout the ARFORGEN model. As we look at modular force organizations and the number of BCTs entering the ready-force and available-force pools, we must ensure that CTCS are postured and resourced to meet their needs.

The CTCS provide a competitive training environment difficult to replicate at home stations. the Army modular force and ARFORGEN have changed the physics of what TRADOC must provide the operating force to maintain the CTCS as a premiere training event. Army modular forces-

_ Increased the basic rotational design from two maneuver battalions to two combined arms battalions and one reconnaissance squadron. _ Increased the number of companies in a heavy BCT.

_ Pulled assets from the division structure and consolidated them under a brigade troops battalion.

_ Significantly increased the size and capability of the brigade staff.

the Army is reshaping the dirt CTC's operations group to meet the requirements of the new rotational troop list. Also, organic unmanned aerial vehicles, an array of complex digital systems, and the ability of headquarters to influence the full-spectrum battlefield must be stressed through battlefield events, enemy contact, and higher-control-induced stimuli to hone the entire BCT's warfighting edge.

Our opposing forces, long considered the epitome of a thinking and adaptive enemy, must understand and apply the most recent tactics the enemy is using in Iraq and Afghanistan and replicate the human terrain on which we operate.

ARFORGEN also places additional stress on the CTC system by creating more BCTs requiring more frequent training. We can no longer afford to have battalion and brigade commanders receive one CTC rotation per command tour. To solve this challenge, DA, TRADOC, and U.S. Army Europe are building exportable training capability (ETC) packages to provide enhanced collective training at unit home stations or forward-deployed sites. the ETC provides the essential CTC support (observer/controllers, opposing force, instrumentation, TADSS) to conduct a BCT-level exercise. USAREUR's Joint Multinational readiness Center established the first ETC with an initial capacity of conducting four ETC rotations annually. Beginning Fiscal Year (FY) 2009, we will stand up an ETC in the continental United States. Although we have not yet determined the ETC's permanent location, we know it will be sharply focused on advanced home-station training support.4

Reshape the fundamental Army learning process for a dynamic operating environment. the Army's training and leader-development model succinctly captures the notion of lifelong learning and how the learning domains (operational, institutional, and self-development) require mutual support between operating and generating forces.5 to continue our move toward this objective, we must assess what we teach Soldiers, how we teach Soldiers, and how we exchange information between operating and generating forces.

One of TRADOC's objectives is to reduce the time Soldiers spend in school while still providing the operating force with highly trained Soldiers. The key to this is assessing and changing how we present information to the student. Many suggest that distributed learning, distance learning, and assisted learning are possible solutions to reducing the time Soldiers spend away from their units and families. as an institution, we must be cautious about how we integrate distance learning. We should not make Soldiers choose between professional development and spending time with their family.

In my judgment, we should be able to reduce course length by blending distance learning and traditional classroom instruction. Distance learning should not be an entry requirement, but a graduation requirement. For example, the Infantry Captain's Career Course is 19 weeks long. By carefully analyzing the poI, we might be able to shorten that to 16 weeks by moving three weeks of instruction to distance learning, to be completed before graduation. To accomplish this, we need to take advantage of the best available learning technologies and seek advice from industry and academia regarding their best-known methods of delivery.

We must also develop a process to seamlessly link the operating force with the generating force in terms of doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPS), and best practices through a structured but adaptable knowledge-management network. The lessons learned process has become vastly important to our Army. During peacetime, the institutional Army drives change through DOTMLPF and observations of trends at the CTCS. during war, the operating force drives change based on experiences, events, and lessons learned in theaters of operation.

Historically, we have considered TTPS as part of our doctrine-development process, but with the enemy's evolving tactics and the pace of change, this idea might no longer be valid. We believe the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), at Fort Leavenworth, will assume increased responsibility for the horizontal distribution of best practices across the Army, while TRADOC focuses on high-level doctrinal principles and immutable fundamentals.

TRADOC's Lessons Learned Initiative (L2I) envisions branch schools having virtual cells in command posts deployed to theaters and at home stations across the Army. These virtual cells would provide a greater understanding of the current fight, serve as a resource for deployed forces to reach back and query, and help with the horizontal passing of best practices throughout TRADOC as we develop DOTMLPF solutions for the current force and Future Combat Force. L2I is more than CALL with additional resources; it offers an opportunity to better understand and support the operating force with ARFORGEN training, experimentation, and how we monitor and police the communities of practice on the Internet. L2I must be embedded as an integral component of future TRADOC centers of excellence (COE).

Redesign TRADOC for excellence. The Army's new global footprint of forces and the DoD Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) directive provide TRADOC an opportunity to change its internal structures to better support Army needs. Over the decades, our schools and centers have evolved to meet the needs of their respective branches, which has resulted in duplicated efforts and misplaced resources across TRADOC. A COE is an organization that creates the highest standards of achievement by generating synergy through effective, efficient integration of functions while reinforcing the unique requirements and capabilities of the branches.6 the essential requirement is integration, not just colocation. Creating COEs could break some rice bowls, but it would also build leaner, more agile, more adaptive organizations.

The COE model (for single and multi-branch installations) leverages BRAC's momentum by improving combined arms solutions and DOT- MLPF integration, effectiveness, and efficiency through synergy and reduction of redundancy, and by optimizing battle labs to accelerate the development process.

Our COES are organized with four principles in mind. First, and most important, our efforts must support the needs of the operational Army, specifically improving how we interface and provide DOTMLPF solutions. Second, we must develop a common organizational framework to strengthen synergy and integration among proponents, which would include horizontal information-sharing, best practices, and vertical information-passing from within TRADOC to our enterprise-level partners. third, our structure must support the TRADOC core functions of recruiting, IMT, leader development and education, lessons learned, the CTC program, doctrine, training support, concepts, experimentation, and requirements determination.

Each of these functions requires far greater integration with the operating force than ever before. Finally, multi-branch COES will consolidate functions at the center level to the maximum extent possible while maintaining branch identity with branch commandants focusing on leader development, education, and branch functional training.7

The two most well known COES are the Maneuver Center and Fires Center. Moving the armor Center to Fort Benning and the Air Defense Center to Fort Sill requires careful planning to ensure we take care of our Soldiers, their families, and our great DA civilians. It also requires resources and military construction to ensure we can train and educate Soldiers to meet the Army's requirements. However, these are relatively straightforward challenges when compared to changing TRADOC and Army cultures.

We are all products of our branch schooling, but that parochialism is in tension with the mindset required for an expeditionary Army. Developing combined-arms solutions from the beginning of the DOTMLPF process better serves the needs of the Army modular force. To ensure that our new structures have capability, we are developing a dynamic, collaborative network in support of the Army Knowledge Management System embedded in the COES. Key parameters include reaching back from deployed units, monitoring ongoing exercises and experiments, linking to power-generation and power-generation support platforms, and assisting in home-station training.

Other areas we are exploring include maintenance and supply functions, neither of which are TRADOC core functions. Yet, we must have equipment present and operational for training. We are working closely with the Army Materiel Command (AMC) and Installation Management agency (IMA) to develop training base equipment improvement plans to optimize resources and place the experts (AMC and IMA) in charge. We are also relooking how we think about battle labs. As TRADOC commander during the early 1990s, General Frederick Franks instituted the concept of battle labs to experiment with and test emerging concepts needed for future battlefield functions.8 recently, battle labs have focused largely on branch-specific issues, and we believe a broader, more functional approach to requirements-determination might be more useful.

Adapt requirements process. The Army and joint requirements process is a complex, sequential, prescriptive method for developing and acquiring materiel solutions for the military. Its thoroughness is both a virtue and a challenge. It ensures the product is optimized for its intended purpose and nested across DOTMLPF, but it is time-consuming, overly bureaucratic, and could potentially lead to missed opportunities. TRADOC does not own the process, but as an active participant it must understand it to meet the needs of the operating force. The Joint Capabilities Integration and development System (JCIDS) directs the Army's requirement process, so unilateral changes are not a feasible course of action. However, TRADOC's enterprise-level perspective obligates us to review the process and recommend changes as necessary.

The first step is to examine and then reduce the process itself by applying Lean Six Sigma methods to the development, staffing, and approval process of requirements determination. Reducing the staffing process to only two, at the colonel and general officer levels, and developing automated databases of requirement documents and supporting analysis, could help to shift the focus from routine tasks to critical analysis. Additionally, creating a small number of broadly focused, capability-based assessment categories under which we can nest smaller requirements will accelerate the process without being disruptive. TRADOC will conduct rehearsals of concept drills to codify how we will accomplish each of the JCIDS processes. Three critical outputs of these rehearsals are to develop a common vision of the process, capture and publish the rules in a single document allowing participants to clearly understand roles and responsibilities, and provide our recommended changes to DA.

Given the reality of today's operating environment, it is possible to use two separate and distinct requirements processes. One process is very deliberate and futures- and technology-oriented; the other is rapid, to meet the needs of the operating force. Unfortunately, this creates an inevitable tension between doing things quickly and doing things precisely. Operational needs statements have proven incredibly helpful in getting equipment into the hands of the formations in contact. However, we are experiencing the fallout of materiel solutions that do not come with training packages, sustainment plans, or the ability to interface with other equipment. TRADOC has an obligation to evaluate new requirements through a DOTMLPF lens because materiel not properly integrated from the beginning tends to cause problems later in its life cycle.

Senior leaders must constantly look for targets of opportunity to advance technological capabilities to meet the needs of the operational force. To achieve this objective, we must operationalize the requirements process and bring commanders in at appropriate decision points. To support their decisionmaking, we must develop commander's critical information requirements to separate ordinary data from key information and to focus the staff's analysis and recommendations in forums similar to battle update briefs. The speed of technological advances combined with the adversary's changing tactics creates windows of opportunities that open and close quickly. Only with commanders' informed involvement can we seize these opportunities.

Support continued development of the generating force. The evolution of the institutional Army to the generating force is ongoing. The incredibly diverse functions that various Army commands execute make transformation challenging but necessary to provide responsive title 10 functions to sustain a joint and expeditionary Army with campaign qualities. As an emerging concept, generating forces wrestles with fundamental questions: What is the generating force? How is it different from the institutional Army? What are its core competencies? A proposed definition for the generating force is: The generating force provides Title 10 organizing, training, and equipping functions that direct and resource, develop, generate, project, and sustain forces' operational capability for use by the combatant commander.9

Developing doctrine. TRADOC has identified three areas critical to the Army's conversion to a generating force: developing generating-force doctrine, achieving military-to-civilian conversion, and developing a foundation for civilian education and leader development. TRADOC will be working closely with other generating-force Army commands in the staffing of Field Manual 1-01, The Generating Force for the Army in Joint Operations: 2015-2024, which discusses implementation strategies and articulates the role of the generating force in support of the operating force.10 this doctrine must focus on overarching principles and not TTPS to give the maximum flexibility to commanders and to fully support the changes occurring in the operating force. Although separating the Army into a generating and an operating force might be useful for analyzing functions and organizations, the distinction blurs in practice.

As we develop doctrinal foundations, three main points emerge. First, the generating force must be hyper-responsive in generating the necessary capabilities. Second, the generating force reach must be seamless or, in some cases, colocated in the area of operations. Examples of this include the sustainment functions conducted at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, and the knowledge reach-back available through the communities of interest. Finally, generating-force functions must be capable of replication in an area of operation. Conducting concurrent combat, stability, and reconstruction operations calls on many skill sets required to build an Army. The best example of this might be the training of police and Army units in Iraq and Afghanistan.11

Converting positions. DA has announced it intends to grow the operating force to 355,000 Soldiers within an Army end strength of 482,400 active component Soldiers over the next several years.12 TRADOC acknowledges this requirement and is actively working with the Army for an optimal solution. However, we must be cognizant of what this means to TRADOC's ability to meet mission requirements. One partial solution is converting military positions to civilian positions. In FY 2005, TRADOC converted more than 3,000 Soldier positions to civilian positions. Conversion does not equate to a decrease in capability, but it does give TRADOC a different dynamic.

As we lead our organization through change, the first critical step is for commanders to identify those positions Soldiers must fill and those civilians can fill. Right now, Soldier-only positions include those required to maintain combat readiness; those required by law, such as joint positions; and those that require the enforcement of good order and discipline.13 For example, we must fill drill sergeant positions with Soldiers, but civilians can fill positions that teach a technical skill.

Educating and developing civilians. We are taking on the challenge of civilian education within TRADOC. Organizations becoming increasingly civilianized require an investment in civilian education and civilian leader development. If we are to take advantage of the talents of our civilian work- force, we must educate them for the future. Analysis reveals that the Army sees civilian education as a cost, not an investment, and consequently the Army does not have an integrated, centrally managed, or adequately resourced program.

Several measurable objectives could fix this challenge. First, we must develop a civilian education model and policies that are sequential, progressive, tied to increased responsibility, and codified in a DA pamphlet (pam) 600-type publication.14 Second, if we are serious about investing resources in our civilians, we probably need to take a hard look at establishing a transient account for civilian education so that supervisors who send civilians to school are not hindered by having an empty seat in the office. Third, we must tie civilian progression to mobility and professional development. If the Army commits resources for training and incentives for promotion, civilians must be prepared to fill nominative assignments regardless of location. Changing the civilian education process is a huge undertaking, but it has incredible potential. TRADOC is prepared to test a pilot program with the objective of achieving small victories over time versus changing a huge system immediately.

Integrate current and future Army modular forces. Our future operating environment will be highly complex, distributed, and extremely lethal. our enemies are currently training cadres of people who are studying how we operate, what strengths to avoid, and where we are vulnerable. Any future force we develop must be unambiguously tied to the campaign needs that TRADOC pam 525-3-0, The Army in Joint Operations: The Army's Future Force Capstone Concept 2015-2024, outlines.15 this is where the intellectual must drive the physical, and our concepts must drive DOTMLPF solutions.

Figure 4 lists the seven key ideas of the Army's Joint operational Concept for future military operations.16 Currently, we do not have the capability to realize these seven ideas, but through wargaming, experimentation and further concept development, we will be able to form a comprehensive DOT- MLPF perspective and integrate all force-capability requirements. This is hard but important work, and we are working closely with Joint Forces Command and the other services to identify and integrate joint required capabilities to ensure we get this right.

We must also maintain a running dialog with the operating force to understand its needs, determine what works, and identify current capability gaps. We cannot allow the Future Combat Force to become isolated from current operations and useful only to scientists and theoreticians. As we identify capability gaps and direct analytical support for DOTMLPF development, including validation of research and development priorities for key Army science and technology needs, we must seek opportunities to make those capabilities available now to the current force. These developments help those formations currently in contact, but also show tangible progress and will sustain the valuable support the Army has received to date.

The evaluation Brigade Combat team slated to be activated at Fort Bliss will truly accelerate the process. As we place new doctrine and technologies in the hands of young Soldiers and leaders, we have no doubt they will surprise us with their innovation and understanding of how to get more out of the organization than originally designed. TRADOC will focus on overarching principles and allow Soldiers to develop the TTPs needed to fight with this emergent formation. No matter how complex the future force becomes, there remains a fundamental truth that training superiority trumps technical wizardry every time. This might imply the need to develop new training methods as we develop and mature the Future Combat System-equipped BCT.

Our vision for TRADOC is simple: Victory Starts Here! I believe this is absolutely true, and it starts in our classrooms, on our ranges, and all across TRADOC where we develop young Soldiers and adaptive leaders. It is where the foundation of our great Army begins. As we fight this long war, there will be a tremendous amount of focus on current operations, which is appropriate. TRADOC is charged with preparing Soldiers for current needs while thinking about the Army's future needs and how we will achieve our objectives. Some of these objectives are simple changes to internal processes, and we will be able to achieve them quickly. Other objectives require coordination at the enterprise level, and we will not realize them for years. As the generating force draws closer to the operating force, we look forward to exchanging thoughts and concerns as we adapt and learn now and in the future. Victory Starts Here!

NOTES

1. U.S. Army training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), TRADOC Campaign Plan, Fort Monroe, Virginia, coordinating draft, 22 March 2006.

2. Ibid.

3. U.S. Department of the Army, Army Campaign Plan (Washington, DC: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff G3, 30 September 2005), change 2, annex F, Army Force Generation.

4. U.S. Army Combined Arms Center-Training (CAC-T) briefing, "CTC Way Ahead: Update to the Army training and leader Development Conference," Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 29 September 2005.

5. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 7-0, Training the Force (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 22 October 2002), 1-6.

6. CAC in-Process review (IPR) to Commanding General (CG) TRADOC, "TRADOC Area of Interest (TAI) 3-Redesign for Excellence Solution Strategies," Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 15 December 2005.

7. CAC briefing, "TRADOC Area of Interest (TAI) 3-Redesign for Excellence Solution Strategies," TRADOC Senior leaders Conference, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 26 January 2006.

8. In 1992 Gen Frederick Franks, CG TRADOC, established six battle labs: Early Entry, Lethality and Survivability Battle Lab, Fort Monroe, Virginia; Depth and Simultaneous Attack, Fort Sill, Oklahoma; Mounted Battle Space, Fort Knox, Kentucky; Dismounted Battle Space, Fort Benning, Georgia; Battle Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and Combat Service Support, Fort Lee, Virginia (unpublished point paper, "History of the TRADOC Battle Labs," Office of the TRADOC Historian, Fort Monroe, Virginia, December 2005).

9. E-mail exchange between the TRADOC Commander's Planning Group and U.S. Army Combined arms Support Command (CASCOM) initiatives Group, 30 January 2006.

10. FM 1-01, The Generating Force for the Army in Joint Operations: 2015- 2024 (Washington, DC: TRADOC, Futures Center (Forward), 26 September 2005), 11-31.

11. Ibid.

12. Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 2006 Army Posture Statement (washington, DC: 10 February 2006), 20.

13. U.S Army Combined Arms Support Center (CASCOM) briefing, "TRADOC area of interest 5," 27 January 2006.

14. All Da PaM 600-XX publications deal with personnel issues.

15. TraDOC Pamphlet 525-3-0, The Army in Joint Operations: The Army Future Force Capstone Concept 2015-2024 (Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters, TRADOC, 7 april 2005), 16-36.

16. Ibid.

Also available online at:
http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/
MayJun06/WEB%20pdf/Wallace.pdf

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