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Reshaping The Expeditionary Army To Win Decisively: The Case For Greater Stabilization Capacity In The Modular Force

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Brian G. Watson

Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
August, 2005

Army Col. Brian G. Watson is a member of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2005.

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Reshaping The Expeditionary Army To Win Decisively: The Case For Greater Stabilization Capacity In The Modular Force

The United States is without question the world's premier superpower and, as such, bears a heightened responsibility as the foremost champion of freedom. Major shifts in the security landscape have made fulfilling that responsibility increasingly difficult. In response, the United States made significant revisions to the objectives and concepts of its national strategy, with greater emphasis on leveraging all instruments of power to subjugate regimes whose oppressive rule, ideological opposition, and use of terrorism threaten the expansion of the global family of free and democratic states with open economies.

America's armed forces are the most capable and formidable in the world. Their ability to defeat swiftly any adversary and terminate con(ct on favorable terms is uncontested. But under the new strategy, con(ct termination is no longer fully sufficient. Long-term con(ct resolution manifested by the emergence of a new democracy-regime change-has become the chief campaign objective of military intervention. Consequently, winning this nation's future wars will require an expeditionary land force with broader campaign qualities in order to conduct both decisive combat operations and stability operations.

Today, the U.S. Army is decisively engaged in both fighting an unfamiliar type of war and transforming itself to meet the challenges of future warfare. But what are those challenges? What capabilities does U.S. strategy demand of its military instrument? Where are the major capability gaps, and how should they inform Army Transformation to ensure the future expeditionary Army has the right campaign qualities?

This paper argues that the major capability gap in today's force-and vital for future campaigns-is the ability to conduct stabilization as part of expeditionary land warfare. Moreover, it makes the case that the Army's major transformation effort-the Modular Force-does little to improve the Army's stabilization capability. This paper begins by exploring the changes in U.S. strategy that are the impetus behind the need for greater capacity to conduct post-con(ct stabilization and reconstruction in the future force. Then it analyzes the emerging role of the Army in post-con(ct operations in the context of modern combat to understand more fully the specific requirements of stabilization. The paper then develops an operational concept-progressive stabilization-that complements the Army's concept of rapid decisive operations. It outlines three key force attributes an expeditionary force structure must have to provide the requisite mix of combat and stabilization capabilities. Finally, this paper builds on those attributes to suggest three areas where Army leaders must make near-term adjustments in the Modular Force to ensure the nation has a truly expeditionary force with the campaign capacity for both rapid decisive operations and stabilization.

Stabilization and Reconstruction: A Strategic Requirement

The case for stabilization and reconstruction as an essential warfighting capability begins by understanding the new threat and the corresponding changes to U.S. strategy that are redefining the chief aim of armed con(ct and the scope of future campaigns. Globalization has created a family of like-minded states who strive to institutionalize such ideological norms as free markets, open societies, the rule of law, and popular governance. In the process, globalization has also exposed a group of illegitimate and/or ineffective governments and nonstate actors who violently reject these institutions because accepting them threatens their survival and challenges the ideologies on which they are founded.1 Chronic instability, violent internal con(ct, genocide, religious extremism, and rampant corruption are symptomatic conditions of ineffective, illegitimate, and oppressive regimes bent on insulating themselves from the in「ence of globalization. These conditions, in turn, invite an alliance with opportunistic nonstate actors who are also ideologically opposed to globalization's precepts.2 Oppressive regimes provide geographic sanctuary, a populace ripe for recruits, and a global venue for grievances, while nonstate actors provide the regimes with a new instrument of power capable of global reach, using means a state cannot otherwise condone.3

The strategic aims of this new threat alliance are to remain in power and to block the spread of globalization into their region-no matter what the social or economic cost. These aims put them on an ideological collision course with the world's champion of freedom-the United States.4 The direct threat to the United States and its functioning partners is, therefore, the increasingly wide array of traditional, irregular, and catastrophic means employed by this alliance to erode U.S. power and achieve regional dominance.5 The use of traditional modern military forces to challenge U.S. resolve within a region remains a possibility. But, the use of irregular means such as inciting terrorism, insurgency, international crime, and civil war are now the chief asymmetric means employed by oppressive regimes and their nonstate henchmen to mitigate U.S. strengths. The new race for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or similar effect weapons represents the most dangerous threat. These weapons give the threat the capacity to paralyze the political will of free nations, ignite regional instability, and create opportunities for regional dominance.6 Remaining in power is integral to the threat's overall security strategy. Pervasive internal oppression and autocratic governance become key strategic concepts. Invasive, omnipotent state-run security forces quell any internal opposition. Staterun infrastructure and public services provide absolute control over every aspect of the populace's quality of life. Oppressive regimes strengthen their grip over the populace by instituting a system of national policies and domestic controls designed to block-or at least marginalize-outside ideological in「ences on the society and economy.

In response to this new threat, the United States is adjusting its security strategy in recognition that America can no longer ignore these emerging threats or their underlying cause and remain a world leader. The core objectives of American strategy remain unchanged: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations, and respect for human dignity. Strategic concepts such as defusing regional con(cts, defeating global terrorism, and preventing or preempting threats from WMD represent new ways the United States intends to counter the array of traditional, irregular, and catastrophic threats it now faces. However, the most remarkable shift in U.S strategy is the prominence given to expanding the circle of development by building the infrastructure of democracy in place of tyrannical regimes.7 In this way, the new strategy acknowledges that U.S. long-term security requires refocusing the instruments of power towards resolving or removing the underlying conditions of con(ct-the oppressive regimes themselves. This revelation makes the business of proactive regime change a central feature of American strategy.

The strategic emphasis on democratization affects all instruments of power, but the impact on military forces and the scope of future armed con(ct are especially profound. Achieving long-term con(ct resolution enjoys new prominence, and the new measure of effectiveness is how well-armed con(ct refashions an oppressive regime into a free, open, and democratic society.8 Consequently, the terms of favorable con(ct termination also are redefined under the new strategy. Swiftly defeating an oppressive regime's efforts to achieve regional dominance, acquire WMD, or support terrorism is no longer sufficient. Regime change is the new standard for con(ct termination because it attains the prerequisite for achieving the only acceptable outcome of war-a new democracy.9

Expanding the scope of armed con(ct to include regime change (con(ct termination) and democratization (con(ct resolution), in turn, has exposed a major gap in the nation's strategic capabilities. Today's military instrument is optimized for achieving con(ct termination in the traditional context. It is designed to defeat the direct threats to the United States and its partners, but not the underlying cause of those threats. The new strategy requires a military with broader range of capabilities: adept at simultaneously destroying an adversary's military capability, removing the regime, and maintaining the long-term stability needed to foster progress towards a free and open society.10 Likewise, the nation needs greater reconstruction capacity to exploit rapidly the stability achieved by the military. The ability to conduct stabilization and reconstruction are essential to winning future con(ct, but represent significant capability gaps in today's military force and other instruments of power.

The United States implemented its new security strategy with high-stakes operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The success of both operations hinges on the ability of U.S. land forces to achieve the full measure of "winning decisively" and provide the capacity for long-term stabilization commensurate with their new role in con(ct resolution. Because "you go to war with the force you have," the Army has struggled with generating the right capabilities. The Army was not built for this new role in warfare. In the years preceding September 11, 2001 (9/11), the Army had a different view of its responsibilities in future warfare and embarked on a different modernization course, one that featured different capabilities than it now requires.

The Army Misreads the Future Landscape

In the 1990s, the Army leadership was confronted with two views of the future and a choice to make on what capabilities it needed in the post-Cold War environment. On the one hand, the success of Operation DESERT STORM fostered a prevailing view that the chief role of the Army was to defeat an adversary's ground force swiftly and then promptly return home-leaving post-con(ct operations to someone else. Faced with 40 percent less combat force structure after the post-Cold War drawdown, this camp advocated a modernization path that improved strategic responsiveness through smaller, lighter, more lethal, and leaner forces. The Army's vision centered on developing combat formations that were enabled by "network centric warfare" with enhanced deployability and precision lethality to complement the "shock and awe" of the Joint Force.11

On the other hand, the last 2 decades saw a sharp rise in the use of military force for a completely different type of mission-stability operations-with a need for vastly different capabilities. This trend was a source of great angst among senior military leaders and aggravated a long-standing cultural aversion to the use of U.S. military power for nation-building. These operations represented everything military commanders hope to avoid: extended and open-ended deployments, ambiguous political and military objectives, no clear signs of military victory, and indifference among Americans at home for their sacrifice.12 The increasing frequency of these missions around the world, however, was dismissed as an aberration rather than a forewarning of the future security environment and the role of America's Army.

Cultural aversion trumped experiential learning, and the Army embarked on a modernization path defined by a new operational framework-Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO). The RDO concept aimed at enabling the military instrument to respond quickly with smaller, more lethal forces to bring regional con(ct threatening U.S interests to a rapid and decisive close.13 Its central operational framework- effects based operations-integrated the application of precision engagement, information operations, theater enablers, and dominant maneuver to produce a relentless series of multidimensional raids, strikes, and ground assaults throughout the battlespace. When correctly arranged in time and space, these operations attack the adversary in dimensions he is unable to counter, allowing U.S. forces and their allies to dictate the tempo and terms of any operation.14 RDO was hailed as a revolution in military thinking. Its singular focus on rapid termination of the con(ct vice long-term commitment of forces to resolve long-standing problems represented a bold shift from the former thinking about warfare.15 RDO became the rallying point for the Army's march into the future. It pervaded military thinking, equipment procurement, unit redesign, and force structure decisions regarding combat support and service support units.

The wake-up call came when the United States required its military instrument to execute the new strategy. The mission-permanently reduce the threat to the United States by defeating two errant regimes ideologically opposed to freedom in Afghanistan and Iraq and replace them with constitutional democracies. The Army, however, was not designed for the full task at hand. While the Army had perfected its ability to defeat any adversary swiftly, it also had mortgaged its ability to conduct protracted stability operations and deliver the enduring results the national strategy now insisted it achieve.

The Consequence of Rapid Decisive Force to Promote Stability

There are two great truths distilled from the myriad of lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq. First, the U.S. military has superbly achieved the vision of RDO. U.S. forces are capable of destroying an adversary's military and decapitating its national leadership with blinding speed and efficiency, using exceptionally low force levels. Second, too much of a good thing is not always the right thing. Overwhelming success in RDO produces 2nd and 3rd-order effects detrimental to creating the conditions for a free and open society to emerge within a region-the chief objective of military intervention in the modern environment.

The traditional form of combat operations has several inherent characteristics that make it conducive to setting the conditions for nation-building. Typical characteristics include gradual build up of overwhelming force, offensive campaigns lasting extensive periods of time, progressive and foreseeable culmination of the enemy's military capacity, and a formal capitulation of the enemy regime followed by a cease fire.16 Upon con(ct termination, the large military presence and relatively secure contiguous areas of operation facilitated a "military occupation" and deliberate transition to post-con(ct stability operations. This, in turn, afforded the international community with the time necessary to plan reconstruction, muster resources, and begin the process of nation-building in secure areas already occupied by large forces.

Conversely, RDO are designed specifically to produce relentless pressure on an adversary's regime and its military force to induce a simultaneous and catastrophic collapse. Compressed timelines for crisis planning, rapid force deployments, and near-immediate initiation of combat operations allow the friendly force to dictate quickly the tempo of operations. Commitment of relatively few ground combat units, empowered with overwhelming precision joint fires, ensures rapid maneuver, and enables the force to induce the simultaneous and catastrophic collapse of both the enemy force and national leadership. Con(ct termination occurs quickly-almost unpredictably-as both the opposing military force and national leadership ‘e for survival. The simultaneous collapse of the regime and its military forces also means an abrupt halt in internal security, emergency services, public services, and transportation infrastructure. Consequently, RDO leave a power vacuum in oppressive regimes where internal security, economic, social, and political structures are already fragile after years of neglect.18

These characteristics of RDO exacerbate setting the conditions for con(ct resolution in a number of ways. First, the rapid deployment of military force in response to crisis, immediate initiation of hostilities, and swift termination of con(ct simply outpace the U.S. and the international community's ability to generate the capacity for post-con(ct nation-building. This makes the ground combat forces wholly responsible for filling the security and public service vacuum left by the catastrophic collapse of the regime. But a ground force optimized for RDO does not have the depth or breadth of capabilities required to fill a vacuum of the magnitude and complexity left by catastrophic collapse. Operations must take a "strategic pause" while vital post-con(ct nation-building capabilities are mustered, deployed, and employed using military and other instruments of power. Each passing day spent in this "strategic pause" brings a heightened risk of internal security disintegrating, rampant lawlessness emerging, and the support of the "newly liberated" populace waning as they fail to experience any improvement in their human condition. The impending internal deterioration affords nonstate actors in opposition to the emergence of a free society with the tinderbox needed to ignite a liberation insurgency.

RDO is here to stay as the framework for conducting combat operations and terminating con(ct. But RDO is only one component of the broader range of campaign qualities needed in the Army to conduct military interventions intended to liberate failing nation-states, change the conditions that prompted con(ct, and promote democracy.20 In today's security environment, the ability to mitigate promptly the adverse symptoms of RDO is essential to achieving an enduring victory. It demands a military instrument with a force capacity to execute transparent and swift transitions from RDO to stability operations.

The challenges of modern warfare and modern political objectives demand an Army specifically designed to win battles and stabilize regions. Change depends on a fundamental shift in the military mindset-one that genuinely considers stability operations as mission essential. More importantly, it relies on committing the resources necessary to build a viable capacity for stability operations on equal par with RDO.

The Winds of Change Begin to Blow

The gap in national capacity to promote the emergence of a democratic regime in the aftermath of war has not gone unnoticed. Each instrument of power seems to be answering the call to close the gap. The Department of State has established an Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction to lead and coordinate U.S. Government efforts to "stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from con(ct or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy."21 The U.S. Congress has recently proposed a wide range of initiatives aimed at synchronizing National Security Council and State Department efforts, creating a corps of permanent civilian employees that could respond to post-con(ct stability operations, and establishing stability and reconstruction training facilities. The Bush administration also recently proposed the Global Peace Operations Initiative, a $661 million program, to assist other nations to train and equip military forces to participate in coalition stability operations.22

Perhaps the most striking wind of change has come from within the Department of Defense (DoD)- once the mainstay of opposition to committing military forces to stability operations. Spurred by recommendations of the Defense Science Board, the Secretary of Defense recently prepared a draft DoD Directive telling the Services to reshape forces to provide a more robust stabilization and reconstruction capability.23 More specifically, it directs the Army and Navy to lead the effort in organizing, training, and equipping Army and Marine Corps Active and Reserve Component forces to provide the range of combat, combat support, and combat service support capabilities needed during transitions to and from hostilities. The directive also instructs the Commanders of Regional Combatant Commands to give primary responsibility for stabilization and reconstruction operations to their Combined/Joint Force Land Component Commander.24

Change also is evident in recent revisions of the Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept (SOJOC). The SOJOC identifies two prime purposes of stability operations: to ensure the uninterrupted continuation of combat operations and to create favorable conditions for post-con(ct reconstruction and long-term U.S. success.25 The joint concept establishes the importance of conducting stability operations concurrent with and immediately following major combat operations, with emphasis on their inherent interdependence. During major combat operations, stability operations are essential to facilitating the forward momentum of combat operations. Immediately following con(ct, stability operations ensure armed con(ct does not reemerge in the vacuum left by combat operations and enables other instruments of power to surmount the underlying conditions that led to con(ct in the first place.26 The SOJOC underscores the important role military forces have in establishing a safe and secure environment, providing essential social services, rebuilding critical infrastructure, and providing humanitarian relief in order to facilitate the transition to legitimate local civil governance.27 The joint concept is founded on the premise that a successful marriage between combat operations and stability operations is so vital to achieving national objectives in military con(ct that it must be a core mission of U.S. military forces.28 In fact, the joint doctrine suggests that, out to the year 2015, the most likely context for the employment of military forces to conduct stability operations is the aftermath of armed con(ct to defeat transnational actors or errant regimes.29

Understanding Stabilization Versus Reconstruction

Precise use of terminology is always problematic when discussing the development of new capabilities. The recent proliferation of military thinking about post-con(ct operations is no exception. Two of the most widely used terms to describe the suite of new capabilities a land force must possess are stabilization and reconstruction. Sometimes these terms are used interchangeably. Other times they are used in conjunction with one another to describe a single capability (e.g., stability and reconstruction capability.)30 While current Joint doctrine does not define either term, the DoD Directive instructing the Military Departments to develop "stability and reconstruction" provides some useful definitions and distinctions.31 Stabilization is defined as the effort "to create a secure and stable environment and to provide for the basic human needs of the population to include food, water, sanitation, and shelter." 32 Reconstruction, on the other hand, is the effort "to create a stable and self-governing polity by establishing the rule of law, rehabilitating the economy, and otherwise improving the welfare of the people."33 Hence, both stability and reconstruction are essential components of the larger purpose of stability operations to "maintain or reestablish order and promote stability."34 But they also are distinctly different efforts involving different tasks, performed by different organizations, at different operational levels.

As defined above, stabilization efforts are tied most closely to mitigating the adverse effects that RDO has on security, populace, and critical infrastructure at the tactical level. The chief aim is two-fold: provide immediate human relief, and ward off the conditions that can fuel an insurgency. Stabilization demands synchronizing activities with combat operations and integrating a wide range of capabilities throughout the battlespace-particularly immediately following major engagements in urban areas. For these reasons, military forces under military control are the most suitable agents for stabilization.

Stabilization sets the conditions for reconstruction where the chief aim is fostering the emergence of a new member of the global community. Reconstruction represents a shift towards rebuilding local and national institutions that provide legitimate governance, economic growth, national public welfare, and rule of law. As such, reconstruction is the primary domain of civilian agencies within government, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations.

While stabilization and reconstruction are distinctly different efforts, they overlap in both time and space and are equally interdependent. Stabilization must be successful in order for reconstruction to begin. Furthermore, stabilization efforts continue during the course of reconstruction by providing steadfast improvements in security, human condition, and infrastructure to facilitate extending the reconstruction operation throughout the battlespace. Consequently, the focus and intensity of stabilization efforts will vary at times and in different locations, but its purpose remains fixed on setting the conditions for reconstruction. Finally, only successful reconstruction ultimately terminates the stabilization effort and resolves the con(ct.

A Closer Look at Stabilization

While all instruments of international power contribute to stabilization, the burden to generate the necessary capabilities, prioritize resources, and integrate their execution on the battlefield falls squarely upon the land force. The de facto presence of military forces, combined with their unique ability to operate in crisis environments under extreme conditions, makes them the force of choice.35 In the new American way of war, the success or failure of combat operations depends increasingly on the ability of land forces to overcome the gap between combat operations and reconstruction.36 History confirms a direct correlation between the size of military presence during post-con(ct stabilization and reconstruction, and the likelihood that favorable long-term con(ct resolution is achieved.37 Given that successful reconstruction of a nation-state typically takes 4 years or longer, success depends on a land force with the capacity for protracted stabilization, and a nation willing to commit its forces for the duration.38

Stabilization requires the land force generate capabilities in four critical task areas to fill the void left by RDO and set the conditions for reconstruction by other national and international instruments. These areas are: sustain the populace, repair critical infrastructure, provide internal and external security, and synchronize transitions and turn-overs.39 First, the land force must have the capability to provide internal and external security as necessary to establish and maintain a foothold for all other stabilization activities to occur. This requires combat forces to defeat or destroy all internal or external elements that continue to oppose the emergence of a new society or that would promote anarchy after con(ct termination. Security also involves imposing civil law and order by employing military police units working in lieu of or reinforcing indigenous police organizations.

A second critical task is improving and sustaining the welfare of the populace rapidly in the wake of combat. Initially, the land force must focus on providing the local populace with emergency medical support and sustainment (food and water) in order to improve the human condition immediately. However, sustaining the populace over the course of stabilization may require the land force to expand the scope of assistance beyond rudimentary life support quickly. Providing preventive medicine, school restoration, supply distribution, refugee control, and reopening local markets are all vitally important to sustaining the populace in the interim, while reconstruction capacity continues to build. Expanding populace sustainment activities provides visible signs of progress key to maintaining indigenous support.

Third, rapid repair and protection of critical infrastructure are essential on a number of levels. These efforts improve the mobility of the populace, enable the work force to return to jobs, and facilitate the return of commerce-all highly visible signs of progress that set the conditions for the emergence of a new social and political order. Repairing critical infrastructure also is essential to ensuring effective, sustained, and uninterrupted military operations-particularly intra-theater mobility. Urban rubble clearance, road repair, bridging, airfield repair, ordnance disposal, water/natural gas pipeline repair, electrical power generation, and waste management are among the myriad of critical tasks the land force must accomplish in short order.

Finally, the land force must have the command and control capacity to handle the complexity of conducting stabilization in concert with combat operations and master rapid and smooth transitions with diverse outside agencies. Land force headquarters and staffs must have the depth and breadth of experience to anticipate and effectively control the transition from combat operations to stabilization operations at the tactical and operational level. These transitions will be erratic across the battlespace, progressing more rapidly in some areas than others and requiring different combinations of capabilities to provide security, sustain the populace, and repair infrastructure. Foreseeing and controlling the transition from stabilization to reconstruction is equally important. As governmental and nongovernmental organizations build reconstruction capacity within the host-state or region, the dependence on unique military capabilities lessens.

Understanding each of the four tasks involved in stabilization is essential to understanding what capabilities the Army must provide to mitigate the effects of rapid decisive operation and achieve the enduring results demanded by U.S. strategy. But, there is a missing component-a coherent operational concept for how stabilization capabilities function in concert with RDO as part of future campaigns. That concept is "progressive stabilization."

Progressive Stabilization Concept: The Missing Link

Winning the nation's future wars not only requires a land force that fully attains the Army's vision of "an expeditionary force with campaign qualities," but also expands that vision to include stabilization.40 It obliges the Army to broaden the context of an expeditionary force to include the generation, employment, and integration of a more dynamic array of stabilization capabilities in ways that are complementary to RDO. Overcoming this new challenge means the Army must retool how it employs forces to achieve the right balance of capabilities. Progressive stabilization provides a conceptual framework for fully integrating stabilization efforts with combat operations and defines a path forward for force modernization decisions. Progressive stabilization is founded on two principles: 1) early integration of emergency stabilization efforts into combat operations at the lower tactical level, and 2) rapid expansion of stabilization efforts to exploit success and set the conditions for reconstruction.41

Integration of stabilization efforts at the outset of combat is vital to success.42 The initial aim of progressive stabilization is to mitigate the effects of combat on the populace and counter conditions that, if ignored, could ignite or support a liberation insurgency. To that end, the land force must be capable of infusing highly ‘xible stabilization force packages directly into forward brigade combat teams (BCTs) when and where combat allows. These stabilization force packages include a tailored mix of combat, combat support, and combat service support units under singular command and control-usually a battalion or task force-provided to the BCT in either a command or support relationship. The mix and size of units assigned to a stabilization task force may vary, but the focus remains on providing forward brigades with an initial capacity to provide emergency relief to the populace and begin initial repair of the most critical infrastructure. Stabilization task forces may contain some specialized security force capabilities, but will rely most heavily upon the BCT to set security conditions. The intent is to provide forward brigade commanders with the ability to exercise mission command for initial stabilization efforts through a single subordinate and thereby maintain the freedom of action of organic combat battalions.

Rapid expansion of the stabilization effort in both scope and geographical area is paramount to exploiting the success of initial stabilization efforts and the larger combat operation. Generating larger brigade-sized units capable of accepting "stabilization hand-over" from the forward BCTs is vitally important. It enables the land force commander to preserve the freedom of action of the combat force and become the principle mechanism for expanding the stabilization effort to set conditions for reconstruction. After hand-over, multifunctional stabilization brigades provide mission command over all stabilization efforts within an assigned area, and focus on expanding both the scope of populace support and infrastructure. These stabilization brigades must also include some combat security forces. However, their focus is on maintaining internal security and law enforcement at the local level. Consequently, the stabilization brigade will command a wide and ever-changing array of forces to accomplish all four critical task areas.

The stabilization brigade enhances the land force commander's mission command over stabilization efforts by ensuring continuity and unity of effort, particularly during transitions at the tactical level. A major function of the stabilization brigade is making certain that stabilization efforts expand in ways that are responsive to, and synchronized with, the combat operations of forward BCTs. For example, a stabilization brigade's area of responsibility may increase or decrease in direct response to the needs of forward combat brigades. Priorities for infrastructure repair are driven equally by requirements to support current and future combat operations as well as stabilization and future reconstruction. Similarly, decisions on the {w and bed-down of displaced persons must support the combat operation. Unlike BCTs whose assigned sector shifts to facilitate a position of advantage against enemy forces, the stabilization brigade's area of operation remains generally fixed relative to the geography of demographics and infrastructure to facilitate establishing a rapport with the people and ensuring a smooth transition to reconstruction. While the chief aim of the stabilization brigade is expanding the scope of the stabilization effort, it must do so in a manner that both supports the forward BCTs and sets the conditions for long-term turnover to reconstruction organizations.

Implications for the Army's Future Expeditionary Force

Future warfare requires an expeditionary Army with some new campaign qualities inherent in its organizational design. The expeditionary land force (Army and Marines) must generate rapidly the capability to provide land dominance during RDO (blue line). But concurrent with the prosecution of combat operations, the land force must simultaneously build and employ capabilities to conduct progressive stabilization operations (green line) throughout the remainder of the campaign. This construct underscores three expeditionary force qualities that the Army must achieve as it transforms the force.

First, the ability to initiate progressive stabilization from the outset as an inherent part of combat operations demands a ready force pool of stabilization capabilities in the active force. The Army must have a robust force pool comprised of modular and scalable combat support and service support units that can be tailored rapidly under multifunctional battalion and brigade headquarters and integrated into operations as coherent force packages. Modularity ensures the correct combinations can be achieved; scalability ensures the force can be right-sized for the specific mission. This facilitates the formation of stabilization task forces that can integrate directly into committed BCTs during the initial phase of combat operations to initiate stabilization efforts. As major combat operations mature and the stabilization efforts grow, the force pool must be capable of generating larger stabilization brigades that are able to assume stabilization responsibility for larger areas, allowing the BCTs to continue combat operations or redeploy. Creating a modular, scalable, and modernized pool of stabilization capabilities in the active force is essential and represents the most "bang for buck" in better preparing the Army for future warfare.

The need to generate forces for RDO and progressive stabilization simultaneously underscores the importance of a second defining attribute of future expeditionary operations-surge capacity of a wider and larger array of forces. The Army must have a more balanced surge capacity to generate the aggregate requirements for both RDO and progressive stabilization. The issue centers on the capacity to surge the requisite combat support and service support units for stabilization in addition to those needed to support the BCTs for RDO. Historically, the Army has marginalized the amount of combat support and service support in the active force to the minimum required to support its basic combat formations and preserve precision force structure spaces for "early deployers." In the new force, the term "early deployers" must encompass those capabilities needed to generate both a rapid decisive combat force and a progressive stabilization force. The Army must reconsider its previous force structure decisions and adjust the mix of combat, combat support, and service support within the active force structure to fully satisfy the balanced surge requirement.

Finally, a distinguishing feature of future land campaigns is the relatively short duration of major combat operations (several months) compared to stabilization operations (3 to 4 years or more.)43 Campaign "staying power" becomes a premier attribute of an expeditionary Army force structure, but is defined by protracted stabilization vice protracted combat operations. Consequently, a greater portion of the Army's active force and almost all of the reserve component must be organized, trained, equipped, and managed specifically to generate stabilization-oriented force packages. This new dynamic has a profound effect on the overall force mix. To achieve a viable expeditionary force structure, the Army will have to increase the relative proportion of stabilization capability within the active force to reduce its complete dependency on the reserve component during protracted operations. Additionally, the reserve component will have to entirely reorient its force structure design to make generating stabilization force packages its central purpose.

Army Modularity: Right Effort Aimed at the Wrong Target

In direct response to recent and current operations, the Army has embarked on a period of unprecedented evolution marked by radical changes in employment doctrine, infusion of information technologies to enhance precision engagement and maneuver, and a comprehensive reorganization of its fundamental warfighting structures. In part, this transformation acknowledges that land forces must be able to confront the complex challenges of the 21st century in which armed con(ct is on the rise and includes the requirement to conduct combat, stability, and humanitarian operations at the same time.44 The Army's near-term effort-the Modular Force-aims at disassembling the Army's corps, division, and brigade structures to create a more ‘xible and responsive brigade-based land force with ‘xible command and control structures.45

The present course of the Modular Force effort seems, however, to discount the importance of generating the viable stabilization capability that is essential to future expeditionary campaigns. Specifically, Army Modularity fails in three areas: 1) it has not focused on providing the modular and scalable force pool of stabilization capabilities that can augment brigade combat teams; 2) it does not provide the land force with a multifunctional brigade capable of exercising mission command for areawide stabilization efforts to free forward BCTs for maneuver; and 3) it does not generate an adequate mix of modular brigades within the active and reserve components given the characteristics of future land campaigns.

The centerpiece of the Modular Force is the consolidated redesign of the Army's various BCTs into 3 standard fixed designs: Heavy BCT, Infantry BCT, and Stryker BCT. Design features include: only two combined arms maneuver battalions; a reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition battalion; a smaller, but organic artillery battalion; an organic forward support battalion; and a brigade troops battalion that contains some additional combat support such as military police, engineers, chemical, and military intelligence. In general, the BCT is a fixed organization optimized for combat operations. When the brigade mission requires additional forces, the Brigade Troops Battalion provides attachments with administrative and logistical support and may be given mission command over these forces when necessary.

While the redesign of the BCT optimizes the organization for RDO, it also creates greater dependencies on outside augmentation in the context of its ability to perform initial stabilization tasks within its assigned area. As expected, the greatest shortfalls are in tasks associated with providing emergency support to the indigenous populace and repairing critical infrastructure. Training and Doctrine Command's guide to the Modular Force emphasizes the BCT design's selfsuf ficiency for full spectrum combat operations. The modular BCT does feature some organic military police, intelligence collection, signal, and combat engineer assets that were not previously organic to combat brigades. However, the current design of these units represents a minimalist approach, barely capable of accomplishing the tasks necessary to support combat operations-let alone the additional tasks required for stabilization. More importantly, the guide to the Modular Force underplays the role of the BCT in performing initial stabilization, and does not address how the BCT receives, integrates, and employs the additional forces necessary to accomplish these tasks.

Leaner and more lethal BCTs for combat operations are not all bad, if there also exists a viable force pool of modular and scalable forces that can integrate readily into the brigade to initiate progressive stabilization. The Army's effort to date, however, shows no indication that modernizing forces at echelons above the BCT is a remote priority. The BCT's organic Brigade Troops Battalion seems to offer a potential headquarters for receiving augmentation and synchronizing initial stabilization efforts. However, this is not its stated mission, and its austere staff does not have the depth and breadth of skills necessary to exercise mission command over stabilization efforts and support combat operations.47 With some minor adjustments, this shortfall could be easily remedied. Yet, the problem of a viable force pool of stabilization capabilities with the tactical mobility, survivability, modular/scalable design, and C4I architecture to "plug and play" into forward brigades remains an issue. The lack of an ongoing, comprehensive, and Army-wide effort to modularize the diverse range of combat support and service support forces at echelons above the BCT is a major concern.48 The current direction of the Modular Force indicates this trend will continue, and undermines any effort to build a meaningful progressive stabilization capability within the Army to fill the gap.

Another feature of the Modular Force is the creation of five standard multifunctional support brigades to replace the myriad of support troop organizations typically found at division and corps level. The Modular Force concept envisions five basic support brigades: an aviation brigade; a fires brigade; a sustainment brigade; a reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition brigade; and a maneuver enhancement brigade. Except for the aviation brigade, these support brigades do not have fixed organizational designs. Instead, they have a small base of organic forces and receive a mix of additional functional battalions as assigned, OPCON, or attached in order to perform missions at echelons above brigade combat team level. Support brigade headquarters have staffs with a wide range of expertise able to control a diverse range of subordinate units.49

The objective behind the development of the standard, multifunctional brigade is to provide the major land force commander greater ‘xibility in tailoring the land force for expeditionary missions. Rather than a fixed division structure typical of today's Army, the modular force's primary operations headquarters, Unit of Employment (UEx), can provide mission command for any mix of six BCTs, in addition to the proper mix of support brigades as required by the mission. Not only does it provide the ‘xibility to achieve the right size and mix of forces for a given mission, it also facilitates changing the mix of forces in response to the evolutionary requirements of a campaign. In this context, the Modular Force concept offers tremendous potential in enabling an expeditionary force to begin progressive stabilization at the outset of operations, and then change the mix of forces and headquarters as needed to complete the transition to full stabilization and ultimately reconstruction. However, an organization framework that supports transitions from combat operations to stabilization is one thing; having the right balance of new organizations in the force is quite another.

A review of the proposed designs and mission orientations of the support brigades reveals that the Modular Force construct remains exclusively grounded in RDO and discounts the increasing importance of stabilization as an inherent part of future warfare. The intended value-added of the multifunctional support brigade framework is to provide the UEx Commander with a suite of multifunctional headquarters with specific mission area orientations through which the Commander can exercise mission command. The current construct provides mission command for such vital functions as delivering fires, conducting reconnaissance and target acquisition, providing sustainment, orchestrating aviation support, and preserving freedom of maneuver. But none of the five new modular support brigades is oriented specifically on providing the UEx with a subordinate brigade focused on mission command for stabilization efforts.50 While all the support brigades can accomplish disparate aspects of stabilization, none of them are expressly designed to provide unity of mission command over the wide combination of forces needed to conduct stabilization within an assigned area.

The maneuver enhancement brigade seems to offer the greatest potential as a surrogate stabilization brigade. Its mission to execute shaping and sustaining operations to prevent or mitigate the effects of hostile action and ensure the freedom of action of forces assigned to UEx is a close match. The maneuver enhancement brigade's ability to exercise mission command over engineering, military police, ordnance disposal, civil affairs, chemical, security forces, and other type units makes it the most capable headquarters for synchronizing the range of stabilization tasks. Still, exercising mission command over stabilization efforts is not its express purpose and the design is not optimized for stabilization.51

Consequently, the Modular Force support brigade construct does not provide the UEx-the Army's primary operations headquarters-with a brigade specifically designed or designated to exercise unity of command over stabilization efforts. The absence of this capability exacerbates the stabilization burden placed on the forward brigade combat teams and degrades their freedom of action and ability to maintain a relentless tempo of offensive action during decisive operations. More importantly, it hinders the ability of the land force to exploit decisive engagements by rapidly initiating and expanding stabilization throughout the area of operations in the wake of combat operations. Finally, the lack of a support brigade designed and designated to orchestrate stabilization efforts within an assigned area disrupts and delays the transition to reconstruction. This major ‖w in the Army design indicates a narrow view of the Army's role in future combat.

The proposed mix of modular brigades in the active and reserve component is perhaps the most troubling evidence that the Modular Force remains fixated on RDO and discounts the importance of stabilization as a core competency. In particular, the Army's Modular Force resourcing strategy for the active force re‘cts a persistent fixation on retaining combat capability at the expense of achieving a force with greater expeditionary balance. In 2003, the Army decided to aggressively convert all 10 active divisions to the new BCT designs by 2007 and, in the process, create an additional 10 BCTs in the active force. But there was no corresponding plan to create the necessary support brigade structure. The support brigade designs were not even completed until a year-and-a-half later and, by this time, the Army had already begun conversion of four divisions to the new BCT designs without a roadmap for generating the requisite support brigades. In 2005, the Army completed a Modular Force Structure Analysis to determine the number and type of support brigades needed to support the 43 BCTs. That analysis indicated that the active force would have to increase by 56K soldiers (total of 538K) in order to build the full complement of support brigades required to support 43 BCTs-at a cost of $13.5B per year over the budget.52 That analysis was based on a modeling framework that featured RDO, but it did not account for the additional depth and breadth of forces needed to conduct stabilization simultaneously with combat or for prolonged periods after con(ct termination.

Confronted with an unaffordable structure and tough decisions, the Army is again resorting to its old ways. The current plan reduces the number of support brigades in the active force in order to retain the full 43 active component BCTs. Consequently, the Army's active structure is designed to provide the combat forces necessary for two near-simultaneous major combat operations, but without the capacity to concurrently conduct progressive stabilization. Of particular importance is the Army's decision to have only three Maneuver Enhancement Brigades in the active component. Although not specifically designed for stabilization, the Maneuver Enhancement Brigade is the best candidate for providing the UEx with a progressive stabilization capability. Consequently, the active force is capable of generating 10 UEx's using the 43 BCTs, but it can only generate 3 UEx's with a maneuver enhancement brigade unless it activates forces from the reserve component. The lack of maneuver enhancement brigades-as a surrogate for a stabilization brigade-significantly degrades the ability of the land force to surge the full range of combat and stabilization capabilities needed in future warfare.

The protracted nature of future operations accents the importance of the expeditionary land force as a "Total Force" in which the active and reserve components are complementary in ways that account for the challenges of future land campaigns featuring RDO and progressive stabilization for prolonged duration. The Army's decision to retain the rapid decisive capability for two major combat operations in the active force, in turn, increases its reliance on the Reserve Component to shoulder more-but not all-of the post-con(ct stabilization requirement. Yet the mix of forces in the Reserve Component does not re‘ct that role. The planned mix of brigades in the Reserve Component remains very BCT centric, even though the increased proportion of sustainment and maneuver enhancement brigades indicates a greater capacity for stabilization at first glance. However, the Army will likely require early deployment of these stabilization-related brigades in the Reserve Component to offset the lack of progressive stabilization capability in the Active Component. This leaves an available force pool almost exclusively comprised of BCTS, fires brigades, and aviation brigades for the protracted phase of stabilization; while each is necessary the mix of brigades-particularly the absence of uncommitted sustainment and maneuver enhancement brigades-is disproportionate to the stabilization mission requirement. Recent policies to reduce reserve component deployment times (1-year deployment for every 6 consecutive years) exacerbates the problem-any forces deployed early in a campaign will likely be unavailable for post-con(ct operations.53 In effect, the mix of type brigades in the Reserve Component represents an area of chief concern because it does not provide an expeditionary force with the requisite depth and breadth of capabilities needed to meet the challenges of future warfare.

Shift and Adjust: Bringing Modularity on Target

In order to be an effective instrument of national strategy, the Army must grasp the full scope of its responsibility as the nation's premier land force and embrace stabilization as a core competency for its future force. The nature of con(ct has changed dramatically. Achieving the "enduring results" demanded by national strategy requires a land power capable of terminating con(ct quickly and setting the conditions for long-term con(ct resolution. As the nation's premier land force, the Army must embrace fully its responsibility to provide the means necessary to conduct RDO and progressive stabilization-and be equally adept at both. The immediacy of current operations and the potential of future con(ct in the near term underscore the urgency of near-term adjustments. Army Transformation's short-term effort-the Modular Force-provides an excellent window of opportunity to generate a force with the right balance of capabilities to answer the nation's next call. However, it requires commitment to "shift and adjust" the Army's current direction to generate a viable stabilization capability. Only then can the Army begin to use the full measure of Army Transformation to mitigate the gaps in today's force.

The organizational concept behind the Modular Force provides a sound way ahead for the future, but falls short of its full potential. The conceptual emphasis on standard brigade combat teams, multifunctional support brigades, modular force pools, and expeditionary headquarters with the ‘xibility to adapt the composition of the land force in response to change is right on target. In this regard, the Modular Force concept enables the force to overcome the organizational challenges of simultaneously conducting RDO and progressive stabilization. The ability to constantly tailor and retailor the UEx with the right mix of BCTs and support brigades also gives the force the expeditionary qualities needed to contend effectively with transitions between rapid combat operations and prolonged stabilization. Despite the soundness of the Modular Force concept, the current direction of Army implementation is missing the target. The current Army plan fails to generate a force structure with the balance of capabilities needed to conduct rapid decisive combat operations simultaneously with progressive stabilization and then transition to protracted stabilization. Without this balance, the Modular Force will fall short of meeting the nation's needs. There are three areas in which immediate course corrections by senior leaders can alter the Army's present course and ensure the Modular Force remains relevant to future warfare.

First and foremost, the Army must modernize and reorganize its combat support/service support forces at echelons above the BCT into a viable force pool of modular stabilization capabilities as an integral part of the Modular Force. The main effort of the Modular Force design and implementation must remain improving the combat effectiveness of the BCT in prosecuting decisive operations. However, modernizing today's combat support/service support forces must become a formally recognized supporting effort-an integral part of the Army's Modular Force-and inexorably linked to the main effort. Senior leaders must recognize that continued neglect of the supporting effort places the main effort at significant risk. Extending Army Transformation to include modernizing today's combat support/service support into a viable force pool of stabilization capabilities, however, will fail without the attention and commitment of Army senior leaders, first and foremost.

The Army should immediately set up a task force similar to the one used for developing the new modular BCTs to examine the progressive stabilization gap and develop a coherent plan for modernizing the requisite combat support and service support forces. The modernization plan must produce a force pool of modular and scalable combat support/service support units that can 1) integrate directly into the forward BCTs to provide initial stabilization capabilities, and 2) combine into ‘xible "follow and support" brigade formations that can expand stabilization efforts to unencumber the forward BCTs engaged in decisive combat operations. The task force must develop more fully the "progressive stabilization" concept and establish a single, integrated organizational approach for unit design that enables rapid force generation, deployment, and integration in ‘xible and diverse combinations at the tactical level. Working with proponents, the task force must develop specific modernization paths for combat support and service support units to ensure they have the strategic deployability, tactical mobility, combat survivability, and battle command interoperability needed to integrate into the BCTs and support brigades. Above all, Army leaders must make certain that force pool modernization is integral to the Army-wide modernization plan and fiscally resourced for success. Without such a force pool, the Army will not have a truly expeditionary force with the full range decisive combat and progressive stabilization capabilities needed for future campaigns.

Second, the Army must reevaluate its framework of standard support brigades to ensure that its primary operations headquarters, UEx, has a support brigade fully capable of-and dedicated to- providing mission command over stabilization efforts within assigned areas. Successful force application in future armed con(ct depends on the ability of UEx to simultaneously conduct offense, defense, and stability operations in ways that maintain the tempo of decisive operations. Preserving the freedom of action of assigned BCTs is of paramount importance, but competes with the need also to initiate and then expand stabilization activities throughout the zone of action in the immediate aftermath of combat. As discussed above, integrating modular and scalable stabilization capabilities directly into to the BCT formation is a vital step toward ensuring the Army can begin stabilization simultaneous with combat operations. However, it does little to preserve the overall freedom of action of forward BCTs to maintain relentless pressure during decisive operations. UEx must have a support brigade within its formation that is capable of-and dedicated to-accepting "battle handover" of initial stabilization efforts from the BCTs, and then expanding the scope and intensity of stabilization operations in a follow and support role. This demands a brigade that is both a warfighting headquarters and capable of providing mission command over a wider range of robust stabilization capabilities. The current Modular Force framework does not include a brigade that is specifically designated or designed to provide this capability.

To remedy this shortfall, the Army has essentially two options: create a new type of stabilization support brigade or expand the mission orientation of one of the existing type support brigades. While there is some initial appeal to a creating a specialized stabilization brigade, it is more consistent with the multifunctional support brigade approach to formally expand the mission set of one of the existing support brigade designs. The Army should immediately designate the Maneuver Enhancement Brigade as the primary support brigade responsible for providing UEx with mission command over stabilization efforts at the tactical level. The Maneuver Enhancement Brigade's current mission to prevent or mitigate the effects of hostile action and ensure the freedom of action of UEx forces during decisive operations makes it a logical headquarters to execute "follow and support" missions oriented on stabilization. Furthermore, the command and staff skill sets needed to provide mission command over stabilizationtype forces largely already exists within the Maneuver Enhancement Brigade's design. Still, the Army must reevaluate the staff design and make the modifications necessary to ensure it has the depth and range of staff competencies required to synchronize stabilization efforts. The Army also should reconsider whether expanding Maneuver Enhancement Brigade's mission to include stabilization should alter the number and type of forces the brigade is routinely assigned.

Third, the Army must immediately revisit its recent force structure decisions regarding the mix of BCTs and support brigades in the active and reserve components. The Army's relevancy as a land force depends on its ability to deploy rapidly an expeditionary force capable of overwhelming decisive combat operations (including initial stabilization) and then sustain that force with the additional stabilizationcentric forces needed for protracted post-con(ct operations. The Army's proposed force structure mix for the active and reserve components does not re‘ct a coherent approach to meeting this challenge. The active component must be able to generate an expeditionary force focused on decisive operations with the capacity for initial stabilization as an integral part of its overall pool of active forces. Yet, the proposed structure still places 75 percent of the Army's critical stabilization enablers (e.g., maneuver enhancement brigades and associated forces such as combat and construction engineers, military police, civil affairs, ordinance disposal, chemical, transportation, and supply units) in the reserve component. The Army's penchant for placing critical combat support/service support in the reserve component to maintain a greater proportion of combat forces in the active structure is no longer a sound practice. Assuming the earlier recommendation to expand the role of maneuver enhancement brigade, the Army should resource one maneuver enhancement brigade per UEx as a minimum in the active force. This ensures the Army has the capacity to deploy an expeditionary force with inherent stabilization capabilities from the outset of con(ct. It also ensures that active duty formations participating in post-con(ct stabilization rotations have a foundation on which to build more robust stabilization capabilities. If Army active duty end-strength does not support this increase, the Army may have to consider trading active BCTs for more maneuver enhancement brigades. Although this may be a tough pill for the Army to swallow, it seems consistent with the observations in Iraq where BCTs designed for pure combat are conducting stabilization tasks, but depend on heavy augmentation by outside units and staff.

With regard to the reserve component force structure, the Army's success in future land warfare depends heavily on a strategic "bench" of ready stabilization-type capabilities that enable "morphing" the initial expeditionary force into stabilization-centric formations during post-con(ct. This new role for the reserve component demands a more fundamental overhaul of the proposed structure. The focal point of the reserve component structure must be on generating a post-con(ct force. This does imply that post-con(ct operations are the sole responsibility of the reserve component. But, it recognizes the reality that post-con(ct operations are likely the primary domain for their wartime employment; the reserve component must be structured accordingly. Here the recommendation is to increase the overall mix of maneuver enhancement brigades and the associated forces in the reserve component. As a goal, the Army should resource two maneuver enhancement brigades per UEx in the Army National Guard. The Army should also resource five maneuver enhancement brigades in the Army Reserve to provide the active component with a theater level surge capacity during initial deployment or as augmentation for active units committed to post-con(ct stability force rotations. Again, increasing the number of maneuver enhancement brigades will likely involve trade-off with other type brigades in the reserve component. But, the Army needs to consider seriously the value-added of resourcing the number of fires, aviation, and maneuver brigades it currently has in the reserve component in the context a postcon (ct domain.

Universal recognition that future armed con(ct on land will likely involve stabilization operations from the very outset of combat operations through con(ct resolution must guide Army Transformation. U.S. national security strategy demands the means to win decisively always and achieve enduring results that improve the underlying conditions that promote con(ct. For the military instrument, the emphasis on achieving enduring results extends military campaign objectives beyond con(ct termination to include setting the conditions for con(ct resolution. This fundamentally redefines the scope of an expeditionary land force and demands it broaden its core capabilities. Future victory depends on a land force equally adept in prosecuting RDO as conducting progressive stabilization to mitigate the effects of combat and bridge the gap to reconstruction. The Modular Force provides an adequate mental framework to drive organizational designs. But the current direction of the Modular Force misses the mark. Its myopic vision of an expeditionary force confines Army Transformation to new ways of fulfilling a traditional role that ends with con(ct termination. As a result, the Army is expending tremendous resources reinventing its former self rather than fully responding to the challenges of future warfare. The deep fight demands more. Future success requires an Army whose view of land warfare and an expeditionary force structure includes the concept of progressive stabilization and a new balance of combat and stabilization capabilities. Serious consideration of the recommendations outlined above to bring the Modular Force back on track marks a new beginning. Taking these recommendations to the full measure will result in vastly more capable and relevant force-and usher in real Army Transformation.


1. Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 2003, pp. 121-124. This concept is borrowed from Thomas P. M. Barnett's description of the new security environment as globalization's creation of a "Functioning Core" and "Disconnected Gap."

2. Ibid., pp. 88-89.

3. Robert C. Orr, Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-con(ct Reconstruction, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2004, p. 9.

4. Barnett, pp. 43-48.

5. George W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002, p. 1.

6. Richard B. Myers, National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2004, Washington, DC: The Pentagon, 2004, pp. 4-6. This is summarization of the four challenges of the new security environment as outlined in the National Military Strategy. Judgments on whether they are the "most likely" or the "most dangerous" threats are derived from the speeches of a number of senior speakers from the Department of Defense (DoD) participating in the Commandant's Lecture Series, U.S. Army War College, 2004-05.

7. Bush. This is a summary of the strategic objectives and concepts outlined throughout the 2002 National Security Strategy.

8. Anthony H. Cordesman, Post-con(ct Lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan: Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 19, 2004, p. 2.

9. Frederick W. Kagan, "War and Aftermath," Policy Review, Vol. 120, August/September 2003, p. 17.

10. Myers, pp. 12-13, 18-19. This broad statement of the required force capabilities is summarized from the characterization of operations designed to "swiftly defeat the efforts of an adversary" or "win decisively" in the National Military Strategy.

11. Kagan, p. 7. The Army's specific modernization efforts focused on the development of precision longer-range weapons and information technologies that would network unit formations together and provide enhanced situation awareness.

12. James J. Anthony and Max G. Manwaring, eds., Beyond Declaring Victory and Coming Home: The Challenges of Peace and Stability Operations, Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2000, pp. 8-15.

13. U.S. Joint Forces Command, A Concept for Rapid Decisive Operations-White Paper Version 2.0, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 2002, p. 4.

14. Ibid., p. 16.

15. Ibid., p. 21.

16. Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, eds., Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2004, pp. xiv-xv.

17. Ibid., p. xiv. This figure is based on a similar figure contained in the executive summary entitled, "Historical Pattern of Combat and S&R Missions."

18. Ibid., pp. 15-17.

19. Ibid., p. xv. This figure is also based on a similar figure contained in the executive summary entitled, "New Challenges: Preemption and RDO."

20. Department of the Army, United States Army Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2004, p. 7.

21. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction; "About S/CRS," available from http://www.state. gov/s/crs/c12936.htm, Internet, accessed March 13, 2005.

22. Nina M. Sefarino, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 2004, pp. 7-8.

23. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, "Defense Capabilities to Transition to and from Hostilities," Department of Defense Directive Number, Washington, DC, October 8, 2004, p. 8.

24. Ibid., p. 9.

25. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 2004, p. iii.

26. Ibid., pp. 22-27.

27. Ibid., p. 10.

28. Ibid., p. 16.

29. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

30. Binnendijk. For example, the recent work done by the Center for Technology and National Policy at the National Defense University uses the term "stabilization and reconstruction" as a single entity (e.g., S&R missions, S&R units, and S&R Commands).

31. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (As Amended Through 30 November 2004)," Joint Pub 1-02, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 12, 2001. This dictionary is the central source for all "official terms," but it does not provide a definition for either stabilization or reconstruction.

32. Rumsfeld, p. 2.

33. Ibid.

34. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept, p. 2.

35. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," Joint Pub 3-0 (Revision First Draft), Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 15, 2004, pp. IV-34-36.

36. Binnendijk, p. xv.

37. James F. Dobbins, "America's Role in Nation-building: From Germany to Iraq," Survival, Vol. 45, Winter 2003, pp. 90-94.

38. Ibid., p. 104.

39. Binnendijk, pp. 22-23. The first three of the critical stabilization tasks directly correlate to those developed in Binnendijk and Johnson. The fourth task, to "synchronize transitions and turn-overs," is derived from their discussions on the important role of stabilization headquarters.

40. Department of the Army, United States Army Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2004, pp. 4-5. The description of an "expeditionary force with campaign qualities" is chosen carefully to re‘ct the how these terms are used to frame the Army's vision for the future force.

41. Karl C. Rohr, "Progressive Reconstruction: Melding Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare with Nation Building and Stability Operations," Marine Corps Gazzette, Vol. 88, April 2004, pp. 48-51. The concept of progressive stabilization is an adaptation from Major Karl C. Rohr's work on a concept called "Progressive Reconstruction." This paper uses the term "progressive stabilization" for consistency with DoD's definition.

42. Binnendijk, pp. 27-28.

43. Dobbins, p. 94.

44. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Army Comprehensive Guide to Modularity (henceforth Guide to Modularity), Fort Monroe, VA: Department of the Army, October 8, 2004, p. vii.

45. Ibid., pp. 1-6.

46. The list of specific stabilization tasks that involve military forces under the new modular designs is contained in Appendix 1.

47. Guide to Modularity, p. 8-2.

48. Andrew Feickert, "U.S. Army's Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress," CRS Report for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 19, 2004, pp. 7-8.

49. Guide to Modularity, pp. 1-15 - 1-19.

50. Ibid., pp. 5-17 - 5-27.

51. Ibid., pp. 5-20 - 5-23.

52. The results and associated costs of the Army Modular Force Structure Analysis are based on remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandant's Lecture Series at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks.

53. The description of the pending DoD policy on reserve component deployment times are based on remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandant's Lecture Series at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks.

54. Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, Reconstructing Iraq: Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post- Con(ct Scenario, Carlisle, PA: U.S Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, January 2003, pp. 13-20.

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