Theater Immersion Postmobilization Training
in the First Army
We are in a war with no rear areas or front
lines. We have to instill the Warrior Ethos into the mobilized
soldiers we train. Every soldier must be able to function as an
infantryman. Soldiers must have tough, realistic, hands-on, repetitive
training until their response is intuitive. When soldiers get
off the bus at the [mobilization] station, they must feel they
have arrived in Iraq or Afghanistan.
We have a non-negotiable contract with the
American people to prepare [our] sons and daughters for war. We
must use imagination and innovation to do this better than we
ever have before. We cannot; we will not fail in this task.--
LTG Russell L. Honoré
Between 11 September 2001 and the summer of
2003, the First and Fifth Continental United States Armies (CONUSAs)
mobilized and deployed thousands of Reserve Component (RC) soldiers
from the U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG) and the U.S. Army Reserve
for the Global War on Terrorism. In the First Army's area of responsibility
(AOR) alone, some 77,924 RC soldiers were trained and deployed from
mobilization stations east of the Mississippi River. By the fall
of 2004, this number grew to 191,491. Some soldiers and units were
employed in the United States as part of Operation Noble Eagle;
others deployed to combat zones as part of Operations Iraqi Freedom
and Enduring Freedom. CONUSA mobilized additional ARNG and RC forces
and deployed them to the Kosovo Force, the Stabilization Force in
Bosnia, and Joint Task Force Guantanamo. Initially, most of these
soldiers and units were combat support (CS) and combat service support
Dynamics changed during the summer of 2003.
Entire ARNG-enhanced brigades were called up for duty in combat
zones. In the First Army AOR, the 30th Brigade from North Carolina
was the first such formation mobilized for employment in Iraq. The
30th Brigade began postmobilization training, with the 24th Infantry
Division (ID) in oversight. The 2d Training Support Brigade (TSB)
of the 78th Division, Training Support, heavily reinforced with
trainers from the 78th and 87th Divisions, had the lead for training.
The 30th Brigade executed postmobilization training at Fort Bragg,
North Carolina; Fort Stewart, Georgia; and Fort Drum, New York.
This was a historic mission; it was the first time an entire ARNG-enhanced
brigade mobilized and deployed to a war zone under the First Army's
auspices. The effort was a success, but the First Army experienced
challenges and learned significant lessons.
During the summer of 2004, the First Army mobilized
multiple ARNG brigades in the form of Tennessee's 278th Regimental
Combat Team (RCT) and Mississippi's 155th Brigade Combat Team (BCT).
To avoid competing with active units for training resources on active
posts, both formations mobilized at Camp Shelby, Mississippi.
The 278th RCT trained at Camp Shelby from June
through September then executed a mission rehearsal exercise (MRX)
at the National Training Center (NTC) in October. After completing
the MRX, the 278th RCT returned briefly to Camp Shelby then deployed
to theater in November. Similarly, the 155th BCT trained at Camp
Shelby from July through October, executed an MRX at the NTC in
November, and deployed to theater in December. Leading the First
Army effort was a 24th ID command and control (C2) cell with the
3d Brigade of the 87th Division (heavily reinforced by elements
of the 87th and 85th Divisions) as the lead trainer.
This approach created an economy of scale that
saved resources, particularly training support brigade observer/controller-trainers
(OC-Ts). Lessons learned during the 278th RCT's training applied
to the 155th BCT's training. Both brigades mobilized at a single
location. First Army introduced a new approach to postmobilization
training-theater immersion -a training concept that is now the watchword
for postmobilization training across the entire First Army AOR.
Reserve Component units called up for mobilization
are of all shapes and sizes and perform myriad missions requiring
varying training programs. For the most part, the combined forces
land component commander (CFLCC) defines specific training requirements,
but the list of CFLCC tasks is not all-inclusive. Unit commanders
often arrive at mobilization stations with specific mission essential
task lists (METL) they want particular emphasis or additional training
on. In general, battalions or smaller units receive from 35 to 60
days of postmobilization training, but the precise number of training
days varies based on the mission, destination, and latest arrival
The mobilization of brigade-size formations
for combat in Iraq demanded a different approach. In wartime conditions,
formations receive about 90 days of intense training from the individual
level through brigade operations at the mobilization station. Postmobilization
training covers a variety of CFLCC-mandated tasks ranging from individual
to collective tasks and from stability- and supportfocused operations
through conventional combat missions. Reserve Component brigade
training concludes with an intense MRX at one of the command training
Theater immersion rapidly builds combat-ready
formations led by competent, confident leaders who see first, understand
first, and act first; battleproofed soldiers inculcated with the
warrior ethos man the formations. Theater immersion places-as rapidly
as possible-leaders, soldiers, and units into an environment that
approximates what they will encounter in combat. At the soldier
level, training is tough, realistic, hands-on, repetitive, and designed
to illicit intuitive soldier responses. It thrusts formations into
a theater analog soon after they arrive at their mobilization station
and places stress on the organization from individual to brigade
levels. Theater immersion is a combat training center-like experience
that replicates conditions downrange while training individual-
through brigade-level collective tasks.
Theater immersion's most important component
is a deliberate, continuous study of the contemporary operational
environment (COE) intheater, particularly a study of the threat.
To facilitate this process and because of the evolving nature of
the threat in Iraq, the First Army is refining Web-based collaborative
information sites and quickly disseminating the latest intelligence
and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to trainers. The intelligence
officer of the 3d Brigade of the 87th Division with the First Army
G2 studied daily intelligence reports from each brigade's targeted
employment area, myriad unit after-action reports (AARs); Center
for Army Lessons Learned products; and Department of the Army (DA),
G3, Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Task Force products to replicate
and update TTP in the training area. The intelligence officer interviewed
soldiers and leaders of all ranks and positions, from riflemen to
brigade and division commanders, in-country to obtain the most recent
views of the COE. The 3d Brigade, 87th Division, S3 and the First
Army G3 studied the latest TTP and operational patterns of coalition
forces to determine the best methods to counter and defeat the threat.
Having 20 of its own soldiers deployed to Iraq as coalition military-assistance
training teams greatly helped in this process. The teams provided
almost daily updates to help craft the training environment and,
with 3d Brigade and First Army combat veterans, were employed as
OC-Ts soon after returning from Iraq.
The training environment was grounded in an
operational scenario updated with fragmentary orders and intelligence
summaries and subscenarios for specific training events. Employing
crawl-walk-run, eight-step, and multiechelon techniques, soldiers,
leaders, and units progressed from individual to collective events
and from vehicle and squad to battalion- and brigade-level operations.
Collective events culminated at brigade level with a field training
exercise (FTX) and peaked at battalion level with a 5-day Army training
and evaluation program (ARTEP) that ended with a battalion live-fire
coordination exercise (FCX). These events placed a premium on battle
command and decisionmaking in a stability operations and support
operations (SOSO) environment.
To approximate the environment in-country,
the TSB commander and unit leaders executed two reconnaissance missions
and predeployment site surveys to confirm training practices were
appropriate to each brigade's sector. Key trainers, like the TSB
executive officer and the command sergeant major (CSM) traveled
to Jordan and Kuwait to ensure appropriate cultural awareness and
reception, staging, and onward integration (RSOI) training.
The most obvious manifestation of theater immersion
is the physical design of training sites. The Army constructed two
fully functioning forward operating bases (FOBs) for the 278th Armored
Cavalry Regiment (ACR) and 155th Brigade, as well as four villages,
a highway overpass, and roads lined with guardrails. The villages
included mosques, offices for civil authorities, markets, walled
residences, tunnel complexes, traffic circles, and low-hanging telephone
and electric cables typical of Iraqi villages.
Joint Coalition Council facilities where soldiers
interfaced with indigenous civil leaders replicated those in-theater.
The Army transformed cantonment areas into three FOB analogs with
entry control points (ECPs), guard towers, and wire. FOBs and towns
were named after existing locations in-country, and road signs,
police cars, and markets were created based on recent photos from
Iraq. To save time and conserve costs, 3d Brigade, 87th Division,
soldiers performed most of the construction work to build these
sites. For example, the 2d Company, 305th Battalion TSB, built most
of the two FOBs for defense training and battalion ARTEPs and FCXs.
Within weeks of arrival at the mobilization
station, and after soldier readiness processing and dental and medical
examinations, units began operations as tactical formations. Unit
leaders planned, prepared, battle-tracked, and controlled their
organizations while acclimating to the battle rhythm typical of
units fighting in-theater. They had to accomplish some classroom
instruction, but training maximized time in the field. Soldiers
averaged over 40 days operating from FOBs and camps while under
constant threat of attack by a resourceful enemy.
Because time is limited at the mobilization
station, immersing soldiers immediately into a replicated combat
zone enables focused training 24 hours a day and retraining as needed.
Instead of living in a normal garrison environment, soldiers were
surrounded by concertina wire, ECPs, and guard towers to simulate
the FOB environment. In a FOB, small-unit leaders trained theater-specific
tasks, troop-leading procedures, and basic discipline.
To populate the simulated villages, the Army
hired 300 civilians on the battlefield (COBs) including 80 Iraqi-Americans.
Under control of the 3d Company of the 349th Logistics Support Battalion
(LSB), the COBs, particularly the Iraqi-Americans, added a powerful
dose of realism to each training event. Iraqi-Americans portrayed
linguists, mayors, police chiefs, religious leaders, terrorists,
news reporters, and Iraqi National Guard, Army, and Border Police.
They spoke to soldiers only in their native tongue and wore clothing
appropriate to their positions. These COBs were given simulated
identities, rehearsed at COB academies, and routinely participated
in training events. Soldiers encountering the COBs communicated
through translators to negotiate, conduct bilateral meetings, gather
intelligence, and react to civil disturbances.
A full-time opposing force (OPFOR) from the
3d Company of the 349th LSB, primarily mobilized reservists, rehearsed
operations for weeks before the brigades arrived. Dressed and equipped
like anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) and with OPFOR academy training and
daily S2 updates on the latest threat TTP, the OPFOR designed and
executed threat countertasks that immersed training leaders and
warriors in the most realistic situations possible. IEDs such as
booby traps, mines, projectiles, bombs, and vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs)
were ubiquitous. Soldiers were constantly subjected to simulated
sniper, rocket, and mortar attacks.
Instilling the Warrior Ethos
To achieve success against the AIF OPFOR, soldiers
and leaders conducted detailed troop-leading procedures, issued
doctrinally correct five-paragraph orders, conducted rehearsals,
and performed rigorous precombat inspections and precombat checks.
The Army treated every training event, including individual weapons
qualification; military operations on urban terrain (MOUT); combat
patrolling; and cordon and search, as a combat mission.
The Army organized training events in 19 modules,
each focusing on 1 or more of 83 theaterspecific CFLCC training
tasks. These modules led to new theater-specific METLs for each
formation and echelon. The 3d Brigade, 87th Division, validated
in writing that individuals and units had trained to proficiency,
and the commander of First Army approved resulting training plans.
The Army created a densely packed training matrix to ensure soldiers
could accomplish all required training tasks to standard. Trainers
tracked soldiers by name as they progressed through CFLCC-mandated
individual tasks. To accomplish this, the 3d Brigade of the 87th
Division was heavily reinforced by trainers from the 1st, 4th, and
5th Brigades of the 87th Division and elements of the 4th Brigade,
85th Division. At its peak, the effort employed some 750 First Army
personnel to train the 7,000 soldiers of the 278th ACR and 155th
BCT. The ratio of OC-Ts to soldiers was ap proximately 1 to 13.
TSB commanders responsible for various modules prepared detailed
training plans, rehearsing, terrain-walking, and validating training
events in detail and preparing risk-management worksheets.
TSB commanders also put their training creativity
to the test in multiecheloned training events to validate individual
and collective tasks. Speed and trust in absorbing the latest lessons
learned and flexible, adaptive, responsive trainers were the watchwords
for developing training plans. Theater-specific tasks like FOB defense,
ECPs, combat patrols and ground assault convoys, raids, or cordon
and search garnered significant attention in training for combat
in Iraq. But First Army trainers built many other tasks into the
training program, including METL-specific, branch, and specialty
training. Gathering and updating the latest TTP for each task and
developing appropriate threat countertasks were critical, and this
is a continuing process that lies at the heart of theater immersion.
As conditions changed in-theater, trainers
rapidly changed conditions on the training battlefield. This approach
placed a premium on agile, creative TSB commanders and aggressive,
streamlined acquisition of the latest lessons from the war zone.
The trainers included key individual tasks
that cross-walked to collective tasks in tough, realistic, hands-on
conditions to create intuitive soldier responses. They embedded
IED threats in-theater in every training event possible from land
navigation to battalion ARTEPs and in every form conceivable, from
projectiles slung behind guardrails to boobytrapped buildings and
highway overpasses. Soldiers repeatedly trained on multiple tasks.
For example, a single simulated rocket attack trains soldiers how
to react to indirect fire, casualty evacuation procedures, 9-line
medical evacuation requests, damage assessment, crater analysis,
counterbattery fire, and many other procedures.
Individual and collective training places emphasis
on first-line supervisors and junior-level leaders. AARs focused
on key leader skills and the warrior ethos to develop initiative
and aggressiveness in formations. At the heart of this approach
were comprehensive noncommissioned officer AARs led by TSB and brigade
CSMs. As units progressed through training, gaining greater confidence,
the responsibility for conducting AARs passed to unit leaders.
The Army devised and executed a robust live-fire
program throughout the training matrix to ensure soldiers participated
in live-fire events throughout training. Soldiers and units progressed
through rigorous premarksmanship instruction to individual- and
crewserved- weapons qualification. Reflexive-fire and close combat
assault courses included urban scenarios, IEDs, and moving-target
arrays followed by live-fire FOB defense against a moving VBIED
and squad and platoon live-fire assault courses.
After crew-served-weapons qualification, gunners
and assistant gunners qualified on weapons from vehicles such as
HMMWVs, heavy expanded mobile tactical trucks, 5-ton trucks or howitzers
(day and night), and on moving platforms engaging stationary and
moving targets. Crews formed into combat patrols and ground-assault
convoys for collective live-fire events in day-and-night conditions,
again from moving and stationary vehicles versus moving and stationary
targets. Combat vehicle crews executed Bradley and Tank Tables through
Table XII. Paladin crews and platoons fired through Field Artillery
Table XV. Mortar platoons executed mortar training and evaluation
programs. A battalion/brigade FCX combined fires from motorized
companies, howitzer platoons, mortar platoons, close air support,
and Army aviation. By the time they completed training at Camp Shelby,
the 278th RCT and 155th BCT had expended over 2.3 million rounds
of ammunition and more than 14,500 soldiers were qualified to use
individual and crew-served weapons.
The 3d Brigade, 87th Division, and Camp Shelby
also used training devices to enhance soldier weapons proficiency.
While tank and Bradley crews employed traditional systems like the
Mobile Conduct of Fire Trainer, the Army fielded new systems as
well, notably the Virtual Combat Convoy Trainer, which soldiers
used to good effect to practice and sustain convoy skills. Additional
devices the Army found useful in training squads and crew-served
weapons teams were the Engagement Skills Trainer- 2000 and the Virtual
Battlefield Simulator-1. The Fire Arms, Laser Marksmanship, and
Beamhits Training Systems were also superlative primary marksmanship
instruction tools. As the 278th RCT and 155th BCT mobilizations
drew to a close, the Army fielded mine simulators and training IEDs.
These new devices will see plenty of action in future mobilizations.
Whether soldiers are breaking through Normandy
hedgerows or operating from dispersed FOBs throughout Iraq, effective
logistics, particularly maintenance, is a key determinant of a unit's
ability to effectively perform its mission and survive. The paradigm
shift from "normal" operating procedures practiced at
armories and drill centers to the full exploitation of the Standard
Army Maintenance Information System is a challenge. Rapidly immersing
leaders, operators, and units in the Unit Level Logistics System
(ULLS-G), with emphasis on "blasting" to the Standard
Army Supply and Maintenance Systems rather than the antiquated "disc-drop"
system, is imperative.
A 2-day structured "ULLS-G Gunnery,"
with all operators and maintenance leaders in attendance and outside
subject matter experts brought in for training, included the U.S.
Army Forces Command G4 and a III Corps Command Maintenance Evaluation
Team. ULLS-G Gunnery laid the foundation for effective maintenance
management and Class IX flow throughout mobilization, into the MRX,
and on to theater. Enforcing attendance, oversight, and accountability
at brigade-level maintenance meetings was instrumental to unit success.
Trainers issued DA activity codes to units
and enforced parts-ordering and tracking. Because time was of essence,
trainers inspected and validated all unit equipment before deployment
and training. Creating accountability and confidence in the maintenance
and supply system was imperative. Training event OC-Ts habitually
checked operators and equipment for proper licensing, dispatches,
and preventive maintenance checks and services. Operators or equipment
found wanting were frozen in place until unit commanders corrected
the problem. All of this was reported in tactical AARs.
Command maintenance, evaluation, and training
teams and internal trainers, such as the TSB S4 and logisticians
with recent theater experience, focused on logistics management
and unit administrative and logistical operation center (ALOC) procedures.
They stressed recent ALOC TTPs and CSS situational awareness, provided
one-on-one assistance, and distributed relevant logistics information,
such as the "Mobilizing Unit Leader's Maintenance Management
Smart Book and Baseline SOP" and "ALOC Smartbooks"
from recent Combined Arms Support Command publications. Because
some units received relatively brief postmobilization training,
immediately on a unit's arrival trainers stressed a sense of logistical
urgency and recent doctrine and TTPs. Establishing a baseline of
logistic fundamentals greatly improved unit sustainment.
For ARNG leaders and staffs, steeped in legacy
battle command techniques designed for high-intensity operations,
counterinsurgency operations and SOSO presented a significant paradigm
shift. Commanders' critical information requirements and the military
decisionmaking process were no longer easy to apply to the operational
environment. ARNG leaders and staffs had to learn a whole new lexicon
with supporting tasks and TTPs and apply them to theater immersion
so unit leaders could see first, understand first, and act first.
Pattern analysis and sanitation, water, energy,
academics, trash-medical, and security charts replaced watchwords
like doctrinal and situational templates. Effects-based targeting,
information operations, and force-protection working groups moved
to positions of prominence in unit planning. ARNG trainers embraced
new digital equipment and employed it throughout the formations,
and soldiers learned new battle rhythms similar to those encountered
A robust Battle Command Training Plan (BCTP)
included the Leader Training Program at the NTC; cultural awareness
training in Jordan; pre-deployment site surveys; staff and leader
IED training; a BCTP command post exercise (CPX); a signal exercise;
and company, battalion, and brigade CPXs. Both brigades participated
in CPX-based MRXs with each of their go-to-war divisional headquarters.
The 1st (Simulations) Brigade, 87th Division,
was the primary trainer for the capstone CPX conducted at Camp Shelby
based on the Brigade/Battalion Simulation System. Equipped with
a digital division tactical operations center, 1st Brigade, 87th
Division, became a simulated higher headquarters and provided digital
links for all key Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS)
devices across brigades. Battalion ARTEPs exercised battalion and
brigade C2 with the brigades issuing orders and tracking each battalion.
To paraphrase Sun Tzu, knowing the enemy is
critical to battlefield success; in battling the AIF, this principle
is amplified. Simply put, actionable intelligence drives operations.
To build unit proficiency, the First Army developed a rigorous 11-day
training plan, which incorporated knowledge of the enemy, to build
intelligence products and analysis of the enemy to develop predictive
analysis for future operations.
A 2-day knowledge-based training plan gave
brigades necessary knowledge to understand the enemy and how he
organizes. Soldiers studied insurgency operations, AIF organizations
operating in Iraq, enemy weapons systems, IEDs, equipment, and tactics.
Soldiers cannot absorb this knowledge in 2 days; the use of the
classified computer network is critical to continued study of AIF
The second element in the training plan was
analysis. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) defines
success or failure for intelligence organizations. A 9-day training
plan included the All-Source Analysis System (Light), urban IPB,
link-pattern analysis, collection management, and targeting and
analytical techniques. During the first 6 days, soldiers mixed classroom
instruction with practical exercises. A 3-day intelligence exercise
integrated all subjects taught during the first 6 days of training.
The exercise and other brigade staff training, such as brigade and
battalion CPXs and battalion ARTEPs, allowed brigades to develop
intelligence battle rhythms and become familiar with useful intelligence
products. Realistic, detailed threat scenarios reinforced the analytical
procedures learned previously. Intelligence training was aggressive
and mentally taxing.
Because of the Army's dependence on Army Tactical
Command and Control Systems, battle command requires competent signal
units. Theater immersion means experiencing theater-like conditions
in all collective signal-specific training events. Signal elements
set up voice and data communication backbones in FOBs, base camps,
and remote sites; moved them; then set them up again. Signal training
posed several challenges. A TSB does not possess divisional or area
signal asset trainers or tactical network engineers. A garrison
support unit does not possess signal-asset maintainers. Contracting
support for technical and maintenance expertise; tasking a signal
battalion for tactical network support; and creating a signal specific
OC-T team from across the 87th Division solved this problem.
Under the 3d Brigade, 87th Division, S6's oversight,
training began before units arrived at the mobilization station.
Contractors arrived at unit home stations and provided initial operator
proficiency assessments, operator training, and equipment assessment
and maintenance. Contractors provided assessments to the TSB S6
and helped refine training plans. Once at Camp Shelby, the signal
company participated in CPXs and polished unit-collective tasks.
The signal company participated in all digital CPXs, and Camp Shelby
provided additional digital C2 training during battalion ARTEPs.
Both brigades transformed from heavy, mechanized
formations to agile, motorized organizations with HMMWVs and a mechanized
infantry task THEA HEA HEATER TER IMMERSION MMERSION 8 January -February
2005 MILITARY REVIEW force. The Army fielded new equipment in these
formations, such as ATCCS devices like Blue Force Tracker, Maneuver
Control System-Light, and the All-Source Analysis and Advanced Field
Artillery Tactical Data Systems, which many Active Component units
have yet to receive. New tools of war such as M4 carbines (soldier
favorites in the Rapid Fielding Initiative); the Raven Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle; and the PROPHET intelligence system facilitated
Transformation does not apply only to digital
systems and new pieces of equipment. Soldiers transform as well.
In the case of members of mobilizing brigades, many soldiers were
cross-leveled to flesh out changing formations. Combat soldiers
like tankers and scouts gained an additional military occupation
specialty (MOS) as infantrymen; CS and CSS personnel attended a
20-day 91W course to meet the Army's latest MOS standards. Phased
mobilization allowed the Army to call up selected personnel in advance
of unit mobilizations and assign them to MOS qualification-producing
institutions. These soldiers arrived at the mobilization station
at approximately the same time as their parent units.
The MRX was the culminating event in the First
Army training program. The brigades debarked from planes and trains
and flowed into Fort Irwin in simulated RSOI operations-as if they
were moving trough the aerial and sea ports of debarkation in Kuwait
en route to Camps Arifjan and Buehring. As they would have to do
in Kuwait, the brigades battletracked the build of combat power,
force-protected, and planned and prepared for a long, contested
move into the Mojave Desert. At the NTC, brigades conducted combat
road marches into the AOR and occupied FOBs, faced myriad force-protection,
SOSO, and combat tasks prevalent in-theater-all under constant attack
from the AIF. Training included robust live-fire MOUT and live-fire
and live-counterfire missions by Paladins from the FOBs. Because
free elections in-theater are crucial in the strategy for victory
in Iraq, election-support missions at the NTC were the units' graduation
Immersion: An Evolving Concept
First Army did not rest with the success of
the 278th RCT and 155th BCT's missions. Trainers from across the
First Army descended on Camp Shelby and lessons, techniques, and
methods spread rapidly to mobilization stations across the eastern
United States. Trainers improved theater-immersion initiatives at
each mobilization station and tailored them for combat, CS, and
CSS formations. Many trainers also brought their own innovative
methods to Camp Shelby. Today, the Army is building FOBs at every
major mobilization station, and many theaterimmersion tools pioneered
in the 278th RCT and 155th BCT mobilizations are omnipresent.
The most significant lesson learned in the
278th ACR and 155th BCT effort was the need for more sophisticated
and rigorous training in battalion and brigade battle command; in
particular, effects-based targeting and information operations.
Here time is the enemy, as are the multitude of training and transformation
requirements that compete for leader time and attention. To mitigate
the problem, the Phased Mobilization Concept was expanded to provide
more time for leaders, headquarters, and CSS elements to mobilize
in advance of the main bodies, which would allow them to complete
individual and some collective training requirements before their
units mobilized and to better prepare them to guide their organizations.
This approach created more time to focus on critical battle command
training events, including multiple brigade-level command post exercises
as well as a brigade FTX with multiple maneuver battalions in the
Finally, it was determined that an OC-T team,
created along lines analogous to the NTC Bronco Team, was necessary
to coach, teach, and mentor brigade and battalion leaders and staffs
throughout postmobilization training. In the future, these initiatives
will be put to the test with the mobilization of the 48th Brigade
at Fort Stewart, Georgia, and the 2d Brigade, 28th Division, at
Camp Shelby, Mississippi, as well as other mobilizing units across
the First Army AOR.
Also available online at: