A Different Course? America and Europe
"Nations are not something eternal.
They had their beginnings and they will have an end. A European
confederation will very probably replace them. But such is not
the law of the century in which we are living. At the present
time, the existence of nations is a good thing, a necessity even.
Their existence is the guarantee of liberty, which would be lost
if the world had only one law and only one master."1
- Ernest Renan, 1882
With ten new members added into the fold and
a new draft constitution working its way
through capitals for ratification, the European Union (EU) is in
the midst of unprecedented political and geographic integration.
This transcontinental constitutional process
is a major undertaking. Of course, at 263 single-spaced pages, just
reading the EU constitution is a major undertaking. One can't help
but compare the EU's behemoth to the US Constitution, which is a
modest 4,600 words, not including amendments. While the EU document
addresses everything from fisheries to occupational hygiene, the
US Constitution deals with broader matters-treaties and taxation,
war and peace, rights and responsibilities.
Perhaps it's understandable, then, that as
Europe strives to come together, the transatlantic community, led
as it is by the United States, seems to be coming apart. Some voices
on both sides of the Atlantic argue that this parting of ways is
inevitable, even desirable. After all, the differences between Europe
and the United States are more pronounced and their common interests
less obvious than at any time in the last 65 years. However, if
the history of the past hundred years or so teaches us anything,
it is that the transatlantic partnership is an essential ingredient
both to the security of the United States and to the security of
the modern world. Hence, understanding the changes and challenges
within Europe could help Americans respond to the changes and challenges
facing the transatlantic community.
What is Europe?
The question "What is Europe?" is
not so easily answered-especially, it seems, inside Europe. Some
see Europe as a large chunk of the northern hemisphere stretching
from Iceland to Siberia; some say it's smaller, but they don't know
precisely how much smaller. Some say Europe is an economic club,
an idea, a common cultural heritage. Others say it's a political
unit of diverse peoples-hence, the EU's new motto "United in
Diversity." British Prime Minister Tony Blair wants "a
Europe of nation-states," while French President Jacques Chirac
envisions "a grand design for Europe," one that will secure
France's "place in the world."2
Answering this question is essential for Europeans
and the rest of the world, however, because as long as it remains
unanswered the still-amorphous swath of earth known as Europe cannot
really play a dependable role in international security. Like a
college student "finding herself" or a 40-something going
through his mid-life crisis, an undefined Europe may be independent;
it may even offer something constructive from time to time; but
it will usually be self-centered and focused inward. This sort of
Europe cannot be an enduring partner in the 21st century.
Europe is indeed a common market-and a powerful
one at that. After all, the European Union consists of some 450
million people. When considered as one unit, the EU's 25 economies
comprise the largest gross domestic product (GDP) on earth. But
is it really a union? It has a flag and a pan-national anthem. It
claims to have a common currency, though key members of the EU,
including the United Kingdom, have not adopted it. However, Europe
has no common foreign policy. It has no common language, except
perhaps the language spoken by George W. Bush and Blair, two men
who have caused more than a little heartburn for the continental
club. Indeed, the EU's draft constitution is written in almost two
Europe also has no common history or ethnicity
or founding moment. None of this precludes it from being a confederation
of countries, but simply serves to underscore that Brussels cannot
forge a United States of Europe. EU advocates might be able to create
the appearance of nationhood, but they cannot change what's in the
heart: Paris is first and foremost the capital of France, as every
Frenchman knows. After spending 45 years under Soviet occupation,
a Warsaw shopkeeper will not soon forget that his home is Poland-and
will not soon trade servitude in one union for servitude in another.
In a word, it seems that most Europeans still believe as Ernest
Renan did in 1882-that the existence of nations is a good thing,
a safeguard against a Europe with only one law, one master.
EU advocates are quick to counter such "Euro-skepticism"
by arguing that Americans feel the same way about their home states.
Perhaps this was true in the time of Robert E. Lee, when Virginians
fought for Virginia, but it is no longer. Indeed, the US Civil War
itself settled that question. As US historians have observed, before
the war, "United States" was used in the plural form,
as in "The United States are bound together by the Constitution."
After the war, it was singularized, as in "The United States
is a democratic republic." There is no question about where
US foreign policy is made or executed, what currency it uses, which
constitution is supreme, where its boundary lines are, or which
language is held in common. These questions remain unanswered for
Europe, and they cannot be solved by a piece of paper signed in
Thanks to 60 years of cooperation and confidence-building,
the prospect of these questions being settled on a battlefield is
unthinkable. However, the prospect of the European Union coming
apart is not. When or if the EU splits up, the blame will be laid
at the feet of those who pushed too far, too fast, and too deep.
At least since the end of the Cold War, and
arguably even earlier, proponents of an undivided Europe have generally
fallen into two camps. On one side was the group proposing to widen
Europe geographically-that is, to steadily bring new European countries
into the common market formed after World War II. What was once
a group of six grew to ten, and then to 15, and now to 25-from Britain
all the way to the Baltics. This view of Europe, centered on the
principles of economic community, focuses largely on the free movement
of people, capital, and goods.
On the other side was a group that promoted
a deeper Europe, one that was institutionally connected in areas
that would ultimately infringe on national sovereignty-areas such
as currency, foreign policy, defense, and governance. However, most
proponents of this politically and governmentally integrated Europe
recognized that its success depended on shared values and interests,
rather than shared geography.
In recent years, key European players began
to argue that political deepening and geographic widening were inextricably
linked. Thus, they advocated both a wider Europe (stretching to
the borders of Russia) and a deeper Europe (bound together by one
currency, a common foreign and security policy, and even a single
The outlines of this deeper Europe are found
in the "Constitution for Europe," which was endorsed by
the EU's 25 heads of government in June 2004 and is now facing national
parliaments and referendums for ratification. If all goes well for
EU constitutionalists, the document could come into force in spring
2005. In its 260-plus pages, the document seeks to further legitimize
and strengthen many of Europe's existing structures, while creating
new ones. The EU's major organs of power will include:
• The European Parliament-the EU's chief
legislative body, its members directly elected by the European populace
to five-year terms.
• The European Council-an administrative
and deliberative body comprising the heads of state or government
from the EU's 25 member states, plus the President of the European
• The Council of Ministers-something
like a council of councils consisting of ministers from each member
state, grouped together by function. For example, all 25 telecommunications
ministers will be part of the Council of Ministers of Telecommunications.
• The European Commission-this EU executive
committee will consist of 13 commissioners selected by a rotating
group of EU states; a president, who is selected by a qualified
majority of the European Council "after appropriate consultations"
and confirmed by a majority vote of the European Parliament; non-voting
commissioners, as chosen by the president; and the new "Union
Minister for Foreign Affairs."
• The European Court of Justice-the EU's
main judicial body, which adjudicates disputes between the European
Commission and member states, as well as referrals from national
The draft constitution also strives to make
EU policymaking more efficient. According to Heather Grabbe of the
Center for European Reform and Ulrike Guerot of the German Marshall
Fund, "The EU has spent 12 years trying-and failing-to make
much progress towards greater efficiency and legitimacy."5
This drive toward efficiency no doubt plays a part in the distance
between the European Union and the people it serves. Indeed, the
EU is struggling to find a balance between efficiency and accountability,
with every move toward one invariably weakening the other. For instance,
the European electorate doesn't have much of a direct say in who
sits on the European Commission, even though the commission "shall
promote the general European interest and take appropriate initiatives
to that end." 6
Of course, it pays to recall that the US political
system has its own "democratic deficit." After all, the
Electoral College does not always reflect the will of a national
majority. Moreover, how Europeans choose to govern themselves is
not America's worry. Even so, there is something unsettling to American
eyes about an EU system that puts so much distance between the people
and their political representatives-and so much power in a supranational
Historian Hans Kohn defined 18th-century nationalism
as "a political movement to limit government power,"7
but this European pan-nationalism seems to be a movement aimed at
expanding the power of government. Consider the so-called "double-majority
system" aimed at preventing small and medium-sized countries
from having veto power over the will of large states. Under a plan
developed in Nice in 2000, EU members initially agreed to a population-based
formula that weighted the legislative power of France, Britain,
Germany, and Italy just slightly higher than that of Spain and Poland.
However, fearing that the Nice agreement gave too much clout to
medium-sized countries like Spain and Poland, the larger states
reneged and proposed a plan that would have enabled supranational
laws to be passed with a bare majority of EU member states (13 of
the 25) plus a 60-percent majority of the EU's total population.
Representatives from the large and medium states finally agreed
on a plan that requires at least 15 countries representing 65 percent
of the EU population to support a measure before it becomes law.8
This wasn't the only time the EU's political
center of gravity decided that agreements are subject to change.
Mired in recession, France and Germany flouted the EU's Stability
and Growth Pact, which calls on members to hold budget-deficit spending
under a fixed percentage of GDP. The EU's newest members can expect
more double standards: As a New York Times analysis revealed, "Almost
all of the 15 current Western members are imposing restrictions
to keep out Eastern workers for several years."9
If the 2004 European Parliamentary elections
are any indication, the EU's double standards and distance from
the average voter may be having an effect. Only 26 percent of eligible
voters in the EU's eastern half even bothered to vote-and this was
their first election.10
The Foreign Legion
All of this points to the possibility that
by forcing political union and geographic expansion, Europe's new
founding fathers may be attempting too much and reaching too far.
As one European diplomat remarked at a recent conference, "Europe
needs to walk before it can run."11
This is especially true in the realm of foreign and security policy.
Given recent history, the draft constitution's
promise to create an EU foreign minister and its requirement that
member states "support the common foreign and security policy
actively and unreservedly" seem laughably premature. After
all, if the war in (and about) Iraq has proven anything, it's that
the EU's 25 members do not have a common foreign policy. Instead,
they have 25 foreign policies that sometimes coalesce on ends, sometimes
on means, but seldom on both. Britain, Italy, and Poland led Europe's
sizable hawkish bloc into Iraq. France and Germany led a much smaller
but louder dovish bloc. And Spain has found a way to be in both
Advocates of the European Union point to this
splintered state during the Iraq crisis as evidence of the need
for a faux foreign minister rather than evidence of the opposite-and
this is where the EU becomes America's worry. The EU's "internal"
foreign-policy disagreements are muddying the transatlantic waters
and affecting US security.
Bounced back and forth between Brussels and
national capitals, non-European diplomats privately talk about how
difficult it is for them to deal with the EU. As it stands now,
the EU comprises 25 sovereign countries-each with its own head of
state, its own foreign minister, its own defense minister. In addition,
the EU also has a president, an external affairs commissioner, and
soon, apparently, a foreign minister-and all of these people claim
to speak for Europe. Consider a recent press conference hosted by
US Secretary of State Colin Powell: The Irish Foreign Minister was
there representing the EU presidency (at the time held by the Irish
Prime Minister), the EU external affairs commissioner was there
representing the EU Commission, and the EU's High Representative
for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (precursor to the EU
foreign minister) was in attendance representing the European Council.
Regrettably, the problems caused by the EU's
refusal to recognize its own limits on the global stage are more
serious than the size of the stage needed to accommodate the EU's
foreign legion. Again, the Iraq War is instructive. Thanks to French
President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder,
it took eight weeks for the UN Security Council to agree on a resolution
requiring Iraq simply to comply with existing resolutions, even
though a healthy majority of their fellow EU members and virtually
every leader in Eastern Europe supported a hard line against Baghdad.12
(Even then, the French and Germans made sure not to explicitly authorize
military action to bring Iraq into compliance.)
When Britain and the United States returned
to the UN for authorization in March 2003, they found the French
and German governments unwilling to compromise. In a naked bid to
win support during his reelection campaign in late 2002, Schroeder
had announced that Germany would oppose military action in Iraq-with
or without a UN Security Council resolution. "We will not be
part of it," he vowed.13
The French government tried to make sure no
one else would be a part of it either. As a sovereign, independent
country, France should never be expected to simply fall in line
behind America, but Iraq marked a new low. "Instead of keeping
the focus on Iraq and Saddam," as former US Secretary of State
George Shultz observed, "France induced others to regard the
problem as one of restraining the US."14
Indeed, given the size, reach, ambitions, and actions of the European
Union, one gets the sense that some proponents of the EU see it
as a check on American power.
After France's opposition at the United Nations,
President Chirac threatened the East Europeans for siding with Washington
rather than Paris on Iraq: "If they wanted to diminish their
chances of joining [the EU]," he snapped, "they couldn't
have chosen a better way."15 (Diversity
apparently has its limits in Chirac's Europe.) Acting like a counterweight
to Washington rather than an ally, the French President then dispatched
his Foreign Minister to more than a dozen capitals to organize an
international opposition against his erstwhile allies. In fact,
when London circulated an eleventh-hour compromise requiring Saddam
to pass six diplomatic and military tests to prove he had disarmed,
France actually rejected the plan before Iraq.
President Chirac ultimately condemned the Iraq
War because it was "undertaken without the approval of the
United Nations . . . which is the only legitimate framework for
building peace in Iraq"16-even
though military action was arguably justified under 16 separate
Winston Churchill worried about the corrosive
effect of such mischief on the United Nations. "We must make
sure that its work is fruitful," he warned in 1946, "that
it is a reality and not a sham, that it is a force for action, and
not merely a frothing of words."17
Of course, words are all the European Union
could offer, but this is only partly because EU members could not
agree on a course of action. Even if all 25 EU leaders had marched
lockstep into Iraq, another impediment to action would have remained.
Defense spending in France is $46 billion, or just 2.5 percent of
GDP; in Germany it's a scant 1.3 percent of GDP; and if Britain
remains estranged from Brussels, what military muscle the EU can
claim will be in doubt. "Without the UK," according to
Grabbe and Guerot, "a foreign and security policy venture would
lack political credibility."18
And without a unifying foreign policy, one wonders if EU members
will ever invest the kind of resources necessary to enhance the
organization's military muscle.
A Strained Alliance
Doubtless, Washington's difficulty in finding
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq has given President Chirac
reason to gloat. Yet some observers have concluded that Iraq's WMD
program may have been spirited out of the country during the diplomatic
foot-dragging.19 In others words, even
if Saddam's flouting of UN resolutions wasn't enough to justify
the use of force, there is more than circumstantial evidence to
indicate that he had stores of WMD materials to the very end.
Of course, Iraq was neither the beginning nor
the end of the US-European rivalry. "Europe has a set of primary
interests which to us have none or a very remote relation,"
as George Washington concluded in his farewell address in 1796.
"Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us
to pursue a different course."20
This transatlantic disconnect continued into
the 19th and 20th centuries. By the middle of the Great War, as
Europe bled itself white, Americans began to stray from their isolationist
instincts. For their part, Europeans began to recognize that the
United States was a source of stability and security. Yet even during
the most dangerous and deadly decades of the Cold War, the transatlantic
partnership was strained. Derek Leebaert details some of these strains
in his essential history of the Cold War, The Fifty-Year Wound:
• After World War II, prominent US policymakers
wondered why 140 million Americans should protect 200 million Europeans.21
The numbers have changed, but the question still hangs in the air
in some corners of America.
• In 1954, US taxpayers were covering
75 percent of the French war in Indochina. Yet France often parlayed
US assistance and equipment into financial payoffs. For example,
after using a US aircraft carrier earmarked for the war effort in
Vietnam to ship and sell fighter jets, the French government had
the gall to ask Washington for additional aircraft carriers.22
There are echoes of this self-serving duplicity in the gathering
reports of French complicity in the UN's scandal-plagued Oil for
Food Program in Iraq.
• In 1956, France and Britain diverted
equipment intended for NATO's European defense to launch their war
in Egypt. Eisenhower found out about British preparations for war
from US reconnaissance photos.23 Less
than a decade later, France pulled out of NATO's military structure.
• In the 1980s, NATO leaders wobbled
as millions of Europeans protested the decision to station Pershing
missiles along the Iron Curtain in response to Moscow's deployment
President Reagan was vindicated by the course
of history. Yet the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 seemed to widen
the transatlantic divide. Brent Scowcroft, who served as National
Security Advisor to the elder President Bush, noticed that "the
United States seemed largely absent in longer-term French calculations
about Europe."24 As he recalled
in A World Transformed, the "outlines of a Europe in which
NATO [and hence, America] would play a stagnant role or even disappear"
began to emerge.25
When Yugoslavia began to descend into civil
war in 1991, the Europeans seized upon the crisis as an opportunity
to prove themselves. It was, as one European diplomat dramatically
declared, "the hour of Europe." Washington took the hint
and stood aside. Yet there was little action behind the words. Indeed,
European governments slouched toward the lowest-common denominator
of inaction throughout the war. As historian William Pfaff observed
in The Wrath of Nations, the Europeans were "unable to act
collectively and refused to act individually." In Pfaff's view,
organizations such as the European Community (forerunner to the
EU) "proved an obstacle to action, by inhibiting individual
national action and rationalizing the refusal to act nationally."26
After four years of feckless diplomacy, 250,000
deaths, and two million refugees, the hour of Europe had passed.
The Bosnian war would end only after America reasserted itself.
The Kosovo War would further highlight the transatlantic asymmetry
in military and political power.
America's willingness to act without Europe's
help or blessing is arguably more a function of this imbalance than
it is of some desire to go it alone or play the role of cowboy-and
it definitely predates the presidency of George W. Bush. Recall
how President Bill Clinton unilaterally broke the UN arms embargo
in the former Yugoslavia.27 He opposed
the EU-backed Landmine Treaty. He ordered America's representatives
to the treaty-writing conference that spawned the International
Criminal Court (also strongly endorsed by EU members) to vote against
the final document,28 although he reversed
himself at the eleventh hour of his presidency. And in his final
five years as President, he bombed no fewer than five countries-Afghanistan,
Bosnia, Iraq, Serbia, and Sudan. Of those military operations, the
UN explicitly authorized precisely one (Bosnia).
In other words, this transatlantic tension
isn't caused by the party affiliation of the US President. As Financial
Times columnist Gerard Baker recently put it, "The most powerful
illusion under which many Europeans seem to be laboring is the idea
that if only President Bush would go away, the world would revert
to the status quo ante, a mythical world of brotherly love and UN-mandated
To be sure, European and American interests
converge less today than they did in the years between the end of
World War II and the end of the Cold War, but they converge more
than they did in George Washington's day. America and Europe may
indeed be taking different courses, but to extend President Washington's
metaphor, these paths often overlap.
The War on Terror
Fully 21 of the European Union's 25 members
supported the campaign in Iraq. The fact that the two largest, Germany
and France, chose not to be among that number has more to do with
their internal politics than with Washington. US Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld notes that 24 of NATO's 26 current or future members
have troops in Afghanistan or Iraq, and 17 of them have deployed
troops on both fronts.30 As European
Commission President Romano Prodi says of the US-EU relationship,
"The situation is much better than one year ago."31
Indeed it is, as evidenced by US-EU cooperation
in June 2004 on a UN resolution officially authorizing the US-led
peacekeeping force in Iraq. The resolution passed unanimously; it
conferred international legitimacy on the nascent Iraqi government
(and by extension, on the US counterinsurgency operation); and it
unearthed common ground between the war's opponents and supporters.
NATO is now committed to training Iraq's army.
Beyond Iraq, key European Union nations-including
France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom-have joined the United
States in forming the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to
strengthen their capacity to secure the seas and intercept weapons
of mass destruction and their precursors while in transit. More
than 40 other countries are supporting the PSI, which already has
scored successes in intercepting Libyan and North Korean weapons
and weapons material.32
Likewise, Washington's Container Security Initiative
(CSI) relies on close cooperation with European governments. The
CSI program deploys US Customs personnel in some of Europe's largest,
busiest seaports-including Rotterdam, LeHavre, Bremerhaven, Hamburg,
and Antwerp. The rationale for the program is simple: As the world's
biggest consumer, the United States opens its ports to some six
million cargo containers every year, making US port security difficult.
Under the CSI, US Customs officials can screen containers coming
into the United States before they arrive at American ports. This
keeps US ports open and efficient, which makes EU governments happy,
and adds another ring of security to America's open borders, which
makes US citizens safer.33
Even so, there are plenty of reminders that
coalition warfare is never easy: After the March 2004 terror attacks
in Spain, the hawkish ruling party was ousted in favor of an anti-war
party committed to yanking Spanish forces out of Iraq. As Michael
Radu of the Foreign Policy Research Institute laments, "The
most important lesson to be learned from Spain is the most depressing
and the one most likely to be assimilated by the terrorist networks
the world over: in a Western democracy, terrorism, if massive enough,
In addition, although NATO's European members
are engaged in training Afghanistan's new army, providing security
for elections, and extending stability from Kabul into other cities,
NATO can and should do more. Indeed, there was wide agreement within
the alliance to augment NATO's 6,500-man commitment in Afghanistan
with elements of the new NATO Response Force (NRF), a self-contained
rapid-reaction unit of warplanes, warships, and 20,000 troops. Predictably,
Chirac balked, declaring, "The NRF is not designed for this.
It shouldn't be used for any old matter."35
Afghans and Americans alike might take issue
with the notion that the security and long-term stability of the
very place that incubated al Qaeda is just "any old matter."
On other fronts, Germany and Britain have signed
on to the Bush Administration's Greater Middle East Initiative.
According to President Bush and Chancellor Schroeder, the wide-ranging
plan will "promote freedom, democracy, human rights, the rule
of law, economic opportunity, and security in the Greater Middle
East."36 In exchange, those governments
that take the path of reform will receive more aid, lucrative trade
opportunities, and new military and diplomatic contacts. Although
Paris has expressed qualms about following Washington's lead, the
EU already has a similar program in place, focusing on the southern
In a sign of common ground, France and the
United States brought about a relatively peaceful solution in Haiti,
deploying a joint force to stabilize the impoverished Caribbean
nation in early 2004. NATO is handing off its peacekeeping mission
in Bosnia to the European Union. Likewise, Washington and the EU
have been collaborating closely to keep nuclear weapons out of the
hands of the Iranian government.37
Finally, the emerging international missile
defense (IMD) coalition is built around a strong transatlantic core.
Britain was the first ally to join, as the Blair government agreed
to software and hardware upgrades of existing ground-based radar
stations at Fylingdales and Menwith Hill. Denmark is paving the
way for similar technology upgrades at radar and satellite-tracking
stations in Greenland. The Polish and Czech governments are negotiating
with Washington on the deployment of interceptors and/or radar stations
on their soil. Japan and Australia serve as the coalition's key
pillars in the Pacific.38
These heady days of missile defense call to
mind something Churchill said in March of 1955, when he called on
the West to maintain a "defensive shield" and rallied
his countrymen to preserve "the unity and brotherhood between
the United Kingdom and the United States."39
Churchill wasn't talking specifically about missile defense, of
course, but his words take on special meaning in the shadow of North
Korean nukes and Iranian missilery.
In sum, the transatlantic community is still
a community, and the outlines of a durable post-9/11 security order
are emerging. If given space to grow, this emerging order could
allow European governments to play niche roles where they are able,
EU powers Germany and France to participate where they are comfortable,
and the United States to lead a true coalition of the willing. It
could even open the door to the possibility of Europe and America
playing good cop/bad cop with rogue regimes. Without question, this
post-9/11 security system is premised on US leadership, but it relies
on existing NATO structures and a dependable European Union.
Before this new security architecture can take
shape, both America and Europe have adjustments to make. For its
part, Washington should remember that how something is said is often
more important than what is said, especially to European ears. US
Presidents often speak bluntly and sometimes must act without the
UN's permission. However, nuance and process are important in Europe.
The "us or them" ultimatum doesn't sound any better coming
from Washington than it does coming from Paris or Brussels.
As Secretary Rumsfeld has said of the War on
Terror, "Victory will require that every element of American
influence and power be engaged."40
Military strength is part of that power, but so is diplomatic deftness.
Although the US military can crush any foe, winning the peace requires
ambidexterity, and keeping the peace requires partners. Nation-building,
like misery, loves company.
For its part, the European Union must address
some basic questions. Does the EU really need a foreign minister,
or will such an experiment create more problems than it will solve?
Is it time to invest more in defense and less in new bureaucracies?
And perhaps most important of all, do the EU's powerbrokers really
want differences over style and semantics to divide their new union
and cripple the venerable transatlantic alliance?
Prime Minister Tony Blair, who at times seems
like the last thread holding Europe and America together, has answered
this last question with one of his own: "If our plea is for
America to work with others, to be good as well as powerful allies,
will our retreat make them multilateralist? Or will it not rather
be the biggest impulse to unilateralism there could ever be?"41
In other words, the United States is neither
the EU's nor the world's master; however, if European leaders fail
to recognize that America plays a special role in the world, they
could drive the United States away from the very organizations that
promote international cooperation-and thus ultimately jeopardize
Europe's own security.
As historian John Lewis Gaddis writes, "There
is something worse out there than American hegemony."42
Some in Europe understand this; some do not.
1. See Hans Kohn, Nationalism:
Its Meaning and History (Melbourne, Fla.: Robert Krieger Publishing,
2. Ed Johnson, "European
Union Adopts First Constitution," Miami Herald, 19 June 2004;
address by Jacques Chirac, 4 May 2000, http://www.france.diplomatie.gouv.fr.
3. See Heather Grabbe
and Ulrike Guerot, "Could a Hard Core Run the Enlarged EU?"
Center for European Reform Briefing Note, February 2004; see also
Cornelius Brokelmann, "Young Leaders Study Group on the Future
of Europe, First Conference Report," 12-15 November 2003, American
Council on Germany/Draeger Foundation/ZEIT Foundation, 2003.
4. Draft Treaty Establishing
a Constitution for Europe, 20 June 2003.
5. Grabbe and Guerot.
6. European Union Draft
7. Kohn. p. 29.
8. EU Business, "EU's
Presidency Warns of Race against Time on Constitution," EUBusiness.com,
10 March 2004; Thomas Fuller and Katrin Bennhold, "Leaders
Reach Agreement on a European Constitution," The New York Times,
19 June 2004.
9. John Darnton, "Union,
Not Unanimity, as Europe's East join West," The New York Times,
11 March 2004.
10. Paul Taylor and
Jeremy Smith, "Europe's Incumbents Battered Amid Record Stay-Away,"
Reuters, 13 June 2004.
11. Remarks delivered
under Chatham House Rules, Berlin, November 2003.
12. Patrick Tyler,
"NATO Backs Bush on Iraq but Germans Oppose War," The
New York Times, 22 November 2002; "United We Stand: Eight European
Leaders Are as One with President Bush," The Wall Street Journal,
30 January 2003.
13. Bruce Jacobs,
"2002 in Review: A Year Marked by a New Currency, Old Tensions,
and Expanded Alliances," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, http://www.rferl.org/features/2002/12/17122002170625.asp.
14. George Shultz,
"A Changed World," lecture before the Foreign Policy Research
Institute, Washington, D.C., 11 February 2004, http://www.fpri.org.
15. CNN, "Chirac
Lashes Out at 'New Europe,'" http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/02/18/sprj.irq.chirac/.
16. BBC, "Europe
Split over War," http://news.bbc.co.uk, 20 March 2003.
Churchill and the Sinews of Peace Address," http://www.hpol.org/churchill/.
18. Grabbe and Guerot.
19. See Con Coughlin,
"Saddam's WMD Hidden in Syria, Says Iraq Survey Chief,"
The London Telegraph, 25 January 2004; David Kay, Report to the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, 2 October 2003; Douglas Jehl, "Official
Suggests Iraq Hid Weapons in Syria," International Herald Tribune,
29 October 2003.
20. George Washington,
Farewell Address, 1796, http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/49.htm.
21. Derek Leebaert,
The Fifty-Year Wound (Boston: Little, Brown, 2002), p. 58.
22. Ibid., pp. 162-63.
23. Ibid., p. 202.
24. George Bush and
Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, 1998), pp.
25. Ibid., pp. 266-67.
26. William Pfaff,
The Wrath of Nations (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), p.
27. CNN, "US
Gave Tacit Approval for Iran-to-Bosnia Arms Shipments," 5 April
28. See Jennifer Elsea,
"International Criminal Court: Overview and Selected Legal
Issues," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress,
5 June 2002.
29. Gerard Baker,
"Bush Should Not be Demonized," Financial Times, 2 October
30. Donald Rumsfeld,
remarks in Munich, 7 February 2004, http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20040207-secdef0885.html.
"Prodi: The World Has Not Become Safer as a Result of the War
on Iraq," http://www.euractiv.com/cgi-bin/cgint.exe/2034086-28?204&OIDN=1507400.
32. US Ambassador
John N. Palmer, "Confronting the Terrorist Threat on All Fronts
: The Role of the Proliferation Security Initiative," 29 March
CBS News, "N. Korea Calls Ship Seizure Piracy," http://www.Cbsnews.com/stories/2002/12/12/world/main532751.shtml,
12 December 2002.
33. US Department
of Homeland Security, US Customs & Border Protection, "Hong
Kong Implements the CSI and Begins to Target and Pre-Screen Cargo
Destined for US," 5 May 2003, and "China Joins the U.S.
in Container Security Initiative," 25 October 2003; US State
Department, "US Customs Service's CSI," 22 February 2002.
34. Michael Radu,
"The News from Spain: Terror Works," 16 March 2004, http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20040316.americawar.radu.terrorworks.html.
35. Ian Black, "Unrepentant
Chirac Clashes with US Again," The Guardian, 30 June 2004.
36. See John Vinocur,
"Schroeder and Bush Get in Sync on Mideast," International
Herald Tribune, 28 February 2004.
37. Louis Charbonneau,
"Iran Unhappy with Draft Nuke Resolution-Diplomats," 11
June 2004, http://www.reuters.com.
38. See Katherine
Baldwin, "Britain Formally Agrees to US Missile Defense,"
Reuters, 5 February 2003; American Foreign Policy Council, Missile
Defense Briefing Report, 6 August 2003 and 10 June 2003.
39. Winston Churchill's
Address to the House of Commons, in David Cannadine, ed., 1 March
1955, Blood, Toil, Tears, and Sweat: The Speeches of Winston Churchill
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989).
40. Donald H. Rumsfeld,
DOD News Briefing, 1 November 2001, http://www.intelforum.org/z011101-dod.html.
41. Tony Blair address
to the House of Commons, 18 March 2003.
42. John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise,
Security and the American Experience (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Univ. Press, 2004), p. 89.
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