Afghanistan: From Here to Eternity?
"With home-bred hordes the hillsides teem,
The troopships bring us one by one, At vast expense of time and
steam, To slay Afridis where they run, The 'captives of the bow
and spear', Are cheap alas! as we are dear." - Rudyard Kipling,
"Arithmetic on the Frontier"
American policy in Afghanistan is at a crossroads,
or so it appears. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggested
in May 2003 that the war on terror in Afghanistan was in "cleanup"
or "mop up" phase.1 Overshadowed
by the swift American military victory in Iraq, the images of airmobile
troops and special operations forces rooting out al Qaeda in remote
Afghanistan mountains took a back seat to images of M1A1 Abrams
tanks sweeping through the desert destroying Iraq's Republican Guard.
Indeed, by the end of 2003, the problematic aspects of the American-led
reconstruction effort in Iraq continued to dominate discourse.
At the same time, critics darkly hinted that
Afghanistan was "another Vietnam" when aspects of the
ongoing but low-level Taliban terrorist activities popped up in
the media in the fall of 2003. Those seeking to attack American
reconstruction policy in Iraq point to Afghanistan and claim that
it is somehow a failed prototype, that the credibility of the American
reconstruction effort in Iraq is somehow linked to the credibility
of the American-led effort in Afghanistan. These are dangerous and
simplistic arguments. Afghanistan is a complex place in its own
right: it has a unique ethnic makeup, geography, social structure,
economics, and military factors. It is by no means analogous to
Iraq in any way. Imprecise perceptions, some deliberately constructed,
could distort the reality of the situation in Afghanistan and where
the United States stands after two years of operations there. If
we are not clear about what the issues are, we may create unrealizable
expectations about what can be accomplished, with the kind of subsequent
media backlash which is extant in Iraq.
Criticism of American Afghanistan policy can
best be characterized as reflexive reactions based on obsolete worldviews
combined with juvenile demands for instantaneous success. If it
is not successful by now, it therefore must be a failure. Some examples:
When describing necessarily violent activities undertaken by American-supported
anti-Taliban factions, anti-American journalist Robert Fisk in the
Independent (UK) uses phrases like "This is just how the Americans
began in Vietnam," and asserts that "Afghanistan is on
the brink of another disaster." Of course, in this view, America
is to blame.2 Analyst Jim Lobe penned
an article entitled "Afghanistan Quagmire," in which he
shrilly stated that "Afghanistan is beginning to look like
a quagmire rather than a victory, with echoes of the confusion and
uncertainty and persistent blood-shedding of Vietnam."3
In other cases, organizations with specific
interests in the Afghanistan situation have raised criticisms to
bolster their proposed policies (and perhaps potential involvement)
without taking into account the wider view necessary to take in
the magnitude of the problems in Afghanistan. Human Rights Watch
demands that the UN-mandated but now NATO-led Kabul stabilization
mission, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),4
should be expanded into other urban centers to provide "greater
security" for reconstruction, the protection of women's rights,
the return of refugees, and to reign in "regional warlords."5
Josh Pollack in DFI International's Current Defense Analyses argues
that heavy weapons must be stored, and combatants must be demobilized
and then be reintegrated into society. ISAF, therefore, should be
expanded and provided with the capability to "stop any Afghan
faction from playing a spoiler role" while at the same time
building up "a capable, centralized, and balanced indigenous
The International Crisis Group, like the others,
argues that the "international community" must increase
ISAF to 25,000 to 30,000 troops and expand it to other population
centers to "monitor potential disputes" which could disrupt
the political process. The development of a legal system and a human
rights monitoring mechanism could then be introduced.7
Indeed, after consulting some refugees in Iran, the Program on Humanitarian
Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University is more than
willing to provide detailed if unsolicited advice on how Afghans
should run their country, with suggestions like "the new administration
should prevent discrimination against any ethnic or political group"
and "disarm everybody throughout the country." The implications
of these arguments are that some international force should run
the show in Afghanistan, not American-led forces or even the Afghans.8
There are two distinctly conflicting visions
of Afghanistan, once the Vietnam faux-analogists' unhelpful assertions
are discarded. The "ideal" vision of Afghanistan held
by numerous Western observers consists of something which resembles
a semi-modernized quasi-European state with a prosperous economy,
where there is little or no political violence and everybody's human
rights are protected by a strong central government which can project
power throughout the territorial confines of what we call Afghanistan.
This vision is tempered by two realities. The
first is the impact of events that the United States put in motion
in Afghanistan after 11 September 2001, given the circumstances
of Taliban control over the territory of Afghanistan and al Qaeda's
presence in it, leading to the collapse of the regime. The second
reality relates to what the current power brokers in Afghanistan
will allow in the wake of all of this. These two realities will
not be altered all of a sudden by the pronouncements of the pundits
and the demands of the NGOs. Perhaps they should not be radically
altered. If we are going to formulate a future American policy and
strategy for Afghanistan, we have to operate in the realm of the
possible, keeping in mind that mid-course corrections are not always
achievable or even desirable.
The Unfolding Strategy
The close proximity of any analysis of American
actions in Afghanistan to unfolding events dictates that we rely
on public pronouncements and media analysis for our understanding.
We do not see behind the scenes too well, despite the release of
Bob Woodward's Bush At War 9 and the
availability of information on the internet. American objectives
in Afghanistan are, however, clearly stated, if not made widely
available. First is the destruction of al Qaeda's networks, training
camps, stockpiled resources, and communication systems. Second is
the destruction of any governing entity providing support or sanctuary
to al Qaeda: this was primarily the Taliban regime. Third, reconstruction
efforts would be undertaken to ensure that international terrorism
could not use Afghanistan and its people as a haven or operating
base in the future.10 Incidentally,
American objectives in Vietnam were never this clearly stated, let
alone achieved, particularly in the critical 1963-65 phase of that
war. The vague language used at that time indicated that American
forces were to "stop communism in South East Asia" and
" train the south Vietnamese army."11
The Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) campaign
in Afghanistan, in fact, is the complete antithesis of American
involvement in Vietnam in the 1960s. The first phase12
of the war in Afghanistan lasted from approximately 7 October 2001
to 6 or 7 December 2001. In those two months, the first American
objective was achieved with a combination of special operations
forces, anti-Taliban proxy armies, and selective use of airpower
to support both. The irony is that the Taliban regime collapsed
far ahead of schedule. Mazar i Sharif, for example, was expected
to hold out well into 2002, as were other urban locations like Herat.
US Central Command (CENTCOM) plans originally conceived the first
phase as a shaping campaign pending the introduction of large-scale
conventional forces to reduce these strong points alongside the
indigenous proxy forces. In early 2002, the equivalent of an airmobile
brigade group was deployed, but this formation was much smaller
than the unneeded but planned-for division or corps-sized options.13
There was some debate among American departments
and allies as to how to achieve the second and third objectives.
One school of thought saw American-led OEF forces completing their
offensive operations against al Qaeda and the Taliban, withdrawing,
and then handing over stability operations to a European-led stabilization
force, which would first establish itself in Kabul and then spread
to the other population centers. Another school of thought drew
out the transition phase so that both forces coexisted, with the
security assistance force slowly replacing OEF forces, perhaps over
the course of a year. In both schools of thought, training cadres
from the OEF forces or the planned security assistance force would
establish the foundations for a multi-ethnic national army, which
would in turn replace the expanded security assistance force around
the territorial confines of Afghanistan.14
The rapid collapse of the Taliban, among other
factors, threw this debate off the rails. Attempts to deploy British
forces to the Kabul region to act as a stabilization force were
blocked by an irate Northern Alliance command. Subsequent attempts
to establish an International Security Assistance Force in the Kabul
area were stymied and delayed, again by the Northern Alliance. The
size and mandate of ISAF were subjected to UN meddling stemming
from the Bonn Agreement, which gave the Northern Alliance a veto
over what the force was capable of doing. At the same time, some
in CENTCOM saw an expanded ISAF as a competitor for OEF forces outside
of Kabul, with all the associated problems of coordinating two separate
international forces in a complex environment.15
The winner of the debate was the US Secretary
of Defense. A guiding principle for American planners was to keep
the American "footprint" in Afghanistan as small as possible.
Analysis of the Soviet experience indicated that the larger a foreign
force stationed in Afghanistan is, the more targets it produces,
which in turn increases the size and intensity of any insurgent
effort directed against it. The OEF force did not have to expand
beyond brigade group size once the Taliban regime had collapsed.
If the 4,500-member ISAF stabilization force (1,500 combat arms,
3,000 support personnel) expanded outside of Kabul in the face of
indigenous non-Taliban opposition, it would require substantial
American assistance to extract or protect it, which in turn would
increase the size of the footprint.
What emerged from this analysis was that the
nature of the second phase of operations in Afghanistan amounted
to a stabilization campaign conducted by OEF forces rather than
ISAF, even though the brigade-sized ISAF deployed to Kabul in the
spring of 2002. The intention was still to hand off to some other
entity, not necessarily an expanded ISAF, once the stabilization
phase was complete, but the Iraq situation in late 2002 and early
2003 dominated events and diverted resources.
On the surface, and to media observers, all
operations conducted in Afghanistan since January 2002 look the
same. ISAF patrols Kabul alongside the police forces and exerts
control over the Kabul International Airport. OEF airmobile light
infantry, working with special operations forces and indigenous
allied forces, hunt any al Qaeda that have slipped through the net
and the remnants of the Taliban regime who are conducting an insurgency
along the southeastern border of Afghanistan. When one examines
these operations in detail, however, it is clear that the geographical
area (and the population that inhabits it) influenced by the Taliban
is steadily decreasing, that the number of American troops on the
ground has decreased since January 2002, and that the ability of
the Taliban to launch sizable military actions has substantially
decreased from company-sized operations (the size of the forces
encountered during Operation Anaconda in spring 2002) to roughly
platoon-sized operations or smaller. In many cases, mines are emplaced
and individual rocket attacks are conducted, along with the odd
ambush, but the intensity and scale of activity have noticeably
decreased over time. As far as can be determined, no man-portable,
surface-to-air missiles have been successfully deployed against
OEF aircraft. There has been no equivalent repeat of "the Year
of the Stinger"16 like that faced
by Soviet forces in the 1980s.
As in any war, there are still casualties.
For example, in one month-long period (March 2003) there were two
anti-tank mine attacks, one with a secondary device designed to
kill survivors or rescuers; one attack with an improvised explosive
device; a successful ambush against a Special Forces patrol, leaving
two dead and one wounded; and an unsuccessful ambush against a convoy
from the 82d Airborne. A car-bomb also was detonated in downtown
Kabul, with little effect on its intended target. In all of these
instances, OEF forces and the Afghan Militia Forces tracked down
and killed or captured those responsible. In another case, there
was a tragic crash of an HH-60 Pave Hawk helicopter, which killed
all six crew members and medical staff.17
So Afghanistan remains a war with casualties.
Media pronouncements that the war is heating up, however, and that
a new Taliban-led jihad is in the offing, are greatly exaggerated.18
Since May 2003, there has been one operation in which the Taliban
fielded a force larger than a platoon, but it was defeated by indigenous
forces supported with OEF airpower. To suggest that the activities
of Taliban remnants during the latter half of 2003 are somehow the
equivalent of the Tet Offensive in Vietnam in 1968 defies reality.
Indeed, the temporary media focus on the low-level attacks made
it appear as though there was some sort of resurgence, when in fact
there has been a constant low level of violence and the media has
been preoccupied with other matters like Iraq.
There are no indications thus far that the
populations in any area outside of southeastern Afghanistan want
the Taliban back in control. In certain districts of the provinces
adjacent to Pakistan, the attitude of the Pashtun-dominated populations
appears to be malleable: they do not necessarily support Taliban
rule, but will if it is established or if the allegiance of their
local leaders shifts. On the other hand, if there is an appearance
of too much ethnic Uzbek or ethnic Tajik control from Kabul, it
may generate sympathy among Pashtuns toward their relatives in the
Taliban. Efforts are taken by OEF forces to stave off potential
Taliban exploitation of these realities. Whether OEF forces or other
organizations can continue to do this over the long term remains
to be seen. The violent activity conducted by Taliban remnants and
their sympathizers will never completely stop. We should not expect
it to. We should expect, however, that there will be no more large-scale
military operations by enemy forces-that is, anything larger than
a ten-man ambush party or, at worst, some platoon-level equivalent
action. We should expect to see the minimization of enemy attempts
at subversion among the civilian population, particularly the Pashtun
populations in southeast Afghanistan.
OEF forces cannot and should not do this alone,
however. Indeed, there have been calls for the rapid expansion of
the Afghan National Army (ANA), and some of its units have worked
alongside OEF forces in counter-Taliban operations. It will take
time, much longer than originally anticipated, to form a multi-ethnic
national army. The other military power in Afghanistan, however,
is collectively wielded by the Afghan Militia Forces or AMF. These
are the personal armies of the tribal and ethnic chieftains who
fought the Taliban. Usually called "warlords," these leaders
were integral to successful operations against the Taliban in the
first phase of the war. Special operations forces work closely with
them to coordinate OEF air and fire support, conduct tactical training,
and provide advice when required. The loyalties of these chieftains
and the people they control and represent can shift for a variety
of reasons, as OEF commanders found out during Operation Anaconda
in 2002. It is critical that the members of any military force operating
in Afghanistan understand, to the extent possible and at all levels,
the intricacies of the tribal relationships and religious affiliations
of the groups it interacts with. Failure to do so will result in
the failure of mission objectives at all levels. Have no doubt:
the lines walked by OEF commanders are extremely fine ones in Afghanistan,
and it requires significant agility and political dexterity to maintain
the situation there. There are legitimate grounds for pessimism
if this balancing act fails.
There are competing views as to the role of
the chieftains in the future of Afghanistan. The school of thought
that demands a strong central government backed up by the ANA ignores
these power brokers at its peril-or worse, demands that they be
disarmed and tried for human right violations. The chieftains are,
in fact, the men who control Afghanistan. They must be part of the
solution and made to feel that they are, since it was their people
who ultimately bled to take down the Taliban and al Qaeda alliance.
No way has been found to merge the ANA and the AMF. Indeed, problems
similar to those encountered by Zimbabwe and South Africa in the
creation of new armed forces after regime change are minor compared
to the ANA-AMF problem.
It is highly unlikely that these chieftains
will work with an expanded ISAF or other international force as
closely as they have with the OEF forces. Indeed, an expanded ISAF
will be viewed with suspicion and probably seen as a precursor force
to outright imposition of ANA control and therefore central government
control. That is a prescription for renewed civil war, something
similar to the events of the post-Soviet, pre-Taliban period in
the early 1990s, or worse.
The issue of poppy and drug production on the
territory of Afghanistan is extremely difficult to address. What,
exactly, is its relationship to the existing power structures? It
can be assumed that some chieftains are involved and use it as a
means of revenue generation. Does it in fact drive their actions
and operations or support them? The belief by some that Afghanistan
will become the "next Colombia" is, perhaps, exaggerated,
but drugs will be a factor in any future political instability.
It appears as though 90 percent of the drugs and drug products in
the region winds up in Europe, not North America; the other 10 percent
is scattered along the way in former Soviet republics. If this is
in fact a European problem, there may have to be a European solution.19
Apparently the heroin extracted from poppies in the region is substandard
compared to similar products produced elsewhere in Asia and is not
in as much demand, at least for the time being. Like terrorism,
drug production tends to gravitate toward and find a base in lawless
regions. Having inflexible, overly moralistic policies for dealing
with those who deal in drugs may be unrealistic in this environment
if there are other priorities.
So where do we stand in early 2004? The first
two objectives, the elimination of the Taliban regime and the uprooting
of al Qaeda's base and support structures in Afghanistan, have been
achieved. The third, reconstruction of Afghanistan and its institutions
to prevent the re-use of the country as a base for al Qaeda, is
in progress and will take time. It is clear that we must forestall,
as long as possible, a repeat performance of the inter-chieftain
civil war which gripped Afghanistan after the collapse of the Soviet-
and then Russian-backed Najibullah regime in the early 1990s. Can
we do that over the long term? There are historical grounds for
pessimism: it could be argued that Afghanistan never really had
a strong central government with effective European-style institutions.
Expecting such progress within the next five years may be expecting
There is a possibility, a hope raised by many
NGOs, that the people of Afghanistan have had enough of war and
instability. Cyclical inter-tribal and inter-ethnic violence, however,
appears endemic to Afghanistan. How do we prevent that? Can we Western
outsiders using our means prevent it? Can we create enough influence
within certain key groupings to prevent it? Can we build and strengthen
a multi-ethnic army and security service before ethnic and tribal
violence starts up again? We are talking about nothing short of
societal transformation-and some will resist it. They will seek
outside help, and they will get it. One possible solution is to
hedge our bets by assuming that there will be another civil war
in the future and ensuring that certain chieftains retain strong
connections to the United States. If Afghanistan descends into civil
war again, a repeat performance of the proxy operations conducted
in the fall of 2001 can be arranged if it looks like al Qaeda or
affiliated organizations are attempting to reestablish themselves
in or around Afghanistan.
OEF and ISAF forces are essentially buying
time to effect this transformation or at the very least provide
a strong base for it. These missions are doing so with the deployment
of foreign troops. The United States has to ensure that it does
not keep deploying larger and larger numbers which will increase
the footprint and therefore vulnerability. If OEF and ISAF forces
cut and run too early, the United States will be perceived in some
quarters as having failed to live up to the promises made. The Taliban
might reconstitute itself and bring back al Qaeda, putting us back
to square one. If OEF and ISAF forces stay too long, however, there
is a danger of repeating the Soviet experience, or the forces may
wind up trapped between competing armies in another civil war.
To suggest that American policy has failed
in Afghanistan because of these facts is reaching too far and requires
substantial amounts of intellectual dishonesty. The only other option
was to not attack the Taliban regime and to avoid any involvement
with Afghanistan. Such a course of action was not a realistic option
after the events of 11 September 2001.
Points to Ponder
For those involved in formulating future policy
in Afghanistan, and to those who comment on it, the following observations
seem worthy of consideration.
• Most of Afghanistan constitutes a post-Apocalyptic
environment closer to Mad Max: The Road Warrior than to Mr. Smith
Goes to Washington. The ecological damage wrought by the Soviet
Union and its puppet government in Kabul is staggering. The ideological
and spiritual damage wrought by the Taliban on the Afghan peoples
is the mental equivalent of the drought caused by the deliberate
destruction of irrigation systems and aquifers by Soviet explosives
and tanks. The illiteracy rate approaches 80 to 90 percent.20
Most infrastructure has deteriorated, and there is virtually no
industry. In some cases, "doctors" in remote villages
are the second-generation descendants of Western-trained medical
people. Essentially, Afghanistan is at the same Year Zero that Cambodia
was at when the Khmer Rouge were finished implementing their murderous
program. Many civil institutions are, in some cases, led by men
in their 70s because they are the only living corporate memory from
• The so-called "warlords"
and their violent operating methods are a reality. It is critical
that the more zealous members of international legal institutions
recognize that antagonizing them or calling them to account under
Western legal structures is completely counterproductive to the
reconstitution of Afghanistan. We must resist the inclination to
be judgmental. We need to work with them. Those who don't want to
participate will have to be co-opted, since outright removal will
trigger waves of violence that could wreck what has been built thus
far. Constructive engagement could lead to moderation.
• Democracy and human rights in Afghanistan-by
our standards and by our concept of time-are perhaps not possible
in the short term. The complexities of inter-tribal and inter-ethnic
politics in Afghanistan make Bosnia look like an easy problem to
solve. Given the high level of illiteracy and the probable high
levels of political intimidation that will accompany any Western
form of electoral process, the mere concept of democracy cannot
be expressed, let alone take hold in the near term. We need to think
in terms of "modernization" as opposed to "democratization."
The Afghan peoples have a traditional system: can they modify and
update it to satisfy us? Should they?
• A robust OEF force and a robust ISAF
force are critical instruments in the ongoing stabilization effort.
OEF forces particularly have been effective at eliminating al Qaeda
and Taliban influence in the territorial confines of Afghanistan.
They have, in fact, bought time for the stabilization effort. They
have prevented Taliban remnants from interfering with the effort
in dramatic ways. They also serve as nascent coercive forces and
influences to keep some elements in line. What we do with those
instruments and how that is received by the Afghans will be an important
• The United Nations has a serious credibility
problem in Afghanistan. It is not considered reliable by Afghans
generally. In many cases, soldiers from OEF and their accompanying
civil-military cooperation efforts are more effective, but this
state of affairs is temporary and related to influence generation,
information gathering, and force protection as much as humanitarian
assistance. A handover from the OEF force to some sort of structure
must eventually take place. But what will that be? Who will control
it and provide security? The current Provincial Reconstruction Team
(PRT) concept is a step in the right direction. By coordinating
humanitarian and reconstruction assistance at the province level,
"buy in" from provincial chieftains is more likely than
it is with some monolithic UN structure or one run by the Kabul-based
central government. The danger lies in selecting the means to protect
it: OEF, ISAF, ANA, or local AMF? Which will increase the "footprint"
to unacceptable levels?
• For the time being, the primary external
problem to the Afghanistan effort will be events in Pakistan. Taliban
remnants as well as al Qaeda hide out in certain border regions
abutting Afghanistan. The ability of the Musharraf government to
go after and defeat them in detail is questionable given the volatile
nature of the post-9/11 Pakistani political landscape, and the fragmented
and paranoid character of inter-ethnic and tribal problems within
Pakistan's borders. Ethnic Pashtun tribes straddle the Durand Line
(i.e., the Afghan-Pakistani border) which facilitates a seamless
flow of illicit trade. Obsolete variants of Islam flourish in that
region, and it remains a breeding ground for continuous problems.
Northern Alliance suggestions in Bonn during the fall of 2001 that
a UN peacekeeping force be introduced along the border to guarantee
Afghan territorial integrity may emerge, producing a Kashmir-like
problem with attendant high levels of violence. The development
of Afghanistan must take into account Pakistan. It may even be the
case that the United States' Pakistan policy is more important,
and that its Afghan policy becomes an adjunct to it.
• A CIA analyst argued prior to the invasion
of Iraq that al Qaeda "allowed" Afghanistan to collapse
so that American forces could be lured into Afghanistan and bled
just as the Soviets had.21 It is evident
that al Qaeda has instead focused its efforts in order to bleed
American forces in Iraq. Recognizing, of course, that al Qaeda can
attack targets in both areas, Iraq is more accessible to terrorists
and presents more targets for the time being. If the situation in
Iraq changes and the American presence is reduced, it is possible
that al Qaeda or affiliates may re-focus their attention on Western
forces operating in Afghanistan, be they OEF forces or ISAF forces.
Determining where the United States should
go from here with regard to Afghanistan is no easy task. Selection
and maintenance of the aim will require careful and detailed analysis
to avoid what the critics have already projected into the political
consciousness through the media and analytical community. What is
very clear, however, is that the future and fate of the Afghan peoples
will rest on the decisions that they and their leaders take. If
the situation devolves, it will be because choices have been made
by those exerting power throughout Afghanistan. To suggest that
the United States does or should exert fine control over those processes
is patently incorrect.
We must remember what the primary purpose of
the American presence in Afghanistan was and is: the destruction
of al Qaeda, its Taliban shield and support structure, and the prevention
of the territory's use as a sanctuary for continued al Qaeda operations.
So far, those aims have been achieved. The Vietnam analogy remains,
for the time being, the wishful thinking of a small group of misinformed
or misleading pundits.
1. Rowan Scarborough,
"War on Terrorism in 'Cleanup' Phase," The Washington
Times, 2 May 2003.
2. Robert Fisk, "Afghanistan
is on the Brink of Another Disaster," Independent (UK), 15
3. Jim Lobe, "Afghanistan
Quagmire," Foreign Policy in Focus, 6 September 2002.
4. For the detailed
origins of ISAF, see Sean M. Maloney, "The International Security
Assistance Force: Origins of a Stabilization Force," Canadian
Military Journal, July 2003.
5. Human Rights Watch,
"Afghanistan: US Should Act on Expanding Security," http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/08/afghan0830.htm.
6. Josh Pollack, "Afghanistan's
Missing Peace," Current Defense Analyses, January 2002.
7. International Crisis
Group Kabul/Brussels, "Securing Afghanistan: The Need for More
International Action," 15 March 2002.
8. "Securing Communities
for Reconstruction: Views from Afghan Community Leaders from the
Afghan Refugee Community in Zahedan and Mash'had, Iran," HPCR
Central Asia: Discussion Summary, Vol. 1, Issue 6, 23 May 2002.
9. Bob Woodward, Bush
At War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002). This "Team Woodward"
work should be read with skepticism: see Christopher Hitchens, "Aural
History," Atlantic Monthly, June 2003, pp. 95-103.
10. Operation Enduring
Freedom briefing given to the author, Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan,
11. See Charles Morrisey,
"From In-Country to In the Pentagon: United States Military
Policy and the Training of the South Vietnamese Army," Ph.D.
dissertation, Bowling Green State University, May 2002.
12. Note that CENTCOM
campaign planning is based on a four-phase operational planning
template. I have chosen not to use it in this case and have assigned
my own definitions of the phases for the purposes of this article.
14. Maloney, "The
International Security Assistance Force."
15. Ibid.; not-for-attribution
16. Operation Enduring
Freedom briefing provided to the author, Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan,
17. The author was
accompanying Operation Enduring Freedom forces in southeast Afghanistan
at the time when these attacks took place.
18. Paul Anderson,
"Taliban Leader Warns of Jihad," BBC News, 4 May 2003,
19. Briefing provided
to the author, Kabul, March 2003.
20. Note that this
figure is in excess of UN estimates, which sit at around 70 percent.
The Ministry of Education representative in Kandahar province believes
that 90 percent is a better estimate.
21. See Anonymous, Through
Our Enemies' Eyes (Washington: Brassey's, 2002).
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