U.S. Army presents itself as a Clausewitzian organization.
Officers in the Army fondly quote the Prussian theorist and,
at the strategic level, his dictums dominate; political control
of the military, war as an extension of policy, his trinity,
etc. Consideration of Clausewitz’s friction and
fog of war has translated into the doctrine of auftragstaktik
and maintenance of initiative at the lowest possible levels
of command. At the tactical and operational levels,
however, the U.S. Army remains more firmly rooted in the ideals
of Antoine-Henri Jomini. Jomini’s scientific approach
to understanding and succeeding at war lies at the heart of
Army doctrinal operations. The American Army, in its
collective description of war and its methods of planning
operations in war, follows more closely the Swiss theorist
than the Prussian.