America's Army: Expeditionary and Enduring
-- Foreign and Domestic
AS OF SUMMER 2003, a higher percentage of the
total Army appears committed to active combat operations than during
any period since World War II.1 While
the Army moves to transform at a forced pace, it still defends against
the most certain foreign threat the continental United States (CONUS)
has faced since the War of 1812. Change is not new; it is a staple
of defense.2 However, new combinations
of requirements-quick response (expeditionary) and long-term national
commitments (enduring)-require unusual solutions both overseas and
Several new challenges facing the Army are
implementation requirements that stem from the September 2002 National
Security Strategy of the United States.3
These competing requirements include:
- Preemption of global terrorist attacks.
- Support of domestic homeland security.
- Reconstruction of failed states to eliminate sources of terrorism.
- Evolving land power for total-spectrum operations that accelerate
Transformation across all services.
The result is that America's Army must become
more expeditionary-the first with the most-and more enduring-capable
of providing long-term domination while rebuilding multiple failed
states and defending the homeland.
New National Security Strategy
In June 2002 at West Point, New York, President
George W. Bush introduced his principles of response to the threats
of global terrorism. He said, "All nations that decide for
aggression and terror will pay a price. We will not leave the safety
of America and the peace of the planet at the mercy of a few mad
terrorists and tyrants. We will lift this dark threat from our country
and from the world."4
In two aspects, Bush's statement is a remarkable
departure from past national security strategies. First, while deterrence-then
defense-remain essential, particularly for the use of strategic
nuclear weapons, strategy is offense-oriented, particularly with
respect to countering global terrorism. land power must be capable
of strategic offensive operations to preempt hostile use of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD). land power should also be capable of effecting
regime change in hostile states harboring terrorists supported by
WMD with or without coalitions of the willing and with little advance
These concepts are big, new, and quite different
from past defensive multilateral military requirements [such as
NATO] essentially structured current land power strategy. Solid action
programs, funded by a growing defense budget that dwarfs the combined
defense budgets of potential friends and foes alike, back this national
policy. As proven in recent military operations, Bush says what
he wants and then does what he says. Declaratory policy becomes
quite credible because it has been consistently and effectively
converted into action policy.
Opportunities for intervention abound. North
Korea, Iran, and Syria have been put on notice after recent mid-intensity
operations to effect regime change in Iraq.5
Relocating U.S. forces in South Korea from the demilitarization
zone could free those forces for offensive operations to force North
Korean regime change in the event of provocation. Offensive U.S.
military forces should be present in the Middle East for the near
term. Is the next step to effect a presence in Palestine and the
Golan Heights to guarantee peace? Or is it to respond to a terrorist
coup in Pakistan (nuclear threat) or in Saudi Arabia (global oil
supply)? Forces appear about ready to be dispersed globally to enable
offensive operations in forward operating bases "designed for
the rapid projection of American military power against terrorists,
hostile states and other potential adversaries" around the
world.6 These are, indeed, new potential
offensive warfighting readiness challenges for America's Army.
But there are other waves of challenges, such
as Transformation and domestic defense. Civil authority over the
U.S. military, supported consistently by legislative authority,
is explicit in demanding Transformation to enable the offensive.
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld is making the most sweeping
changes to DOD since those mandated in The National Security Act
of 1947, which created the department.7
Providing for land power support in defense
of the homeland is another aspect of The National Security Strategy
that is challenging. As America's Army, the U.S. Army, in a Federal
Republic appropriately safeguarding the rights of the citizenry
in a democracy, must support state and local governments as they
fight terrorists who are willing to die and to kill thousands if
not millions of Americans.
America's Army must underwrite, hopefully,
zerodefect defense of the continent; it must be expeditionary -at
home. Composed as it is of active forces (Federal, national), U.S.
Army National Guard (ARNG) (state, regional), and U.S. Army Reserve
(USAR) (Federal, regional), America's Army is superbly designed
to support this mandate. Imagining a framework of sharing of responsibilities
and authorities more suited to serious defense of the citizenry
is difficult.8 But it is equally difficult
to envision a force that is truly expeditionary-both foreign and
The Active Army naturally leads when the total
Army of Active Component and Reserve Component units is projected
globally in offensive or defensive operations under the constitutionally
mandated powers of the President as commander in- chief. In the
past, the Active Army has often led federalized forces of the various
state ARNGs during periods of domestic disturbance, such as the
several Garden Plot operations to restore order in major urban areas
in the 1960s. Although these are important precedents for ARNG service,
it is unlikely that they apply to current homeland defense requirements.
In each state, the central executive authority
responding to terrorist attack is the state governor. The state
military force, mandated to provide such support as might be required
to state and local first-responders, is the ARNG of each state.
Just as U.S. defense is the first and dominant priority of the U.S.
Army, homeland defense of each state would be the first and dominant
responsibility of a state's Joint National Guard.9
As Federal leadership (executive and legislative)
provides military and other support to a state under terrorist attack,
it seems likely that those forces would be under the command of
the state governor with appropriate authority and responsibility
delegated to the state's adjutant general.10
Not surprisingly, Lieutenant General Steven Blum, Chief of the National
Guard Bureau, appears to "want state adjutants general, under
some conditions, to retain control of their activated units, as
joint task force commanders, capable of addressing any mission presented,
utilizing all the forces available within the state or attached
from other sources."11
Joint task force (JTF) command within a state
executing homeland defense is clearly an important, and certainly
a logical, expanded role for the ARNG, and it is a role that will
require the most serious professional leader development. Senior
leaders in the ARNG (officers and noncommissioned officers) are
clearly up to the task. After all, their demonstrated competence
in conducting Partnership for Peace (PfP) operations with former
Soviet Warsaw Pact nations in Eastern Europe contributed materially
to the eastern expansion of NATO to Russia-a strategic achievement
of the first magnitude.
At issue for the ARNG is not the quality of
performance, it is the quantity of support required. How much can
the Nation expect the ARNG to do? Competence -current or achievable-is
not the issue in expanding ARNG commitment to serious homeland defense.
The issue is time and the ability of its citizen- soldier leaders
to fulfill expanded, enduring, homeland-defense responsibilities.
The ARNG must fulfill the homeland-defense role as well as be prepared
to respond rapidly in an expeditionary mode to WMD attack. And,
the ARNG must perform these roles without a serious degradation
of the capability to support overseas offensive and defensive land power
operations that The National Security Strategy envisages.
Of course, the ARNG could be enlarged, or the
USAR could be expanded to support offensive and homeland defense
responsibilities. The USAR could also establish special-purpose,
multifunctional units on call to conduct operations in support of
ARNG JTFs in states under attack. The USAR could also form additional
units prepared to replace priority ARNG units called to JTF duty
in their state and, therefore, no longer be available for overseas
preemption or stability operations. Certainly these things are doable,
but how large should the offensivedefensive hedge be?12
The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome epidemic in China is a modest
measure of what might occur after serious biological weapon attack
in the United States. Current formulations of homeland defense might
be too narrow. A destructive computer virus that interrupts vital
services or a sudden regional power blackout can influence millions
in their homes or work environments almost immediately. Sudden,
direct attack against the population can override, simultaneously,
the protective shield of Nation, state, and local governments.
The complexity of day-to-day American life
creates many pressure points for applying disruptive terrorism.
Recent examples include the sniper attacks in and around Washington,
D.C., and the electrical blackouts in the northeast and upper Midwest.
Uncertainty and fear can create remarkable demands for protection.
For example, after a missile shot down an Israeli civilian aircraft
in Kenya in December 2002, politicians called for ARNG air defense
units to be placed at all U.S. airports.
The point is that the U.S. defense establishment
is now between a rock and a hard place in reconciling new, nontraditional
offensive missions and extraordinary and unpredictable (including
irrational but compelling?) homeland defense requirements likely
to occur simultaneously. Both scenarios clearly require effective,
quick-response (expeditionary) capabilities, whether overseas or
at home, fully responsive to public expectations.
The tension between what the public expects
and what the military can provide is aggravated by emerging military
requirements to bolster various failed regimes in countries that
are attractive to terrorist networks. Such regimes have failed because
they were never viable (as in Congo and Somalia) or because the
U.S. changed their regimes, and we now find ourselves responsible
for rebuilding them (as in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and most recently,
Iraq).13 Rebuilding takes years, if
not decades, and the result is a profoundly enduring presence. The
necessary size of an enduring presence is clearly debatable and
appears to vary state by state.14
Bosnia, aided by the European Union and NATO,
is a clear, good-news story. Similar PfP operations, stability operations
and support operations (SOSO) in Bosnia and in Kosovo have resulted
in significant achievements. Such operations supporting substantial
joint, interagency, multinational (JIM), and intergovernmental programs,
ensure a highly effective and enduring presence. By its actions
in the Balkans, the Army has demonstrated solid proficiency in intergovernmental
and JIM programs. A firmly institutionalized feedback process ensures
that lessons learned are shared and trained across the Army. Unfortunately,
this success record has not been matched to date in Afghanistan.
The growth in violence from 2002 to 2003 brings ominous recollections
of the Vietnam experience.15
We cannot yet predict the outcome of the regime
change in Iraq, but near-term omens are not favorable. Restoring
basic services will come in time, as will creating genuine political
comity among competing ethnic groups. Low-intensity conflict (LIC)
mixed with SOSO will give way to SOSO when there is clear restoration
of law and order and basic needs, such as electricity, water, and
food. However, military capability, sufficient to cause regime change,
decisively employed in a mosaic of land, sea, air, special forces,
and the CIA in mid-intensity conflict (MIC), clearly has not proven
to be sufficiently dominant and enduring to enable effective follow-up
SOSO on the ground. Nor has such military capability been successful
in preventing the development of local insurgent and terrorist groups
that will have to be neutralized before there can be substantial
state-building. The enemy has a vote. Commendable intergovernmental
and JIM practices from the Balkans have not yet been translated
After the highly effective MIC operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq, even the most casual observer can see that
the military has been successful in conducting operations that differ
significantly from the way operations were conducted in Operation
Desert Storm. The long, deliberate buildup to achieving dominant
land power, characteristic of Operation Desert Storm, is gone.
Rumsfeld's recent commentary makes it clear
that he aggressively and successfully sought rapid military action
backed by sufficient land, sea, air, SOF, and CIA capabilities applied
in a shifting mosaic sufficient to decisively remove Iraq's old
regime.17 This certainly reflects successful
Transformation underway. Yet, expeditionary land power successful
for conventional mid-intensity fighting has proven inadequate for
establishing the necessary enduring conditions for SOSO to build
a new regime.
Looking back on the campaign from months or
years of perspective, we might ask if land power would have been
more effective in achieving national objectives if a clearly dominant,
enduring capability had been provided immediately to augment temporarily
effective decisive expeditionary capability. As Richard Hart Sinnreich
recently commented, "[F]ighting a war quickly and cheaply doesn't
guarantee winning it quickly and cheaply."18
Decisive action certainly precluded destruction of oil fields and
might have precluded the generation and employment of WMD in Iraq.
Many other highly negative contingencies did not materialize, at
least not during the first several months of occupation. Clearly
U.S. forces achieved great successes, but the mission was essentially
regime change, WMD or not. Failing to subsequently provide the enduring
force dominant in LIC and SOSO might have made effective regime-building
much more difficult-with more serious implications to come.
Some implications began to appear by early
fall 2003, with continuing terrorist operations against U.S. and
British occupying forces. The coalition of the willing appears anemic
in providing military force appropriate to assist in effective occupation.
The point is not to apply 20-20 hindsight to
criticize a clearly brilliant campaign that was well led and well
fought. Rather, it is to suggest that the expeditionary mindset
that pervades execution of The National Security Strategy and thereby
the design of major Army forces for a future military might be fallacious.
Perhaps such a mindset is appropriate for the
U.S. Air Force (USAF), the U.S. Navy (USN), the U.S. Special Operations
Command (SOCOM), and certainly for the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC),
as the USMC's basic rationale. Such a mindset is essential when
there is a fleeting target as envisaged by strategic planners within
DOD. Andy Hoehn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy,
says, "If there is a terrorist training camp somewhere and
we come to understand that there is something we can do militarily,
we don't have a month to do it. . . . We certainly don't have six
months to do it. We may only have hours to do it."19
The Army should certainly be an effective participant
in expeditionary operations. However, expeditionary capability has
not been the fundamental rationale for America's Army, although
it is clearly a useful capability to provide to the President and
Secretary of Defense, particularly when unique forcedentry capabilities
are required far inland.
The Army exists to control people-holding the
bayonet at as many throats as required for as long as required to
achieve the U.S. national will, whatever that might require as military,
political, economic, and social change might be sought. How long
"holding the bayonet" takes is a decision of national
civil authority. After other services have gone back to their bases
in the United States or overseas, America's Army is expected to,
and will, endure in the target state to underwrite America's larger
political, social, economic, or military objectives.
Offensive operations to effect regime change
might or might not require destruction of the enemy's military,
but it certainly will require firm control of the population for
as long as is required to embed a new regime. In Germany, Japan,
and South Korea, doing so took years, if not decades. Firm control
requires a solid, survivable, enduring presence sufficient to overcome
the unpleasant uncertainties of occupation. Should that credible
presence be provided in survivable, psychologically intimidating
Abrams or Bradleys? Is it feasible or desirable to attempt to maintain
an intimidating presence in light Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCT)
or Future Combat Systems (FCS), which are potentially vulnerable
to future hand-held weapons-top down or bottom up or whatever? The
Abrams-Bradley pair clearly is world class-militarily and psychologically
dominant. Would a lighter Objective Force, FCS-equipped, be as dominant
So, on the one hand, national requirements
increase for quick-response expeditionary operations -offensive
and defensive. On the other hand, requirements mount for enduring
land power domination as failed states rebuild. Similar requirements
rise for homeland defense. Now add Transformation. The response
cannot be either-or; it must be all, and this is the challenge for
America's Army at war-expeditionary and enduring, foreign and domestic.
Expeditionary and Enduring Force Design
The issue is not whether America's Army should
be equipped with a more readily deployable SBCT or whether it should
strive for Objective Forces equipped with FCS. It should, when for
national military reasons it is essential to augment the superb
expeditionary capabilities of USAF, USN, and particularly, USMC
and SOCOM. Certainly this was General Peter K. Schoomaker's emphasis
when he addressed the need for a "more 'joint', 'expeditionary'
and 'modular'" army.20
The majority of America's Army should be fully
equipped with mobile, highly survivable, fully protected firepower
capable of fighting and winning under the worst conceivable conditions
while also thoroughly intimidating (hopefully, justifiably terrifying)
any person or group electing to oppose the objectives of enduring
national military commitment.21 Similar
logic applies to the full combat, combat support, combat service
support suite of materiel. Whatever a commander's personal belief
about what is happening in the targeted objective area, and as appropriate
and justifiable as his actions might seem, the forcible presence
of America's Army should channel his actions to those desired by
the Nation, for as long as the Nation elects to dominate the area.
The enduring-not expeditionary-mission of the Army is enduring domination.
When future joint forces assemble for network-centric
operations, land power must be able to prevail across a broad spectrum
of conflict. Former Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki
outlined his vision of the breadth of required capabilities early
in 2000: "The spectrum of likely operations describes a need
for land forces in joint, combined, and multinational formations
for a variety of missions extending from humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief to peacekeeping and peacemaking to major theater
wars, including conflicts involving the potential use of weapons
of mass destruction. The Army will be responsive and dominant at
every point on that spectrum" [emphasis added].22
There is no reason to believe that those imperatives no longer apply.
In fact, recent events reinforce the requirements for full-spectrum
Now add the additional requirements of The
National Security Strategy-inter alia regime change created through
offensive preemptive operations. Clearly America's Army needs adaptive
leaders; organizations; adaptive doctrine and tactics, techniques,
and procedures (TTP); training; and most of all, superb soldiers.
It goes back to the absolute requirements of balanced doctrine,
training, leader, organization, materiel, and soldiers (DTLOMS),
each exploiting cascading excellence in America's Army.23
There is more. We need to ensure that the requisite
balanced DTLOMS will support varying mosaics of combat capability
composed of land, sea, air, SOF, CIA, and such multinational capabilities
as coalitions of the willing or combinations of Federal, state,
and local government. Finally, add expectations of uncertain change
in complex organizations. In his treatise "The Objective Force
in 2005," John Riggs says, "The Objective [Future] Force
is composed of modular, scalable, flexible organizations for prompt
and sustained land operations" [emphasis added].24
So, unpredictable changes in the composition of teams of decisionmakers
during operations appear certain at about every echelon.
An ongoing discussion focuses on materiel and
specifically the characteristics of the Objective Force-FCS. The
debate is predictable and appropriate. After all, FCS will cost
billions. But, the most dramatic new challenge to the Army does
not come out of that debate, whatever the materiel solutions. The
challenge comes with the ripple effects of comparable change in
balancing DTLOMS in the face of sustained operations in a continually
changing mosaic of expeditionary and enduring, foreign and domestic,
national military capabilities mandated by The National Security
Strategy. This is unprecedented. 25
Doctrine. The Objective Force-FCS conceptual
framework is comprehensive and thoughtful. Clearly this concept
is adapting to the requirements of evolving joint doctrine. In fact,
given strong Army paternity in creating doctrine, this is not surprising.
It remains to be seen if a decisive capability to end a regime is
sufficient to dominate and to create these conditions or whether
diplomatic efforts can induce other nations to support us with military
capabilities to create those conditions.
Employing highly flexible, varying mosaics
of capabilities mandates review of doctrine to ensure that the use
of new, perhaps transient, capabilities, such as Delta or CIA operatives
or state and local governments, governments, is understood and assimilated
by leaders and that TTP have been embedded to ensure their effective
integration. Past doctrinal concepts of regime- building, such as
imposition of constabulary forces, appear inappropriate for the
practices of sudden changes in the mosaic that might have been stimulated
by competent enemies; that is, requiring rapid changes in force
composition and mission so as to continue to dominate local situations.
Occupying forces might have to employ rapidly shifting combinations
of SOSO, LIC, and MIC to retain the tactical initiative, particularly
when the stakes include potential use of WMD. The occupying force
must possess joint tactical constructs, appropriate to rapid shifts
up and down the spectrum of conflict.
Conceptually, it seems likely that the doctrinal
expectation should more and more envisage combined arms operations.
Mounted combined arms forces are represented by the symbology of
red, blue, yellow, and the lightening bolt of the Armor patch. Light
forces are combined arms for foot, parachute, helicopter, or air
and land mobility. SOF are combined arms that now include the USAF
and the USN. Sustaining highly capable combinations of capabilities
within these combined arms teams is challenging. Now, the national
military vision is a combined arms of the combined arms; that is,
having rapidly variable mixes of the entire base of combined arms
that can assemble rapidly for decisive, then hopefully, dominant
operations. This is not the conventional constabulary, nor is the
appropriate conventional, predetermined, domestic, natural-disaster
team when the threat is global terrorism.
Another doctrinal implication of shifting mosaics
is the need to be prepared to operate across intergovernmental and
JIM programs, utilizing joint (USAF, SOCOM); interagency (Department
of State, CIA, FBI, Drug Enforcement Agency); intergovernmental
(Federal, state, local); and multinational (Iraqi, Afghan, NATO)
forces. Multinational operations are particularly challenging because
they might require interaction with groups of local leaders across
the range of local agencies and governments. Imagine the complexity
of operational frameworks 101st Air Assault units faced in governing
Mosul, Iraq, while also facing sporadic insurgent operations. What
doctrine and TTPs are required to prepare a senior tactical headquarters
to assume effective, enduring governmental authorities over millions
of people-many friendly, some indifferent, some quite hostile and
capable; that is, enduring a Great Depression while staying ready
to fight MICs to counter any hostile use of WMD in hours not days?
This is not your conventional constabulary.
Leaders. Emerging patterns of operations confirm
past expectations of evolving requirements for leaders in America's
Army.26 The extraordinary range and
rapidity of change in the Skills, Knowledge, and Attributes (SKA)
required of leaders confirm the wisdom of the Army Training and
Leader Development Panel in focusing on leader self-awareness and
adaptability. Now leaders must broaden their service SKA to those
intergovernmental and JIM operations require. Bright, motivated
leaders, corporal and above, faced by the requirements of current
operations, understand this. They learn experientially, as has been
demonstrated in recent operations to the great satisfaction and
pride of America observing the conventional combat phase of Operation
Iraqi Freedom through the eyes of embedded media.
The challenge is to bring the wealth of experience
back to the institution so that profound learning at whatever grade
can be translated to higher and lower grades. Bringing distilled
wisdom back to the institution will allow knowledge to multiply
as it percolates among leaders, much as the insight gained through
years of tactical wisdom engendered by the various combat training
centers has seeped throughout the Army to be applied in expeditionary
and enduring operations-foreign and domestic.
Fortunately, new capabilities, such as the
Battle Command Knowledge System, evolve to encourage and, hopefully,
accelerate the exchange of data, information, and knowledge, initially
within America's Army, then across intergovernmental and JIM missions
as it suits national purposes. The Army, already one of America's
leading learning organizations, is about to become a premier learning
and teaching organization. As this occurs and is translated to intergovernmental
and JIM associates, there should be substantial opportunities to
expand the coalition of the willing, which in turn, should generate
the capabilities required for enduring domination while protecting
rebuilding. There should be comparable opportunities to support
homeland defense in expeditionary and in enduring aspects.
Leader development is alive and well. Now the
focus migrates to preparing teams of leaders, such as the chain
of command, as well as individual leaders. Such a progression should
ensure that Army leaders and their units and organizations can exploit
their current excellence to stay ahead of the accelerating change
mandated by national military leadership, particularly the generation
of necessary expeditionary and enduring capabilities.
Training. Current training doctrine and TTP
are good and improving.27 A new training
challenge comes with increasing reliance on intergovernmental and
JIM operations. There is a compelling requirement to create intensive
experiential training packages that can be rapidly modified on the
ground to train to task, condition, and standard, shared with various
intergovernmental and JIM combinations. The first requirement is
to train to ensure effective communication, which requires much
more than liaison-level understanding. Shared task proficiency is
essential, given the pace of operations.
Organizations. Organizations are shaped by
the doctrine and TTPs they are to implement. The requirements for
modular, scalar organizations, combined with support of the varying
mosaics of current operations, put a tough mark on the wall. I advocate
an organizational structure of core fighting teams, similar to the
Delta Force troop-level organization, with multiples of from four
to six leader teams to which additional capabilities could be added
and that would be described as SOCOM+ when all of the other services
This proposal might seem quite revolutionary,
but in terms of small unit combined arms teams, it actually approximates
post-World War II armored cavalry platoons, which had a scout section,
a tank section, an armored infantry squad, a mortar squad, and a
platoon headquarters. By thoroughly modernizing (likely including
some robotic capabilities), the diversity of capabilities, as represented
in old armored cavalry squads, is an organizational precedent for
future organizational design.
Now, however, combat power plug-in capabilities
need to be built in. Since the operational environment might shift
back and forth rapidly from SOSO to LIC and potentially MIC with
WMD, the base organization should readily expand or contract to
accom- modate or release additional capabilities. What would be
even more challenging and necessary is providing the same flexibility
in order to add intergovernmental and JIM capabilities. Conventional
mechanized infantry platoon leaders did that in Kosovo, and they
now do it in Iraq, whether the intergovernmental or JIM participant
is an Iraqi policemen, contractor repair personnel, or SOCOM/ CIA/FBI
operatives. Whether we are talking about separate platoon headquarters
or a supplemental platoon liaison team or more communications to
provide others, we need to revisit the organization of companies
or troops and platoons. Similar logic applies for each of the other
joint tactical constructs and for the requirements of homeland defense.
Such a construct would not be like your father's or grandfather's
constabulary once the expeditionary phase of combat operations is
over-nor would this be a postmodern military.
Soldiers. Soldiers - competent, confident,
disciplined soldiers - are the Army's abiding strength. Superb young
leaders, as diverse as is America, are endowed with curiosity and
initiative to seek a better way to accomplish any task. They have
precisely the attributes needed to master unanticipated situations.
Innovative, effective recruiting continues. Favorable combat arms
midterm reenlistment continues. Lateral-entry (continuum of support),
which appears to be coming, will provide more opportunities with
which to attract highly competent leaders.28
This is a clear "good news story" that should continue.
We should regard current Transformation processes
as a glass half full. Transformation is not going away in the face
of other compelling challenges; nor should it. Transformation enables
America's Army to stay inside the decision loops of adversaries
as part of a larger national effort. Those who believe the pace
is too rapid will be disappointed. The pace will not slow; it will
increase. The spectrum of conflict, including the challenges of
homeland defense, is just too broad, and the global potential of
terrorist and WMD threat too great, to brake the momentum for Transformation.
In fact, the pace should quicken. We must address the enduring dominate
military force requirements of effective and, therefore, enduring
regime change, just as we must address the requirements associated
with the clearly attractive flash of expeditionary operations.
The Army has been transforming throughout its
history.29 As an institution, the Army
thrives on change and does quite well at it. Of particular note
is that the Army has accomplished recent change in the midst of
a decade of severely constrained resources. Forcing change when
every decision is a zero-sum game paid with another canceled program
is tough and debilitating. But, it is nothing compared with earlier
crises, such as at Valley Forge or during the Army's precipitous
decline after two world wars. The Army must transform as it leans
into the challenge of addressing enduring domination as thoroughly
as it addresses the clearly necessary expeditionary capability-foreign
1. Frederick Kagan,
"An Army of Lots More Than One," The Weekly Standard,
07 July 2003, on-line at <www.weeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer_preview.
2. LTG Frederic J. Brown,
"Perpetual Transitions," Military Review (November- December
3. The White House,
The National Security Strategy for the United States (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 2002).
4. President George
W. Bush, Graduation address, U.S. Military Academy, West Point,
NY, 1 June 2002. In this context, "we" means the United
States of America.
5. Doug Struck, "U.S.
Troops Will Leave Korean DMZ," Washington Post, 6 June 2003,
A1; Thom Shanker, "Lessons From Iraq Include How to Scare North
Korean Leader," on-line at <Nytimes.com>, accessed on
12 May 2003; Glenn Kessler, "U.S. Eyes Pressing Uprising in
Iran," Washington Post, 25 May 2003, A1; Charles Krauthammer,
"Syrian Power Play," Washington Post, 18 April 2003, A21.
6. Vernon Loeb, "New
Bases Reflect Shift in Military," Washington Post, 9 June 2003,
A1. See also Kurt M. Campbell and Celeste Johnson Ward, "New
Battle Stations," Foreign Affairs (September-October 2003):
7. Secretary of Defense
Donald H. Rumsfeld might be making sweeping changes in DOD, but
not without legislative "backfires" as traditional practices
change. See Stan Crock, "Rumsfeld vs. Everybody," Business
Week (16 June 2003): 76-78.
8. For a more expansive
discussion of this serendipity, see Brown, "America's Army,"
Military Review (March-April 2002): 3-8.
9. U.S. Army and U.S.
Air Force units are about to be organized as joint force headquarters
in each state. For more information, see LTG H. Steven Blum, "The
Army National Guard-Back to the Future," Association of the
United States Army, 3 September 2003, 3.
10. As discussed in
Brown, "Transformation under Attack," Military Review
(May-June 2002): 15.
11. Jim Sullins, "Merger
may make Guard the fast force of old," Army Times, 9 June 2003,
12. For additional
discussion of dilemmas of hedges, see Brown, "Quality over
Quantity and Hedges," Military Review (July-August 2002): 64-69.
13. This is not to
assert that these areas might present similar challenges. There
are vast differences between each, particularly between Afghanistan
and Iraq. SOSO priorities adopted uniformly can be absolutely dysfunctional
because of great local dissimilarities.
14. Perhaps predictably,
Rumsfeld advocates a "light" presence in Iraq. In "Beyond
'Nation-Building'," The Washington Post, 25 September 2003,
A33, he says, "We are not in Iraq to engage in nation-building;
our mission is to help Iraqis so that they can build their own nation.
That is an important distinction."
15. For a sobering
assessment of progress in Afghanistan, see "Not a dress rehearsal,"
Economist (14 August 2003): 35-37.
16. This is not a
criticism of the performance of America's Army units; the record
is yet to be written. However, it appears that some U.S. leaders
had unrealistic expectations of success being achieved with limited
forces. Saddam Hussein's prepared Plan C interjected LIC into SOSO
17. See Brown, "Transformation
under Attack," 14-15.
18. Richard Hart Sinnreich,
"Winning Badly," Washington Post, 27 October 2003, A19.
19. Loeb, "US
shifting troops to far-flung bases," on-line at <www.dawn.com/2003/
06/11/int15.htm>, accessed 23 October 2003.
20. Sean Naylor, "Fast
forward," Army Times, 6 October 2003, 14.
21. Not to mention
the effect on U.S. forces of possessing clearly world-class equipment
that in the case of the Abrams, is yet to contribute to a U.S. casualty,
an extraordinary contrast with the low survivability of the M4 Sherman
tank in Europe in World War II.
22. Secretary of the
Army General Eric K. Shinseki, "The Army Vision," Department
of the Army Weekly Summary, 7 April 2000.
23. As discussed in
Brown, "Imperatives for Tomorrow," Military Review (September-
October 2002): 81 footnote; Brown, "Transformation Under Attack,"
24. LTG John Riggs,
"The Objective Force in 2015," final draft, 12 December
2002, concept summary, i.
25. Substantial change
occurred in the 1980s, including AirLand Battle Doctrine, Big Five
(Abrams, Bradley, Apache, Blackhawk, Patriot), new organizations,
intensified leader and soldier development, but these changes were
not up against simultaneous changing mosaics of expeditionary and
enduring combat operations (such as intergovernmental and JIM operations)
and massive change in Army business practices. The discussion of
DTLOMS is an extension of that in Brown, "Imperatives for Tomorrow,"
26. See Brown, "Leaders
for America's Army."
27. See Brown, "Three
Revolutions: From Training to Learning/Teaching and Team Building,"
Military Review (July-August 2003).
28. See Brown, "Transformation
Under Attack," 12-14.
29. See also Brown, "Leaders
for America's Army." 30. For one perspective of change, see
Brown, "Perpetual Transitions."
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