The Case for a Joint Military Decisionmaking
FOLLOWING OPERATION Eagle Claw, the failed
attempt to rescue U.S. Embassy hostages held by the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard in 1980, Congress decided that the armed services would need
help in overcoming the historic aversion to working together as
joint forces.1 The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols
Act provides a framework in law to facilitate a more joint perspective
by reorganizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff.2
Although the services have made great strides since 1986, they still
have major hurdles to overcome.
Why cannot a staff of senior interservice
officers function together as an effective team? Varying experience
and training in military decisionmaking is a significant factor,
but there is more. The armed services do not have a joint military
decisionmaking process (JMDMP). Each clings to its own parochial
method of staff planning, and each approaches military- decisionmaking
procedures in radically different ways. Such differences ensure
friction and obstruct joint interoperability. An agreed-on JMDMP
must be taught in the individual service schools if the services
are to ever have truly effective joint staffs. The events of 11
September 2001 demonstrate the complexity of the contemporary operating
environment (COE). We cannot win the ongoing war against asymmetric
threats such as terrorism without fully synchronous joint operations.
Therefore, it is time for the services to set aside parochial differences
and come together to create a joint concept for use in the COE.
What's in a Name?
Over time there has been some movement toward
developing a joint concept. The U.S. Marine Corps has adopted a
military decisionmaking process (MDMP) similar to the Army's. The
U.S. Air Force uses a rather eclectic mixture of existing approaches
to the process. The U.S. Navy, a late entry into the mix, has its
own spin on the process, which it calls the commander's estimate
of the situation (CES). Each service's approach has merit, and on
the surface, problems appear easy to correct. More than enough doctrine
exists to cover all requirements. The hitch is in creating an agreed-on
lexicon so all services will use the same words to describe the
same types of tasks.
Although the distinction between what is art
and what is science might appear superfluous, it is anything but.
Determining what is art and what is science is the basis for almost
all of the differences between the services. For example, in the
Army's MDMP, staff procedures are considered science because a litany
of tenets, principles, and standard operating procedures govern
them. And, in the Army's MDMP, the commander's decision and direction
are considered art because they are a culmination of the commander's
intuition based on his experience.
As a name, the Army's MDMP could allude to
tactical-level operations and, therefore, might not lend itself
to the broader aspects of strategic and operational missions. On
the other hand, the Navy's CES process is often seen as being too
commandercentric and inappropriately art-heavy. The easiest resolution
of the problem is for all of the services to agree on a new term
that takes its roots in the joint approach. Our recommendation is
that the term "commander's estimate of the situation,"
which is step 4 of the Navy's concept-development phase, should
replace the Army term "military decisionmaking process,"
and all of the services should begin using the same terminology
to describe the same processes.3
What Does This Mean?
Deciding how to synthesize the procedure is
more important than deciding what name to give the process. Mission
analysis, the first aspect of the process, illustrates significant
differences among the services. The Navy's approach to the process
involves the following seven steps:
1. Analysis of the mission.
2. Analysis of factors affecting possible
courses of action (COAs).
3. Analysis of enemy courses of action (ECOAs).
4. Analysis of own COAs.
5. Analysis of ECOAs and own COAs.
6. Comparison of own COAs.
7. Stating the decision.
The Army and Marine Corps' approach involves
the following seven steps:
1. Mission receipt.
a. Area of operation (AO)/area of interest
b. Terrain and weather analysis.
c. Threat models (intelligence preparation
of the battlespace (IPB), steps 1 through 3).
2. Mission analysis (CES, steps 1 through
3), including pertinent threat COAs (initial phase of the IPB, step
3. Develop COAs (CES, step 4). a. Refine threat
COAs. b. Draft event template.
4. Analyze COAs (CES, step 5). a. Prioritize
threat COAs. b. Event template. c. Identify intelligence requirements.
5. Compare COAs (CES, step 6). a. Collection
plan. b. Intelligence synchronization matrix.
6. Decision and COA approval (CES, step 7).
7. Write operations order (OPORD).
The major difference between the two processes
lies in how each treats intelligence. The Army's approach relies
heavily on detailed staff preparation as the process begins on receipt
of the mission. The Navy's approach "hand waves" the IPB,
perhaps because the Navy commands the seas and feels that it always
has situational awareness. In a joint and combined arena, the IPB
process is crucial. The staff must perform the IPB up front if the
joint process is to be successful. The joint CES process must include
The Air Force approach seems to take its origins
from an older Army model that used templates and checklists to help
the staff develop the MDMP. The Air Force's CES includes the following
1. The mission.
2. The situation and COAs. a. Considerations
affecting possible COAs. (1) Military geography. (2) Relative combat
power. (3) Assumptions. b. Enemy capabilities. c. Own COAs.
3. Analysis of opposing COAs.
4. Comparison of own COAs.
5. The decision.
6. Concept of operations.4
The Air Force also uses a template for creating
an OPORD to guide the process. The template frames the major portions
of the operation, but it does not provide details for staff analysis.
The staff relies on checklists found in U.S. Air Force Manual (AFMAN)
10-401 V2, Commander's Estimate of the Situation.5
The extensive checklists demonstrate the detail to which the Air
Force is committed in the process. Such checklists also have been
useful to the Army and the Marine Corps.
The mission analysis briefing (for the Army
and the Marine Corps) and the commander's planning guidance (for
the Navy) provide similar products by different names. The Air Force
does not have a counterpart for these processes. The Army and Marine
Corps' mission analysis briefing format contains the following 11
1. Mission and commander's intent of the headquarters
two levels up.
2. Mission, commander's intent, concept of
the operation, and deception plan or objectives of the headquarters
one level up.
3. Review of commander's initial guidance.
4. Initial IPB products.
5. Specified, implied, and essential tasks.
6. Constraints on the operation.
7. Forces available.
8. Hazards and their risks.
9. Recommended initial commander's critical
information requirements (CCIR).
10. Recommended time lines.
11. Proposed restated mission.
The Navy commander's planning guidance includes
the following 10 steps:
1. The situation.
2. The restated mission, including essential
tasks and associated objectives.
3. Purpose of the forthcoming military action.
4. Information available (or unavailable)
at the time.
5. Forces available for planning purposes.
6. Limitations (constraints and restraints),
including time constraints for planning.
7. Planning assumptions.
8. Tentative COAs under consideration.
9. Preliminary guidance for use (or non-use)
of nuclear weapons.
10. Coordinating instructions.
Each of these products produces similar products.
The Navy commander's planning guidance is essentially a briefing,
and it is similar to the Army's mission analysis briefing. However,
by not recognizing that the briefing is a staff product, the Navy,
by virtue of its language, confuses art with science. The Army and
Marine Corps' staff briefings keep the distinction clear and provide
a more detailed product. When the Army and the Marine Corps' process
alludes to commander's guidance, it lists a detailed array of commander
issues, clearly indicating where science ends and art begins by
separating staff and command responsibilities. Referencing CCIR
reinforces the joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace
(JIPB) process by keeping intelligence tightly integrated into the
process. The process includes the following:
1. Specific COAs to consider or not to consider,
both friendly and enemy, and the priority for addressing them.
2. Reconnaissance guidance.
3. Risk guidance.
4. Deception guidance.
5. Fire support guidance/deep operations guidance.
6. Mobility and countermobility guidance.
7. Security measures to be implemented.
8. Additional specific priorities for combat
support (CS) and combat service support (CSS).
9. Any other information the commander wants
the staff to consider.
10. The time plan.
11. The type of order to issue.
12. The type of rehearsal to conduct.6
Following the commander's guidance, the Army
and Marine Corps discipline the process by restating the mission
to ensure everyone focuses on the task and the purpose of the operation.
Restating the mission also presents a picture of what must be accomplished.
The components of the restated mission include the five "Ws":
1. WHO (the type of forces that will execute
the action with which available assets).
2. WHAT (the type of action; that is, attack
or defend and the essential tasks the force will perform).
3. WHEN (the action will begin).
4. WHERE (the action will occur; that is,
in what AO with what objectives).
5. WHY (each component will conduct its part
of the mission; that is, to what purpose). The restated mission
also includes on-order missions. The concept of operations (CONOPs)
addresses be-prepared missions.
The Army and Marine Corps also use a specific
list of items in the warning order (WO) to ensure subordinates have
the needed information for continued planning. The CCIR are reinforced
during this step to ensure intelligence synchronization throughout
the planning process. The WO also includes related issues, such
as reconnaissance, security, deception, management of time, and
guidance for rehearsals.
The Navy's next step is grounded in operational
art in the attempt to circumscribe the panoptic elements of space,
forces, and time. The purpose is to determine how the battlespace
affects both friendly and enemy operations. The staff begins the
process by identifying and analyzing all militarily significant
environmental characteristics of each battlespace dimension. The
staff analyzes these factors by using matrixes to determine the
factors' effects on enemy and friendly forces' capabilities and
Using matrixes to list factors associated
with space, forces, and time might be useful for orienting the staff
to the issues, but using matrixes does not facilitate a facile understanding
of interactions. The Army and Marines might say that a better way
to capture the interactions of these complex factors is by using
the synchronization matrix, based on integrating battlefield operating
systems (forces) across terrain (space) and synchronized in time.
Such interactions become critical when developing COAs.
In the Navy's process, steps 3 and 4, developing
ECOAs and own COAs, include the following:
1. Project possible enemy objectives.
2. List own critical strengths and weaknesses.
3. List own centers of gravity (COGs).
4. List own critical vulnerabilities.
5. List own decisive points.
6. Identify individual enemy capabilities.
7. Develop ECOAs: ECOA/vulnerabilities matrix.
8. Prioritize ECOAs.
The steps for developing the Navy's own COAs
1. Review/restate mission and pertinent data.
2. List own objectives.
3. List enemy critical factors.
4. List enemy COGs.
5. List enemy critical vulnerabilities.
6. List enemy decisive points.
7. Develop tentative COAs (mutually exclusive
and collectively exhaustive), including- a. Focus of direction of
main effort. b. Scheme of maneuver. c. Task organization/phasing.
d. Use of reserves. e. Combat employment/method of mission accomplishment.
f. Logistics plan/execution.
8. List tentative COAs.
9. Conduct tests for adequacy, feasibility,
and acceptability (with matrixes), including risk assessment (matrix).
10. List retained COAs.
11. Develop CONOPs for each COA. The steps
the Army and Marine Corps use in COA development follow:
1. Analyze relative combat power.
2. Generate conceptual possibilities.
3. Array initial forces.
a. Identify the main effort, then supporting
effort forces two levels down.
b. Identify purpose(s) for main and supporting
c. Determine task(s) that will accomplish
stated purpose(s) for main and supporting efforts.
4. Develop scheme of maneuver.
5. Determine command and control (C2) means.
a. Assign headquarters (HQ) to each unit
b. Assign graphic control measures.
6. Prepare COA statement(s) and sketch(es).
The Navy's approach has some utility. Using
objectives, critical strengths, and weaknesses, COGs, critical vulnerabilities,
and decisive points for analysis is a great way to visualize conceptual
possibilities. The steps are generally intuitive in the Army and
Marine Corps' process, but specifying these steps would be a better
way for the Army and Marine Corps to more rigidly frame COA development.
This type of analysis could be used before arraying initial forces
in step 3. By design, the Army and Marine Corps' method lends itself
to preparing for the war game and will result in schemes of maneuver
and C2 means. The specificity of the Army and Marine Corps' COA
development process is critical to a meaningful wargame.
The Navy's method for analyzing enemy and
own COAs includes the following:
1. Reexamine the mission statement.
2. Review own/enemy physical objectives (matrix).
3. Determine measures of effectiveness (MOEs)
4. Conduct wargame/gaming (matrix and spreadsheet).
5. Interpret results.
6. List COAs retained (matrix and spreadsheet).
The Army and Marine Corps' method of analysis includes the following:
1. An attempt to visualize the flow of an
operation, given- a. Friendly strength, disposition, and COA(s).
b. Enemy assets and probable COA(s). c. Terrain and or environment
2. Modification or change of COA tasks to
3. Change to organization(s) of maneuver force(s).
4. Application of the efforts of combat, CS,
and CSS to improve the COA and enhance mission accomplishment by
This is not an exercise to validate the COA,
and it is not a "what if" drill to develop branches and
The wargame method the Army and Marines use
is much more visual in its approach. The Navy's method is data-centric
and is a mathematical approach to problem solving. The focus on
spreadsheets and MOEs is not conducive to visualizing the battlespace
and the coming campaign. There is a major break in continuity here;
the Navy's process does not build to a meaningful wargame of the
The Navy's approach in comparing COAs is no
less confusing in its approach. The Army and Marine Marine Corps'
approach again differentiates between art and science. The actual
COA comparison is critical. The staff can use any technique that
helps them reach the best recommendation and for the commander to
make the best decision. The most common technique is using the decision
matrix, which employs evaluation criteria, or governing factors,
to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of each COA. These matrixes
provide staff officers a tool with which to compare several competing
COAs against criteria, which when met will produce operational success.
Service examples of the steps to the Navy's
comparison of own COAs include the following:
1. Determine governing factors.
2. List advantages and disadvantages of each
3. Identify actions to overcome disadvantages.
4. Make final test for feasibility.
5. Make final test for acceptability.
6. Compare merits of each COA (using the decision
matrix and comparison matrix [+/-]).
When the Army and Marine Corps conduct COA
comparison, all COAs must be adequate, feasible, and acceptable,
which can be determined by the following:
1. Weighing criteria for evaluation.
2. Evaluating strengths and weaknesses of
3. Considering estimates from the entire staff.
4. Providing conclusion and recommendation.
The Navy assessment makes no mention of the
staff, which again makes it difficult to determine how the interaction
of science and art is to take place. The Navy approach comes across
as theoretical because it uses a textbook approach based on "chop
logic" and is not utilitarian. The Army and Marine Corps' method
uses the estimates of the entire staff in a process that maximizes
science for the staff and art for the commander.
The Navy's step 7, The decision, is another
name for the orders brief, which again causes a language and art
and science problem. The implication is that the product is the
commander's decision, or art. While not altogether incorrect, the
orders brief itself is a staff product, or science, with commander's
guidance providing the influence of art. The commander's guidance
expresses the commander's intent and addresses the CONOPs in terms
of objectives, scheme of maneuver, sector of main effort, phasing,
deception, fires, and reserves.
The Army and Marine Corps' method uses the
science of the MDMP to circumscribe the information the commander
needs to assess the product. The commander provides guidance on
the approved or refined COA. This form of intuition, or art, further
refines the staff's product before it is disseminated to the command's
subordinates. Subsequently, the commander issues a warning order
followed by the production of an OPORD or operation plan (OPLAN)
with appropriate annexes. Science becomes secondary to art, but
the staff (science) clearly drives the process. The distinction
made during the Army and Marine Corps' MDMP approach is critical
to overall understanding of the selected COA and for the continuity
of the operation. An understanding of the proper interface between
art and science is essential to creating a meaningful joint CES
Where Do We Go From Here?
Military commanders must make decisions constantly.
They and their staffs resolve simple, routine, or complex problems
every day. To help them think through their options when faced with
a forceemployment decision while applying knowledge, experience,
and judgment, military commanders need a decisionmaking tool to
facilitate the process. The Joint Military Operations (JMO) Department
at the Naval War College (NWC) has revised the Navy's CES process
in the NWC 4111E workbook to help with this effort.7
The faculty uses the eclectic combination of service practices to
great advantage in the classroom and offers a better solution to
the joint CES process.
Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Doctrine for Planning
Joint Operations, defines CES as "a logical process of reasoning
by which a commander considers all of the circumstances affecting
the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course
of action to be taken to accomplish the mission."8
In the estimate, the commander evaluates all of the elements of
employing forces and assets. The COA selected is the basis for developing
plans and issuing combat orders. The commander's estimate is also
a means by which to transmit the decision to the next higher command
echelon for approval.
Although the commander's estimate process
provides a comprehensive framework, rigid adherence to the form
or faulty application of the commander's estimate might lead to
a strictly mechanistic process of rationalization. Thus, spending
mental effort on the mechanics of the process rather than on the
estimate itself could undermine clarity of thinking. The result
might or might not be a sound decision.
The commander's estimate should lead to the
adoption of a COA that is suitable, accomplishing the mission and
complying with the supported commander's guidance, while also being
consistent with doctrine.
- Feasible, accomplishing the mission within
established time, space, and resource constraints.
- Acceptable, balancing costs (forces, resources,
risk, and so on) with advantages gained by executing a particular
- Distinguishable, preparing COAs that are
significantly different (unique) from each other.
- Complete, incorporating major operations
and tasks to be accomplished, including forces required, logistics
concept, deployment concept, employment concept, time estimates
for reaching objectives, reserve force concept, and the desired
The commander's estimate is the first and
most critical phase in the military planning process and occurs
at all command echelons: tactical, operational, and theater-strategic.
Normally, a geographic combatant commander (a commander in chief)
will also prepare a strategic estimate during peacetime as an integral
part of the deliberate planning process. Within available time constraints,
the estimate should be as comprehensive as possible. However, it
could vary from a short, almost instantaneous mental estimate to
a carefully written document that requires days of preparation and
the collaboration of many staff officers. Time available to complete
the estimate is an important factor in the CES process.
The staff might expand or condense the steps
in the CES according to the nature of a problem. However, to maintain
the logical sequence of reasoning and to ensure consideration of
pertinent factors, all the steps of the estimate should be generally
followed when possible. The format of the estimate process should
not prevent a commander from selecting the best method of arriving
at a sound solution to a military problem. Staff-section-specific
estimates support the process. Most of the staff (J1, J2, J3, and
so on, or service counterparts) prepare their own estimates of the
situation. The staff inserts pertinent parts of these staff estimates,
verbatim or in modified form, into the CES.
JP 5-03.1, Joint Operation Planning and Execution
System (JOPES), vol. I, "Planning Policies and Procedures,"
discusses the requirement for submission of a CES, but it does not
provide guidance for preparing one.10
The NWC 4111E workbook, which discusses how to conduct a CES regardless
of the scope of military action the force is to take, includes elements
most command echelons use in the CES.11
Where appropriate, NWC 4111E provides references to formats or guidance
that joint doctrine publications contain.12
A CES that another service conducts might differ in format and detail
but will address issues similar to those in this discussion. The
proposed generic CES consists of five principal steps:
1. JIPB (part I) and mission analysis (part
2. Develop friendly COAs.
3. Analyze friendly COAs.
4. Compare friendly COAs.
5. Make the decision.
As a reminder, in practice these steps always
occur sequentially, even if only mentally. For example, staffs cannot
compare COAs before they actually develop the COAs. More important,
subordinate, or even superior commanders, will conduct parallel
planning for their own CES that requires input from the command's
CES process. Briefly, these steps include the following:
Step 1, JIPB, part I, supports the commander's
decisionmaking and planning for a major operation or campaign by
identifying, assessing, and estimating the adversary's COGs; critical
vulnerabilities, capabilities, limitations, intentions; and COAs
that the force is most likely to encounter based on the situation.
There is a general agreement on the four major steps of JIPB:
1. Define the battlespace environment. Identify
the AO and AI. Determine the significant characteristics of the
environment. Evaluate existing databases. Identify intelligence
gaps and priorities.
2. Describe battlespace effects. Analyze factors,
space, and time of the battlespace environment. Determine battlespace
effects on enemy and friendly capabilities and broad COAs.
3. Evaluate the enemy. Identify enemy COGs.
Consider enemy general COAs. Determine the current enemy situation.
Identify enemy capabilities.
4. Determine enemy ECOAs. Identify the enemy's
likely objectives and desired end state. Identify friendly critical
factors, as seen from the enemy's perspective. Identify enemy critical
factors, COGs, critical vulnerabilities, and decisive points. Identify
the full set of ECOAs available to the enemy. Evaluate and prioritize
each ECOA. Develop each ECOA in the amount of detail time allows.
Identify initial collection requirements.
Step 1, mission analysis, part II, is a problem-solving technique
for studying the assigned mission and to identify all tasks necessary
to accomplish it. Mission analysis is critical because it provides
direction to the commander and the staff, enabling them to focus
effectively on the problem at hand. Mission analysis normally consists
of the following steps:
1. Determine the source(s) of the mission.
2. Determine who are the supporting and supported
3. Identify available forces and assets.
4. State the higher commander's mission.
5. State the higher commander's intent.
6. Determine specified, implied, and essential
7. Identify externally imposed limitations
affecting the mission.
8. Identify (planning) facts.
9. Identify (planning) assumptions.
The product of the mission analysis is the
restated mission, which must be a clear, concise statement of the
essential (specified and implied) tasks the command must accomplish
and the purposes of those tasks. The commander normally issues an
initial intent with his planning guidance and the warning order.
The commander's intent should focus on the aim of the forthcoming
action for subordinates two levels down. Paragraph 3, Execution,
in an OPORD or OPLAN, contains the intent statement. The purpose
of the commander's guidance is to focus staff effort in a meaningful
direction to develop COAs that reflect the commander's style and
expectations. The content of planning guidance varies from commander
to commander and is dependent on the situation and time available.
Step 2, develop friendly COAs, allows the
commander to develop concepts of operation that, if adopted, result
in mission accomplishment. The commander must envision employing
his own forces and assets as a whole, normally two levels down,
taking into account externally imposed limitations, the factual
situation in the AO, and the conclusions arrived at during step
1 for each COA. Staffs developing COAs must ensure that COAs are
suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete. COAs
are developed based on the mission and own (friendly) capabilities.
Normally, there are six steps in COA development:
1. Analyze relative combat power, including
risk assessment and risk management.
2. Generate options, brainstorming being the
3. Array initial forces.
4. Develop tentative CONOPs.
5. Recommend C2.
6. Prepare COA statements and sketches. At
this stage of the process the staff might propose, or the commander
require, a briefing on the COAs developed and retained to gain the
commander's approval of the COAs to be further analyzed; to receive
guidance on comparing and evaluating COAs; or to receive guidance
for revising briefed COAs or developing additional COAs.
Step 3, analyze friendly COAs, is the heart
of the CES process. This step equates to analyzing opposing COAs;
analysis is nothing more than wargaming. This step is a dynamic
analysis of the probable effect each ECOA has on the chances of
success of each COA. The aim is to develop a sound basis for determining
each COA's feasibility and acceptability. Predicted outcomes might
also show the need to consider additional modifications to the COAs
that could mitigate risk or improve expected performance. Analysis
also provides the planning staff with greatly improved understanding
of the COAs and the relationship between them. The staff follows
eight steps during the wargaming process:
1. Gather the tools.
2. List all friendly forces.
3. List assumptions.
4. List known critical events and decision
5. Determine evaluation criteria and/or MOEs.
6. Select the wargame method.
7. Record and display the results.
8. Wargame the operation and assess the results.
Step 4, compare friendly COAs, compares the remaining COAs. The
commander and staff develop and evaluate important governing factors,
considering each COA's advantages and disadvantages; identifying
actions to overcome disadvantages; making final tests of feasibility
and acceptability; and weighing the relative merits of each. The
reconciliation of objectives in this step must be tied to the mission.
Step 5, the decision, occurs after the staff
identifies the preferred COA and makes a recommendation to the commander
after completing its analysis and comparison. If the staff cannot
reach a decision, the J3, J5, or chief of staff decides which COA
to recommend at the commander's decision briefing. The staff then
briefs the commander. The chief of the operations planning group
(OPG)/joint planning group (JPG) highlights any changes to the COA
as a result of the wargaming process. Component commanders might
be present, but they are not required to be there for the decision
brief. However, their participation, either in person or via videoteleconference,
enhances the planning process. After the decision briefing, the
commander selects the COA most likely to accomplish the mission
and issues any additional guidance on priorities for operational
functions, orders preparation, rehearsal, and preparation of mission
Navy's CES Approach
To ensure continuity of effort at the operational
level of warfare, the services should adopt the Navy's approach
for CES staff operations. Joint planners should consider the Navy's
amalgam, or portions of it, for inclusion in JOPES to serve as the
animus for change in the services' staff colleges. A further refined
joint CES staff process in JOPES would provide clear guidance to
the services to ensure that we all speak the same language and approach
the decisionmaking process the same way.
This is a simple, yet poignant, step toward
actualizing the objective of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Inculcation
of the practices at the service colleges would better prepare staff
officers for joint duty and preclude the type of staff confusion
that brought planning to a halt during the Persian Gulf war and
ensure success in the COE by way of a standard approach to the decisionmaking
Using NWC 4111E is a move in the right direction;
it provides a CES for military problems requiring the employment
of combat forces. The workbook's format accommodates estimate requirements
regardless of the size of the forces involved and the environment
and the scale of the objectives the force is to accomplish. The
estimate's format is also intended to apply across the full range
of military operations.
1. For a history of
Operation Eagle Claw, see on-line at <www.specwarnet.com/ miscinfo/eagleclaw.htm>.
2. To learn more about
the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, see on-line at <www. chaplain.navy.mil/Attachments/JPME.pdf>.
3. Joint Forces Staff
College (JFSC) Publication 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide formerly
AFSC Publication 1) (Norfolk, VA: National Defense University Joint
Forces College, 2000).
4. U.S. Air Force Manual
(AFMAN) 10-401 V2, Planning Formats and Guidance Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO] 1 May 1998).
6. Naval War College
(NWC) 5111E, Workbook (13 April 1995). Electronic copies are available
on-line at <www.nwc.navy.mil/jmo> or by calling (401) 841-6458
or DSN 948-6458.
8. JP 5-0, Doctrine
for Planning Joint Operations.
9. JP 5-00.2, Joint
Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.
10. JP 5-03.1, Joint
Operation Planning and Execution System, vol. I, "Planning
Policies and Procedures."
11. NWC 4111E.
Also available online at: