Renaissance of the Attack Helicopter in the
"Americans define war as being waged
against a uniformed, disciplined, opposing state's armed forces,
the sort who will fight fairly, the way the Americans do."
-Daniel P. Bolger1
THE FACT THAT I am writing this article at
an Iraqi airfield north of Tikrit testifies to the success of the
United States and its coalition partners in their endeavor to remove
Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime and to liberate the Iraqi people.
Although this second Persian Gulf war witnessed conventional and
symmetrical battles in its opening phases, some Iraqi forces employed
asymmetric techniques to undermine U.S. campaign plans and to test
Subsequent to the capture of Baghdad, Task
Force (TF) Iron Horse, comprising the 4th Infantry Division (ID)
and attached units, was charged with clearing the area north of
Baghdad (centered on Tikrit, the former hub of Saddam's political
support) of noncompliant forces (NCF) and interdicting the proliferation
of the many remaining weapons systems in that area. Both the employment
of asymmetric techniques against U.S. forces moving against Baghdad
and the subsequent intransigence of NCF in northern Iraq, employing
hit-and-run, guerrilla-style tactics to acquire weapons and disrupt
U.S. lines of communications (LOC), were anathema to the U.S. definition
During the first Persian Gulf war in 1991,
Iraqi forces confronted the United States and its coalition partners
according to the dominant Western (conventional and symmetric) paradigm
of war. It is hardly surprising that the Iraqi forces were defeated.
It is also not surprising that in 2003, some Iraqi forces adopted
asymmetric approaches to try to mitigate U.S. overmatch in technology
and conventional military prowess. The most glaring and disquieting
Iraqi employment of asymmetric techniques occurred during the approach
to Baghdad on 23 March 2003. Highly dispersed small Iraqi units
set ambushes, using a cell phone and observer network in the cities
south of Baghdad. These ambushes damaged a number of AH-64s that
were conducting a corps-level, deep-shaping attack against Republican
Guard divisions surrounding Baghdad.
The Iraqi enemy never presented a massed target
for AH-64 attacks and quickly dispersed into the cities rather than
remain in conventional and predictable defensive battle positions.
During this Iraqi ambush, small-arms and antiaircraft fire damaged
more than 90 percent of a U.S. regiment's helicopters, and one helicopter
crew was captured. The damage to one attack helicopter battalion's
aircraft was so severe that the battalion did not see any major
action for the rest of the war.2
Not long after the fall of Baghdad, and before
coalition forces had finished subduing a host of NCF in northern
Iraq, the media began to report that the days of the Apache Longbow
were numbered. These negative media comments echoed the death knell
of deep-attack shaping operations and postulated that the Apache
was obsolescent. This opinion seemed to be based on one highly visible
but unsuccessful large-scale deep attack. Actually, the Apache had
proven its worth and effectiveness during the first Persian Gulf
war and the war in Afghanistan. Hoping to gain an advantage in the
zero-sum defense appropriations game, self-proclaimed attack helicopter
and air-power experts said it was time to eliminate the Apache and
supplant its ground support role with the U.S. Air Force's A-10
Warthog. Others argued that the Apache was designed for a deep-attack
role in the context of a conventional war between organized, combined-arms
formations. Therefore, adversaries who embraced asymmetric approaches
saw the Apache as a dinosaur, just another Cold War relic.
The armchair experts were wrong. After 23 March
2003, Army attack aviation adapted tactics to counter the asymmetric
threat. With close air support (CAS) A-10 attacks, Apache helicopters
conducted effective armed reconnaissance and close shaping missions
that were integrated with ground maneuver to defeat Republican Guard
divisions surrounding Baghdad. After Iraq's organized formations
dissolved, Iraqi Ba'ath party guerrillas confronted effective and
lethal small AH-64 armed weapons teams integrated with ground scouts
and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) sensors. This phase of Operation
Iraqi Freedom was characterized by decentralized, combined arms,
small units operating in nonlinear, noncontiguous areas of operations
(AOs). U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, provides a perceptive
description and codification of this operational milieu where combat
and stability operations intersect.3
The Apache Longbow remains an effective instrument
in armed reconnaissance operations throughout a nonlinear, noncontiguous
battlespace against an enemy that uses symmetric and asymmetric
tactics. After Baghdad was seized, the attack helicopter integrated
with ground maneuver in a close fires role. Coalition forces were
operating against paramilitary and noncompliant forces in nonlinear
AOs that were highly distributed in time and space.
Asymmetric Warfare, Quo Vadis?
The enemy, employing his small forces against
a vast country, can only occupy some big cities and main lines of
communication and part of the plains. Thus, there are extensive
areas in the territory under his occupation that he has had to leave
ungarrisoned and that provide a vast arena for our guerrilla warfare.-Mao
Tse-tung4 Mao Tse-tung is one of the
most widely studied practitioners of the asymmetric approach. In
the quote above, he explains how guerrilla bands can harness time
and space to their advantage. A host of definitions of asymmetric
warfare and asymmetric strategy exists. In fact, there are so many
definitions that asymmetry has become the strategic term de jour
since the mid-1990s and now means many things to different people.
The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia characterizes
asymmetry as attacks "posing threats from a variety of directions
with a broad range of weapons systems to stress the enemy's defenses."5
However, Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, describes
asymmetric action as actions in which "forces, technologies,
and weapons are different," or actions in which terrorism and
a rejection of the conventional approach is the norm.6
The 1999 Joint Strategy Review defines asymmetry even more broadly
as "attempts to circumvent or undermine U.S. strengths while
exploiting U.S. weaknesses using methods that differ significantly
from the U.S. method of operations."7
U.S. Army War College professor Steven Metz
offers another definition for strategic asymmetry: "In military
affairs and national security, asymmetry is acting, organizing,
and thinking differently from opponents to maximize relative strengths,
exploit opponents' weaknesses or gain greater freedom of action.
It can be political-strategic, militarystrategic, operational, or
a combination, and entail different methods, technologies, values,
organizations, or time perspectives. It can be shortterm, long-term,
or by default. It can also be discrete or pursued in conjunction
with symmetric approaches and have both psychological and physical
Counterinsurgency expert Max Manwaring limited
the scope of asymmetric warfare to insurgencies and small internal
wars. Manwaring explicitly refers to the U.S. experience of fighting
guerrillas in Vietnam as an asymmetric war.9
The first reference to his notion of asymmetric conflict is in an
article on the U.S. experience in Vietnam.10
Asymmetric warfare is not a new concept; it dates as far back as
the Roman occupation of Spain and the Levant. Asymmetry's scope
and definition limit the use of hit-and-run, small-unit tactics
by irregular and paramilitary elements to harass, ambush, bomb,
and disrupt the outposts, checkpoints, or LOC of conventional formations.
Practitioners of the asymmetric approach concentrate limited attacks
against regular military forces' critical vulnerabilities by using
treachery to undermine the overmatch of technology and aggregate
forces of their adversaries.11
The subject of asymmetric warfare is relevant
because the U.S. military will continue to confront enemies that
use asymmetric techniques. Four facts point to this likelihood:
-Western powers have the most advanced militaries
(technology and firepower) in the world.
-Economic and political homogenization among
these nations essentially precludes a war among them.
-Most rational adversaries in the non-Western
world have learned from the two wars against Iraq not to confront
the West on its terms.
-The United States and its European allies
will employ firepower and technology in the less-developed world
against ostensibly inferior adversaries employing asymmetric approaches.
Asymmetric conflict will therefore be the norm,
not the exception. The asymmetric nature of the war in Afghanistan
underscores the salience of asymmetric conflicts.12
Time and Space: The Dispersion/ Concentration
"Strategy is the art of making use of
time and space".
In the vast expanses of China, Mao Tse-tung
masterfully manipulated time and space to cause Japanese forces
to disperse. By inducing the dispersal of the Kwantung Army, Chinese
guerrillas could attack isolated outposts and reduce Japanese forces
piecemeal. Essentially, the weaker opponent can use time and space
factors to shape the concentration/ dispersion chimera to his advantage.
The asymmetric warrior uses space to draw his enemy out to the countryside,
making it difficult for the big power to concentrate its numerical
superiority. The conventional force, then, must use more and more
troops to secure its LOCs, resulting in the need for a host of isolated
outposts. The weaker adversary is thereby able to locally concentrate
his inferior numbers against overextended detachments.
Military historian B.H. Liddell-Hart refers
to this form of warfare as an inversion of the orthodox principle
of concentration: "Dispersion is an essential condition of
survival and success on the guerrilla side, which must never present
a target and thus can only operate in minute particles, though these
may momentarily coagulate like globules of quick-silver to overwhelm
some weakly guarded objective."14
In other words, a prudent, asymmetric-thinking enemy manipulates
time and space to disperse the greater power's military forces,
protracting the conflict and wearing down the will of the orthodox
opponent. Mao Tse-tung and North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap
repeatedly emphasized that forces dispersed to control territory
become spread so thinly that they are vulnerable to attack. Thus,
if the conventional formation concentrates its forces to overcome
this vulnerability, then other areas are left insecure. A massive
increase in forces could help resolve this operational contradiction,
but it also immediately increases the domestic costs of the war.
Conversely, if the conventional army aims to placate domestic opposition
to the war by withdrawing some forces, the contradiction at the
operational level becomes more acute.
Mao Tse-tung explained that the guerrilla could
prolong his struggle and make it a protracted war by employing manpower
in proper concentrations and dispersions and by concentrating against
dispersed enemy detachments that are relatively weaker. For every
territorial space, there is an inevitable mathematical logic that
dictates how many troops are required to exert control. For example,
British soldier and writer T.E. Lawrence claimed that it would have
required 20 Turkish soldiers for every square mile (600,000 total-a
prohibitive number) to control the Arab revolt in 1916.15
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, after the fall
of Baghdad, TF Ironhorse's nonlinear AO north of Baghdad ran from
Taji to Bayji along the Tigris River in the west, to Kirkuk in the
north, and east to Iraq's border with Iran. On any given day, TF
Ironhorse comprised about 24,400 combat and combat support troops
operating in an AO of approximately 51,180 square (sq) kilometers
(km). To put the potential for paramilitary dispersion and concentration
into Lawrence's mathematical logic, in this highly dispersed environment,
coalition forces had approximately one soldier for every 2 sq km.
Adaptation After the Abyss
"Whoever fights monsters should see
to it that in the process he does not become a monster. And when
you look long into the abyss, the abyss also looks into you."
The Apache crews who conducted the deepshaping
attack on the night of 23 March 2003 must have thought they were
staring into the abyss when they flew into curtains of small arms
and antiaircraft artillery fire thrown up by Iraqi regular and irregular
elements. After the regiment's attack against the Republican Guard
Medina Division, the helicopters, with battered rotors and airframes
full of holes, withdrew. The Apaches flew into a classic asymmetric
helicopter ambush similar to those guerrilla and paramilitary fighters
created in Vietnam and Somalia.
According to an Army report, the enemy was
able to set ambushes using a cell phone and a visual observer network
in the cities south of Baghdad. Supposedly, an Iraqi two-star general
in Al Najaf alerted the Iraqi air defense network by phone about
the Apache assembly area locations and when the helicopters had
been launched. Army V Corps Commander Lieutenant General William
S. Wallace remarked that the enemy general used a cell phone to
speed-dial a number of Iraqi air defenders.17
The Iraqi pre-planned air defense network allowed
paramilitary forces to respond quickly throughout the area with
well-aimed, random fire. As a result, many Apaches took hits in
the tail rotor and cockpit areas. U.S. aviators reported that they
had encountered a hornet's nest of enemy antiaircraft fire delivered
by small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, and antiaircraft iron-sight
guns. As the aircraft approached their attack-by-fire positions,
the entire power grid system below them went black, which was a
signal for Iraqi air defenders to begin the antiaircraft ambush.
The long wall of concentrated fire damaged 34 Apaches. When describing
this deep attack to the media, Wallace said that the attack helicopters
"did not meet the objectives that I had set for the attack."18
However, this was only one mission during the war, and the Army
and the attack helicopter community adapted techniques to defeat
an enemy more resolute and treacherous than originally estimated.19
Wallace said, "[W]e learned from our mistakes. We adjusted
and adapted based on what we learned, and we still used the Apache
helicopter in a significant role during the course of the fight."20
After 23 March, the Army V Corps continued
the offensive with a series of limited objective attacks. On 28
March, V Corps assigned the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)
to conduct a deep attack against the 14th Brigade of the Medina
Republican Guard Division. However, learning from the lessons of
23 March, the 101st's attack helicopters altered tactics, essentially
conducting an in-depth zone reconnaissance, clearing the zone while
attacking northward. When they encountered organized smallarms fire
similar to the type used during the night of 23 March, they pulled
back and directed Air Force CAS to eliminate enemy resistance.
For the remainder of the war, Apache helicopters
adopted a close shaping role instead of conducting deep attacks
and provided aviation close fires in support of ground maneuver
forces. Commenting on the shift from the deep-attack role to the
close combat attack, close support role, the V Corps commander stated,
"When the 3d Infantry Division attacked through the Karbala
Gap and subsequently into Baghdad, in addition to its own attack
helicopter battalion, it had 21 Apaches from the 11th Attack Helicopter
Regiment under its operational control (OPCON), amounting to a total
of 39 Apaches for continuous 24-hour operations to provide close
combat attack or close support of ground forces."21
The 101st's helicopter attacks after 23 March
destroyed 866 targets, including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles,
artillery, air defense artillery (ADA), and missile launchers. In
addition, the 3d ID's attack helicopter battalion destroyed 25 tanks,
27 infantry fighting vehicles, 6 artillery pieces, and 52 ADA pieces
as it provided aviation close fires during the march to Baghdad.
To adapt to an enemy employing asymmetric tactics
from urban-centric dispositions, the 3d ID's attack battalion mission
profile transformed from battalion-massed or phased attacks against
armor and artillery to continuous close combat attacks in support
of the division's main effort brigade combat team (BCT). The Apache's
close support role during the war's principally orthodox, formation-against-formation
phase signaled the rebirth of aviation in a close fires role and
represented a paradigm shift from a decade-long infatuation with
deep attacks. After U.S. forces seized Baghdad, the Apache continued
to perform in a close support role, but in an expanded battlespace
and against a more dispersed and unorthodox paramilitary foe employing
Maoist hit-and-run techniques.22
The Close Fire Role Against Irregulars
"We must make war everywhere and cause
dispersal of [enemy] forces and dissipation of his strength."
After the fall of Baghdad, TF Ironhorse cleared
and expanded the large, nonlinear AO in northern Iraq. Instead of
fighting Republican Guard divisions, the task force cleared the
AO of elusive, intransigent NCFs. In this milieu, attack helicopters,
working in teams of two, performed cordon and search, armed aerial
reconnaissance, airborne reaction force, and patrol operations.
These roles were similar to the successful, responsive attack helicopter
tactics employed during the Vietnam war.
While TF Ironhorse's aviation brigade's civil
affairs element was trying to restore water and electricity to local
villages, its attack helicopter crews, operating with the 1st BCT,
were attacking the various elements opposing the new order: hard-core
members of Saddam Hussein's government, criminal bands, Iranian
agents, suicide bombers, and power-hungry Iraqi factions determined
to seize control. This period represented an overlap between war
and stability operations.
Stability operations, the current Army lexicon
for what used to be operations other than war and low-intensity
conflict, encompass a wide range of tasks, including countering
insurgencies. Intensity is relative and contextual; however, when
the term "low-intensity conflict" was in vogue, an aphorism
offered, "It is not low intensity to the platoon engaged in
a firefight with insurgents."
In today's vernacular, Somalia would be categorized
within the realm of stability operations. However, anyone who has
read the book or seen the movie Black Hawk Down realizes the acute
intensity of the Battle of Mogadishu on 3-4 October 1993.24
V Corps chief of staff Brigadier General Daniel Hahn described this
environment when he said, "It will look at times like we are
still at war," and "stability operations are characterized
by momentary flare-ups of violence."25
At the beginning of the war with Iraq, the
United States and coalition forces aimed to destroy Republican Guard
divisions so as to remove Saddam Hussein's regime. After the regime's
collapse, the new mission statement required TF Ironhorse to clear
the AO of NCF; to interdict the acquisition and proliferation of
weapons; and to establish a secure, stable environment in northern
Iraq. In this landscape, the Apache proved to be an effective weapons
platform for reconnaissance, detection, and interdiction of NCF
During the evening of 1 May 2003, scouts and
a UAV working under the 1st BCT observed and engaged paramilitary
elements stealing crates of ammunition from an arms cache west of
Tikrit. An aerial weapons team of Apaches arrived at the objective
shortly thereafter, vectored to the target by 1st BCT command post
staff officers who were watching live UAV-feed. The Apaches sealed
off the NCF's avenue of escape, opened fire with 30 millimeter cannon,
and turned the paramilitary's vehicle into a "hunk of twisted
metal," leaving 14 dead.26
Attack helicopters were effective in blocking
and interdicting fleeing paramilitaries during cordon and search
operations, working within the ground BCT's concept of operation.
On several occasions, aerial weapons teams proved instrumental in
filling holes in the cordon along inaccessible exfiltration routes.
To preempt and unhinge any NCF effort to attack the aviation brigade's
base camp, AH-64s, integrated into combined-action teams comprising
military police, tactical human intelligence teams, and Bradley
ADA Linebackers, conducted raids, ruses, and feints in the 5-km
area beyond the wire. In some instances, Apaches destroyed unmanned
remnant air defense systems just outside the main operating base
fence line to exhibit dissuasive and credible force. As a result,
the enemy conducted no successful attacks against the Camp Speicher
base cluster. A final but salient component of the rebirth of aviation
close fires was a continuous relationship between attack helicopter
companies and the ground BCT.
For the duration of the counter-NCF phase of
Operation Iraqi Freedom, one attack helicopter company remained
under each ground brigade's OPCON. An aviation liaison officer (LNO)
also remained in the command post of each brigade to plan and integrate
close support. One LNO was a seasoned senior warrant officer, two
were career course captains, and all were Apache-qualified aviators.
The LNOs were key players in anticipating missions
and in integrating air and ground operations. Also, allocating one
platoon per 12-hour mission cycle allowed the attack battalion to
respond to contingencies 24 hours a day, 7 days a week in the three
AOs. The relationship, training, and techniques that developed between
the aviation brigade and the ground combat teams were essential
preconditions for success and bore exponential improvements in air
and ground integration. The only disadvantage of having three attack
companies under an OPCON relationship with the brigades was that
this left no Apaches for a tactical combat force (TCF) or reaction-force
role. A potential remedy for this was to either embed a TCF team
in each company or to rely on the corps attack regiment for the
TCF. In such an expansive AO, maintaining one central and principal
operating base was necessary for sustaining a high tempo.27
The Importance of Concentration
"Every lost battle is a principle of
weakness and disorganization; and the first and immediate desideratum
is to concentrate, and in concentration, to recover order, courage,
and confidence." -Carl von Clausewitz28
"And if I concentrate while he divides,
I can use my strength to attack a fraction of his. There, I will
be numerically superior. Then if I am able to use many to strike
few at a selected point, those I deal with will be in dire straits."
These quotes by two of the most renowned philosophers
of war show the importance of concentration. The words of Clausewitz
and Sun Tzu also contrast the distinctly Western and Eastern ways
of war. Modern military history shows that the West and its military
forces have generally dominated and monopolized the conventional
paradigm of war, usually winning when the East or the South decided
to fight according to this paradigm. The philosophies of military
strategists Henri de Jomini, Clausewitz, and Russian general Alexandr
A. Svechin are embedded in the cultures of these militaries. As
a result, the West has embraced the direct use of military force,
combining maneuver and firepower to mass combat power at a decisive
point, which usually equates to the destruction or annihilation
of an enemy force or army.
The problem is that the enemy U.S. forces are
most likely to fight is one who has for centuries embraced a different
philosophy of war. Potential adversaries are from Asia and the Near
East--cultures that generally embrace an Eastern tradition of war.
Moreover, the Eastern way of war, which usually stems from the philosophies
of Sun Tzu and Mao Tse-tung, is distinguished from the Western way
of war by its reliance on indirectness, attrition, and perfidy.
In other words, the Eastern way of war is inherently more asymmetric.
Employing attack helicopters in a close combat
role where intransigent adversaries adopt asymmetric techniques
is particularly germane for the U.S. military in its war against
al-Qaeda. Since the 19th century, the United States has embraced
the conventional paradigm and marginalized the unconventional one.
After victories against Iraq in two conventional Persian Gulf wars,
it is unlikely that another second-tier power will fight the United
States according to its paradigm.
The implication for using attack helicopters
in the future is evident; the U.S. military needs to cultivate the
mindset, doctrine, and techniques that combine attack helicopters
with small, ground-maneuver elements operating in a dispersed AO.
Attack helicopters also should be able to concentrate small teams
rapidly at the critical time and place to provide lethal fires.
Learning these lessons and techniques is important
because asymmetric warfare is not ephemeral. The Army has historically
viewed irregular warfare as a temporary anomaly. As a result, it
has not done a stellar job of retaining asymmetric warfare techniques
in its institutional memory. One expert on the history of the Army
and guerrilla warfare feels guerrilla warfare is so incongruous
to the natural methods and habits of a well-to-do society that the
Army has tended to regard it as abnormal and to forget about it
when possible. Each new experience with irregular warfare has required
that the Army learn appropriate techniques all over again.30
1. Daniel P. Bolger,
Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990s (Novato, CA: Presidio
Press, 1995), 69.
2. U.S. Army, V Corps,
"Attack Aviation Lessons Learned: Operation Iraqi Freedom,"
unpublished and unclassified report, 2003, Camp Virginia, Kuwait,
3. U.S. Army Field Manual
(FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office
4. Mao Tse-tung, On
Protracted Warfare (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967), 65.
5. Joint Publication
(JP), Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia (Washington, DC: GPO, 1997), 59.
6. JP 3-0, Doctrine
for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), III-9.
7. Joint Strategy Review
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1999), 2
8. Steven Metz, "Strategic
Asymmetry," Military Review (July-August 2001): 24.
9. Max G. Manwaring,
Internal War: Rethinking Problem and Response (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, 2001), vii-viii.
10. The term "asymmetric
conflict" first appears in 1974 in Andrew Mack, The Concept
of Power and its Uses in Explaining Asymmetric Conflict (London:
Richardson Institute for Conflict and Peace Research, 1974).
11. Metz, 25.
12. Once again, "inferior"
connotes a weakness in conventional measures of military might,
not necessarily in strategy, tactics, and warrior skills. Asymmetric
conflict was also the norm during the Cold War and for most of U.S.
history. During the Cold War, the threat of nuclear escalation precluded
a symmetric conflict between the two superpowers.
13. Napoleon Bonaparte,
in Michael Handel, Masters of War: Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Jomini
(Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1992), 99.
14. B.H. Liddell-Hart,
Strategy, 2d ed. (New York: Praeger, 1967), 365.
15. Andrew Mack, "Why
Big Powers Lose Small Wars: the Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,"
in Power, Strategy, and Security: a World Politics Reader, ed.,
Klaus Knorr NOTES (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983),
138-39; Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans., Samual B. Griffith
II (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 98; Liddell-Hart,
16. Friedrich Wilhelm
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, book IV, trans., Helen Zimmern
(1886) in Bartlett's Familiar Quotations (New Jersey: Franklin Electronic
Bookman, 1998), 146.
17. Scott Canon, "Time
to Study the Lessons Learned in War," Kansas City Star, 2 May
2003, 1; V Corps, 1; Neil Baumgardner, "V Corps Commander:
Army 'Altered Use' of Apaches Following Failed Attacks," Defense
Daily, 8 May 2003, 3.
18. V Corps, 2.
19. Baumgardner, 3;
Rowan Scarborough, "General Tells How Cell Phone Foiled U.S.
Attack in Iraq," The Washington Times, 8 May 2003, 13.
20. Scarborough, 13.
21. V Corps, 2; Baumgardner,
22. Baumgardner, 3;
Baumgardner, "Apache Longbow Battalion Destroyed Two Republican
Guard Battalions During OIF," Defense Daily, 4; V Corps, 2.
23. Mao Tse-tung,
24. Michael R. Gordon,
"Between War and Peace," New York Times, 2 May 2003, 1.
27. Major John Novalis,
4th ID attack helicopter battalion Executive Officer, interview
by author, 13 May 2003 Camp Speicher, Iraq; "Operation Iraqi
Freedom After Action Review," unpublished and unclassified
report, 2003 Camp Speicher, Iraq, 5.
28. Carl von Clausewitz,
On War, ed., Anatol Rapoport (New York: Penguin Books, 1968), 361.
29. Sun Tzu, The Art
of War, trans., Samual B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1982), 98.
30. Russell F. Weigley, The
History of the United States Army (New York: MacMillan Publishing
Company, 1967), 161.
Also available online at: http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/download/english/JulAug03/cassidy.pdf