Leadership: More Than Mission Accomplishment
The aim of leadership is not merely to find
and record failures in men, but to remove the causes of failure.
-W. Edwards Deming1
THE QUALITY of Army leadership has recently been
questioned. If you believe what is being written, there exists in
the Army today - -
-A serious generation gap between Baby Boomers
and Generation X, resulting in a dramatic increase in captains leaving
- An increasing lack of trust between junior
and senior officers, according to Army surveys of majors attending
the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC).3
- An increasing number of senior officers turning
down battalion and brigade commands, citing their disillusionment
with command climate and senior leadership.4
Do these trends indicate that many senior leaders
lack the interpersonal skills or the moral conviction necessary
to practice sound leadership? Certainly junior leaders' growing
disenchantment with senior leaders indicates a problem, if one assumes
that perception is reality. The Army can neither confirm nor deny
a leadership problem exists because it chooses not to comprehensively
or officially evaluate the quality of leadership development and
the effectiveness of its organizations. Instead, it concentrates
overwhelmingly on evaluating the quality of leadership development
by leaders' product: mission accomplishment. A cascading effect
ensues. The Army emphasizes mission accomplishment over other leadership
competencies, such as morale and discipline. Mission accomplishment
is rewarded as the sole criterion of good leadership. Leadership
training and supervisor reinforcement is limited and inadequate.
Therefore leaders are not fully developed. Comprehensive leadership
is not practiced. Instead, the primary focus is on getting the job
done, often at the expense of people and the organization. Subordinates
become disillusioned, which precipitates a leadership crisis.
In theory, the Army's popular slogan "Mission
First, People Always" is on target. In practice, however, Army
leaders often put mission first but neglect people, especially in
leader-development programs. That the Army is in the midst of a
trust crisis is not surprising. U.S. Army General (Retired) Frederick
Kroesen reiterates that this crisis is not new. In fact, during
at least six distinct periods in Army history since World War I,
lack of trust and confidence in senior leaders caused the so-called
best and brightest to leave the Army in droves.5
The question is, "What can be done to prevent this cycle from
Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Army Leadership,
strongly emphasizes mission accomplishment as a leader's key responsibility.6
The FM quotes General Douglas MacArthur's warning that "our
mission... is to win our wars...There is no substitute for victory;
that if you lose, the nation will be destroyed."7
Yet, unlike earlier versions, FM 22-100 equally emphasizes that
"being just technically and tactically proficient may not be
enough [and] that the Army would need leaders of competence and
character who not only acted to accomplish their mission but also
acted to improve themselves, their leaders, their unit, and achieved
excellence."8 This new balance
acknowledges the Army's repeated failure to emphasize adequately
the full spectrum of leader attributes, skills, and actions, and
it provides a good first step toward correcting this deficiency.
But, does it go far enough?
The Army's leadership model relies on the three
fundamental tenets of Be, Know, Do. These, in turn, rest on nine
supporting pillars of values; attributes; character; knowledge;
experience-based training; counseling and mentoring; mission accomplishment;
organizational effectiveness (OE); and leader development. Leadership,
similar to a physical structure, will only stand firm if its supporting
pillars or foundation remain solid. Previous and current senior
Army leaders have failed to institute this holistic approach to
leadership. Army chiefs of staff have claimed that leadership is
key to military success, but they have failed to recognize that
unless all of the competencies are solidly developed, the Army leadership
structure will collapse. Periodic neglect of multiple leadership
pillars has caused cyclical leadership crises. Unless the Army corrects
the problem, change will be excruciatingly slow. Failure could mean
the loss of at least one generation of effective future leaders
and possibly a return to the hollow army.
Measuring Leadership Effectiveness
FM 22-100 defines leadership as "influencing
people-by providing purpose, direction, and motivation - while operating
to accomplish the mission and improving the organization."9
Yet, if we review most individual evaluation reports, all we find
are citations of easily quantifiable tasks-mission accomplishment.
We see little mention of more unquantifiable aspects of leadership-contributions
regarding purpose, direction, motivation, leader development, and
overall organizational improvement.
Admittedly, these soft aspects of leadership
are not easily evaluated. How can we reliably measure a commander's
effectiveness in counseling and developing leadership skills in
subordinates when the results might not manifest themselves for
years? How can we measure a leader's impact on organizational effectiveness
and morale when leaders rotate quickly? How can we measure subordinates'
trust and confidence in their commander at the time a commander's
evaluation is due? So we say, "Good leaders will always accomplish
the mission." Yet, history provides many examples of poor leaders
who accomplished the mission. In the meantime, captains are leaving
the service while resident CGSC students and those declining command
indicate they have lost faith in senior leaders, despite those leaders'
impressive records of mission success.10
We cannot sustain an army at peak operational
capability by focusing solely on mission accomplishment. The long-term
effectiveness and efficiency of units and the fullest development
of leaders require that the Army develop some way to evaluate less
quantifiable measures of leader competence. U.S. Army General Bruce
Clark's adage, "An organization does well only those things
the boss checks," surely applies to leadership processes.11
Until Army leaders begin rewarding intangible indicators of effective
leadership, current priorities and behaviors will not change.
In a recent Officer Evaluation Report (OER)
update, Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki noted that
"selection boards clearly indicate that the OER is giving [the
board] what they need to sort through a very high quality officer
population and select those with the greatest potential to lead
our soldiers.[However,] feedback from the field indicates the OER
is not yet meeting our expectations as a leader development tool."12
Can there be any more reliable admission that the officer evaluation
system indicates neglect of essential elements of leadership development?
The current OER does not adequately measure
the entire spectrum of leadership competencies that FM 22-100 outlined.
The only portions of the OER that receive any credibility are the
rater's and the senior rater's evaluation on "specific aspects
of the performance and potential for promotion."13
These narratives focus largely on quantifiable aspects of mission
accomplishment. Because most promotion or selection boards have
so little time to evaluate each record, they almost exclusively
consider the senior rater's rating over the rater's, who in a majority
of cases knows the individual better. The expediencies of the review
process, a process that is further exacerbated by attempts to normalize
the rating across a bell curve or center-of-mass profile, dilute
even the narrow evaluation. While the current OER appears to reduce
evaluation inflation, it is a poor substitute for honest, well-rounded
feedback on all leadership competencies.
Although the new OER attempts to evaluate an
officer's character and how well he or she reflects Army values,
it reduces the report to a go or no-go evaluation. Moreover, this
go/no-go assessment contributes to junior officers' perception of
a zero-defect Army because there is no recovery from a no-go check.
In "Military Leadership into the 21st Century: Another 'Bridge
Too Far'?," U.S. Army Lieutenant General (Retired) Walter F.
Ulmer, Jr., asserts: "The Army does not enforce guidelines
about leadership style except at the extreme edge of the acceptable
behavior envelope [and thus] permits a potentially unhealthy range
of leader behaviors."14 Does the
Army believe that officers enter active duty either with or without
honor, integrity, courage, loyalty, respect, selfless-service, and
sense of duty? Do not officers possess degrees of each? Cannot these
values be taught, learned, and developed? Does someone deficient
in these areas have the opportunity to learn from his or her mistake,
to become stronger and more reliable than someone who has never
been tested? The Army's current evaluation form does not address
these questions, much to the detriment of the profession and its
The Army's definition of leadership, which
emphasizes improving the organization, creates unnecessarily an
ethical dilemma and implies that maintaining the excellence of an
organization is not enough. Stating that all organizations must
be improved is unrealistic and, at OER time, encourages creative
interpretation to reflect significant improvements. Efforts to demonstrate
endless improvement serve only to compromise the integrity of everyone
The fixation on superlative ratings-"the
absolute best of six battalion commanders"-leads to a self-centered,
on-my-watch mentality. Such judgments naturally tend to address
a commander's ability to accomplish the mission, often at the expense
of the organization and its people. This focus is further exacerbated
during short tours when making a mark is often valued over the organization's
best long-term interests.15 This practice
persists because organizational effectiveness, leader development,
and command climate are not accounted for in rating a leader's performance.
Nowhere on the OER is there a specific requirement to evaluate the
organization's effectiveness or the quality of subordinate leaders'
development. Though these aspects are sometimes included in the
performance evaluation's narrative, they appear only because of
the rater's initiative to include them.
The latest version of the OER addresses the
need to evaluate a leader's attributes, skills, and actions. Yet,
it appears that the Army has no clear way to evaluate these dimensions
because no guidance or criteria is provided for evaluating them.
No indication is offered about how the information derived will
be used, and no feedback is given on how the ratings fit into the
overall evaluation. Also, these ratings of attributes, skills, and
actions are totally subjective and superficial because they require
the rater merely to check a block without comment. This cursory
assessment is particularly troubling because the Army does have
some effective tools and processes to make such evaluations. Examples
include command climate surveys, organizational inspection results,
and 360-degree leadership assessment tools.16
But, as long as the boss's evaluation is the only one that counts,
it is doubtful that organizational effectiveness or leader development
will ever receive their appropriate share of emphasis, time, or
Evaluation Concept Flaw: Top-Down and One-Dimensional
The current evaluation system is one-dimensional.
Its top-down rating approach tends to measure whether an individual
kept his boss happy. Was the mission accomplished? No one denies
that mission accomplishment is essential to a military operation,
but should mission accomplishment become the sole determinant of
a leader's successful performance? An evaluation system that uses
mission accomplishment as its sole measure of success:
- Places individual interests (those of the
boss and the subordinate) over the organization.
- Provides an incomplete picture of leadership
abilities and potential.
- Discourages counseling and organizational
- Compromises integrity by circumventing honest,
- Deters tough, long-term organizational development
or team-building processes.
- Fosters a zero-defect mentality.
To avoid these negative consequences, evaluators
must expand evaluations to take into account perceptions of subordinates,
peers, and the state of the organization, together with the boss's
perceptions and with the record of mission accomplishment. Adding
these dimensions to the rating process will be cumbersome. Developing
the process will take time and experimentation. Implementing this
360-degree feedback will require considerable confidence-building
to overcome concerns that jealous peers or disgruntled subordinates
will provide distorted feedback. Until multidimensional feedback
is institutionalized, the Army will have difficulty refuting the
perception that senior leaders are self-serving, short-sighted,
out-of-touch, unethical, and averse to risk.17
Holistic evaluations will address the shortcomings in morale, organizational
effectiveness, and leader development that are increasingly evident.
Leadership cannot be learned solely from a
book. Although theoretical knowledge is essential and provides the
foundation for understanding leadership, experience-based training
is the most effective method for acquiring action-based skills.18
The Army's leadership training is flawed because it overlooks the
importance of experience-based training.
Leadership training in Army schoolhouses is
currently based overwhelmingly on book-learning. Exceptions are
found in specialty training, such as Ranger School, the Special
Forces Qualification Course (SFQC), and escape and evasion courses,
in which soldiers learn technical and tactical skills and experience
the challenge of leading in difficult circumstances. Imagine trying
to explain, even to another soldier, what it is like going through
Ranger School or SFQC. Without realistic, experience-based training
of an escape and evasion course, can we even begin to imagine being
a prisoner of war or what it feels like to have the bends from not
Lectures and case studies cannot substitute
for experience. The benefits of experience-based learning are evident
in the superior performance, cohesion, and esprit de corps of specialty
units, such as the Ranger Regiment, Special Forces, and so on. Even
highly realistic and stressful joint experiences of Battle Command
Training Program (BCTP) exercises make for effective training.19
Consider what the quantum leap in effectiveness across the Army
would be if experience-based training were applied to attaining
organizational and leadership skills.
Today, officers' leadership training, from
commissioning source through the Army War College, comes almost
exclusively from books. Summer camps, training exercises, and rotational
leadership positions, especially at West Point and in ROTC, offer
excellent experience-based opportunities, but this training is inadequate
in terms of content, intensity, and personal accountability. Experience-based
training remains limited once an officer is commissioned. Leadership
training in the basic branch schools continues to be almost exclusively
classroom-based. The apparent strategy is to teach what is in the
field manual, then reinforce that knowledge through case studies
of great battle captains. The Army then says, "Go forth. Emulate
what you have read, and be successful leaders." Learning leadership
is not that easy. Book-learning and case studies provide a good
foundation, but the practical, individual experience of actually
leading an organization is missing.
A frequent argument for not providing experience-based
training opportunities is that real leadership teaching and learning
begins in the unit under the watchful eye of a company commander
or platoon sergeant. But if the Army does not cultivate or evaluate
the full spectrum of leadership skills, what is being passed from
one generation of leaders to the next? The fact is that there is
little consistency. What is being passed on is a hodge-podge of
interpretations, theories, and practices that vary from unit to
unit and from leader to leader.
Admittedly, we find many examples in the field
where officers get it right - where good on-the-job training and
counseling are effectively practiced. Unfortunately, there are many
more cases where leaders get it wrong and do a disservice to subordinates.
Because there is no consistent Army standard for conducting counseling,
leadership development is a hit-or-miss proposition.
Reinforcing Leadership Skills through Counseling
The leader who chooses to ignore the soldier's
search for individual growth may reap a bitter fruit of disillusionment,
discontent and listlessness. If we, instead, reach out to touch
each soldier - to meet needs and assist in working toward the
goal of becoming a "whole person" - we will have bridged
the essential needs of the individual to find not only the means
of coming together into an effective unit, but the means of holding
together. -General (Retired) Edward C. Meyer.20
Field Manual 22-100 specifically declares that
"subordinate leadership development is one of the most important
responsibilities of every Army leader. Developing the leaders who
will come after you should be one of your highest priorities."21
Leaders are directed to provide good counseling by means of dedicated,
quality time to listen to and talk with junior leaders. Leaders
should help subordinates develop goals, review performance, and
plan for the future. However, officers at all levels agree that
good counseling is not being performed routinely or adequately.
According to Ulmer, "Mentoring and coaching have long been
in the Army lexicon, but their routine use is a localized phenomenon,
highly dependent on the interests and skills of unit leaders. There
is no meaningful institutional motivation for being a good coach,
yet that skill is highly prized by subordinates at every level."22
Shinseki concurs: "Officers continue to
say that they are not being counseled. Commander's counseling is
key to leader development and remains one of the most important
things we do to develop future leaders of our Army. We all need
to do better in making this part of the OER function better so that
we reinforce our leader development principles. We must slow things
down and reenergize the formal and informal counseling of our officers,
especially our junior officers who are feeling particularly pressured
to leave the force."23
The Army's difficulty in sustaining an effective
counseling program is evident in its lack of an overarching process
that can be sustained in a rapidly changing, large geographical
area. Sustaining a stable professional counseling relationship is
especially difficult in a culture where even stable personal relationships
are difficult to maintain. Little or no progress toward constructing
this counseling program can be expected because we are not offering
at any of the routine career courses experience-based training in
developing individual interpersonal skills.24
The Army does, however, offer training in leadership
procedures at junior-level schools, where trainers explain forms
and work students through case studies. But where are the hard,
uncomfortable, risky encounters in which a student feels what it
is like to counsel and be counseled? Where are the consequences
or feedback for counseling well or for missing the mark? Where else
can this occur while in a controlled environment under the guiding
hand of a trained instructor? Despite the rhetoric, the Army allocates
little time to counseling skills. Nowhere in the military's professional
education system have these skills been integrated into experience-based
learning objectives of the overall course. Is it any wonder that
junior leaders feel uncomfortable with these competencies? And if
they do not feel comfortable in a school situation, how can the
unit be the primary leadership classroom and the commander the expert
The difficulty in changing the evaluation paradigm
is that most current leaders made it without the benefit of solid
counseling, so they have little incentive to overhaul a system that
might have worked for them.25 Unfortunately,
the system worked for current leaders at the expense of unit effectiveness,
command climate, and future leader development. Thus, the current
leadership crisis is but one symptom of a larger problem. Combining
training in using interpersonal counseling skills with a multidimensional
evaluation of all leadership competencies is essential for a return
to sound leadership practices. Surveys of current junior officers
indicate that they understand what leadership should look like and
the standards expected from them. Time and again, officers who become
disenchanted say that their leaders are not walking the talk. More
important, leaders are not counseling junior officers in the ways
and techniques they need to become successful leaders. 26
The Army's strength lies in its leaders' dedication
to maintaining the highest standards. Leaders do this by adhering
to core values, living the leadership attributes, and exhibiting
flawless character. The Army has proven itself a mission-oriented
institution, and it has earned world respect through dependable
mission accomplishment. Army leadership is the foundation of this
great institution, so the Army has expended a tremendous amount
of effort and resources to its development. By all accounts, the
Army and its sister services are the envy of other government organizations
and commercial corporations. However, cracks in the Army's leader
development program threaten the Army's institutional core-its leadership.
Leader development is not adequately supported by experience-based
training to reinforce textbook theories. Counseling is little more
than a good idea. Almost every officer at every level acknowledges
that good counseling is just not happening. Moreover, most officers
recognize that the Army is not teaching, developing, or implementing
the knowledge and skills necessary to teach officers how to counsel.
Currently, leadership assessment focuses entirely
on what officers accomplish, with little consideration for how the
mission is to be accomplished. Little regard is given to the unit's
effectiveness as an organization or its sustainability over the
long term. Such oversight has led junior and midlevel officers to
question senior leaders' values, attributes, and character.
Inadequate leader development produces declining
command climates, declining retention of junior officers, and increasing
hesitancy of midcareer officers to serve in key leadership positions.
At what point do the crumbling pillars and cracks in the supporting
foundation cause the leadership structure to collapse completely?
More important, what can the Army do to rebuild the shaky pillars
and restore leadership to its full potential?
The Army has a history of successful experience-based,
full-spectrum leadership programs. The largest and most promising
was the Organizational Effectiveness (OE) program, which flourished
from 1975 to 1985. Then, in response to a 1985 Government Accounting
Office (GAO) report criticizing the Army for not providing leadership-training
opportunities to Department of the Army Civilians (DAC), the Army
developed a four-level progressive and sequential competency leadership
training program.27 Both programs provide
examples of successfully teaching and institutionalizing leadership
attributes. Such leadership attributes now appear to be de-emphasized
by mainstream military leaders. Of note, not one book on Shinseki's
suggested reading list addresses organizational or leadership processes.
28 However, lessons learned from such
programs could help solve today's leadership crisis.
OE. Following Vietnam, the Army experienced
a leadership crisis while transitioning to an all-volunteer force
and confronting the daunting challenges associated with the escalation
of the Cold War. At that time, leaders' inadequacies manifested
themselves in racial strife, drug use, low morale, and poor discipline.29
The Army's answer to this crisis was Organizational Effectiveness,
a business philosophy that emphasized team-building, transformation,
organizational learning, and investing in people.
On 1 July 1975, the U.S. Army Organizational
Effectiveness Training Center (OETC) opened its doors at Fort Ord,
California. By 1980, more than 570 OE officers had been trained,
certified, and assigned to units and schoolhouses. Organizational
Effectiveness improved the efficiency of units and the effectiveness
of leaders as commanders, trainers, and counselors.30
A 1979-1980 Army study of OE found significant improvement in certain
command climate indicators, including morale, supervisory leadership,
consideration of subordinates, satisfaction with supervisors, fair
treatment from the Army, and job satisfaction.31
The demand for OE services and products increased exponentially
despite their use being totally voluntary.32
Between 1980 and 1985, OE found its way into
the curriculums of the officer educational system and was becoming
institutionalized. The Army was ready to expand OE to encompass
Yet, despite its growing success, in 1985 the
Army terminated the OE program. The most plausible reason was that
personnel and funding resources became convenient bill-payers for
building the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), a facility
that, interestingly, would develop leader skills that could easily
be measured in terms of mission accomplishment.33
The process of bottom-up development of organizational
goals and objectives, based on the organizational strengths and
problem-solving processes at the lowest level, was incompatible
with the Army's top-down leadership style, which relies on hierarchical
structures and centralized control. As OE began to flourish, it
conflicted with the traditional military decisionmaking culture.34
Furthermore, in his doctoral thesis "Tops Down Kick in the
Bottoms Up," Christopher Paparone says, "Those who controlled
the budget of the Army were never convinced to accept the cost and
methods of OE without some centralized control and centralized accounting
of the efficiency of the program."35
The reason behind this nonacceptance was that leadership processes
are hard to define and measure. Also, the Army did not do a good
job of measuring, documenting, or marketing their successes. As
Paparone says, "The very nature of 'touchy-feely' OE flies
in the face of snake-eatin', ass-kickin', REAL Army guys."36
Organizational Effectiveness ceased to exist,
but many OE processes and underlying philosophies are still evident
in operational planning and follow-on leadership programs. Although
there is controversy over whether OE was headed in the right direction
or had grown too big and was abandoning its basic process approach,
there is little doubt that the program had growing acceptance and
was showing promise in improving organizational effectiveness. Did
disbanding this successful program at the time the Army was at its
historic best directly contribute to the subsequent decline in leadership
proficiency? We have already noted that the Army cannot answer this
question, because it has no formalized process to evaluate OE or
DAC Training. Currently, the Army has an organization
dedicated to leader development. Under the Center for Army Leadership
at Fort Leavenworth, the Civilian Leadership Training Division's
(CLTD) charter provides all Army civilians a common core leadership-training
curriculum from entry level career interns to top-level executive
managers.37 CLTD's underlying philosophy,
similar to OE's, is that OE is an internal collaborative process
that empowers the organization to evaluate itself critically, set
its own priorities, and measure progress toward effectiveness. The
program is based on building trust and confidence through cohesion
and empowerment. More important, it recognizes and builds on the
leadership model's nine supporting pillars (values; attributes;
character; knowledge; experience-based training; counseling and
mentoring; mission accomplishment; organizational effectiveness;
and leader development) to positively influence professional traits,
individual development, and organizational effectiveness.
Ironically, this civilian-oriented program
began about the time the Army abandoned its OE program. Two circumstances
spurred the civilian-oriented program. First, military personnel
perceived that civilian counterparts, especially those who supervised
military personnel, lacked leadership skills and were incapable
of holding key positions. Second, supervisory civilians complained
that they were not offered leadership training opportunities as
afforded their military counterparts.38
Since 1986, CLTD has trained more than 68,000
people ranging from interns to Senior Executive Service (SES) and
general officers.39 Unfortunately,
an attempt to quantify the program's value did not begin until 1997
in response to pressure to reprioritize people and dollars. Yet
in the last 3 years, at the junior level (up through General Schedule
[GS]-11), end-of-course evaluations noted an average 15.23 percent
increase in each of 24 leadership dimensions and attributes. At
the senior level (GS-12 and above, and lieutenant colonels [LTC]
and colonels [COL]), surveys were solicited from students and their
supervisors immediately after the course ended and then 6 months
later. Evaluations of key leadership skills indicated an increase
of 9.5 percent on 13 leadership behavioral indicators as reported
by the supervisor, and a 13.5 percent increase as reported by students.
When applied as a ratio between increase of value in salaried skills
compared to training costs per participant, the return on investment
was 230 percent or 326 percent, depending on whether the supervisors'
or the students' value-added perceptions were used in the calculations.40
More important, after students returned to their home stations and
as the training's value to the individual and to the organization
became increasingly apparent, organizations began sending more people
to attend the course. Eventually, organizations requested the course
be exported and taught to their entire organization. This began
a new dimension of CLTD known as "consulting."
CLTD has developed and conducted everything
from basic team-building command climate workshops and command transition,
to complete, long-term organizational improvement programs.41
This has become a genuine bottom-up, incremental, organizational
improvement movement that, like OE, is now at the threshold of having
an Armywide effect.
Will CLTD be allowed to mature and flourish?
Or, will its resources also be cut and given to another program
that simply enhances leaders' technical proficiency rather than
other, more fundamental leadership attributes and skills? If leadership
development were a piece of equipment and evidence suggested that
a change in design was warranted, would not the Army upgrade it?42
Why then is the Army so reluctant to make such obvious changes in
the current leadership training design?
The Way Ahead
Leadership, more than any other skill, is consistently
heralded as the Army's load-bearing pillar. When the Army is at
its best, leadership is the key ingredient. When it is at its worst,
we hear of a leadership crisis. So what makes the difference? Possibly
it is leadership training, the effort to hone nonquantifiable leadership
skills that do not automatically develop simply because the Army
teaches leaders to be technically proficient. Moreover, lack of
counseling denies junior officers the opportunity to learn from
mistakes and from the experiences of their seniors. Finally, the
evaluation process fails to balance all leadership tasks (mission,
organization, and leader development), nor does it foster the highest
ethical standards. As the Army learned as it repaired itself after
the Vietnam war, both individual and unit experience-based leadership
training are essential. The Army must maintain balance between mission
accomplishment, organizational effectiveness, and leader development.
To develop the next generation of senior leaders,
the Army must implement:
- Leader development doctrine that emphasizes
that leadership is more than just accomplishing the mission.
- Progressive, sequential, experience-based
leadership OE training.
- Multidimensional tools for counseling and
evaluating the full spectrum of leadership traits, skills, and actions,
and this entire leader evaluation must be part of the promotion,
assignment, and school selection process.
- Specific evaluation measures that hold leaders
accountable for organizational effectiveness and subordinate leader
development as a criterion equal to mission accomplishment, of which
accountability for effective and routine counseling is most critical.
- Safeguards against future efforts to eliminate
full-spectrum leadership development and organizational effectiveness
as a bill-payer for other programs, especially after correcting
current leadership deficiencies.
History shows at least one thing: every time
the Army disregards the relational aspect of leadership -the part
that causes human interaction to become effective and organizations
to operate efficiently -the Army's decline is sure to follow. All
pillars in the leadership model must be strong for leadership to
function, just as any building must have all its load-bearing walls
intact to remain standing.
Will the Army ever learn? Ulmer hit the mark:
"Strong conclusions about required competencies and behaviors
have rarely produced powerful and integrated new policies designed
to support the development of the heralded attributes."43
Solving the leadership crisis will depend on whether Army leaders
can understand and institutionalize the leadership model through
diligent training and effective, multidimensional evaluation of
the full spectrum of leadership competencies. More important, the
Army must stick to the experience-based leader-development process.
Otherwise, the Army cannot reach its full potential or confidently
refute the cyclical claims of a leadership crisis.
1. W. Edwards Deming, Out of
the Crisis (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986).
2. Leonard Wong, Generations
Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps (Carlisle, PA: U.S.
Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute monograph, October
2000), 25; David Wood, "Army Confronting a Crisis of Morale
and Purpose in its Officer Corps," 19 December 2000, on-line
at <www.newhouse.com/ archive/ story1a121900.html/>, accessed
on 2 February 2001.
3. COL Patricia Capin,
"Army Team-CGSC Perceptions," e-mail message, 1 December
4. Wood; CPT John P.
Delaney, "Officers declining to attend USAWC," e-mail
message to MG Robert Ivany, 15 December 2000.
5. GEN Frederick J.
Kroesen, "A Message for the Less than the Best and the Brightest,"
Army (December 2000): 9.
6. U.S. Department of
the Army (USDA), Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Army Leadership (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 31 August 1999).
7. Ibid., 1-1.
8. U.S. Army Center
for Army Leadership (CAL), "FM 22-100 Chain Teaching Package,"
15 March 2000, on-line at <www.fm22-100.army.mil>, accessed
on 7 February 2001.
9. FM 22-100, 1-4.
10. Wood, 3; Capin.
11. Jerry N. Hess,
"Oral History Interview with Bruce C. Clarke," 14 January
1970; on-line at <www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/clarkeb.htm>,
accessed on 7 February 2001.
12. GEN Eric K. Shinseki,
"CSA Sends-OER," e-mail message to multiple addressees,
20 November 2000.
13. DA Form 67-9,
Officer Evaluation Report Support Form, October 1999, Part V b and
Part VII c.
14. GEN Walter F.
Ulmer, Jr., "Military Leadership into the 21st Century: Another
'Bridge Too Far?'" Parameters 28 (Spring 1998): 10.
15. MAJ Donald E.
Vandergriff, "Truth@readiness.mil," Naval Institute Proceedings
(June 1999), on-line at <www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles99/PROvandergriff.htm>,
accessed on 22 January 2001.
16. John L. Rovero
and R. Craig Bullis, "Assessing Self-Development," Military
Review (January-February 1998): 35-40.
17. MG John C. Faith,
"Leadership in the 21st Century: Is it Time to Change the System?"
Army (December 2000): 13.
18. W. Huitt and J.
Hummel, "The Behavioral System," Educational Psychology
Interactive, May 1998, on-line at <chiron.valdosta.edu/whuitt/col/behsys/behsys.html>,
accessed on 1 March 2001.
19. Battle Command
Training Program (BCTP) web page, on-line at <bctp.leavenworth.army.mil>,
accessed on 13 March 01.
20. GEN Edward C.
Meyer, U.S. Army Chief of Staff 1979-1983.
21. FM 22-100, C-1.
22. Ulmer, 12.
24. Based on a review
of the curricula of the Captains Career Course, the Command and
General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC), the Army War College (AWC),
and three branch basic or advanced courses.
25. Faith, 12-13.
27. CAL, Civilian
Leadership Training Division web page; on-line at <wwwcgsc.army.mil/cal/CLTD/CLTDFR.htm>,
accessed on 23 February 2001.
28. Shinseki, "The
U.S. Army Chief of Staff's Professional Reading List," 7 July
2000, on-line at <www.army.mil/cmh-pg/reference/CSAList/CSAList.htm>,
accessed on 15 December 2000.
29. Christopher Paparone,
"Tops Down Kick in the Bottoms Up" (Ph.D. thesis [draft],
Pennsylvania State University, 16 October 2000) 16.
30. Paparone, 17.
31. Ibid., 27.
33. Ibid., 31.
34. Ibid., 36.
35. Ibid., 38.
36. Ibid., 39.
38. Kennith Burns,
CAL, telephone interview, Fort Leavenworth, 22 November 2000.
39. Frank Loeffler,
"Civilian Leadership Training Division," spreadsheet,
CAL, Fort Leavenworth, December 2000.
40. Delane S. Keene,
"Program Evaluation Briefing, Civilian Leadership Training
Division," CAL, briefing slides, Fort Leavenworth, August 2000.
42. Mark Lewis, "Time
to Regenerate," E-mail message to Peter Varljen, 09 January
43. Ulmer, 7.
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