The U.S. Army Professional Writing
Collection showcases articles from a variety
of professional journals that focus on relevant issues affecting
The Army. This micro-site seeks to stimulate innovative thinking
about the challenges that may face tomorrow's Army. It is further
intended that the articles featured on this site cause reflection,
increased dialogue within The Army Community, and in the best case,
action by Soldiers. Updated monthly, these articles are written
by Soldiers, civilians, academics, and other subject matter experts.
Links to various Army publications, Department of Defense journals
and selected non-governmental defense-related publications are also
provided on this site.
ancient India, six blind men encountered an elephant for the
first time and quickly began to squabble about the nature of
elephants; The first blind man bumped into the elephant's side
and declared that the beast was like a wall; The second, discovering
the ear, concluded it was like a fan; The third blind man came
across the tail and thought the elephant to be very much like
a rope; The fourth, encountering the elephant's leg, was sure
the animal resembled a tree; Finding the tusk, the fifth blind
man proclaimed the elephant to be like a spear; And the sixth,
grasping the elephant's trunk, concluded the giant pachyderm
most resembled a snake.
has often been commonly stated, "People have been killing
each other in the name of religion for centuries." There
is more than enough superficial evidence to support this assertion.
After all, personal values, culture and belief systems are
great motivators for an individual and a group. A key aspect
of waging war is "justification" in the mind of
the population. Religion is often introduced to justify actions
and motivate the masses. While this may be truly endemic of
a misguided worldview of one's religion, it is never the less
a true statement regarding the human condition. Justifiable
or not, religion motivates. Religion, as a motivator and catalyst
to garner popular support for waging war, may or may not be
rooted in justifiable purpose. Most times, it can be argued
that religion may play a key and significant role in the conduct
of warfare on a psychological and cultural level, but is it
the cause of warfare? Do nations, states and kingdoms wage
war over religion? Is religion a primary cause of conflict
between governments? Many have argued that it is. Another
popular statement is, "Religion has been the cause of
more wars than any other factor throughout history."
This is commonly accompanied by "people have been killing
each other in the name of God for centuries." Upon closer
examination, these statements exude an element of mythology
BATTLES GO, it was a small victory, but for U.S. Army command
and control (C2), the implications of the Battle of Taji might
be far greater than the historical significance of the engagement
itself. The battle began as the Bradley fighting vehicles
and Abrams tanks of the 4th Infantry Division's (ID's) 1st
Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, and Task Force (TF) 1-8 seized
their objectives at Taji Airfield, Iraq, on 16 April 2003.
Just miles away, the 4th ID's commanding general sat in his
newly modified Bradley command vehicle, watching the action
unfold and coordinating the division's effort. Although it
might not have appeared singularly unique, battle command
in the 4th ID at Taji was exercised in a technically new style
that foreshadows the future of land combat.
joint force confronts a complex, ever-changing environment.
To enable the agility and speed required in today's battlespace,
the doctrine community must adjust its products, organizations,
and processes to maximize the support provided to the warfighter.
This includes providing timely and accurate tactics, techniques,
and procedures (TTP) publications. Doctrine is divided into
two categories-broad, fundamental principles and specific
TTP. Fundamental principles have been, and continue to be
effectively compiled in today's joint doctrine hierarchy.
In the area of TTP however, there are shortfalls. The increased
need to adapt rapidly to changing battlespace dynamics increases
the need for TTP. Operations are becoming more joint in virtually
every area-logistics, missile defense, single integrated air
picture, combat identification, command and control, fires,
deployment/redeployment, and anti-access/assured access to
name a few. The joint environment creates a need to clarify
tactical and operational linkages-this is the realm of joint
and multi-Service TTP. Our TTP must become increasingly flexible
and responsive as the joint force faces adaptive enemies that
are unconstrained by doctrine and bureaucracy.