- Chapter VI:
-
- ARMY DEPLOYMENT AND THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN
- December 1941-March 1942
-
- During the ARCADIA Conference Japanese forces took Hong Kong (which
surrendered on 25 December) and Manila (2 January), began heavy air
raids on Rangoon, compelled the troops covering the southernmost part of
'Malaya to withdraw south of Kuala Lumpur, landed at several points in
Borneo and tire Celebes, and made their first air attacks on Rabaul. The
Japanese had for the time so little to fear on other fronts, and their
lines of communication from their southern front to their advance bases
in the South China Sea and from there northward to Japan were so short,
that they could concentrate forces more quickly than the Allies at any
given point. They presumably intended not to pause until they had seized
Singapore and Rangoon and the northern approaches to Australia.
-
- An attempt to meet them on equal terms at these points would require
Great Britain and the United States, handicapped by lack of a concerted
plan and subject to conflicting and urgent demands from other quarters,
to expend far more in this area than anyone in Washington or London had
proposed before Pearl Harbor. In terms of planes, ships, and escort
vessels, Great Britain and the United States would have to exert an effort several times greater than that of which the Japanese
were capable. Only then could the Allies counterbalance the advantages
that the Japanese had by virtue of their head start, superiority in
aircraft carriers, and relatively short interior lines of communication
from their production centers to the fronts and between sectors. But the
ARCADIA Conference did not take up the proposition, the force of which
was more evident with every day that passed, that the Allied position
was greatly overextended.
-
-
- During the conference, the one general statement on the war against
Japan was that introduced by the British Chiefs in their opening
statement on American-British strategy. As one of the steps to be taken
in 1942 to put the grand strategy into effect, they listed "the
safeguarding of vital interests in the Eastern theatre," with the
following elaboration
-
- The security of Australia. New Zealand. and India must be maintained,
and the Chinese war effort supported. Secondly, points of vantage from
which an offensive against Japan can eventually be developed must be
secured.
- [120]
- Our immediate object must therefore be to hold
- a. Hawaii and Dutch Harbour [Alaska].
- b. Singapore, the East Indies Barrier, and the Philippines.
- c. Rangoon and the route to China.1
-
- The British statement entirely omitted one point that remained of
interest to the President and the American staff-the future role of the
Soviet Union in Far Eastern strategy. Both had acknowledged the fact
that the Soviet Government intended to avoid hostilities with Japan and recognized
that it was logical for the Soviet Government not to enter
into any arrangements with the United States that ,might have the effect
of hastening Soviet involvement. 2
Nevertheless, it was American policy to
lay the basis for American air operations against Japan from Siberian
bases, 3
and for this use the Army Air Forces proposed to allocate one group of heavy
bombers.4
The project did not come up during the
conference, presumably because the British Government had dissociated
itself from the attempt to encourage Soviet collaboration in the Far
East.5
The President and the Chiefs of Staff did mention the
possibilities that in the spring Japan might attack or the Soviet Union
might intervene.6
The American representatives made two additions
to the British statement of Far Eastern strategy, both of which
indicated that American views still comprehended future collaboration
with the Soviet Union against Japan. To the above-listed three strategic
positions to he held in the Far East, the American Chiefs added
"the 'Maritime Provinces of Russia." At the instance of the U.
S. Army Air Forces, the Chiefs also incorporated in the paper a
supplement listing air routes to be established and maintained
throughout the world, including a route via Alaska to Vladivostok. This
was the extent of ARCADIA discussions of the role of the Soviet Union in
the war against Japan.7
- [121]
- After listing the positions that the United States and Great Britain
must make it their "immediate object" to hold, the British
Chiefs had concluded that the "minimum forces required to hold the
above" would have to be "a matter of mutual discussion."
This declaration stood in the final version adopted by the British and
American Chiefs. 8
But the Chiefs did not proceed to a "mutual
discussion" of the dispositions of their forces. They evidently
considered it to be contrary to current policy to acknowledge that the
United States and Great Britain must write off any of their "vital
interests in the Eastern theatre," or to reckon what it might cost
to "safeguard" the others.
-
- For the Southwest Pacific and southeast Asia, the British and
American planners did compile tables showing "the estimated
strength of forces initially in the Area, and the reinforcements
ordered or planned to be sent." 9
The planners compiled these
tables to accompany recommendations drawn up for the Chiefs of Staff, at
their direction, on the disposition of forces in the area or due to
arrive during January. As directed, the planners considered the
alternative assumptions that the Philippines and Singapore would both
hold; that Singapore and the Netherlands Indies, but not the
Philippines, would hold; and that neither Singapore nor the Philippines
would hold. For the interim guidance of the various commands concerned
they drew up a resolution adopting all the standing national objectives in the region, without distinction, as
Allied strategy. With
slight modifications, the Chiefs approved the resolution:
- (a) To hold the Malay Barrier . . . as the basic defensive position
in that Far East theatre, and to operate sea, land, and air fours in as
great depth as possible forward of the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese southward advance.
- (b) To hold Burma and Australia as essential supporting positions
for the theatre. and Burma as essential to the support of China, and to
the defense of India.
- (c) To re-establish communications through the Dutch East Indies with
Luzon and to support the Philippines' Garrison.
- (d) To maintain essential communications within the theatre.10
-
- There was little else they could do. It was the policy of the British
Government to assert that Singapore could and would be held, and to
conduct on this basis its relations not only with the American
Government but also with the Australian Government and the Netherlands Government-in-exile.11
- [122]
- The policy of the United States was analogous, for it was desirable
from the American point of view not to concede in advance the loss of
the Philippines or Burma. It was American policy to support the position
of General MacArthur in the Philippines as long as possible. It was
also convenient to assumed that the British, with Chinese help. might
hold Burma and thus postpone the difficult decisions that would have
to be made, in case Burma were lost, with reference to the American
program for the support of China.
-
-
- By the time the planners were at work on their study for the Chiefs,
the ARCADIA Conference had taken under consideration a proposal for
establishing "unified command" in the Southwest Pacific and
southeast Asia.12
The conference finally adopted this proposal, setting
up the Australian-British-Dutch-American (ABDA) Command, whose
jurisdiction comprehended the Philippines, the Netherlands Indies,
Malaya, and Burma. The allied commander in the ABDA theater, Lt. Gen.
Sir Archibald Wavell, received for guidance the same comprehensive
declaration of Allied aims that the Chiefs had approved, together with
an even more hopeful statement of the strategic concept
-
- The basic strategic concept of the ABDA Governments for the conduct
of the war in your Area is not only in the immediate future to maintain
as many key positions as possible, but to take the offensive at the
earliest opportunity and ultimately to conduct an all-out offensive
against Japan. The first essential is to gain general air
superiority at the earliest possible moment, through the employment
of concentrated air power. The piecemeal employment of air forces
should be minimized. Your operations should be so conducted as to
further preparations for the offensive.13
-
- The act of setting lip the ABDA Command-though not the definition of
strategy nor the listing of forces, which remained unchanged--
represented an adjustment to the actual military situation. In agreeing
to create the command and present the accomplished fact to the
Australian Government, the Netherlands Government-in exile, and the
Chinese Nationalist Government (whose interests were also affected;, the
conference demonstrated that the British and American Governments were
ready and willing to take bilateral action in the field of military
affairs, in spite of differences in national policy and notwithstanding
the embarrassments they might incur in the fields of domestic and
foreign policy.
-
- The proposal to establish "unified command" in the Southwest
Pacific and southeast Asia originated with General Marshall, who
declared, in introducing it, that its
- [123]
- adoption would solve nine tenths of the problems of British-American
military collaboration.14
As he explained during the debate that
followed, his immediate aim was to place on a single officer
responsibility for initiating action to be taken in Washington and
London with reference to strategic deployment to and within the
area.15
According to 'Marshall, Wavell was the "logical
man," since he knew India, was "used to moving troops,"
and had "been engaged in active operations which included both a
successful operation and a setback." What was no less important,
the choice of Wavell served to overcome the fear of the Prime Minister
that British forces might be diverted from the defense of Singapore and
"wasted" on the Philippines or Borneo.16
-
- Besides fixing responsibility in the theater for getting Washington
and London to act, the ARCADIA Conference fixed responsibility in
Washington and London, by providing that General Wavell should report to
a new British-American military committee that was to be established in
Washington. This committee consisted of the senior American officers
that had dealt with the British Chiefs during the conference and senior
representatives that the British Chiefs would leave behind them. The
committee was called the Combined Chiefs of Staffs (CCS).17
-
- Doubts and misunderstandings greeted both the proposal to set up the
ABDA Command and the proposal to place it under the CCS. To General
Marshall's declaration that the whole area from northwest Australia to
Burma constituted a "single natural theater," the Prime
Minister objected that a single commander could not control the
scattered operations in the vast area. Besides having this objection, he
and his Chiefs of Staff were apparently reluctant to place on a British
commander the onus of defeat and a burden of recriminations from the
various other Allied nations concerned. However, with the help of Mr.
Hopkins and Ford Beaverbrook and the agreement of the President, General
Marshall won the Prime Minister's assent to the proposal to establish
the ABDA theater with General Wavell as its commander.18
-
- It was as natural for the British to misunderstand General Marshall's
proposal when he first made it as it was for them to accept it when they
understood it. He proposed that the Allied commander would have no
authority to move ground forces from one territory to another within
the theater. During the period of "initial reinforcements" he
could move only those air forces that the governments concerned chose to
put at his disposal. He would have no power to relieve national
commanders
- [124]
- or their subordinates, to interfere in the tactical organization and
disposition of their forces, to commandeer their supplies, or to control
their communications with their respective governments. Marshall agreed
that the limitations were drastic, but pointed out that what he proposed
was all that could then be done, and declared that "if the supreme
commander ceded up with no more authority than to tell Washington what
he wanted, such a situation was better than nothing, and an improvement
over the present situation." 19
It was this restricted authority
that General Wavell was given over the vast ABDA Command.20
-
- When it came to providing for the "higher direction" of the
ABDA Command, General Marshall found himself in agreement, not in
disagreement, with the British Chiefs of Staff, and it was not the Prime
Minister, but the President, who hesitated lest the automatic
interposition of professional views on deployment of British and American forces should make it harder rather than easier to reach
politically acceptable strategic decisions. When the question of the
"higher direction" of the ABDA Command first came up, the
President turned for advice to Admiral King, who recommended setting up
a special body in Washington to deal only with strategy in the Southwest Pacific, on which the
Australian Government and the Netherlands Government-in-exile, as well
as the American and British Governments, would be represented.21
The
President was himself inclined toward this solution.22
The British
Government, on the other hand, meant so far as possible to settle
questions of strategic policy in the Southwest Pacific directly with
Australian and Netherlands officials in London, and did not want
Australian and Netherlands representatives in Washington to take part in
British-American deliberations there, although they would, of course, be
consulted by American officials and the American military staff in
Washington. The British Chiefs of Staff accordingly proposed to put the
ABDA commander under the British-American Chiefs of Staff committee in
Washington. 23
Admirals Stark and King agreed with Marshall to
recommend this solution to the President.24
The President replied
with a "re-draft" of their proposal, in which he reverted to
the procedure originally recommended by Admiral King, with the
difference that the Washington committee would include representatives
not only of the Netherlands and Australia but also of New Zealand.25
- [125]
- The Chiefs of Staff stuck to their original proposal, modifying it in
form but not in essence. They explained their adherence to it partly on
the ground that it would be quicker and less confusing not to duplicate
in Washington the machinery already in use in London for consulting the
Dominions and Netherlands Governments. They also believed that the
British-American Chiefs of Staff committee in Washington was peculiarly
qualified to make recommendations on the questions that must be brought
before the President and the Prime Minister-- the provision of additional reinforcements, major changes in policy,
and departures from the basic directive to the ABDA Supreme Commander.
Sir Dudley Pound, they added, had just talked to the Prime Minister and
had come away with the impression that he would accept this
solution.26
The President, after talking it over with the Prime
Minister, announced that he, too, would accept it.27
-
- Meanwhile, the British had arranged for General Wavell to go to Java
to assume command as soon as possible. On 10 January he set up temporary
headquarters at Batavia.28
On the same day the British Chiefs
proposed and the American Chiefs agreed that the British Government
should ask the Australian and Netherlands Governments to authorize
General Wavell to take command of their forces in the area even though
those governments were not satisfied with the idea of making him
responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, a body on which they were
not represented.29
General Wavell assumed command on 15 January ..although he was "not
yet" in, a position to establish office
or exercise sector operational control." 30
-
-
- Within a month after the ARCADIA Conference, as the Japanese offensive
continued all along the extended "front" of the ABDA Command,
it became evident that the British and American programs of
reinforcement for the Far Fast must be reconsidered. The development
that first called for decision was the collapse of the British position
in 'Malaya. After the capture of Kuala Lumpur, new Japanese landings in
the rear of British positions, continued Japanese infiltration along the
- [126]
- front, and brave Japanese pressure at weak pointy quickly undid
successive attempts to hold a lute across the peninsula in Johore
Province. By the end of January the main body of the defending troops had been
evacuated to the island of Singapore. A weak later the
Japanese, strongly supported by planes and artillery established a
beachhead oil the island. Thereafter, they rapidly repaired the:
causeway, drove into the town of Singapore, and, finally, on 14
February gained complete control of the water reservoirs of the island.
On 13 February the British garrison surrendered.
-
- The retreat from the mainland to the island of Singapore at the end of
January resulted in changes in plans for disposing ground forces
assigned to the ABDA Command. It was too late to do anything about the
18th British Division, one brigade of which had arrived at Singapore on
13 January and the other at the end of the month, or about the 44th
Indian Infantry Brigade, which had also arrived at the end of the month.
But there were still large forces being diverted from the Middle Fast to
whose disposition was to be considerer---the British 7th Armoured
Brigade, due to arrive in February, the 7th Australian Division, due at
the end of February, and the 6th Australian Division, due in March.
The destination of these troops was changed to the Netherlands
Indies. The 7th Armoured Brigade was to proceed to Java; with the
agreement of the Australian Government, the 7th Australian Division was to proceed to Sumatra and the
6th to Java.
-
- When the fall of Singapore became imminent, it was obvious that
further changes must be made. The first sign was a report sent by
General Wavell on 7 February, after his return front Burma, that he
was trying to divert "all or part" of the 7th Armoured Brigade
to Burma, since he had been impressed with the need for armored troops
there at that season, when the rice fields were dry. 31
On 12 February Washington
learned that he had ordered this
- change.32
There remained the question of the two Australian divisions (and a possible question of the
disposition of a third Australian division, the 9th. which was also due
to be returned from the Middle East). On 13 February, in anticipation
of the early fall of Singapore and in view of the movement of an
escorted Japanese convoy toward southern Sumatra, General Wavell
cautiously opened the question of conceding the loss of Sumatra and, in
turn, of Java, and diverting one or both of the Australian divisions to
Burma or Australia. He remarked that this course would be advantageous
"from purely strategic aspects," but would "obviously
have the most serious moral and political repercussions.'' In
conclusion, he declared, "We shall continue with present
plans until situation enforces changes. This message gives warning of
serious change in situation which may shortly arise necessitating
complete reorientation of plans. 33
-
- On 16 February Wavell sent to London a long report oil the situation,
in which he presented the case for accepting the loss of Java.
-
- To sum up, Burma and Australia are absolutely vital for war against
Japan. Loss of Java, though severe blow from every point
- [127]
- of view, would not be fatal. Efforts should not therefore be made to
reinforce Jaw which might compromise defense of Burma or Australia.
- He continued
- Immediate problem is destination of Australian Corps. If there
seemed good chance of establishing Corps in island and fighting Japanese on
favorable term's I should unhesitatingly recommend risk should be taken as I did in
matter of aid
to Greece year ago. I thought then that we had good fighting chance of
checking German invasion and in spite results still consider risk was
justifiable. In present instance I must recommend that I consider risk unjustifiable from tactical and strategical
point of view. I fully recognize political considerations involved.
-
- Wavell then recommended that the 7th Australian Division, which was
approaching Ceylon, and also, if possible, the 6th, should be diverted
to Burma rather than to Australia, on the following ground
-
- Presence of this force in Burma threatening invasion of Thailand and
Indo-China must have very great effect on Japanese strategy and
heartening effect on China and India. It is only theatre in which
offensive land operations against Japan [are] possible in near future. It should be possible for American troops to provide reinforcement
of Australia if required.34
-
-
- Sending American ground forces to Australia, as General Wavell suggested,
would serve much the same purpose as sending American ground forces to the
British Isles. The arrival of the first American ground forces in Australia,
as in the British Isle, would be reassuring, and would have the same practical
effect of releasing Imperial ground forces for combat or police duty in the
Middle East and India, to which it was inexpedient to assign American ground
forces.
-
- The policy of the War Department, during arid after the ARCADIA
Conference, had been to postpone decisions on the commitment of Army
ground forces to Australia. The planners, trying to anticipate the
disposition of Army divisions during 1942, had concluded that two
infantry divisions would probably be sent to the Southwest
Pacific.35
But in the opinion of the senior plain and operations
officer for the area, General Eisenhower, this development would be
contrary to War Department Policy:
-
- The War Department concept of present and future Army participation in
the ABDA Theater involves an Air Corps operation, exclusively. All other
types of forces, auxiliary services and supplies dispatched to the area
have as their sole purpose the support of the Air contingent. We should
resist any expansion of this concept, regardless of the size the air
operation may eventually assume or of the number and types of
supporting troops.36
-
- The only American ground force then present in the ABDA Command was a
partly equipped brigade of field artillery, on its way to the
Philippines, that had arrived at
- [128]
- Brisbane on 22 December with the Pensacola convoy. The brigade had
gone no farther than Port Darwin, where it had been broken up. One of
its regiments, the 147th Field Artillery, was assigned to the defense of
Port Darwin, which had been made part of the ABDA Command. The 2d
Battalion of the 131st Field Artillery Regiment, part of the Texas
National Guard, had been moved to Java. The remaining battalion and
headquarters of the 148th Field Artillery Regiment were under orders to
defend Kupang, on the island of Timor.37
The War Department also
kept in mind the possibility that General Patch's task force, aboard the
large convoy that sailed from New York on 22 January, might on its
arrival in Australia be assigned to Australia or in the ABDA area, in
case of emergency, instead of being transshipped to New Caledonia.38
-
- On 14 February, the day after Wavell's warning message, came an abrupt change
in War Department policy-- a decision to send reinforcements of ground and
service troops to Australia. The original troop list, presented by General
Eisenhower and orally approved by General Marshall, called for one reinforced
infantry brigade and 10,000 service troops.39
The staff soon revised the list and proposed, instead, to send to Australia
8,000 service troops, one tank destroyer battalion of 800 men, and one triangular
division (15,000 troops).40
General Marshall agreed, and selected the 41st Division, under Maj.
Gen.. Horace H. Fuller. The first movement orders were issued at once.41
-
- To get the ships for the movement General Marshall appealed to the White
House. He telephoned Hopkins on 14 February that the Army was short of troop
shipping for 19,000 men and the "necessary complement of cargo ships.
Mr. Hopkins answered that he "would work on it." 42
After a conference at the White House, Rear Adm. Emory S. Land, War
Shipping Administrator, undertook to furnish the additional ships over and
above what the Army and Navy "could scrape together." General Somervell,
in reporting the result of the conference, announced that he expected to have
arrangements completed by 16 February. 43
By that date shipping had been found for 20,000 troops, enough for
- [129]
- all the troops that the War Department wanted to send, except for one
regiment of the 41st Division. By 19 February, shipping for this
regiment, too, had been made available, and the staff directed it to be
shipped. 44
-
- British and American political and military authorities had meanwhile
been considering General Wavell's recommendations. It was evidently necessary
to concede at once the loss of south Sumatra, the Japanese having
already established themselves at Palembang. and to establish a new line
of defense across the Indian Ocean Australia, Ceylon, and Burma. Authorities in Washington and London both urged that the
Australian Government should consent to the temporary diversion to Burma of the 7th
Australian Division, on the understanding that the 6th and 9th Divisions
would be returned to Australia.45
-
- The Australian Government refused, in spite of the appeals of the
President and the British Prime Minister. The prospects in Burma were
most uncertain. The Japanese had crossed the Salwecn River, and the
British command in Burma had just given the order on 19 February; to
abandon the line of the Bilin River and fall back across the Sittang, which, although more defensible, was also the last
barrier before Rangoon. The Australian Prime Minister, after summarizing
for Churchill what Australia had already done to support the ABDA
Command. recapitulating the agreements with reference to returning
Australian divisions, and referring to the dangers then facing
Australia, stated the reasons of the Australian Government for refusing
to divert the 7th Division to Burma:
-
- Notwithstanding your statement that you do not agree with the request
to send the other two divisions of the A.I.F. Corps to Burma, our
adviser, arc concerned with Wavell's request for the corps and Dill's
statement that the destination of the- Sixth and Ninth Australian
Divisions should be left open as more troops might he badly needed in
Burma. Once one Division became engaged it could not be left unsupported
and inferences arc that the whole corps might become committed to this
region or there might be a recurrence of the experiences of Creek and
Malayan campaigns. Finally in view of superior Japanese sea power and
air power it would appear to be a matter of some doubt as to whether
this division can be landed in Burma and a matter for greater doubt
whether it can be brought out as promised. With the fall of
Singapore, Penang and Martaban. the Bay of Bengal is vitally vulnerable
to what must be considered the superior sea and air power of Japan in
that area. The movement of our forces to this theatre, therefore, is not
considered a reasonable hazard of war, having regard to what has gone
before and its adverse results would have gravest consequences on morale of Australian people. The
Government, therefore, must adhere to its decision.46
-
- The doubts of the Australian Government, which the British Chiefs of
Staff had
- [130]
- come to share, were soon borne out by the disastrous Battle of Sittang
Bridge (on 22 23 February, which was followed by the evacuation of
Rangoon and the retreat northward of the defending armies. 47
-
- The action then taken by the United States, though it did not affect
the immediate issue in Burma, established a policy that had a much wider
application: that of American intervention, based on American aid, is
settling the future disposition of Australian and -New Zealand; ground
forces in the Middle East and India. Roosevelt, in appealing for
Curtin's agreement on the specific issue, clearly set a precedent. In
explanation of the American decision "to send, in addition to all
troops and forces now en route, another force of over 27,000 men to
Australia." the President declared that the Allies must "fight
to the limit" for the two flanks, "one based on Australia and
the other on Burma, India and China." and continued:
-
- Because of our geographical position we Americans can better handle
the reinforcement of Australia and the right flank.
- I say this to you so that you may have every confidence, that we are
going to reinforce your position with all possible speed. Moreover, the
operations which the United States Navy have begun and have in view will
in a measure constitute a protection to the coast of Australia and New
Zealand.
- The President also inserted a statement of the belief that, given the
Allied forces in the area and en route, the "vital centers" of
Australia were not in immediate danger, notwithstanding the speed with
which the Japanese were moving. This message established in its simplest
form the view of strategy embodied in the decision to send the 41st Division to
Australia. 48
-
-
- During the first three weeks of February, while the Japanese took
Singapore and occupied southern Sumatra, they also undertook, with
complete success, an air offensive to isolate Java. Given the extent of
the island of Java, the only chance of defending it lay in the
possibility that Allied naval and Air action north of Java might gain
time to allow the development of an Allied fighter air force in Java
strong enough to control the air over the island and the approaches
thereto. This aim achieved, Allied reinforcements could continue to move
north from Australia, and Allied bombers could prevent the Japanese from
landing and supporting large ground forces in Java.
-
- Attempt to Move Pursuit Planes to Java
-
- The development of a fighter command in Java, around the nucleus of
the small, ill-equipped Netherlands Air Force, which had sought but had
not received modern equipment from the United States and Great Britain,
depended on the early arrival of reinforcements. The defense of 'and of
Singapore and the approaches thereto claimed all British fighter
reinforcements. The only hope was that the American pilots and the
crated P-40's that arrived in Australia could be moved, by one means or
another, to Java. The attempt to move these planes to Java took
- [131]
- precedence over the fulfillment of the urgent needs of the Royal
-Australian Air Force (RAAF), which was quite inadequate to
defend Port Darwin and the northeastern approaches to Australia.49
-
- By early February about 300 P-40's had arrived in the
Southwest Pacific.50
The program under which these planes had been
shipped, initiated before the ARCADIA Conference on the assumption that
they would be transshipped or flown to the Philippines, had been
increased early in the conference to provide about 330 P-40's. 51
During January. this program had been further increased to , provide, all told,
about 640 pursuit planes, most of the increase being P-39's (including P-400's, an early inferior variant
of the P-39 designed for export). 52
The P-39's and the balance of the P-40's were
- due to be shipped during the next few weeks.53
-
- The immediate problem was not the lack of planes in Australia, but the
want of preparations for getting them into Java. It would take so long
to make these preparations that there was no choice but to try to move
the planes to the front a few at a time, in violation of every principle
laid down in Air Corps doctrine, and notwithstanding the statement of
policy hopefully incorporated in General Wavell's directive:
-
- The first essential is to gain general air superiority at the earliest
possible moment, through the: employment of concentrated air power. The
piecemeal employment of air forces should be minimized.54
-
- The American command in Australia attempted to assemble the pursuit
planes at Brisbane, where there were as yet neither the trained men nor
the tools and spare parts for this task, and to ferry them to Java by
way of undefended, unfamiliar fields no less ill-equipped to service
them-Port Darwin, Kupang ( Timor) , and Waingapu ( Sumba). On 25 January
the first thirteen
- [132]
- planes arrived at Surabaja.55
By the end of January, before any
others had even set out from Brisbane, Wavell warned that the Japanese
might soon interdict this route and asked whether in that event he might
have a carrier to move planes to Java.56
The reality of the danger was
borne home by daily ,reports of enemy air attacks over Java, Bali, and
Timor, one of which ( on Bali, 5 February) destroyed the greater part of
a second flight of P-40's en route to Java.57
-
- Besides these first two (lights, three others took off from Port Darwin. The third,
which left on 9 February, met bad weather conditions, and all the P-40's crashed en
route. The fourth, leaving on 11 February, 'got through to Java to join the survivors of the first and second flights. The
fifth took off from Port Darwin on 19 February and turned back because of bad
weather, conditions. All but one of its planes were shot down in the overwhelming air attack on Port Danv in that day.
Several planes on the ground and six ships in the harbor were also destroyed, eight
other ships damaged, and base and port facilities wrecked. This attack closed the
last route for fixing pursuit planes to Java.58
-
- The CCS had ruled out Wavell's request for an aircraft carrier to
bring planes within fling distance of Java, with the possible exception
of the British carrier Indomitable, which was due in the theater at the
end of the month with a load of Hurricanes.59
The attack of Port
Darwin conclusively disposed of the alternative of shipping planes from
northern Australia. The one way left of getting pursuit planes to Java (at least before the arrival of the
Indomitable) was to ship them from
Western Australia to southern Java (Tjilatjap). On 9 February
Wavell had announced that by this route the British ship Athene would
take in crated planes, and the American seaplane tender Langley would
carry in assembled planes.60
-
- By 19 February ABDA headquarters was prepared to acknowledge that
the situation in Java was irretrievable. Even before receiving news of the raid on Port
Darwin of that day, Wavell discounted the possibility of getting
reinforcements from Port Darwin, in view of enemy landings in Bali (begun on 17 February), which commanded tire ferry route. To offset the
increasingly high attrition to be expected as the allied force in Java
dwindled were the prospects of supply by the Langley, which was
admittedly "hazardous," and of supply by the British carrier Indomitable, which seemed "doubtful and late." Air Marshal Sir
Richard Peirse, the ABDA air chief, es-
- [133]
- tinlated that at the "present scale of fighting" the Allied
fighter force in Java would ..not remain effective beyond next two
weeks." 61
-
- What to do in this situation the CCS left up to General Wavell to the extent of
giving him "discretion to augment defence of Java with available naval force and with
U. S. aircraft now at your disposal assembling in Australia." ,The same message also
contained instructions governing Allied troops then in Java:
-
- JAVA should be defended with the utmost resolution by all combatant troops at present in the Island for whom
arms are available. Every day gained is of importance. There should be no withdrawal of troops or air forces of
any nationality and
no surrender. Amendments to these instructions caused by emergency
changes in the situation should be referred to Washington, and if
this is not possible will be decided by you on the spot. 62
-
- The purpose of this paragraph of instructions way to settle policy on
evacuation, but Wavell adopted it as a basis for deciding on 22 February to send the
Langley to Java. 63
This decision came somewhat unexpectedly, since he had acknowledged
the day before that as a result of the heavy loses in the fighting of 20
February the air forces left in Java---which he estimated as fewer
than forty fighters, about thirty medium and dive bombers, and ten
heavy bombers-- could "only hope to fight for few more days at
most." He had apparently given up hope of getting in any more
planes, unless by the Langley.64
His decision of 22 February to
send the Langley to Java, he announced with the following explanation:
-
- This may enable us to keep going until arrival aircraft from
INDOMITABLE but in absence of continual and increasing flow of fighters
and bombers this is likely only to gain certain tune but is in
accordance with your instructions that every day is of value.65
-
- Later on during the day Wavell sent a longer explanation to the same
effect:
- To carry out instructions in your D. B. A. 19, it is essential that we
should have fighter and bomber reinforcements. I have accord-
- [134]
- ingly ordered LANGLEY to proceed Java as soon as possible to disembark
fighters and BRETT is ordering few bomber aircraft immediately available
from Australia to proceed. Hope also that aircraft from
INDOMITABLE will be sent if still in time. With these reinforcements valuable
time may be gained by defence JAVA and blows inflicted on enemy naval
and air forces. Otherwise our air force will practically disappear
within very short period.66
-
- The real meaning of the decision came out in a third message of 22
February, which reported the conference Wavell and Brett had had with
the governor general of the Netherlands Indies, with reference to the
liquidation of Wavell's headquarters. In this report. Wavell declared:
"It should be made quite clear to Dutch that withdrawal of ABDA HQ
will NOT repeat NOT mean stoppage of warlike supplies to JAVA and
public announcement to this effect should be made." 67
About the
only "warlike supplies" of any consequence that were
immediately available for movement were American planes. Wavell
announced that he was sending Brett to Australia the next day to
"hasten despatch of air reinforcements from Australia." 68
The War Department for a few days continued to avoid making the decision between the desperate hopefulness of the Netherlands
command and the evident hopelessness of the situation in Java. On 23 February
command in the ABDA area passed to the Dutch. On 25 February, in answer
to a question from Lt. Gen. George H. Brett, who had thereupon taken
command of American forces in Australia, the War Department replied:
-
- The purpose of the War Department to support the defense by every
practicable mans has not repeat not been changed. The event to which
pursuit planes should be transferred to Java must be determined by you
in accordance with the desires of the ABDA Commander, the availability
of shipping, and the practicability of landing these planes in Java and
operating them effectively therefrom .69
-
- The "practicability of landing these planes in Java and operating
them effectively therefrom" was soon thereafter decided. The Langley, with its thirty-two P-40's, went down off Java on 27 February
as a result of several direct hits by enemy bombers. The pilots were
picked up by two other ships, neither of which arrived in port. The Sea
Witch, one of four ships from Melbourne that had made a rendezvous with
the Langley at Fremantle, had also been ordered to Java, rather than to
Burma, its original destination. The Sea Witch got through with its
cargo of twenty-seven crated P-40's, all of which had to be thrown into
the sea during the evacuation of Java, in order to prevent their falling
into the hands of the Japanese. The War Department then finally agreed
with General Brett
- [135]
- that no more pursuit planes should be shipped to Java unless there
were a change in the situation that promised "greater safety in
transit." 70
Thus ended the attempt to build up a fighter command in
Java, an attempt that all told had cost perhaps half of the American
pursuit planes and a great many of the pilots that had by then arrived
in Australia, and that had put into action for about a fortnight one
steadily dwindling provisional squadron in Java. 71
-
- Transfer of Air Units to Burma and India
-
- Even while the attempt to send fighter reinforcements to Java was
beginning ABDA headquarters, the CCS, and the War Department began to
prepare against the probability that it would fail. On 7 February
General Brett, repeating and confirming General Wavell's report of the
desperate situation of the fighter command in Java, went on to outline
the problem of air operations in the area for consideration by the War
Department "in connection with future operation." He
understood that "every effort must be made to retain and maintain a
strong defensive force in Java." But he warned the War Department:
-
- To protect our air striking force it may become necessary to readjust
our idea of the method of hopping the Barrier and eventually taking up the offensive .
. . . It may be necessary to work from the flanks.
- Brett's plan was to base air striking forces, with adequate protection
by pursuit planes, in India and Burma and at Port Darwin. On operations
based in India and Burma he observed
-
- Burma can be occupied in depth with India as bases from which fighters
can easily be flow to fields in North Burma and even into China.
Airfreight transport would be more usable. Water transport might be
difficult. The Burma Road and other supply lines leading north from
Rangoon would require energetic American action. The air operations
would have tendency to (one) relieve pressure on Singapore by action on
Bangkok and Saigon (two) give a direct line of action toward Formosa,
Shanghai and eventually Japan. 72
-
- ABDA headquarters was especially interested in the development of an American bomber force based on Burma. To prepare for the reception of
such a force, as part of the American Volunteer Group, was the mission
that had originally taken General Brett to the Far East.73
These
preparations the ABDA Command had resumed. General Wavell had announced
on returning from Rangoon on 26 January that he proposed to send a
squadron of long-range bombers to operate from Burma, where they would
have "excellent targets.'' 74
On 7 February, returning from a
second visit to Burma, Wavell announced that he had taken with him and
had left in Burma an American officer, Col. Francis VI. Brady, to
"go into questions of operation [of] heavy bombers from
- [136]
- Burma and China." As indicated by Wavell's announcement, made at
the same time, that he intended to divert the 7th Armoured Brigade from
Java to Burma, the immediate concern of ABDA headquarters was then with
the reinforcement of Burma.75
-
- The War Department fell in with the idea of transferring heavy bombers
from Australia to Burma and suggested, "in view of the urgency of
this situation and the necessity for earliest possible action,"
that Wavell also transfer from Australia the necessary ground crews and
supply troops, rather than wait six weeks or more for them to come from
the United States. The ABDA Command already had personnel for two groups
(the 7th and 19th Bombardment Groups) and could expect another (the
43d ), soon to sail from the United States. The War Department proposed
he should send the 19th Group to Burma. There it could be built up with
bombers being flown via the South Atlantic and central Africa, of which thirty-three
were then en route. The War Department left it to him to
decide whether the depleted American Volunteer Group ( operating in
Burma under agreement with Chiang Kai-shek) could provide the necessary
fighter protection until the arrival of replacements then on the way (a
shipment of fifty P-40's due to have arrived at Takoradi, Gold Coast,
where they would be assembled and flown to the Far East, and another
shipment of thirty pursuit planes that had just sailed for Karachi) . or
whether the War Department in addition should reassign to Burma
"one of the four pursuit groups you have or will have in Australia.76
-
- In spite of this general agreement, plans in the theater waited on
events and on decisions from Washington. On 16 February, following the
fall of Singapore, General Brett announced, in response to the proposal
of the War Department, that he was planning to send Maj. Gen. Lewis H.
Brereton to Burma "to prepare for any force which you may organize
to meet situation there" and that he would "make effort to
send maintenance crews to India and Burma to assist in preparation for
possible arrival of combat equipment." 77
-
- Brett's plan was to send to Burma or to Calcutta most of the ground
units of the 7th Bombardment Group, those of the 51st Pursuit Group
(less one squadron) together with Headquarters Squadron of the 35th
Pursuit Group, and air base units, all of which he had ordered moved
from Melbourne to Fremantle in a convoy of four ships. Besides these
units, all told nearly 3,000 troops, the heavy convoy also carried
bombs, ammunition, and thirty-seven crated P-40's. This convoy he
expected to arrive about the middle of March. He was also making
tentative plans to divert to Akvab both the B-17's en route from the
United States and those committed to Java, having heard from Colonel
Brady in Burma that a squadron of B-17's could operate for a short while
from Akyab with British supplies and munitions, maintenance crews, and
fighter and antiaircraft protection.78
-
- The convoy finally sailed from Australia on 22 February, but for
neither Rangoon
- [137]
- nor Calcutta. It went, instead, to Karachi, on the northwest coast of
India, to avoid the rapidly growing danger from Japanese operations in
the Bay of Bengal. The unit left behind much of their equipment, and the
convoy carried only ten pursuit planes. The Sea Witch with its
twenty-seven
planes had been diverted to Java, along with the Langley, which Brett
had apparently hoped to send to Burma.79
-
- Circumstances also modified the plan for diverting heavy bombers to
Burma. Brett's original plan was part of the plan of ABDA headquarters,
following the fall of Singapore, to shift major forces from the defense
of Java to the defense of Burma.80
The unwillingness of the
Australian Government to divert the 7th Australian Division to Burma,
the Battle of Sittang Bridge, and, thereafter, the insistence in turn of
General Wavell and of the War Department on continued support of Java,
cut the ground out from under this plan. 81
Brett did send Brereton to
India (via Ceylon) on 25 February with two heavy bombers. Four
others, salvaged from the final collapse of the air defenses of Java,
followed a few days later. These six bombers, together with two others
of the thirty-three mentioned by the War Department as en route from the
United States via Africa, arrived in time to serve as air transports
during the evacuation of southern Burma in early March. 82
-
-
- Concurrent with the abortive planning in the theater for the diversion
of American air forces to Burma, went the resumption and acceleration
of planning in the War Department for building up an air force on the
Asiatic mainland with the ultimate objective of bombing Japan. The
plans made in 1941 in connection with the American Volunteer Croup
had called for one pursuit group and one bomber group. At the time of
the attack on Pearl Harbor the pursuit group of the AVG was already
established in Burma. Crews for the bomber group were in Australia, and
General Brett was en route to Burma to make preliminary arrangements for
the reception of the force.83
after 7 December these commitments had
continued to figure in the plans of the Army Air Forces. 84
The War
Department had undertaken to bring the pursuit group of the AVG to full
strength as a unit of the U. S. Army (the 23d Pursuit Group). 85
In January the War Department had acted on this commitment by sending out
two shipments of pursuit planes, one to Takoradi and the other to
Karachi, for the 23d Pur-
- [138]
- suit Group.86
The War Department had also begun preparations for
bombing Japan. It was premature to plan for achievement of this
objective on a continuous basis with a prospect of operational results
proportionate to the expense.87
But for the sake of the tonic effect
on the American public and the unsettling effect on Japanese plans and
dispositions, the Army Air Forces had set up two missions, without
provision for replacement, to achieve this feat of arms. One of these
was the Halverson Project (HALPRO), a force of twenty-three B-24's, to
be sent out late in the spring under Col. Harry A. Halverson, which was
to operate from advance bases in China.88
The other project was the
Doolittle mission, three squadrons of B-25's under Lt. Col. James H.
Doolittle, with the objective of carrying out a carrier-based raid on
Tokyo.89
-
- By mid-February it had become very uncertain whether American bombers
could operate from China in the near future. The limiting factor was air
transport, by which all lend-lease for China was to move, at least for
several months.90
After mid-February the conditions under which bombers
could operate elsewhere in Asia were rapidly determined. The loss of
Singapore disposed of the possibility that an American bomber force
operating from Burma might be incorporated under a single Allied command
with the air forces in the Southwest Pacific. Within the next week, as
it became evident that the loss of Rangoon in turn was but a question of
time, the other possibility-that the force might become part of an
Allied command in Burma- --also disappeared. An air force in Asia would
have to operate from India under an American commander directly
responsible to the War Department, and it would have to be decided in
Washington, rather than in the theater, which of its now entirely
distinct missions the force should carry out-the support of Chinese or
British operations.
-
- The American commander that was to provide the connecting link between
American air operations based on India and those based on China was
Maj. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, who was then being sent to China to
assume his dual role as com-
- [139]
- mander of LL. S. Army forces in China, Burma, and India, and as chief
of staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in his capacity as supreme Allied commander in China. Stilwell's appointment to serve in this dual
role, following a month of negotiation, had been formally announced to
Chiang Kai-shek en 1 February, and Stilwell's instructions (drafted by
himself) had been issued the next day.91
-
- Superficially considered, General Stilwell appeared a natural choice
for such an assignment, since he knew the military situation in China
better than any other American general. Considered more closely, he
appeared to be ill-chosen to represent the Arm, in a zone in which air
forces were to be the principal ! and probably the only; American forces
engaged and ,strategic bombing was to be the ultimate American military
objective, since he was especially suited by experience and inclination
to train and command ground forces. His choice also appeared singularly
unfortunate in that he would have to deal constantly with matters of
high American, Chinese, and British policy and with the men that made
high policy, though he himself disliked to do so and-what way more--was
unfavorably disposed toward the particular policies and political
leaders with whom he would have the most to do. Considered still more
closely, however, Stilwell's great knowledge of the Chinese and Japanese
armies and his exceptional fitness for training and commanding ground
forces gave him unique qualifications to carry out American strategy on the
mainland of Asia, since the successful use of Chinese ground forces was
the main condition of putting American air forces in position to conduct
strategic bombing operations against Japan. There was, moreover, a great
advantage, from the point of view of the War Department, in Stilwell's
disinclination to be a "political general," since it was an
expression of his complementary determination to be a "military
general," whose main aim would be to serve rather than to influence
the purposes of General Marshall.92
-
- The War Department's plan for establishing an air striking force in
India was distinct from the project of diverting bombers from the
Southwest Pacific to Burma, but it incorporated the ground crews and
service troops that Brett was preparing to send from Australia. On 20
February General Arnold informed General Brett that the War Department
intended to utilize these troops in establishing an air force at Bombay
that was to consist of one heavy bomber group and one pursuit group. He
stated that these units were to be used in Burma only after they had
been completely organized. The force would be available to General
Stillwell for use in China, and its ultimate objective was long-range
bombing of Japan from bases in China.93
- Soon thereafter the War Department decided to send General Brereton to
India to
- [140]
- command the new force.94
It was designated the Tenth Air Force, with
headquarters at Karachi. It would at first be made up of the bomber
group and the pursuit group, for which most of the ground personnel were
being sent from Australia; the air depot group and miscellaneous service
units, which also were to be sent from Australia; and an air force
headquarters and headquarters squadron and an air depot group, to be
sent from the United States.95
The War Department sent word of the
decision to Chungking on 27 February and followed on 28 February
with a summary statement of the forces assigned.96
On 2 March the
War Department received word from General Brereton by way of Cairo that
he had assumed command of the American air force in India then assigned
to General Stilwell, and that he would establish his headquarters at
Delhi, so as to be near the British authorities on whose cooperation he
must so largely depend.97
-
- Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Tenth Air Force, and the 3d
Air Depot Group embarked on 19 March from Charleston, S. C. along with
other units for General Stilwell--the ground echelon of the 23d Pursuit
Group, personnel for the 1st Ferrying Group, and miscellaneous service
units- -all told over 4,000 officers and men.98
A few days later
Col. Caleb V. Haynes left with an advance detachment of planes---one B-24, four
B-17's, and six C-47's. Besides the five bombers of this flight, the
War Department counted on getting to General Brereton twelve B-17's
that were out of commission along the air ferry route across Africa and
in India. To make up the complement of fifty bombers for the Tenth Air
Force, thirty-three other were to be sent "as soon as
practicable." There were no pursuit planes scheduled for the Tenth
Air Force, aide from the ten that had arrived with the convoy from
Fremantle.99
-
- The employment of American air combat forces in Asia- -the 23d Pursuit
Group, HALPRO, the Doolittle mission, and the Tenth Air Force-was only
one part of the program of the A AF, which had three other projects that
concerned General 5tilwell and the Chinese. One was the establishment of
an air route into China from northeast India, the only means of getting
lend-lease aid to China ,and of supporting American bomber operations in
China) for several months to come, even on the supposition that northern
Burma would be held and the Burma Road reopened. For this purpose the A
AF planned to allocate a hundred transports as fast as then became
available. A second project was to fly thirty-three A-29's to China,
under the command of Lt. Col. Leo H. Dawson. The AA):' hoped to have
the planes for the Dawson mission ready to move by the end of March. On
arrival in China ,the pilots were to be assigned either to the Tenth Air
Force or the 23d Pursuit Group. A third project was the shipment to
China of some 250 obsolescent pursuit planes (P-66's and P--43's); 72 had already been
- [141]
- shipped out since January, and another 50 were due for early
shipment.100
-
- The program as a whole was insubstantial, involving a far wider
dispersion of effort, a much heavier overhead investment, and
correspondingly greater initial waste in proportion to the operational
results to be achieved than the original program of 1941. The original
program of 1941 had envisaged an initial concentration of American air
power and supply in Burma, supporting at once British and Chinese
operations. American efforts were now to be dispersed across the entire
subcontinent of India and could be linked with American effort in
China only at a great expense of time, men, and materiel. The War
Department was aware of the existence of the difficulty, if not yet of
its proportions. On 20 February, when the new program was taking
shape, Col. Clayton L. Bissell, who handled it in the General Staff, and
who was !o become the senior officer for air operations on General
Stilwell's staff, sent the Army Air Forces the following estimate of
'`possible developments
-
- A. Most of above aircraft pills others may be used in India rather
than in China. Plan accordingly.
- B. Available air Transport may be incapable of supporting China with
absolute essentials and may be incapable of maintaining more than a
token air force in China until rail and road can carry supplies through.
-
- C. A new India-Burma Theatre may be formed with which the above may be
amalgamated or at least integrated.101
-
-
- The one part of the Air Forces' planning for the Far East of which nothing at all
came during the early part of 1942 was the planning that had to I do with American air
operations in Siberia. The United States Government tried to open negotiations, in
the face of the declared Soviet neutrality in the Far East and the dissociation of the
British Government from the whole project, by asking the Soviet Government for in
formation on air facilities in Siberia, in order to make plans for the delivery of
lend lease planes via Alaska.102 The ,War Department had been seeking this information
ever since the first discussions, in the summer of 1941, of sending aid to the Soviet
Union.103 During the fall of 1941, in planning for early deliveries under the First
.; Moscow ; Protocol, the Arm has accepted the necessity of shipping planes to overseas
delivery points-Basra, Murmansk, and Archangel-from which they would be flown by Soviet flyers to the ,Soviet fronts
or elsewhere.104 But the Army had persisted
- [142]
- in attempts to get information on facilities for air delivery via
Alaska and Siberia, through the Harriman mission, through a courier sent
from London by General Chaney, and finally, through the State
Department, which had instructed the American ambassador, Admiral
William H. Standley. to do what he could.105
-
- The failure of these attempts and the affirmation of Soviet neutrality
in the war against Japan, made in December 1941, had left it to American
officers to adopt any of several views on the matter of future
negotiations. One view, presented by Colonel Favmonville, the senior
military representative of the Lend-Lease Administration in the Soviet
Union, was that a general agreement on strategy was prerequisite to any
progress on negotiations over the Alaska-Sibera route.106 Another
view, twice presented by the AAF, was that negotiations should be
reopened with the proposal to commit an American bomber force to
operations against Japan from advance bases in the area of Vladivostok.
The AAF first made this proposal just after the ARCADIA Conference, in
compliance with a request originating in the State Department for
comments on the course to be followed in future negotiations with the
Soviet Government.107 The only result at the time was that Mr. Stimson apparently took the matter
up with the President
informally.108 The Air staff again submitted the proposal in March
during the course of a general review initiated by the President
"in regard to the position of Great Britain and the United
States" in the event of Soviet involvement in the war against
Japan.109 As in January, the AAF assumed that the Soviet Union
would co-operate as soon as the United States should commit itself to
sending a force of long-range bombers to Siberia. In anticipation of
favorable Soviet response, the A AF recommended that air units assigned
to other theaters should be tentatively reassigned to provide the
force.110
-
- General 'Marshall's plans and operations staff considered the project
impracticable in itself and inconsistent with American strategy. A full
analysis was written for submission to Marshall and transmission to the
joint Staff Planners JPS, to show that of all lines of action open to
the 'United States to help the Soviet Union against Japan:
- The most valuable assistance which can be rendered to Russia is to
contain Japanese forces, mainly her air force, in the South
- [143]
- Pacific and the sooner our action clearly indicates to Russia that Ģe
shall do this the greater advantage she can gain from that
assistance.111
-
- Another study listed the various reasons for considering study AAF
project impracticable
- The logistical difficulties, personnel and material losses that would
be incurred, lack of adequate facilities in Siberia, inability of Russia
to supply vital necessities upon arrival and during operation, and lack
of sufficient U. S. shipping facilities available for this purpose
preclude the possibility of sending supplies, reinforcements and
airplanes to Siberia for combat purposes in the: event of war between
Japan and Russia.
-
- This study, too, held that "diverting action in the South
Pacific" was a "more logical approach to giving aid to
Russia" and added that "an offensive against Germany" was
"the most logical approach to giving aid to Russia.112
-
- When the joint planning committees (the Joint U. S. Strategic
Committee (JUSSC), and the Joint Staff Planners) took up the question, they did
riot pass judgment either on the strategic value or on the
practicability of the AAF project, but simply pointed, out that a great
deal more would have to be known about the Soviet position and
facilities in Siberia, and thus reverted to the unanswered primary question of how to get the
Soviet Government to give any information or permit an American survey
party to gather it.113
On this question, as on the related question
of the value and practicability of American operations in Siberia, there
was a disagreement between the Air staff, hopeful of Soviet
receptiveness, and Marshall's plans and operations officers, who were
skeptical of the success of negotiations, at least under existing
circumstances. Marshall's advisers were willing to meet with Soviet
staff officers and explain to them how, in practice, Soviet distrust
must limit the scale and effectiveness of American aid of any kind. But
that was all they expected to accomplish, and they were doubtful that
the Soviet Government would be receptive to a proposal to hold staff
conversations.114
-
- The Army planners believed in any event that the Soviet Government
had no incen-
- [144]
- tive to enter into formal negotiations and also that it would be unwise for the
American Government to do so. The, observed that it was
not "practicable" to couple lend-lease questions with
strategic questions, and that it would be "impossible to restrict
the discussions of our own plans to those matters with respect to which
we would be willing to disclose Our intentions." 115
They expected that any agreement; reached with the Soviet
Government in
the field of military operations would be on the basis of quid pro
quo,
and recognized that the United States had not yet tried to deal --- and
was actually not ready to deal-- on this basis with the Soviet Union:
-
- The fact is that it is we who want the information [about Siberian
airfields], yet we cannot trade supplies for it. Russia is most anxious
to avoid belligerency in eastern Siberia; but it is this sera which
interests us. Until we have some concrete offer with which to trade,
Stalin is unlikely to talk with us-he is suspicious of our motives and
unimpressed by our military effectiveness.116
-
- Colonel Handy made the same point when the question came before the
joint Staff' Planners. The Joint U. S. Strategic Committee had
suggested that the United States might propose to establish a commercial
airline between Alaska and Siberia "for the purpose of carrying
supplies and gaining information on the air fields in Siberia." 117
This proposal (which had previously been under consideration in
the State Department) Colonel Handy brushed aside, characterizing it as
"a subterfuge which would not deceive the Russians.' He went on to
observe, "we might as well be frank about what we want." 118
The JPS concluded that the only
way to get information on air facilities in Siberia "would be
through a direct agreement between the highest United States and Soviet
political authorities." The JPS, therefore, recommended that the
JCS request the President "to initiate steps on the political level
looking toward a more complete military collaboration between the United
States and the U. S. S. R." In case he should succeed, a survey of
facilities in Siberia could be made, conversations begun on the staff
level, arid "realistic plans" developed.119 On 30
1larch the JCS sent a memorandum to this effect to the President, who
read and returned it without comment.120 Plans and negotiations
remained suspended on this note until the late spring of 1942.121
-
- The inconclusive end of these studies could not have been so very
unexpected to the Air Forces, and it was obviously welcome to the Army
planners. As it was, U. S. forces, in particular U. S. Army Air
Forces, had evidently undertaken to do a great deal more than they
could carry out
- [145]
- for a long time to come. The belated disorganized movements of U. S.
Army forces into the Pacific and the Far East had as yet almost no
effect on Japanese operations, but they had already called into question
the extent to which the United States would be able and willing to
fulfill prior commitments to help the United Kingdom and the Soviet
Union against Germany. The War Department planners were dismayed lest
the United States, in starting to do everything at once, fail to accomplish even the most necessary
tasks, and they had already set themselves to answer the question which,
if any, operations against Japan were now to be numbered among the
essential missions of the U. S. Army. They were quite sure that it was
no longer possible to evade or defer the question and that U. S. Army
deployment in the Pacific must he controlled by the requirements of
grand strategy.
- [146]
- Page created 10 January 2002
Endnotes
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