Rush to Failure

By CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER 2 JASON HUBBARD AND CHIEF WARRANTOFFICER 3 JEREMY MILLER 2nd Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment 101st Airborne Division (Task Force Saber) Fort Campbell, Ky.May 9, 2011

How dangerous can "light and variable" winds be to the crew of an OH-58D rushing to complete a mission' Read this first-account of a crew who, fortunately, survived a close brush with death and lived to tell their story.

On the night of June 19, 2010, our mission was to conduct area security for a deliberate operation. The squadron commander signed off as the final approval authority. Weather for the evening was perfect. The skies were clear, visibility was unrestricted and winds were light and variable for our night vision goggle flight. We never knew this would play a significant part in our evening.

We did our usual pre-mission planning. We received the mission, gathered the necessary equipment, checked our weight and balance, conducted appropriate hover power and power performance checks, preflighted the aircraft and conducted our crew brief. Everything seemed normal. It was just another routine mission like we had done a thousand times before.

We departed the airfield as a flight of two OH-58Ds and flew to an outlying forward operating base (FOB) in support of ground forces in southern Afghanistan. After the support effort was complete, we conducted forward arming and refueling point operations at another nearby FOB.

Following refuel, we were instructed to position our aircraft at idle in the FOB landing zone (LZ). We were to stay there until called forward to provide security for the ground forces on the objective.

When we arrived at the FOB, the winds were light, just as advertised. The windsock was limp so Chalk 1 announced he would land to the north. We were Chalk 2 and acknowledged lead's call and followed him into the LZ. Both aircraft landed and maneuvered around the small parking area without incident.

Chalk 1 departed to the south due to light winds and the tight configuration of other aircraft in the LZ. We acknowledged and again maneuvered to depart to the south. Both aircraft took off and we proceeded to the objective area to conduct our mission.

We had been on the objective area for about two hours when it was time to refuel again. Chalk 1 told the ground force commander we were departing the area for fuel and would maintain radio communication if anything came up. Both aircraft left the area and returned to the same FOB as before to refuel.

When we arrived at the FOB, we discovered two additional aircraft on the LZ. A pair of Chinooks had parked on the east side of the LZ and shut down, awaiting a mission. Chalk 1 announced they would be landing to the north as before because the winds were still light. Once again, we followed them into the LZ and refueled.

Since we were not needed right away at the objective area, after refueling, we repositioned the aircraft to the parking area. Due to the limited space available in the LZ, Chalk 1 had to park on the west side while we parked on the east side of the LZ. After landing, we rolled the throttle down to idle to conserve fuel. We waited for about 10 minutes and then the ground force commander called and said he wanted us back on station. We rolled the throttle back to 100 percent and got ready to depart.

Chalk 1 announced he was departing to the south, as before, and we acknowledged. We then announced we were ready to depart. Chalk 1 picked up and turned to the south. We, in turn, picked up and turned to the south to follow lead. Due to the location of the Chinooks and the fueling points, we had to follow directly behind lead to depart. What we didn't think of was Chalk 1's rotor wash.

As we departed the FOB en route to the ground forces, we were still in trail position and slightly below Chalk 1's flight path. We started building airspeed and felt the aircraft shudder as we started to go through effective translational lift. That's when the rotor system operates more efficiently because it is operating in clean air. Just as the aircraft began to shudder, we entered Chalk 1's rotor wash, which buffeted our aircraft, and we began to descend. Chief Warrant Officer 3 Miller was the pilot in command and pulled collective to arrest our descent. Because we lacked sufficient power, we continued to descend and Miller announced we were going to land. However, because of obstacles on the south end of the landing zone, we had to extend our landing to an unimproved area.

As we transitioned from takeoff profile to landing, our rotor wash caused a dust cloud so thick we lost sight of all ground references (brownout). I pulled collective to attempt an instrument takeoff; however, we did not have enough power to climb. Unable to see the ground to land and unable to climb, all we could do was hope for the best. Caught in the brownout, we drifted to the right and struck a military-owned demountable container.

The Kiowa flipped and came to rest on its left side, catching fire. I was the co-pilot on this flight, and both Miller and I were conscious and attempted to assist each other in getting out of the aircraft. We were hanging from our seat belt, which neither of us could unlatch. I was able to lift my weight by pressing with my feet and pushing with my left arm to release my seat belt. I kicked out the windscreen and climbed halfway out, and then one of the Chinook crew chiefs pulled me clear. Miller's seat belt had to be cut for him to get out of the aircraft. While I escaped without any injuries, Miller suffered a broken nose.

Lessons Learned

In hindsight, you never want to rush to the point that you neglect safety. We all want to get to the ground forces as quickly as possible. However, if you crash, you won't be helping anyone and may jeopardize the entire ground mission. With the light winds, we should have given Chalk 1 a little more space to take off. We should have ensured Chalk 1's rotor downwash had dispersed. If we'd waited a few seconds longer, we would've missed the rotor wash and this accident wouldn't have occurred.

If you get into a similar situation, it's best to either commit to the takeoff or land immediately. Take the extra 10 or 15 seconds to get out of the LZ. There is no reason to fly tight in Afghanistan with the limited power margins available.

One more thing, you should always have a plan for getting out of an inverted aircraft. We often assume that the aircraft will end up upright on level ground. Put your equipment on your vest so that you can access it while your seat belt is on. While upside down, seat belts won't release like when you're sitting upright, so have your seat cutter where you can get to it and tie it down. Think about every contingency and have a plan.