Reserve Component Readiness

Sections 517 and 521 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 1994 require the information in this addendum. Section 517 requires a report relating to implementation of the pilot Program for Active Component support of the Reserves under Section 414 of the NDAA 1992 and 1993. Section 521 requires a detailed presentation concerning the Army National Guard (ARNG), including information relating to implementation of the ARNG Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 (Title XI of Public Law 102-484, referred to in this addendum as ANGCRRA). Section 521 reporting was later amended by Section 704 of NDAA 1996. U.S. Army Reserve Information is also presented using Section 521 reporting criteria.

Section 517 (b) (2) (A)
The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone who are serving as Active Component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared with the promotion rate for other officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone in the same pay grade and the same competitive category, shown for all officers of the Army.

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*Active Component officers serving in Reserve Component assignments at time of consideration.
**Active Component officers not serving in Reserve Component assignments at the time of consideration.

Section 517 (b) (2) (B)
The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from below the promotion zone who are serving as Active Component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared in the same manner as specified in subparagraph (A) (the paragraph above).

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*Below the zone Active Component officers serving in Reserve Component assignments at time of consideration.
**Below-the-zone Active Component officers not serving in Reserve Component assignments at time of consideration.
***One officer promoted below the zone out of two eligible for consideration.

Section 521(b)
1. The number and percentage of officers with at least two years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the US Army Reserve Selected Reserve units:
ARNG officers: 20,811 or 55.5 percent
Army Reserve officers: 4,968 or 7.9 percent

2. The number and percentage of enlisted personnel with at least two years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units:
ARNG enlisted: 119,269 or 37.8 percent
Army Reserve enlisted: 11,247 or 18.8 percent

3. The number of officers who are graduates of one of the service academies and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation and, of those officers:

a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

In FY07, no graduates of a service academy were released to the Selected Reserve to complete their obligation.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

In FY07, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

4. The number of officers who were commissioned as distinguished Reserve Officers’ Training Corps graduates and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation and, of those officers:

a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

In FY07, one distinguished Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) graduate was released before completing his active-duty service obligation.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver: In FY07, one waiver was granted by the Secretary of the Army. The reason for the waiver was personal hardship (i.e., a child of the service member, born with a congenital heart defect, must be within 10-15 minutes from a major center specializing in pediatric cardiology for services as required).

5. The number of officers who are graduates of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps program and who are performing their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with section 1112(b) of ANGCRRA by a combination of (a) two years of active duty, and (b) such additional period of service as is necessary to complete the remainder of such obligation served in the National Guard and, of those officers, the number for whom permission to perform their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with that section was granted during the preceding fiscal year:

In FY07, no ROTC graduates were released early from their active-duty obligation. Of this number, none are completing the remainder of their obligation through service in the ARNG, and none through service in the Army Reserve.

6. The number of officers for whom recommendations were made during the preceding fiscal year for a unit vacancy promotion to a grade above first lieutenant, and of those recommendations, the number and percentage that were concurred in by an active duty officer under section 1113(a) of ANGCRRA, shown separately for each of the three categories of officers set forth in section 1113(b) of ANGCRRA (with Army Reserve data also reported):

2,129 ARNG officers from units were recommended for position-vacancy promotion and promoted.
37 Army Reserve officers from units were recommended for position-vacancy promotion and promoted.

7. The number of waivers during the preceding fiscal year under section 1114(a) of ANGCRRA of any standard prescribed by the Secretary establishing a military education requirement for non-commissioned officers and the reason for each such waiver:

In FY07, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

8. The number and distribution by grade, shown for each State, of personnel in the initial entry training and non-deployability personnel accounting category established under section 1115 of ANGCRRA for members of the Army National Guard who have not completed the minimum training required for deployment or who are otherwise not available for deployment. (A narrative summary of information pertaining to the Army Reserve is also provided):

In FY07, the ARNG had 61,700 Soldiers were considered nondeployable because of incomplete initial entry training, officer transition, medical issues, nonparticipation, or restrictions on the use or possession of weapons and ammunition under the Lautenburg Amendment. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) maintains the detailed information.

In FY07, the Army Reserve had 35,049 (AR) Soldiers who were considered nonavailable for deployment for reasons outlined in Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting (e.g., pending administrative/legal discharge or separation, medical non-availability).

9. The number of members of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, that were discharged during the previous fiscal year pursuant to section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the National Guard. (Army Reserve data also reported):

The number of ARNG Soldiers discharged during FY07 pursuant to section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the Army National Guard is 161 officers and 11,095 enlisted Soldiers from all U.S. states and territories. The breakdown by each state is maintained by the NGB.

The number of Army Reserve Soldiers discharged during FY07 for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the Army Reserve is 15 officers and 436 enlisted Soldiers. Those Soldiers who have not completed the required initial entry training within the first 24 months are discharged from the Army Reserve under AR 135-178, Separation of Enlisted Personnel. Those officers who have not completed a basic branch course within 36 months after commissioning are separated under AR 135-175, Separation of Officers.

10. The number of waivers, shown for each State, that were granted by the Secretary of the Army during the previous fiscal year under section 1115(c)(2) of ANGCRRA of the requirement in section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA described in paragraph (9), together with the reason for each waiver:
In FY07, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

11. The number of Army National Guard members, shown for each State, (and the number of AR members), who were screened during the preceding fiscal year to determine whether they meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment and, of those members: (a) the number and percentage that did not meet minimum physical profile standards for deployment; and (b) the number and percentage who were transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8):

a. The number and percentage who did not meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment:

In FY07, 155,662 ARNG Soldiers underwent a physical. Of these personnel, 5,606 or 3.6 percent were identified for review due to a profile-limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

In FY07, 56,384 Army Reserve Soldiers underwent a physical. Of these personnel 9,073 or 16 percent were identified for review due to a profile limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

b. The number and percentage that were transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).

In FY07, 5,821 ARNG Soldiers were transferred from deployable to nondeployable status for failing to meet medical deployability standards. This number includes Soldiers returning from a mobilization with a new medical condition and reflects an increase in the use of electronic databases.

In FY07, 839 Army Reserve Soldiers were considered nonavailable for deployment for failing to meet medical deployability standards. This is a decrease of 784 from the previous fiscal year.

12. The number of members and the percentage total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State who underwent a medical screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA:

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

13. The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State who underwent a dental screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA:

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

14. The number of members and the percentage of the total membership of the Army National Guard shown for each State, over the age of 40 who underwent a full physical examination during the previous fiscal year for purposes of section 1117 of ANGCRRA:

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

15.The number of units of the Army National Guard that are scheduled for early deployment in the event of a mobilization, and of those units, the number that are dentally ready for deployment in accordance with section 1118 of ANGCRRA:

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1118 of ANGCRRA.

16. The estimated post-mobilization training time for each Army National Guard combat unit (and Army Reserve unit), and a description, displayed in broad categories and by State of what training would need to be accomplished for Army National Guard combat units (and AR units) in a post-mobilization period for purposes of section 1119 of ANGCRRA:

Information on the type of training required by units during post-mobilization is maintained by First United States Army. The data are not captured and provided by the state.

ARNG units are striving to train in accordance with the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process in order to prepare for operational missions and reduce post-mobilization training time. The ARFORGEN process requires increasing resources as necessary for maximum company-level training proficiency prior to mobilization. This training generally consists of individual warrior training tasks, weapons qualification and gunnery, battle staff training, and maneuver training. This is followed by theater-specific tasks and higher level collective training to complete the predeployment requirements for the unit’s specific mission. The goal for post-mobilization training time for a brigade-size organization is approximately 60 days.

Post-mobilization training time is contingent upon the amount of certified pre-mobilization training conducted, the type of unit, and its assigned mission. In order to reduce post-mobilization training time, the ARNG has developed programs and products such as the ARNG Battle Command Training Capability, the eXportable Combat Training Capability (XCTC), myriad training devices and range complexes for our units. The combination of programs and products, provide our units with the capability to accomplish more pre-mobilization training and reduce post-mobilization training time.

The Army Reserve Training Strategy (ARTS) envisions execution of both the provisions of section 1119 as well as the Office of the Secretary of Defense train-alert-deploy paradigm. Specifically, the ARTS requires higher levels of pre-mobilization readiness through completion of increasingly higher levels of training as units progress through the ARFORGEN cycle. Thus, the initial focus on individual and leader training migrates to low-level unit and battle staff, culminating in multiechelon, combined-arms exercises in the Ready year. The goal is to provide trained and ready combat support/combat service support platoons and trained and proficient battle staffs, battalion level and above, to the mobilization station. Realization of this strategy is dependent upon additional resources as it requires additional active training days and support funds. The majority of the additional training days are currently being resourced in the base budget, but the additional operational tempo is funded via supplementals.

Per January 2007 direction from the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Reserve Component unit mobilizations are now limited to 400-day periods, including a 30-day post-mobilization leave. Perhaps the most significant impact of this policy change is the inclusion of post-mobilization training time in the 400-day mobilization period. Thus, many training tasks previously conducted during post-mobilization periods of three to six months have been identified for pre-mobilization training, and Army Reserve units are training to standard on as many of these tasks as resources permit.

*The period roughly from Training Year 2008 through Training Year 2010, when required training enablers (e.g., dollars, training days, training support structure, training facilities) are resourced and thus support the higher levels of pre-mobilization individual, leader, and collective training needed to maximize boots on ground/deployed time.

17. A description of the measures taken during the preceding fiscal year to comply with the requirement in section 1120 of ANGCRRA to expand the use of simulations, simulators, and advanced training devices and technologies for members and units of the Army National Guard (and the Army Reserve):

During FY 07, the ARNG continued to synchronize the use of existing and ongoing live, virtual, and constructive training aids, devices, simulations and simulators (TADSS) programs with the training requirements of the ARFORGEN training model. By synchronizing the use of TADSS with ARFORGEN, the ARNG continues to improve unit training proficiency prior to mobilization.

To support the training requirements of M1A1 Abrams and M2A2 Bradley-equipped Brigade Combat Teams (BCT’s), the ARNG continued the fielding of the Advanced Bradley Full-Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer, which provides full crew-simulations training for M2A2 units, Tabletop Full-fidelity Trainers for the M2A2 and the Conduct of Fire Trainer XXI for M1A1 and M2A2. When fully fielded, these devices, in addition to the Abrams Full-Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer XXI, will be the primary simulations trainers to meet the virtual gunnery requirements of M1A1 and M2A2 crews.

In order to meet the virtual-maneuver training requirements in the ARFORGEN process, M1A1 and M2A2 units use the Close-Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT) and the Rehosted Simulations Network (SIMNET) XXI, in addition to the Rehosted SIMNET CCTT Core. The CCTT, SIMNET XXI, and SIMNET CCTT provide a mobile training capability to our dispersed units.

In order to train all ARNG units on the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of convoy operations, the ARNG is fielding the Virtual Convoy Operations Trainer (VCOT). The VCOT, through the use of geospecific databases, provides commanders with a unique and critical mission rehearsal tool. Currently, 32 VCOT systems are positioned in the ARNG force to train units on the fundamentals of convoy operations.

In order to meet basic and advanced rifle marksmanship requirements, the ARNG is fielding the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST 2000).

Post-mobilization training for Army Reserve units is directed and managed by the First Army. First Army conducts the theater-specified training required and confirms the readiness of mobilized Army Reserve units to deploy to overseas theaters. ARFORGEN’s Ready Year 2 (the year before mobilization) is particularly critical to implementation of the ARTS and SECDEF policies. During the Ready Year 2, Army Reserve units complete collective pre-mobilization training in a 29-day period, including training on many of the theater-identified tasks formerly covered by First Army during post-mobilization. Timely alert for mobilization–at least one year prior to mobilization–is crucial.

Army goals for post-mobilization training for Army Reserve headquarters and combat support/combat service support units range from 30 to 60 days. Post-mobilization training conducted by First Army typically consists of counterinsurgency operations, counter-improvised-explosive-device training, convoy live-fire exercises, theater orientation, rules of engagement/escalation-of-force training, and completion of any theater-specified training not completed during the pre-mobilization period. Typical post-mobilization periods for various units are outlined below.

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This system is the Army’s approved marksmanship-training device. The ARNG is also continuing use of its previously procured Fire Arms Training System (FATS) until EST 2000 fielding is complete. The EST 2000 and FATS are also used to provide unit collective tactical training for dismounted Infantry, Special Operations Forces, Scouts, Engineer, and Military Police squads, as well as combat support and combat service support elements. These systems also support units conducting vital homeland defense missions.

The ARNG supplements its marksmanship-training strategy with the Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS). The ARNG currently has over 900 systems fielded down to the company level. The LMTS is a laser-based training device that replicates the firing of the Soldier’s weapon without live ammunition. It is utilized for developing and sustaining marksmanship skills, diagnosing and correcting marksmanship problems, and assessing basic and advanced skills.

The ARNG has further developed its battle command training capability through the three designated Battle Command Training Centers (BCTCs) at Fort Leavenworth, Camp Dodge, and Fort Indiantown Gap, and the Distributed Battle Simulation Program (DBSP). BCTCs provide the backbone of the program as collective hubs in the battle command training strategy. The DBSP provides Commanders assistance from Commander’s Operational Training Assistants, TADSS facilitators, and Technical Support Teams. BCTCs and the DBSP collectively help units in the planning, preparation, and execution of simulations-based battle staff training that augments the Department of the Army-directed Warfighter Exercises and greatly enhances battle staff and unit proficiency.

In order to provide the critical culminating training event of ARFORGEN, the ARNG has implemented the XCTC. The XCTC program provides the method to certify that ARNG combat units have achieved company-level maneuver proficiency prior to mobilization. The XCTC incorporates the use of advanced live, virtual, and constructive training technologies to replicate the training experience until now only found at one of the Army’s Combat Training Centers. The centerpiece of the XCTC is the Deployable Force-on-Force Instrumented Range System (DFIRST). DFIRST utilizes training technologies that allow for full instrumentation of the training area from major combat systems down to the individual Soldier, role player, and civilian on the battlefield.

The most important part of every training exercise is the After-Action Review (AAR). By full instrumentation of the units, Soldiers, and training areas, units receive an AAR complete with two-dimensional, three-dimensional, and video playback of the actual training exercise. This allows Commanders and Soldiers to see what occurred during the training exercise from a different perspective, further enhancing the training experience.

The Army Reserve continues to leverage–to extent resources permit–TADSS into its training program. Implementation of Army Campaign Plan Decision Point 72 continues with establishment of the 75th Battle Command Training Division (BCTD) (Provisional). This division, with five battle command training brigades, employs legacy constructive simulations to provide battle command and staff training to Army Reserve and Army National Guard battalion and brigade commanders and staffs during pre-mobilization and post-mobilization. The concept plan as well as requirements for supporting Army battle command systems and simulations drivers for the 75th BCTD is pending Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) approval.

The Army Reserve continues to partner with the Program Executive Office, Simulations, Training and Instrumentation; Training and Doctrine Command agencies; and HQDA to define TADSS requirements for combat support and combat service support units. During FY07 the Army Reserve refined concepts for the integration of live, virtual, and constructive environments to train Soldiers and units. Most notably, during the Pacific Warrior exercise in July 2007, the Army Reserve attempted to integrate live and constructive environments as it trained senior battle staffs in both constructive and live environments while lower echelon units conducted platoon lanes. The distinction between live and constructive was apparent to the senior battle staff managing exercise play. The lack of key TADSS enablers was identified in concept plans (e.g., 75th BCTD, Army Reserve Operations Groups) awaiting HQDA approval. Upon approval and subsequent fielding of the required TADSS, this gap will be filled. The 75th BCTD is on the Entity-level Resolution Federation (ERF) fielding plan. The ERF provides a high-resolution (e.g., individual Soldier-level fidelity aggregated to unit resolutions) joint constructive battle staff training simulation.

The LMTS and EST 2000 remain essential elements of Army Reserve marksmanship training. LMTS procurement continues, and distribution throughout the Army Reserve force continues to increase. The LMTS has also been adapted to support convoy operations training. In either individual premarksmanship training or convoy modes, the system allows the Soldier to use an assigned weapon, as well as crew-served weapons, in a simulation/training mode. EST 2000 systems have been fielded to many Army Reserve Engineer and Military Police organizations to enable full use of its training capabilities by units with high densities of crew-served weapons their at home stations.

The Army Reserve also has a number of low-density simulators it employs to reduce expensive “live” time for unique combat service support equipment. For example, Army Reserve watercraft units train on the Maritime Integrated Training System (MITS), a bridge simulator that not only trains vessel captains but the entire crew of Army watercraft. In 2007 the Army Reserve invested in communications infrastructure so that the MITS at Mare Island, California can communicate and interact with another Army MITS at Fort Eustis, Virginia. This will provide the capability to conduct distributed multiboat collective training among all the simulators. Of note, the MITS is also used by U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, and harbor management agencies. Other simulators include locomotive simulators used by Army Reserve railroad units and a barge derrick simulator for floating watercraft maintenance units. Other simulator requirements have been and are being identified in requirements documents.

To further spread and embed the use of simulations and simulators, the Army Reserve hosted a Functional Area 57 (Simulations Operations Officer) course in Birmingham, Alabama, for 26 officers of the 4th Brigade, 75th BCTD. Conducted by HQDA cadre in August and September 2007, the course was a proof-of-principle effort to assess the viability of exporting the resident course from Fort Belvoir to Army Reserve home stations. The Army Reserve intends to continue off-site delivery to the other four brigades of the 75th Division as well as the three Operations Groups while continuing to use resident school quotas to meet formal schooling requirements. Having a qualified cadre of schooled training supporters is the foundation of the use of simulations and simulators, as well as the authoring of requirements documents conducive to the procurement of simulators and simulations to meet combat support and combat service support needs.

The Army Reserve recommendation for a low overhead driver/staff trainer for brigade-battalion combat support and combat service support Commanders was adopted as a Quick Win by the Total Army Training Capability Study (collective training). The Army is planning on procuring a solution in FY08-FY09 to allow Commanders to conduct stressful and doctrinally correct staff training at home station without the need for a major investment in facilities or support technicians.

18. Summary tables of unit readiness, shown for each State, (and for the Army Reserve), and drawn from the unit readiness rating system as required by section 1121 of ANGCRRA, including the personnel readiness rating information and the equipment readiness assessment information required by that section, together with:

a. Explanations of the information: Readiness tables are classified. This information is maintained by the Department of the Army, G-3. The data is not captured and provided by state.

b. Based on the information shown in the tables, the Secretary’s overall assessment of the deployability of units of the ARNG (and Army Reserve), including a discussion of personnel deficiencies and equipment shortfalls in accordance with section 1121: Summary tables and overall assessments are classified. This information is maintained by the Department of the Army, G-3.

19. Summary tables, shown for each State (and Army Reserve), of the results of inspections of units of the Army National Guard (and Army Reserve) by inspectors general or other commissioned officers of the Regular Army under the provisions of Section 105 of Title 32, together with explanations of the information shown in the tables, and including display of:

a. The number of such inspections;
b. Identification of the entity conducting each
inspection;
c. The number of units inspected; and
d. The overall results of such inspections, including the inspector’s determination for each inspected unit of whether the unit met deployability standards and, for those units not meeting deployability standards, the reasons for such failure and the status of corrective actions.

During FY07, Inspectors General and other commissioned officers of the Regular Army conducted 252 inspections of the ARNG, including 672 ARNG units. The bulk of these inspections (208) were executed by Regular Army officers assigned to the respective states and territories as Inspectors General. Of the remaining 44, 37 were conducted by First Army and the Department of the Army Inspector General and the remaining 7 by the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM); Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC); Communications-Electronics Command; and the U.S. Army Audit Agency. Because the inspections conducted by Inspectors General focused on findings and recommendations, the units involved in these inspections were not provided with a pass/fail rating. Results of such inspections may be requested for release through the Inspector General of the Army.

Operational Readiness Evaluation data for the Force Support Package and expanded separate brigades are unavailable, as inspections there of were eliminated as requirements in 1997. Data available under the Training Assessment Model (TAM) relates to readiness levels and is generally not available in an unclassified format. TAM data are maintained at the state level and are available upon request from state level-training readiness officials.

In accordance with AR 1-201, Army Inspection Policy, the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) conducts inspections of regional readiness commands and direct support units within requirements of the USARC Organizational Inspection Program (OIP). Per the Army Regulation, OIPs at division levels and above, mainly comprise staff inspections, staff assistance visits and Inspectors General. Staff inspections are only one aspect by which Commanding Generals can evaluate the readiness of their commands. The Inspector General conducts inspections and special assessments based on systemic issues and trends analysis with emphasis on issues that could impede the readiness of the Army Reserve.

The Chief, Army Reserve, directed the Inspector General to conduct special assessments in FY07 prompted by concerns over systemic issues. One was the Special Assessment of Property Accountability. It focused on policies and guidance for, compliance with standards of, and adherence to the Command Supply Discipline Program; the effectiveness of the reconstitution process; and the impact of stay-behind-theater-provided equipment on property accountability, with emphasis on transportation and communications equipment.
Another was the Special Assessment of the Organizational Inspection Program, which evaluated the OIP to determine if Commanders were using it to assess readiness and to reinforce goals and standards within their commands. These assessments also encompassed an annual regulatory review of compliance with and effectiveness of, the Army Voting Assistance Program, a program of special interest to the Department of the Army.

The Army Reserve is meeting regulatory requirements through a combination of Battle-Focused Readiness Reviews (BFRRs) and staff assistance visits, with the assistance visits conforming to regulatory requirements of AR 1-201. The BFRR is the tool used by major subordinate Commanders to provide the Army Reserve Commanding General a status on resources and readiness of their commands, and resolve systemic issues/trends in order to achieve continuous improvements in readiness. The Army Reserve conducted 16 BFRRs in FY07. The staff assistance visits were more oriented to a particular topic in the staff proponent’s area.

20. A listing, for each ARNG combat unit (and US Army Reserve FSP units) of the active-duty combat units (and other units) associated with that ARNG (and US Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(a) of ANGCRRA, shown by State, for each such ARNG unit (and for the US Army Reserve) by: (A) the assessment of the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements of that National Guard (and Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(b)(3) of the ANGCRRA; and (B) the results of the validation by the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the compatibility of that National Guard (or US Army Reserve) unit with active duty forces in accordance with section 1131(b)(4) of ANGCRRA:

There are no longer ground combat active or Reserve Component associations due to operational mission requirements and deployment tempo.

As FORSCOM’s executive agent, First Army and USARPAC (U.S. Army Pacific) for Pacific based Reserve Component units, executes the legislated active duty associate unit responsibilities through both their pre-mobilization and post-mobilization efforts with Reserve Component units. When Reserve Component units are mobilized they are thoroughly assessed in terms of manpower, equipment, and training initially by the appropriate chain of command, and that assessment is approved by First Army or USARPAC as part of the validation for unit deployment.
Validation of the compatibility of the Reserve Component units with the active duty forces occurs through the mobilization functions with the direct oversight of First Army, USARPAC and FORSCOM at the Mobilization Centers.

The Army’s Transformation from a division-centric to brigade-centric organization, execution of ARFORGEN, and acceleration of modularity and rebalancing efforts in the ARNG and Army Reserve, coupled with lack of available active ground combat units to conduct annual assessment of Reserve Component units, should obviate the reporting requirement stipulated in Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 10542, Army National Guard Combat Readiness Annual Report.

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21. A specification of the active-duty personnel assigned to units of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 414(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (10 USC. 261 note), shown (a) by State for the Army National Guard (and for the US Army Reserve), (b) by rank of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted members assigned, and (c) by unit or other organizational entity of assignment:

As of September 30, 2007, the Army had 3,251 Active Component Soldiers assigned to Title XI positions. In FY06, the Army began reducing authorizations in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act 2005 (Public Laws 108-767, Section 515). Army G-1, and U.S. Army Human Resources Command carefully manages the authorizations and fill of Title XI positions. The data are not captured and provided by state.