Addendum A

Sections 517 and 521 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY94 require the information in this addendum.  Section 517 requires a report relating to the implementation of the Pilot Program for Active Component Support of the Reserves, which was started under Section 414 of the NDAA for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993.  Section 521 requires a detailed presentation concerning the Army National Guard, including information relating to the implementation of the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 (title XI of Public Law 102-484, and referred in the addendum as 'ANGCRRA').  Section 521 reporting was later amended by Section 704, FY 1996 NDAA.  U.S. Army Reserve information is also presented using Section 521 reporting criteria.

Section 517 (b)(2)(A).  The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone who are serving as active-component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program); compared to the promotion rate for other officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone in the same pay grade and the same competitive category, shown for all officers of the Army.

  AC in RC Army Average**
Fiscal Year 2002
(percent)
   
Major 82.1 89.8
Lieutenant Colonel   43.5 74.5
Fiscal Year 2003
(percent) 
   
Major 87.4 95.0
Lieutenant Colonel  40.5 79.8

*Active component officers serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.
**Active component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at the time of consideration.

Section 517 (b)(2)(B). The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from below the promotion zone who are serving as active-component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared in the same manner as specified in subparagraph (A) (the paragraph above).

  AC in RC***         Army Average**** 
Fiscal Year 2002
(percent)
   
Major 3.0 5.1
Lieutenant Colonel   0 6.0
Fiscal Year 2003
(percent) 
   
Major 3.6 7.1
Lieutenant Colonel  0 6.5

*** Below-the-zone, active-component officers serving in reserve component assignments at time of consideration.
***** Below-the-zone, active-component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at the time of consideration.

Section 521(b).

1.  The number and percentage of officers with at least two years of active-duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.

a.  Army National Guard (ARNG) officers: 21,042 or 57.1 percent.

b.  U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) officers: 9,986 or 24.78 percent.

2.  The number and percentage of enlisted personnel with at least two years of active duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.

a.  ARNG enlisted: 137,428 or 43.7 percent.

b.  USAR enlisted: 35,261 or 20.55 percent.

3.  The number of officers who are graduates of one of the service academies and were released from active duty before completion of their active-duty service obligation. Of those officers:

a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

•In FY03, no officers were released to the Selected Reserve to complete their obligation.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

•In FY03, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

4.  The number of officers who were commissioned as distinguished Reserve Officers' Training Corps graduates and were released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation:

•In FY03, no distinguished ROTC graduates were released before completing their active-duty service obligation.

a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

•In FY03, no waivers for distinguished ROTC graduates were granted.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

•In FY03, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

5.  The number of officers who are graduates of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps program and who are performing their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with section 1112(b) of ANGCRRA by a combination of (A) two years of active duty, and (B) such additional period of service as is necessary to complete the remainder of such obligation served in the National Guard and, of those officers, the number for whom permission to perform their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with that section was granted during the preceding fiscal year; (and the number of officers who are graduates of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps program and who are performing their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with section 1112(b) of ANGCRRA by a combination of (A) two years of active duty, and (B) such additional period of service as is necessary to complete the remainder of such obligation served in the U.S. Army Reserve and, of those officers, the number for whom permission to perform their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with that section was granted during the preceding fiscal year).

•In FY03, a total of four ROTC graduates were released early from their active-duty obligation.  Of this number, three are completing the remainder of their obligation through service in the Army National Guard, and one officer through service in the U.S. Army Reserve.

6.  The number of officers for whom recommendations were made during the preceding fiscal year for a unit vacancy promotion to a grade above first lieutenant and, of those recommendations, the number and percentage that were concurred in by an active duty officer under section 1113(a) of ANGCRRA, shown separately for each of the three categories of officers set forth in section 1113(b) of ANGCRRA (with U.S. Army Reserve data also reported).

a. 96 USAR officers from units were recommended for unit vacancy promotion; 59 were favorably considered.

b. 1,797 ARNG officers from units were recommended for unit vacancy promotion and promoted.

7.  The number of waivers during the preceding fiscal year under section 1114(a) of ANGCRRA of any standard prescribed by the Secretary establishing a military education requirement for noncommissioned officers and the reason for each such waiver.

•In FY03, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

8.  The number and distribution by grade, shown for each state, of personnel in the initial entry training and the non-deployable personnel accounting category established under section 1115 of ANGCRRA for members of the Army National Guard who have not completed the minimum training required for deployment or who are otherwise not available for deployment.  (A narrative summary of information pertaining to the U.S. Army Reserve is also provided.)

a. In FY03, the number of ARNG non-deployable personnel was: 42,276.  The National Guard Bureau (NGB) maintains the detailed information.

b. In FY03, the total number of personnel in the Initial Entry Training (IET) and non-deployable category for the Army Reserve who have not completed the minimum training required for deployment was 16,446 (15,489 enlisted and 957 officers).  This number includes 957 officers who had not completed the Officer Basic Course; 11,600 enlisted personnel who had not completed Advance Individual Training (AIT); and 3,889 enlisted who had a reservation and were scheduled to ship (grade was not a category in ship database).  The Army Reserve makes a substantial investment in training, time, equipment and related expenses when people enter military service.  Separation before completion of an obligated period of service is wasteful because it results in loss of this investment and generates a requirement for increased accessions.  Consequently, attrition is an issue of significant concern at all levels of responsibility within the Army Reserve.  The Army Reserve identifies Soldiers exhibiting the propensity for early separation and provides counseling, retraining and rehabilitation in an attempt to retain a qualified and trained force.  Non Prior Service (NPS) enlistees in Army Reserve units normally are ordered to Initial Active Duty Training (IADT) within 270 days of enlistment.  Non Prior Service direct enlistees in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) must enter IADT within 180 days of their enlistment date.  Non Prior Service enlistees may be authorized an additional period of delay to reporting for duty as provided in AR 601-25, paragraph 3-4.  In accordance with DA Pam 611-21, Army Reserve unit commanders determine alternate MOSs for qualified enlisted Soldiers incapable of completing initial training.  An enlisted soldier who cannot satisfactorily complete the MOS training for which he was selected will be required to accept training to qualify for an alternate MOS as determined by the Army Reserve unit commander (DA Pam 611-21).

(The tracking of new Soldiers who have not completed training is done by the use of the training-pay category codes.  All Soldiers who are awaiting shipment to their Initial Active Duty for Training (IADT) are listed as Pay Category P.  Those Soldiers who have completed IADT, returned and are waiting to attend Advanced Individual Training are coded as Pay Category Q.  Those Soldiers attending training are carried in Pay Category F while at school.  Those Soldiers who are not deployable for reasons other than lack of IET are listed on the personnel databases with a code indicating the reasons for their non-deployable status.)

9.  The number of members of the Army National Guard, shown for each state, that were discharged during the previous fiscal year pursuant to section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the National Guard.  (A narrative summarizing procedures followed for discharging members of the USAR who have not completed the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months of entering the USAR also is provided.)

a. The number of ARNG Soldiers discharged during the previous fiscal year pursuant to section 11115(c)(1) of ARNGCRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the ARNG is 32 Officers and 9,444 enlisted, which includes all 54 states and territories.  The breakdown by each state is maintained by NGB.

b. Those Soldiers who have not completed the required Initial Entry Training (IET) within the first 24 months are discharged from the Army Reserve under AR 135-178, Separation of Enlisted Personnel.  Before discharge, every means available is used to ensure the Soldier has had the opportunity to be trained.  In some cases, the Soldier was unable to attend the required scheduled training through no fault of his own, and therefore would be given another opportunity to complete his training (e.g., temporary medical condition, death of an immediate family member, failure to complete high school and requiring an additional semester of summer school).  In FY04, the Army Reserve will begin implementation of a Delayed Entry Program (DEP).  The purpose of the DEP is to allow the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) to have complete ownership of new enlistees until they report to the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) for their Initial Active Duty for Training (IADT).  This has changed USARECÕs mission from solely a contract mission to a contract and ship mission.  DEP enlistees do not become members of Troop Program Units, nor are they counted within Army Reserve end strength, until they report to the MEPS to ship for their IADT.  If the DEP enlistee is discharged at any time within the DEP, the recruiter is required to recruit a new enlistee to replace the one discharged.

10.  The number of waivers, shown for each state, that were granted by the Secretary during the previous fiscal year under section 1115(c)(2) of ANGCRRA of the requirement in section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA described in paragraph (9), together with the reason for each waiver.

•In FY03, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

11.  The number of Army National Guard members, shown for each state, (and the number of U.S Army Reserve members), who were screened during the preceding fiscal year to determine whether they meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment and, of those members: (A) the number and percentage who did not meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment; and (B) the number and percentage who were transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).

a. Screened during the preceding fiscal year to determine whether they meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment:

•In FY03, approximately 78,791 ARNG Soldiers underwent a physical.  Of these personnel, 3,076, or 3.9 percent, did not meet the minimum physical profile standards required for deployment.

•In FY03, approximately 33,145 USAR Soldiers underwent a retention physical.  Of these, 7,405 were identified for review due to a profile-limiting condition or failure to meet retention standards.

b. The number and percentage that were transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8).

•In FY03, 823 members of the ARNG were transferred from a deployable to a non-deployable status.

12.  The number of members, and the percentage of the total membership, of the Army National Guard, shown for each state, who underwent a medical screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

•Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), Feb 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

13.  The number of members, and the percentage of the total membership, of the Army National Guard, shown for each state, who underwent a dental screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

•Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), Feb 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

14.  The number of members, and the percentage of the total membership, of the Army National Guard, shown for each state, over the age of 40 who underwent a full physical examination during the previous fiscal year for purposes of section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

•Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), Feb 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

15.  The number of units of the Army National Guard that are scheduled for early deployment in the event of a mobilization and, of those units, the number that are dentally ready for deployment in accordance with section 1118 of ANGCRRA.

•Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), Feb 10, 1996, repealed Section 1118 of ANGCRRA.

16.  The estimated post-mobilization training time for each Army National Guard combat unit (and U.S. Army Reserve FSP unit), and a description, displayed in broad categories and by state, of what training would need to be accomplished for Army National Guard combat units (and U.S. Army Reserve FSP units) in a post-mobilization period for purposes of section 1119 of ANGCRRA.

a. Estimated time for post-mobilization training is reported through the Unit Status Report, is classified, and is maintained by the Department of the Army, G-3, Force Readiness Division.

b. Information on the type of training required by units during post- mobilization is maintained by the Continental United States Armies (CONUSAs).

c. Post-mobilization training for Enhanced Separate Brigades (ESB) can be categorized as maneuver, attack, defend, command and control, gunnery, NBC defense and sustainment.

d. Post-mobilization training for FSP units is principally common-task testing, NBC defense, force protection, sustainment, command and control, weapons qualification and tactical communications training.  Virtually all units also require branch-specific technical training to meet deployment standards.  Five additional days are required to conduct convoy lane training (includes live-fire and immediate-action drill training).

17.  A description of the measures taken during the preceding fiscal year to comply with the requirement in section 1120 of ANGCRRA to expand the use of simulations, simulators, and advanced training devices and technologies for members and units of the Army National Guard (and the U.S. Army Reserve).

The Army National Guard (ARNG) made significant progress in the use of Training Aids, Devices, Simulators and Simulations (TADSS) during the preceding fiscal year.  ARNG teamed with the Training and Doctrine CommandÕs Systems Manager Combined Arms Tactical Trainer in developing a Maneuver Gated Training Strategy that incorporates the use of maneuver simulators into training plans, increasing unit proficiency.

Currently, ARNG is fielding the Abrams Full-Crew Interactive Simulator Trainer (A-FIST XXI) to M1A1 Abrams units.  The A-FIST XXI program is co-managed by the National Guard Bureau and the product manager (PM), Ground Combat Tactical Trainers within the Program Executive Office-Simulations, Training and Instrumentation (PEO-STRI).  The system was approved by the Commanding General, United States Armor Center in March 2003 as a precision-gunnery trainer for the ARNG.  A-FIST XXI allows Soldiers to train on their assigned combat vehicles at home station, virtually replicating the demanding doctrinal Tank Table Standards of a live range.  The Advanced Bradley Full-Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer (AB-FIST) will complement the Abrams trainers.  Following a rigorous Limited User Test by the Infantry School and the Army Research Institute, AB-FIST was approved in October 2003 by the Commanding General, United States Infantry School as a mobile training device that can be used for Bradley crew training, in addition to the Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer, to meet established live-fire prerequisites as outlined in DA PAM 350-38.  In addition, ARNG is rehosting legacy Simulations Network (SIMNET) assets.  The SIMNET Upgrades Program will augment SIMNET M1A1 and M2A2 modules with a new, PC-based visual system and host computer, a sound system,and input/output linkages.  These modules will be collocated in tank and mechanized infantry platoon sets with upgraded after action review stations.

Janus Battle Staff Trainers are being updated to the Army's approved software solution.  Hardware procurement that will support One Semi-Automated Forces (OneSAF) Future Combat System (FCS) fielding in a seamless manner is being planned and executed.  The Engagement Skills Trainer (EST 2000) is the ArmyÕs approved collective marksmanship training device in FY04.  It primarily is used to train and evaluate individual marksmanship for initial-entry Soldiers at the Army training centers.  EST 2000 also is used to provide unit collective-gunnery and tactical training for dismounted infantry, special operations forces, scouts, engineers, military police squads, and combat support and combat service support elements.  These systems also support units conducting the vital homeland-defense and airport-security missions assigned to the ARNG.

In addition to the EST 2000 collective marksmanship trainer, the ARNG developed and fielded the Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS) with the Beamhit Corporation.  ARNG began fielding the LMTS in 2000.  We currently have more than 700 systems fielded, down to the company level.  LMTS is a laser-based training device that replicates the firing of the SoldierÕs weapon without live ammunition.  Optimally, it is used to reduce the number of live rounds used during initial, remedial and sustainment training.  LMTS is utilized for developing and sustaining marksmanship skills, diagnosing and correcting marksmanship problems, and assessing basic and advanced skills.  In August 2003, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army approved LMTS as an Army training device to be used by units as a component of their basic, rifle-marksmanship training program.

ARNG also has formed a unique partnership with PEO-STRI in the development, verification, validation and accreditation of systems and system upgrades.  Through the ARNG Distributed Battle Simulation Program, civilian infrastructure commanders receive assistance from ÒgraybeardÓ mentors, TADSS facilitators, and Janus Technical Team Exercise Support in the planning, preparation and execution of simulations-based training that augments the support provided by Training Support XXI Soldiers and greatly enhances unit proficiency and readiness.

The U.S. Army Reserve continues to focus on integrating simulations, simulators and TADSS into training plans.  Army Reserve units participate in Corps Warfighter and Battle Command Staff Training exercises to enhance training readiness.  The Reserve remains an active member of the Army's simulation community by contributing to the Live, Virtual, Constructive (LVC) Training Environment Periodic Review and the LVC Integration Concept Team.  The Army Reserve continues to press PEO-STRI and the National Simulation Center regarding the development of combat support and combat service support functionality within the Army Constructive Training Federation to ensure training capabilities for the entire spectrum.  The Army Reserve has also identified the need for greater digital equipment fielding for the reserve components.  Current and Future forces need digital capability to train effectively in the contemporary operating environment (COE) and the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) environment of Army capabilities.  The Army Reserve continues to improve training capabilities with the Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS) to enhance Army Reserve Soldiers' ability to achieve and maintain marksmanship skills; the Reserve has directly supported the Infantry, Military Police and Transportation schools in the development of devices and simulator-based training, ranging from basic combat to advanced tactical marksmanship involving firing from moving vehicles.  The Army Reserve has begun fielding the LMTS as well as the Engagement Skills Trainer 2000.  The Army Reserve continues to investigate alternative training mechanisms to simulate urban terrain and potential terrorist activities, including the Virtual Emergency Response Training System (VERTS), which replicates the Fort Dix installation, an Army power projection platform.  The Army Reserve continues to develop the Simulations Operations functional area assessment to ensure that capabilities exist to support the DOD Training Transformation goal of integrated live, virtual and constructive training in a joint environment.

18.  Summary tables of unit readiness, shown for each state, (and for the U.S. Army Reserve), and drawn from the unit readiness rating system as required by section 1121 of ANGCRRA, including the personnel readiness rating information and the equipment readiness assessment information required by that section, together with:

a. Explanations of the information. Readiness tables are classified.  This information is maintained by the Department of the Army, G-3.

b. Based on the information shown in the tables, the Secretary's overall assessment of the deployability of units of the Army National Guard (and U.S. Army Reserve), including a discussion of personnel deficiencies and equipment shortfalls in accordance with such section 1121:

•Summary tables and overall assessments are classified.  Department of the Army, G-3, maintains this information.

19.  Summary tables, shown for each state (and the U.S. Army Reserve), of the results of inspections of units of the Army National Guard (and Army Reserve) by inspectors general or other commissioned officers of the Regular Army under the provisions of section 105 of title 32, together with explanations of the information shown in the tables, and including display of:

a. The number of such inspections;

b. Identification of the entity conducting each inspection;

c. The number of units inspected; and

d. The overall results of such inspections, including the inspector's determination for each inspected unit of whether the unit met deployability standards and, for those units not meeting deployability standards, the reasons for such failure and the status of corrective actions. (For purposes of this report, data for Operational Readiness Evaluations will be provided on ESB and FSP units of the ARNG and for FSP units of the USAR.  Training Assessment Model data will be provided to meet this reporting requirement for all other units of the ARNG and USAR.  Data on ARNG units will be reported by State and on USAR units by RRC/DRU.)

•During FY03, ARNG state inspectors general conducted approximately 586 extensive inspections throughout the United States, visiting 970 separate units.  Because IG inspections focus on findings and recommendations, the units involved in these inspections were not provided with a pass/fail rating.  Results of inspections conducted by inspectors general may be requested for release through The Inspector General of the Army.  Operational Readiness Evaluation Data for FSP and ESBs is unavailable because these inspections were eliminated as requirements in 1997.  Data available under the Training Assessment Model (TAM) relates to readiness levels and is generally not available in an unclassified format.  TAM data is maintained at the state level and is available upon request from state training readiness officials.

•In accordance with AR 1-201, the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) conducts inspections of RRCs/DSUs within the USARC Organizational Inspection Program (OIP).  USARC maintains the results of all OIPs.  The OIP focuses on findings and recommendations and the units do not receive pass/fail ratings.  During FY03, six OIPs were scheduled, but only two were actually conducted.  The four units not inspected were not available due to mobilizations.  U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) maintains the results of the CONUSA inspections and Training Assessment Models (TAMs), and holds the data for reserve component FSP unit inspections.

•Summary tables depicting CONUSA inspection numbers by state for the ARNG and by Regional Readiness Command for USAR units are available from DCSOPS, FORSCOM.

20.  A listing, for each Army National Guard combat unit (and U.S. Army Reserve FSP units) of the active-duty combat units (and other units) associated with that Army National Guard (and U.S. Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(a) of ANGCRRA, shown by State, for each such Army National Guard unit (and for the U.S. Army Reserve) by: (A) the assessment of the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements of that National Guard (and Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(b)(3) of the ANGCRRA; and (B) the results of the validation by the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the compatibility of that National Guard (or U.S. Army Reserve) unit with active duty forces in accordance with section 1131(b)(4) of ANGCRRA.

  • The listing is contained in FORSCOM Regulation 350-4.

a. Detailed assessments of specific RC units are maintained at the two numbered Armies in the continental United States (CONUS) and three CONUS-based corps. 

For Army National Guard divisions and ESBs:

•Manpower.  Several ESBs have shortages in enlisted personnel and junior officers.  Duty Military Occupational Specialty Qualification (DMOSQ) is a training challenge because military occupational specialties (MOS) require extensive training, during a limited training window, in different schools that are often taught simultaneously.  Within the ESBs, Full Time Support (FTS) continues to be a challenge, currently filled at approximately 55 percent of requirement.  In ARNG divisions, recent force-structure authorization increases have caused near-term shortfalls in fill percentages.

•Equipment.  Lack of modernized equipment continues to hamper the ESBs.  Shortages in chemical defense equipment and night vision devices limit the full range of capabilities for training of the ESBs.  The ESBs continue to receive the bulk of any new equipment fielded to the ARNG.

•Training.  Adequate training resources in FY03 enabled ESBs to sustain platoon, pre-mobilization training proficiency.  Distances to crew-served weapons ranges and the availability of adequate maneuver areas continue to challenge most units.  Current simulations do not provide a theater-level simulation system, compatible with current simulation suites that replicate a major-theater-of-war scenario. 

For ARNG (and Army Reserve) Force Support Package (FSP) Units:

•Manpower.  Shortfalls in FTS manning limit operations and training management.  DMOSQ is impacted by limited school spaces for low-density MOSs.  Some MOSs require extensive training (11B, 19K, 13B, 13F, 31 and 63H) and sequential schools demand a Soldier's absence from his civilian employment for extended periods.

•Equipment.  Reserve component units do not have the same level of modernization as their active component counterparts in all cases.  This can limit interoperability of combat, combat support and combat service support forces and create command-and-control problems, especially during training.  Several FSP units will require that shortfalls in force modernization equipment be addressed at the mobilization station.  The following are examples of current and projected modernization efforts in the RC: SINCGARS radios, HMMWVs, generators, FMTVs, Javelin and night vision devices.

•Training.  Some Equipment Readiness Code-A (ERC-A) equipment shortages inhibit effective training.  Additionally, significant shortages of ERC-B and ERC-C equipment hamper collective training.  Army Reserve and National Guard units often have significantly older equipment on which to train.  Units will require additional training time after mobilization to achieve proficiency on collective tasks, especially if modernized equipment is provided after mobilization.  Limited funds and/or limited days available for training generally preclude some Soldiers from attending either Annual Training or DMOSQ schools.  Distance to training areas and facilities further erode available training time.

b. The results of the validations by the commander are maintained by the Department of the Army, G-3.  

For ARNG divisions, ESBs and ARNG (and Army Reserve) FSP Units:

•Modernized equipment is the foremost compatibility issue.  As Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment in units are updated and unit reorganization continues, the compatibility issue will improve.  Additionally, the truck fleet remains a major disparity, because the Army Reserve has been substituting 1980Õs vintage 5 Ton trucks for 1960 series 2-1/2 Ton Cargo trucks, which the AC has already replaced with the Light and Medium Family of Tactical Vehicles (LMTV and FMTV).

•Lack of force modernization equipment in the Army Reserve and National Guard affects compatibility the most.  Nonstandard software systems in these units impact both the Standard Installation Division Personnel System and the Unit Level Logistics System.  System compatibility between components is often a challenge.  Until reserve component units are modernized and supported at the same level as AC units, most FSP units will not be fully compatible with the active component until after mobilization.  Decreased mobilization-to-deployment and/or employment timelines make it imperative that reserve component units be modernized and equipped at the same level as the active component.  The National Guard/Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA) funding allows the Army Reserve to procure modernization equipment that the Army does not provide.  This will reduce the disparity in AC/RC compatibility, but is not sufficient to bring the components to full compatibility.

21.  A specification of the active-duty personnel assigned to units of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 414(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (10 USC. 261 note), shown (A) by State for the Army National Guard (and for the U.S. Army Reserve), (B) by rank of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted members assigned, and (C) by unit or other organizational entity of assignment.

Title XI (FY 03) Authorizations

 

OFF

ENL

WO

TOTAL

PERSCOM

2

5

0

7

USAR

56

204

0

260

TRADOC

122

243

0

365

FORSCOM

82

49

9

140

GFR

1509

2471

152

4132

USARPAC

33

62

1

96

TOTAL

1804

3034

162

5000

As of 30 Sep 2003, the Army had 4,750 active component Soldiers assigned to Title XI positions.  The Army goal is to fill 100 percent of the 5,000 personnel authorized for the AC/RC Program.  Although constrained by ongoing support to the Global War on Terrorism, the active Army is maintaining AC/RC program strength and plans to achieve 100 percent fill by the end of FY04.  U.S. Army Human Resources Command carefully tracks fill of Title XI positions in both the Officer Distribution Division and Enlisted Distribution Division.

 

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