Chapter V: Force Development

In fiscal year 1972 the Army experienced the substantial degree of turbulence that might be expected to accompany withdrawal from war, reduction in strength, transition to volunteer status, and over-all fiscal constraint. Army personnel strength in Vietnam was reduced to 31,900 during the year, with about 166,000 troops redeployed. In the meanwhile, Congress reduced over-all Army man-year (a unit of personnel work equivalent to that expended in one year by one man) authorizations, necessitating a number of early release measures. Accelerated reductions coupled with dwindling use of the draft produced a fiscal year 1972 end strength of 811,000, some 37,000 below programed strength and a net reduction of 313,000 for the year.

The shortfall became one of quality as well as quantity. A trained strength shortage of some 37,000 existed by June 1972. Adverse effect upon readiness was minimized by delaying activations of selected units returning from Vietnam and by not filling fifteen battalions of divisions stationed in the continental United States.

The continued reduction in the active Army structure placed increased reliance upon the Reserve Components in the national security picture. Mission assignments and Reserve Component readiness objectives were adjusted accordingly. The Reserve Components also experienced problems in obtaining personnel under a volunteer force environment and the diminishing threat of the draft. Reserve paid drill strength at the end of the fiscal year was about 623,000 of the 660,000 mandated strength level.

Although there was still some uncertainty at year's end that the Army would meet the zero-draft goal by June 1973-target date for achieving an all-volunteer force-successes late in the 1972 fiscal year evoked optimism at the highest levels. Programs under way and being developed reflected a prudent use of resources and a wide range of options to deal with forward deployments and minor contingencies.

The basic objective of Army force development is to provide balanced, modern, and ready forces capable of conducting sustained combat to execute assigned missions anywhere in the world. In its examination of Army forces, the Congress has given close attention to "combat to support distribution."

Combat to support distribution is a statistical element of force structuring, an important analytical tool, yet not of itself a decisive factor.

Although there is great concern that manpower distribution reflect the highest level of combat capability, the Army focuses upon combat capability rather than manpower distribution as the real measure of force effectiveness.

The Army is a highly mechanized and sophisticated force with aviation, missiles, artillery, tanks, communications, surveillance, and a variety of other kinds of modern hardware. Even as these weapons and other types of systems and equipment have created a greater capability, to destroy an enemy than has existed at any previous time in the history of land warfare, they have also created increased support requirements. Although the total manpower associated with an Army division has remained fairly constant, support-type functions have expanded as combat capability has improved. Technological advances have made it possible for fewer troops to deliver more destructive fire power with less exposure and smaller losses. A gradual migration from combat to support functions is in large degree a product of technology. In other words, better weapons, medical care, protective clothing, food, and the like have fortified morale and made the soldier more combat effective. The balance between combat and support distribution is a changing one; the Army's obligation is to refine it and to maintain, on a regular basis, an optimum organization that will insure a combat effective force within available resources. This section of the report reviews some of the elements that go into the equation.

In June 1970 the Army initiated a program to develop an improved command and control capability through an Integrated Battlefield Control System (IBCS) concept. The objective is to provide a fully integrated tactical command and control system that links with similar systems of the other military services, one that the Army may use in the field in the post-1980 period. Combat effectiveness is expected to be improved by advances in doctrine, organization, procedures, and communications with the assistance of automatic data processing techniques and equipment.

To control the Army's efforts, the departmental staff developed an Army Tactical Command and Control Master Plan; that part dealing with division-level command and control was published in August 1971. Other parts treating of echelons above the division level and the connections between strategic and tactical command and control systems will be published early in 1974.

Under the direction of the project manager for Army Tactical Data Systems (ARTADS) the Tactical Fire Direction System (TACFIRE), Tactical Operation System (TOS), Air Defense Command and Control

System (Missile Minder), and Air Traffic Management Automated Center (ATMAC) all moved forward during the year. TACFIRE research and development testing was completed, and in April 1972 engineering and service testing was begun. The materiel need for the TOS was approved and the Congress approved the purchase of a militarized testbed. The AN/TSQ-73 Missile Minder proceeded into research and development testing, and the materiel need for the ATMAC was approved.

The Army has long recognized the combat advantage of selectively disrupting or denying enemy forces use of their electrical communications and other electronic systems. In 1967 a study was initiated to emphasize and achieve full integration of all aspects of electronic warfare (EW) into field army combat operations. The product of the study, a report entitled Electronic Warfare-1975 (EW-75), was the most comprehensive effort ever conducted to address measures that would be required for the Army to operate in a hostile EW environment and conduct EW operations against a modern enemy force.

The EW-75 findings and recommendations were reviewed by the Army Electronic Warfare Board (AEWB) in January 1971, following which development of an EW-75 Master Implementation Plan (MIP) was undertaken. The EW-75 study recommendations crossed virtually all major command and staff lines of responsibility and consequently, the MIP was a major effort.

The EW-75 MIP was in final stages of preparation in February 1972 when a new National Security Council directive (NSCID #6) made sweeping changes in organizational and operational responsibilities for signals intelligence (SIGINT) and certain electronic warfare activities. As a result an EW Review Group was established and charged to resolve areas of conflict between the EW-75 plan and NSCID #6. The impact of this latter directive of the National Security Council was sufficient to cause termination of EW-75 MIP actions and reorientation of study efforts. As a direct result, a new study, Concept for SIGINT and ECM (electronic countermeasures) Support to the Field Army (1976-1986), was launched. The approved concept established, for the first time, operational and organizational goals for Army tactical signal intelligence and electronic warfare support and provided the basis for development of an integrated force structure for U.S. Army Security Agency (USASA) tactical support units. At the close of this report period, work continued on resolving and aligning force structure and operational interface details, but the major milestone of establishing a basic tactical SIGINT and ECM support concept to support future force development had been achieved.

in an era of inflation and cost overruns prompted the Department of Defense to emphasize the "fly before you buy" policy, whose objective is to insure that a new system is thoroughly tested before large sums of money are committed to it. Throughout 1971 the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in a series of policy memoranda to the services, defined operational test and evaluation to prove a system's military worth, directed that it be performed by an agency separate and distinct from the developing command, and directed that there be an operational test and evaluation office, with a clear identification, to provide staff assistance and a headquarters focal point for the organizational test and evaluation agency.

Tests are begun early in the development process and continue throughout the life of a new system. Assessments are made by operational personnel-soldiers of the type and with qualifications similar to, those who will use the system-in a simulated combat environment. The purpose is to determine, at major decision points in the developmental and acquisition processes, the military utility of a system, its expected operational effectiveness, its operational suitability, the need for modification, if any, and the doctrine and tactics for system deployment.

The Army responded to the Department of Defense directives by designating the Combat Developments Command as the Army's independent operational test and evaluation agency; the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development was identified as the staff element with a clear operational test and evaluation function. Work was begun on changing acquisition procedures to conform to the new direction. Existing plans and projects were reviewed to insure that the new procedures were phased into their operational development and testing as soon as possible.

Development and testing of divisional organization is a continuing activity in military establishments, and there were advances in this field during the year. Activity centered upon the 1st Cavalry Division, a unit that has been used over the course of several generations to test advanced organizational structures. A horse cavalry division up to the 1940s,-it was changed to the infantry configuration for service in World War II and later Korea; again in 1965 the division pioneered the airmobile concept and served in Vietnam in that configuration. On May 5, 1971, the division was reorganized at Fort Hood, Texas, with the designation of 1st Cavalry Division (TRICAP). The "triple capable" organization is an experimental division composed of an armored brigade, an airmobile brigade, an air cavalry combat brigade, and a division base. Two programs were established to evaluate the division concept and the air cavalry combat brigade; on-the-scene testing is being conducted under the Modern Army Selected Systems Test, Evaluation,

and Review (MASSTER). The purpose is to adapt and apply highly successful airmobility experience in Vietnam to the more sophisticated battlefield environments that will evolve in the future.

In August 1971, the Air Cavalry Combat Brigade test was launched with a test of an Air Cavalry Attack Platoon (ACCB 1). The operational use, capability, and effectiveness of the platoon in a continuous day and night operational environment was tested, with emphasis on the operational mix of the platoon, but with attention also being given to organization, tactics, command and control, and logistical requirements and techniques. In February 1972, the attack helicopter squadron was evaluated, emphasizing squadron and troop organization, as well as command and control, intelligence, logistics, and use of airmobile infantry. Doctrine, tactics, and techniques were examined, including the ability of the squadron to mass forces, sustain an attack, and evade or suppress air defense artillery weapons.

In a larger context of the TRICAP test program, the operational effectiveness of variously tailored company teams comprising a battalion task force was investigated; employment of air cavalry and attack helicopters with company-sized armor, mechanized, and airmobile elements was emphasized, assuming continuous day and night operations in a European mid-intensity warfare environment.

Based upon these tests and related studies and war games, the TRICAP division evaluation is scheduled to be completed in fiscal year 1973. Tests of an entire attack helicopter squadron and of the air cavalry attack platoon will be continued during the coming two fiscal years.

With the zero-draft target date (July 1, 1973) rapidly approaching, the Army prosecuted the volunteer force effort through fiscal year 1972 in numerous actions designed to strengthen professionalism, enhance Army life, and improve the accession system. In August 1971, the Chief of Staff approved a totally new and comprehensive master program for the Modern Volunteer Army, reaffirming the Army's commitment, establishing objectives, and outlining approaches and attitudes in the effort to achieve a competent fighting force that would attract qualified volunteers.

Under the continuing guidance of the Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army (SAMVA), the Army sought new ways to strengthen professionalism by building incentives to service. Efforts were expanded to return soldiers to their assigned military duties by providing civilian labor to handle nonmilitary duties. A Combat Arms Training Board was formed to revitalize training. A Noncommissioned Officer

Education System was developed to give attention to the professional education of noncommissioned officers at key stages in their advancement. There were improvements in basic Army leadership: improved command stability, upgraded leadership instruction, and changes in the personnel management system through which officers could be identified, developed, and utilized within command and specialty fields that offered opportunities for advancement comparable to general service assignments. In January of 1972 the Chief of Staff stressed once again the importance of military professionalism.

Significant advances were made in actions to remove from Army life those sources of dissatisfaction that were deterrents to service. The 1972 budget included substantial increases in family housing construction, modernization, furniture, and appliances. Actions were under way to improve health care for soldiers and dependents, to make retail facilities more customer oriented, and to improve and consolidate reception and in-out processing services. Special services programs were also being expanded to provide a full range of activities in comprehensive, modern facilities serviced by conveniently scheduled transportation.

Programs were being implemented which would ultimately provide soldiers with a standard of living relatively comparable to that available to young people in other careers. Barracks improvements were almost completed by year's end at Fort Benning, Georgia, and Fort Carson, Colorado, and were under way at more than thirty installations around the world. Almost 370,000 items of new barracks furniture had been delivered. A comprehensive Army Housing Program was approved to modernize troop living quarters, with partitioning for permanent barracks and replacement of temporary buildings over a five-year period. New barracks designs were approved in which, clustered around a small lounge, are four or eight 270-square foot sleeping rooms plus bath, to be occupied by one, two, or three enlisted personnel, depending upon grade.

Congress responded favorably to the need for substantial pay increases for enlisted personnel with less than two years of service. In September 1971, the President signed into law a bill doubling, for example, the entry level basic pay of the private (E-1) effective November 14, 1971. Now that a competitive level had been reached, emphasis turned to measures to attract and retain service members with special qualifications and skills. In June 1972, the Department of Defense took the first step, authorizing the Army to pay a $1,500 bonus for a four-year combat arms enlistment.

Project VOLAR, the Modern Volunteer Army field experiment, was expanded on July 1, 1971, from four to thirteen installations in the United States and from one to three oversea commands. As in fiscal

year 1971, VOLAR was to test and develop, under local conditions, certain ideas and approaches that would strengthen professionalism and improve Army life, and to concentrate resources in areas critical to combat arms accession and retention. Although complete evaluation was not possible by year's end, early indications showed favorable acceptance and response, positive advances in attitude toward the Army and in re-enlistment intention, and high potential for continuing improvement.

To achieve a higher level of new enlistees and re-enlistees, the main effort was centered upon strengthening professionalism and enhancing Army life. To capitalize on improvements in these areas and to insure the proper mix of the quality and kind of volunteers the Army mission requires, the accession system was being modernized. As the Modern Volunteer Army Program was getting under way, enlistments in infantry, armor, and field artillery were averaging 300 a month. After extensive printed advertising, substantial increases in the recruiter force and in recruiting stations, and initiation of new and attractive enlistment options, combat arms enlistments jumped to almost 39,000 in fiscal year 1972 compared with less than 10,000 in the previous year. Overall male enlistments and the 'number of true volunteers jumped as well. Yet these successes were still short of requirements.

Opportunities for women in the Army received increased attention in fiscal year 1972. Military occupational specialties for female personnel were expanded, and the Reserve Components took steps to increase female participation in their troop unit programs.

Reserve Component manning continued to receive Department of the Army attention during the year. Under active Army and Reserve Component recruiting programs, career counselors were placed at thirty-two continental U.S. installations and one in Hawaii. Through their efforts, 29,000 individuals were assigned to Reserve Component units. In January 1972, three-year Regular Army enlisted personnel were offered discharges up to twelve months ahead of schedule if they would join a Reserve Component.

As the year ended the Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army had completed the principal tasks assigned to him by the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff. Although all Modern Volunteer Army objectives had not been achieved, major steps had been taken to reduce the Army's reliance on the draft, and it became appropriate to move development and implementation into the normal structure of the departmental staff. Thus the central responsibility for the MVA program was assigned to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, and the Office of the Special Assistant for the Modern Volunteer Army was terminated on June 30, 1972.

The Army's trained strength at the end of fiscal year 1972 fell 36,300 short of the 774,600 target figure, although it varied during the year from a 28,200 overstrength to a 36,800 understrength. The central reason for the large terminal deficit was a congressionally directed manpower cut that required a 50,000 man-year reduction during the last half of the fiscal year.

In August 1971 the Commanding General of the Continental Army Command, at the request of the Chief of Staff, established a Board for Dynamic Training to link combat arms training managers to the Army's training establishment. The Chief of Staff responded to a board recommendation by establishing the U.S. Army Combat Arms Training Board (CATB) on December 17, 1971, to stimulate the development and dissemination to combat arms units of improved techniques; expedite the development of information channels between combat arms training managers and service schools; publish and disseminate informal training literature on promising techniques; monitor combat arms schools' instructional material tailored to unit needs; determine training device requirements; monitor and sponsor research studies and tests to improve training; and expedite and monitor the development of improved military occupational specialty tests in selected subject areas.

The Army has a Race Relations Education Program that is designed to develop in all personnel an understanding of the basic factors in race relations, the causes of racial tension, and ways to foster racial harmony. Race relations instruction is given in basic training, in the service school establishment, in unit instructional programs, and in orientations for leaders at all levels. (See Chapter 6 for additional material on race relations.)

In basic training and in the service schools, race relations is a specified subject, normally presented in a four-hour block. In recent months this education has been emphasized in the service schools, especially at the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College. It is intended that every unit in the Army have a continuing race relations education program using curricula and materials developed by the Defense Race Relations Institute. It is an Army goal to have instructor teams-one officer and one NCO of majority and minority representation-trained by the institute, in every brigade or equivalent sized unit in the Army. A Senior Commanders Orientation Course is conducted at Fort Knox, Kentucky, for battalion and brigade commanders, and orientation packages are being developed for field and company grade officers and noncommissioned officers for distribution in January 1973.

three-level progressive program for the professional development of career NCO's-basic, advanced, and senior. It is patterned after officer career development training and its objectives are to increase the quality of the noncommissioned officer corps, provide enlisted personnel with opportunities for progressive development, enhance career attractiveness, and provide the Army with highly trained NCO's to fill positions of increased responsibility. Selected basic courses were operating in fiscal year 1972, and advanced level courses were started in the last half of the year; the senior level course will begin in January 1973.

The Army's Reserve Officer Training (ROTC) Program has emerged from a period of disfavor, occasioned by the Vietnam War and antimilitary sentiment, as a stronger and more viable program. The attention focused upon ROTC led students, faculties, college administrations, and the public to assess the importance of the college-based program to the Army and the nation. There was a drop in anti-ROTC incidents of about 30 percent in fiscal year 1972 over the previous year, and no institution that hosts Senior ROTC requested disestablishment in the reporting period. Indeed, nine new units were established, bringing the total to 294, the highest number of units since ROTC was established in 1916.

ROTC enrollments dropped 32 percent in the year, a decrease attributable in large measure to the conversion of training from mandatory to voluntary status at sixteen institutions. These conversions have been taking place at a fairly steady rate for several years as a part of an evolution in ROTC to meet changes in modern education; the unpopularity of the Vietnam War was also a, contributing factor. Excellent legislative support in doubling subsistence and increasing scholarships will help to reverse the enrollment trend. The results of minority recruiting were particularly encouraging. From the 1970-71 to the 1971-72 school year, black participation in ROTC increased from 7.7 to 10.8 percent. This compares quite favorably with the 6.7 percent of blacks in the American college population and the 11.2 percent in the national population.

In March 1972 it was decided to enroll women in the senior program on a test basis at ten ROTC institutions. Field reports indicate that the program is being well received.

Officer production from ROTC met the active Army's requirements during fiscal year 1972, and projections indicate that this will continue.

In sum, there is growing optimism over the ROTC program after a difficult period, and a general conviction that ROTC will continue to provide the high caliber officers needed to lead the Army's volunteer soldiers both in the Reserve forces and in the active Army.

The Office of the Project Manager for Reorganization was established on April 24, 1973 in the Office of the Chief of Staff to manage a series of plans for major reorganization and realignment actions to modernize, reorient, and streamline the Army's organization within the continental United States. Although improved efficiency was the main purpose of the realignments, the effort was designed to improve readiness, training, the materiel and equipment acquisition process, and the quality and responsiveness of management.

In 1969 the Army launched an Equipment Survey Program to provide site reviews of equipment authorizations of active Army Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA) units. The primary objectives are to insure that equipment authorizations are fully justified by mission requirements, that excess equipment is identified and returned to the supply system, and that obsolete items are replaced. Trial surveys were conducted in 1970 to refine methodology, and as fiscal year 1972 opened the program was implemented worldwide. Installation commanders were given the opportunity to conduct surveys to correct their own authorization documents. In the light of the acquisition costs of equipment authorizations that were changed by this program as of July 1, 1972, over $730 million worth of changes had been made and a net reduction of $180 million in authorizations had been achieved. In fiscal year 1973 major command teams will begin to verify installation surveys, and the departmental team will survey field operating agencies of the headquarters staff.

The Army's authorization document system (TAADS) is under constant review and evolution. Generally, the system is designed to consolidate and computerize resource management information to include personnel and equipment requirements. It serves for both the active Army and Reserve Component organizations. Development of a new system called Vertical TAADS, which will expedite document processing, continued during fiscal year 1972 under the proponency of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development. Automatic data processing development is being handled by the U.S. Army Computer Systems Command and the U.S. Army Management Systems Support Agency.

In the area of Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE), major emphasis was placed during the year on completion of the airborne division TOE and continuing development of nondivisional tables. Corps and field army headquarters TOE were completed. The H-series is presently being used by major commands to prepare authorization documents; in fiscal year 1972, worldwide unit conversion to the H-series was initiated.

On July 15, 1969, the Secretary of the Array issued a charter for a surveillance, target acquisition, and night observation (STANO) systems manager to co-ordinate all Army battlefield surveillance and reconnaissance activities. As part of the STANO program, a Modern Army Selected Systems Test, Evaluation and Review (MASSTER) facility was organized. In February 1971 the scope of the system manager's responsibility was expanded to embrace STANO, the Integrated Battlefield Control System, the triple capability (TRICAP) project, and MASSTER. The over-all management framework was designated the Modern Army Selected Systems (MASS) Management Structure. The STANO system manager was transferred from the Office of the Chief of Staff and assigned to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development as Director of Doctrine, Evaluation and Command Systems. The directorate manages MASS activities and the functions of Army doctrine, test and evaluation, electronic warfare, and tactical communications; the MASS activities include STANO, tactical command and control systems, and test priorities and scheduling. STANO management capabilities within the major staff agencies and commands now provide much of the continuing direction, the lack of which initially required a STANO system manager.

Since early 1969, when an over-all reassessment of ballistic missile defense was conducted with the purpose of providing a modified, phased deployment concept with multiple objectives, an annual review of the Safeguard System has been taking place.

Under the new approach for such measured deployment, this review of the Safeguard program would gauge the need for its continuation or expansion, depending upon the threat, technical system advancements, and progress in reaching a Strategic Arms Limitation agreement, so as to "insure that we are doing as much as necessary but no more than required by the threat existing at that time."

In February, 1972, following the third annual review, the Secretary of Defense presented the principal findings concerning the strategic threat and the technical progress of the Safeguard program. He concluded that the Soviet threat had continued to evolve, both numerically and technologically, over the past three years; the Soviets had initiated construction of new silo designs which implied that new or modified missiles might be deployed; and missile launching submarine production continued at a high rate, indicating that the Soviet Union could achieve parity with the United States by the end of 1973. Development of a new long-range missile was also proceeding.

Parallel to this, the Peoples Republic of China continued to develop its nuclear capabilities, and there was evidence that it had flight-tested

a possible intercontinental ballistic missile in 1971 and could have a small operational force as early as 1975.

Progress in development of the Safeguard System during the year was exceptional; no technical problem affected a decision to proceed with deployment. The two-phase system test program began at Meck Island in the spring of 1970, and as of June 30, 1972, 28 tests had been conducted; of these, 24 were successful, 2 partially successful, and 2 unsuccessful.

The first phase of the system test program comprised 16 tests and was completed in the fall of 1971. This phase verified basic system design concepts and demonstrated system level integration of hardware subsystems, while evaluating software programs to be used later. Test results were 12 successful, 2 partially successful, and 2 unsuccessful.

The second phase of the Safeguard test program, which contained about 40 planned missions, began in the fall of 1971. As of June 30, 1972, 12 tests, all successful, had been conducted. These included both Spartan and Sprint intercepts of target re-entry vehicles launched by intercontinental ballistic missile and sea-launched ballistic missile type boosters.

Prior to May 26, 1972, planning for the Safeguard program had been directed toward a twelve-site deployment. Of these twelve sites, Congress had approved full deployment of two sites (Grand Forks, North Dakota, and Malmstrom, Montana) and had authorized advanced preparation of two others (Whiteman, Missouri, and Warren, Wyoming).

Construction on the first two Safeguard sites at Grand Forks and Malmstrom Air Force Bases had proceeded well. As of June 30, 1972, at Grand Forks the installation was 88 percent complete over-all, and at Malmstrom about 12 percent complete. Production of the operational Spartan and Sprint missiles to be deployed was under way.

Even though deployment was restricted to only four of the initially planned twelve sites, the Safeguard System appeared to have a significant effect on the Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) negotiations before May 1972. Without the defense offered by Safeguard, the Soviet offensive momentum would be unconstrained within the foreseeable future and would provide no hope for reaching an agreement to limit offensive and defensive weapons. Under such climate, the Strategic Arms Limitation negotiations proceeded throughout most of fiscal year 1972, culminating in a meaningful defensive arms agreement a month before the close of the year.

The proposal to continue with a moderate deployment was announced early in 1971 by the Secretary of Defense and recommended to Congress. It provided for continued construction at the Grand Forks,

North Dakota, and Malmstrom, Montana, complexes; beginning construction at the site of Whiteman AFB, Missouri, as authorized in the fiscal year 1971 budget; and initial steps toward deployment of a fourth site at either Warren AFB, Wyoming, or in the Washington, D.C., area. In November 1971, Congress authorized continuance of the deployment at Grand Forks and Malmstrom. Also authorized was advanced preparation at the third site, Whiteman, and the fourth site, Warren, for 1972. No authorization was given for the Washington, D.C., area beyond study of component configuration for a National Command Authorities (NCA) defense system.

On February 17, 1972, the Secretary of Defense outlined the fiscal year 1973 Safeguard program being presented to the Congress. The Army was to proceed with the planned deployment at the four Minuteman ICBM sites; continue with area defense research and development under Safeguard and the advanced ballistic missile defense program; initiate advanced preparation for defense of the NCA at Washington, D.C.; and continue with the site defense program. While the Congress was considering the fiscal year 1973 Safeguard program, President Nixon visited Moscow and on May 26, 1972, the Treaty on Limitations of Antiballistic Missiles (ABM Treaty) between the United States and the Soviet Union was signed. When the fiscal year 1973 budget was prepared, the outcome of SALT was not yet known, and thus the problem of funding both the ongoing .Safeguard deployment program and the site defense research and development program had to be resolved. As a result, the site defense schedule was deliberately slowed, holding the fiscal year 1973 fund request to a minimum needed for continued deployment. With the curtailment of the Safeguard program under the ABM Treaty, the Secretary of Defense proposed that the site defense program be brought back to a normal schedule which would provide for earlier availability of developmental hardware, earlier development of software, and earlier test and demonstration.

By 1970, it was evident that, with continued qualitative improvements in Soviet technology, the threat to the Minuteman force in the last half of the 1970s might grow to a level beyond the capabilities of Safeguard defense. For this reason, in 1971 the Secretary of Defense tasked the Army to initiate a prototype demonstration program for site defense (then called Hardsite) as a hedge against the need to deploy responsively a strategically significant terminal defense of U.S. ICBM retaliatory forces. Each module of the site defense system will use a modified Safeguard Sprint interceptor; the radar, when compared to the missile site radar, will be smaller; and the data processor will be an adaptation of a commercial data processor.

Safeguard System Manager. A system engineering and technical assistance contractor was competitively selected, and a prime contract for the prototype demonstration program was awarded in February 1972.

On the same date that the ABM treaty with the Soviet Union was announced, the Secretary of Defense directed certain immediate implementing actions, with the proviso that no irreversible steps be taken. These included suspension, on May 27, 1972, of construction of the Safeguard site at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana; continuation as planned of the Safeguard deployment at Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota; suspension of all future work at the remaining Safeguard site; initiation of planning to cancel the twelve-site Safeguard program and to deploy an ABM defense of the National Command Authorities (NCA) at Washington, D.C., within the provisions of the ABM treaty, on the fastest reasonable schedule (the configuration of the NCA defense would be selected prior to treaty ratification); suspension of all ABM research and development programs prohibited by the treaty; and beginning preparation for dismantling the Malmstrom site to commence on the date of exchange of instruments of ratification. Because of the ABM Treaty limitations, the fiscal year 1973 Safeguard program was reoriented and in June 1972 a modified program was submitted to Congress. This program called for authorization to continue work at the Safeguard site in North Dakota and to begin advanced preparation (but not construction) for the NCA site.

On June 10, 1972, the President submitted to the Senate the treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems. Under the terms, each country was limited to two widely separate deployment areas -one for the defense of the national capital, the other for the defense of ICBMs. The provisions of the treaty were subject to ratification by the Senate. As of June 30, this had not yet occurred.

In order to ease the impact of the Safeguard deployment in communities around Grand Forks, North Dakota, and Great Falls, Montana, the fiscal year 1971 Military Construction Authorization Act authorized the Secretary of Defense, under certain circumstances, to supplement community assistance funds available from existing federal programs. The authority subsequently was delegated to the Safeguard System Manager.

Three key determinations had to be made before granting assistance: (1) that there was an immediate and substantial increase in the need for community service or facilities; (2) that the increase in need was a direct result of work in connection with the construction, installation, testing, and operation of the Safeguard System; and (3) that the com-

munity incurred an unfair and excessive financial burden as a result of the increased need.

The fiscal year 1971 Military Construction Appropriation Bill appropriated $11.8 million for such assistance in fiscal year 1971, and an additional $5.2 million was appropriated in the fiscal year 1972 budget; $26.0 million has been requested in fiscal year 1973.

The communities applied for supplemental Safeguard assistance through the existing program of the appropriate federal agency.

As of June 30, 1972, 134 community impact assistance requests, totaling $18,070,136 had been received from nine administering federal departments or agencies. Twenty-nine were under review and 105 had been processed, resulting in the transfer of $8,825,737 in assistance funds to the administering federal departments. The approved projects for Montana amounted to $3,206,310, while those for North Dakota amounted to $5,619,427. All requests which were disapproved failed to meet one or more aspects of the statutory criteria which govern the administration of Safeguard community impact funds.

Congressional supporters pointed throughout the year to the orderly progress of the system's limited deployment and held that it added credibility to the U.S. deterrent. Furthermore, they felt that the Safeguard ballistic missile defense program continued to provide leverage for use during the SALT negotiations, which in fact proved successful in May 1972.

The program nevertheless was revised by Congress at the end of the year. As a result of the SALT agreement, the June 30 amendment to the budget (House Document 92-321) included decreases in the funds requested for Safeguard totaling $705 million for a revised total request for new obligational authority of $890.4 million. This amendment also proposed the use of $60 million of prior year funds for the fiscal year 1973 research and development program.

The review program of $950.4 million ($890.4 million in new obligational authority and the use of prior year funds in the amount of $60 million) included $644.8 million for the continuation of development and deployment at the Grand Forks, North Dakota, site and $245.6 million for the National Command Authority (Washington, D.C.) site.

As a result of a November 1971 review of the system development plan for the SAM-D surface to air missile project, and the completion in February 1972 of advanced development objectives, a contract was signed on March 31, 1972, for engineering, development. This will cover design, fabrication, and checkout of the SAM-D's tactical hardware.

equipment continued during the year. Reliability demonstration tests conducted at the White Sands Missile Range were highly successful. Production contracts were negotiated and the Continental Army Command started advanced school training for the Hawk at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, and Fort Bliss, Texas. Production and operational tests and evaluation were begun in May 1972.

The Stinger, a replacement for the Redeye man-portable air defense system, was also approved for entry into engineering development during fiscal year 1972 and system development was under way as the year closed.

The TOW, a tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-command link guided missile, was first deployed to tactical units in late 1970. This heavy antitank and assault weapon has a high reliability and accuracy performance and is capable of knocking out the heaviest known armored vehicle. In 1972 it was deployed to Vietnam to assist in countering the North Vietnamese invasion. That invasion in late March 1972 represented the first introduction by the enemy of significant numbers of tanks. To counter it, the United States sent several aerial antitank systems to Vietnam. The first deployment consisted of two UH-1B Huey helicopters with TOW missiles. These two aircraft, with sixteen flight and maintenance crew members, departed for Vietnam on April 21, 1972. The personnel, who had trained with the TOW and conducted operational tests with the helicopters at Hunter Liggett Military Reservation in California and Fort Lewis in Washington, were placed on sixty days' temporary duty to train U.S. personnel in Vietnam in systems operation.

The TOW missile proved to be a highly successful antitank weapon for aerial delivery. To augment the airborne TOW, the Army also deployed six UH-1C helicopters equipped with the M22 (SS-11 antitank missile) weapons systems, and these arrived in Vietnam on May 6, 1972. A third system, an improved version of the standard 2.75-inch Folding Fin Aerial Rocket (FFAR) with a dual purpose warhead was also deployed to Vietnam; it is fired from the UH-1C/M and AH-IG Cobra and contains a shaped charge for armor penetration in addition to the normal high explosive and fragmenting antipersonnel steel case. The FFAR was initially employed at An Loc and in the Quang Tri area and accounted for fifteen tanks by the end of June. The UH-1B/ TOW helicopters were employed, with exceptional results, in the Kontum-Pleiku area. Of 81 combat firings, 65 were direct hits, and 24 tanks were destroyed. Also hit were bunkers, artillery pieces, a 23-mm. antiaircraft weapon, bridges, a petroleum dump, an ammunition dump, armored personnel carriers, and several trucks. The high point came on May 26 when the UH-1B/TOW destroyed ten of

twelve tanks assaulting Kontum city. The six UH-1 M aircraft, operating in the northern military region, accounted for three tanks.

On April 12, 1972, United States Army pilots, flying the Army's CH-54B "Sky Crane" helicopter, established a number of world aviation records. All flights were observed and monitored by officials of the National Aeronautics Association, representing the Federation Aeronautique Internationale:

Record	Previous Record and Holder	New Record and Pilot
Maximum Altitude	9,682 feet	10,850 feet
15,000 kilogram payload	USSR	CWO-3 Daniel Spivey
Time to climb to 3,000 meters	1 minute 38.32 seconds United States	1 minute 21.9 seconds Major John Henderson
Time to climb to 6,000 meters	3 minutes 32.83 seconds United States	2 minutes 58.8 seconds Major Henderson

The Army's limited ability to acquire targets is presently the single largest deficiency in tactical warfare. A key element in upgrading this capability is the development of an aerial scout helicopter. The technology now exists and the Aerial Scout Program is capitalizing on this by competitively testing significant improvements to the current light observation helicopters (OH-58 and OH-6).

The Army sees the Aerial Scout as a true prototype exercise intended to stimulate industry in developing night vision devices and precise navigation equipment. Prototypes in this program will possess an extended target acquisition range capability by means of a long-range stabilized optical subsystem for the observer, improved position location through use of a computerized navigation system, improved survivability by reducing aural, visual, radar, and infrared signatures, and an improved flight performance capability derived from a larger engine to provide compatibility with attack helicopters. The prime contractors for the aircraft are limited to Bell Helicopter Company and Hughes Tool Company. Texas Instruments Company and Hughes Aircraft Company are under contract to provide improved target acquisition and navigation sensors.

In late April 1972, North Vietnam's armed forces introduced into the fighting in South Vietnam an infrared heat-seeking missile. At the time, U.S. Army aircraft had no infrared countermeasures, nor were any in production. But based upon a research and development project that was in being, the Army was able to go into immediate production. Countermeasure kits were produced and the first were being delivered within forty-five days.

Congressional interest in the Army's attack helicopter program was intense because of interservice implications, program costs, and past technological difficulties. As evidenced by past authorizations and appropriations for the AH-1G Cobra, Congress recognized the Army's requirement for an attack helicopter; however, the need for an advanced attack helicopter such as the AH-56A Cheyenne was questioned.

There were concerns about interservice rivalry for the close air support role and assumed duplication with U.S. Air Force fighter aircraft. This issue, raised by the House Appropriations Committee in 1970, resulted in the Packard Close Air Support Study of 1971. The Army, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, consider the fighter-bomber and attack helicopter as complementary weapons systems, a position stated in the study.

There are charges that the helicopter is vulnerable to a sophisticated enemy; these originated from previous Air Force testimony which attributed Army tactical success in Vietnam to what was called a "benign environment." While the environment above 1,500 feet could be called permissive, that below 1,500 feet and in battle areas was hostile. This is the air space in which the Army aircraft operate, and it may be compared to mid-intensity conflict. In a mid-intensity conflict, it is expected that hostile fire below 1,500 feet may be two or three times as great as in Vietnam, with correspondingly higher losses. However, the area above 1,500 feet where fixed wing aircraft must operate will become extremely hazardous due to surface-to-air missiles and radar controlled antiaircraft guns. Attack helicopter losses in Vietnam per flying hour and per sortie are less than the losses of jet fighters in South Vietnam. Thus experience in Vietnam indicates that the helicopter has a high probability of surviving in mid-intensity conflict, while there is serious question concerning the survivability of fixed wing aircraft.

The production unit cost of the Cheyenne has caused concern both inside and outside the Army. The advertised low cost of the AX, an aircraft the U.S. Air Force is developing to provide close air support, combined with the existing inventory of Cobras, has frequently been used as a basis for opposing the development of the Cheyenne.

Thus, prior to making a production decision on the Cheyenne, the Army is evaluating its advanced attack helicopter requirement. In addition to the Cheyenne, the capabilities of two industry-sponsored aircraft, the Bell King Cobra and the Sikorsky Blackhawk, are being considered. The former is an outgrowth of Bell's combat-proven AH-1G, the latter a new gunship utilizing Sikorsky's proven dynamics components from the S-61 program. The evaluation is based on both flight test and analytical data. It is scheduled to be completed by July 31,

1972, and will provide the basis for a major program decision prior to submission of the fiscal year 1974 budget.

The availability of AH-1G Cobra aircraft was a prime consideration in the development of force structure and procurement quantities for an advanced attack helicopter. The planned attack helicopter force will be a mix of Cobra, Cobra/TOW, and the advanced attack helicopter. Toward this end, the Army initiated a program to equip 200 Cobra aircraft with the aerial TOW missile system. The Cobra/TOW does not provide the load-carrying and round-the-clock capabilities offered by the advanced attack helicopter. It does represent, however, an efficient utilization of available assets and the earliest opportunity for fielding an antiarmor capability: After the advanced attack helicopter is introduced, the Cobra/TOW will complement the new system and continue in use in a less demanding role.

The funds required to develop the improved AH-1G were released by Congress on July 22, 1971, and the letter initiating the program was released the next day.

In March 1972, a research-development-test-evaluation contract was let to the Bell Helicopter Company for the integration of the TOW missile system on the AH-1G Cobra. Eight prototype systems are to be delivered to the Army; the first integrated AH-1G is to be available in January 1973. In June 1972, plans were made to accelerate the Cobra/TOW production contract award date.

Training simulation provides a capability to train realistically without wear and tear on actual equipment. In recent years, technology has provided a means to simulate actual flights in ground equipment that has the feel and sensation of actual flight. The trainer, which is a reproduction of a cockpit, its controls, and its instrumentation, saves operation and maintenance cost and is not subject to the uncertainties of weather. To capitalize on such training benefits, a program was established to equip the Army on an area basis with simulators. Initial procurement will be tested at the U.S. Army Aviation School at Fort Rucker, Alabama. The first Synthetic Flight Training System (SFTS) is designed for instrument and standardization training, to include emergency procedures.

Current plans call for a three-phase sequential development. The first involves a UH-1H unit with a four-cockpit simulation facility tied to a single master control panel. Next will be a CH-47C Operational Flight Trainer with one cockpit and a visual device. An AH-1G Cobra/TOW simulator will follow.

vehicle fleet and the need to manage it carefully, especially in a period of austere budgets and competing demands, particular attention was centered on it in fiscal year 1972. A Tactical Vehicle Review Board (TVRB) studied the subject and recommended a reduction of more than 17,000 tactical vehicles, a recommendation approved in February 1972. During the same month, a Special Analysis of Wheeled Vehicles (WHEELS) Study Group was formed to reduce the qualitative and quantitative requirements of the tactical vehicle fleet to minimum essential levels; to improve acquisition procedures; consider expanded use of commercial vehicles; and improve the management of the wheeled vehicle fleet. At the end of the first phase of the study in April 1972, the group estimated that wheeled vehicle requirements could be reduced by about 25 percent (100,000 vehicles) inclusive of those reductions already identified by TVRB.

Also during the fiscal year the Army began to procure commercial construction models to improve the equipment of engineer construction organizations. It is anticipated that commercial designs will be less costly than the military designs previously procured, will facilitate procurement and repair parts support, and will permit the Army to take advantage of commercial experience. The first contracts were awarded for 20-ton dump trucks and 1,500-gallon bituminous distributors. Other items will be added on a continuing basis.

In the field of armor vehicles, Congress in December 1971 directed that the XM803 main battle tank program be terminated but appropriated $20 million in fiscal year 1972 funds for a new tank prototype development, stressing that the new tank should be less complex, less sophisticated, and less costly, while taking advantage of technology from the XM803 program. It was further emphasized that it should not be a "warmed-over" XM803. The MBT70/XM803 program, it may be noted, cost $305.1 million, including termination expenses. A main battle tank team was formed in January 1972 under the supervision of the Commander of the U.S. Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, Kentucky, to establish requirements and characteristics for a new main battle tank.

In the Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle (MICV) program, transition into engineering development was reviewed, a concept paper was signed, and the Secretary of Defense approved development by one, contractor. Requests for contract proposals were released in April 1972; responses are due in September 1972.

In October 1971 a developmental concept paper for the Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle (ARSV) was also approved by the Secretary of Defense and contract proposals released to industry. Six contractors responded, three with track and three with wheel concepts.

On April 10, 1972, the United States signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. The convention provides that the parties undertake not to develop, produce, stockpile, acquire, or retain biological agents or toxins of types and in quantities that have no justification for peaceful purposes, as well as weapons, equipment, and means of delivery designed to use such agents for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. This convention codified for the international community of states party to the treaty the unilateral actions previously taken by the United States. It is the first international agreement since World War II to provide for the actual elimination of an entire class of weapons from the arsenals of nations.

It is expected that the safe destruction of biological and toxin stocks in this country will be completed by the end of 1972. All of the stocks at the Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas have already been destroyed; the former biological warfare facility there is now a new national center for research on the adverse effects of chemical substances in man's environment. The former Army biological research facility at Fort Detrick, Maryland, will be a center for cancer research.

Article IX of the convention reaffirms the objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and contains an undertaking to continue negotiations with a view to reaching an early agreement on effective measures to eliminate such weapons.

In addition to the disposal of biological agents and weapons at Pine Bluff, anticrop biological agents held at Beale Air Force Base, California, also had to be processed. Disposal began in August 1971 and was completed on March 9, 1972; incinerated residue was disked into the soil under the eyes of representatives of the California Department of Agriculture. A cover crop of millet was planted and the site was cleared and returned to air base control.

Disposal of anticrop biological agents at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colorado, initiated on August 2, 1971, continued through the year. By February 26, 1972, deactivation of the agent had been completed without incident and incineration of the inactive residue was in progress. It is anticipated that this will be completed by November 1972.

At the close of fiscal year 1972, a method for disposal of waste from the Fort Detrick anticrop disposal operation had not been de-

termined. The disposal plan had envisioned the use of the sewage disposal system with discharge, following treatment, into the Monocacy River. The State of Maryland and the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments objected and recommended incineration as employed at Rocky Mountain and Beale. On September 11, 1971, the Environmental Protection Agency advised that their review of the plan indicated that no detrimental effects would result from the planned use of the sewage treatment plant; however, in view of the position taken by area jurisdictions, incineration of the residue was recommended. The Department of the Army approved the procedures as used at the western locations. Materials were deactivated during the last half of the fiscal year, and it was expected that incineration would be completed by November 1972.

In connection with disposal operations, the Army requested a four-year Navy-conducted surveillance program to ascertain whether there were any ecological problems connected with the disposal at sea in August 1970 (Operation Chase) of obsolete chemical munitions. At the half-way point, no traces of nerve gas had been discovered and there was no evidence to indicate deterioration of animal life in the vicinity of the scuttled ship.

Efforts continued through fiscal year 1972 to implement the concept of a combined tactical and nuclear proficiency exercise. In November 1971 a departmental representative attended an initial Army training test at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; in December the Continental Army Command recommended that a concept for a test involving the 155-mm. weapon system be approved. This was done, and in March 1972 CONARC was asked to develop final documentation for the 155-mm. system, develop and test literature and directives for the 8-inch weapon system, and develop, test, and recommend a like concept for field artillery missile and rocket units and engineer demolition munition teams.

Also during the year, an extended effort to improve and consolidate guidance concerning nuclear surety policy and guidance matured with departmental approval of a new regulation prescribing policy and procedures affecting nuclear weapons surety. The new document supersedes six former regulations and consolidates such matters in a single source.

An Atomic Energy Officer Program was established in 1953 to provide a corps of trained officers in functional areas of research and development, operations, doctrine, training, logistics, and effects which pertain to atomic energy. In fiscal year 1972, a consultant board that addresses matters in this field concentrated upon increasing the program membership to meet an objective of 272 officers, and making

the program more attractive to atomic energy personnel and more useful to the Army. A recruiting program brought the membership up to 221, the highest in six years, and the consultant board took a number of actions to refine personnel requirements and make members better informed.

Go to:
Previous Chapter	Next Chapter

	Return to CMH Online
	Last updated 27 August 2004